



Pragmatic Markers in Oral Narrative

Montserrat González



Pragmatic Markers in Oral Narrative

Pragmatics & Beyond New Series

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Pragmatic Markers in Oral Narrative: The case of English and Catalan
by Montserrat González

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The case of English and Catalan

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To Maria Condom Ginestera
In Memoriam

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This study deals with the use of pragmatic markers in English and Catalan oral narrative (Labov and Waletzky 1967), a monologued text-genre that presents a regular structural pattern. The main aim is to try to show that pragmatic markers play a decisive role in the telling of the events. In order to be able to cope their significance within the text, the overall structure of English and Catalan narratives is also going to be analyzed and compared.

Pragmatic markers are polyfunctional cues that predicate changes in the speaker's cognition, attitudes, and beliefs and facilitate the transmission of illocutionary force and intentions. They are a feature of oral rather than written discourse. The speaker makes use of them to organize, recover, reformulate and segment the information provided to the hearer. However, narrowing down the domain of markers is not an easy task. Nor is proving all of the above. The literature tells us that pragmatic markers are typical conversational cues. A general claim is also that their use is basically restricted to playing for time to think or/and to letting the interlocutor know that the communicative channel is open. These two rather open functions allow some scholars to refer to pragmatic markers as 'fillers', 'mots crossa', 'omplidors' and 'falques' (in Catalan), or 'muletillas' and 'expletivos' (in Spanish), without exploring further specific traits. Pragmatic markers do have an intrinsic meaning in speech and are not mere fillers of empty spaces. They have a meaning related to the sort of coherence relation they set up with preceding and following propositions and to the pragmatic discourse structure: to the rhetorical, sequential, and inferential components. Due to the grammaticalization process that they have gone through, some of these units still keep some traits that belong to the ideational structure, directly related to the ideas described in the text-world. The coming discussion and empirical analysis will prove that the richness of these lexical units lies in their procedural meaning, which, in some instances, is tightly bound to their referential meaning.

I will try to provide evidence that pragmatic markers are not arbitrarily used in oral speech but are context and genre-dependent. This observation links with my main hypothesis, that is, that markers in oral narratives show semantic-pragmatic traits that make them appropriate for their use in specific narrative segments. Hence, when a narrator starts the telling of a past personal experience (a situation of

danger, in this particular case), s/he does not make use of *any* marker, but of one that has a core structural function that permits the framing of the story; similarly, when internal evaluation is embedded within the account, a marker whose functions allow for the sharing of common ground and beliefs will follow. Finally, during the development of the action, markers whose referential meaning makes them useful for the temporal sequencing of the events will mostly be used.

It will be seen that both English and Catalan narrators will use pragmatic markers to help the hearer ‘visualize’ the event vividly, as a real experience that has in fact taken place, different from a fiction story in a literary book. If we take into account that “narratives are usually told in answer to some stimulus from outside, and to establish some point of personal interest” (Labov and Waletzky 1967), we will fully understand the importance of linguistic devices that, without conveying any significant meaning in semantic or grammatical terms, carry out a function which turns out to be fundamental for the full understanding of the story and, what is more important, for the narrator’s purpose, that is, show the listener that he *really* was in a situation of danger. In this respect, we can refer to pragmatic markers not only as linguistic devices that help the storyteller go through his personal experience at length, but also as tools that are used to convey the force that his/her words need to convince the listener, not present at the time of the event, that something important took place and that the story *has* a point and is, therefore, worth listening to. In Labov and Waletzky’s words (Labov and Waletzky 1967), “he [the narrator] finds himself in a position where he must demonstrate to the listener that he really was in danger. The more vivid and real the danger appears, the more effective the narrative”. In this respect, it is proposed that some pragmatic markers must be considered *intensifiers*, a term coined by Labov to define one sort of *evaluative element* that the narrator uses to show his/her perspective (Labov 1972b: 378). An *intensifier* is a linguistic or paralinguistic device that the narrator uses to strengthen or intensify one of the events taking place in the narrative. As opposed to the other three types of evaluative elements (*comparators*, *correlatives* and *explications*), intensifiers do not interfere in the basic narrative syntax. Gestures, expressive phonology, quantifiers, repetition and ritual utterances are those listed by Labov (1972b: 378). The reason why these elements are called *evaluative* is because the print of the narrator is overtly shown through them in any part of the narrative.

The aforementioned proposal also involves adding one more element to Labov’s list of intensifiers, which I consider are linguistic and non-linguistic devices that carry a clear pragmatic function that help sustain the pragmatic structure of the narrative. As previously stated, these units belong to the evaluative elements that the narrator uses to show a personal perspective. The term *evaluative* is clearly related to the *evaluation* stage of the narrative, “a secondary structure which is concentrated in the evaluation section but may be found in various forms throughout the narrative”

(Labov 1972b: 369). The evaluation of the narrative is what conveys the point of the story, its *raison d'être*, that is, the reason why it was told and what the narrator is getting at. Thus, when finishing a narrative, a good narrator will never hear the listener or listeners say: "So what?" but instead, "he did?" (Labov 1972b: 366). This sort of expectancy on the listener's part is conveyed through the evaluative linguistic and paralinguistic devices that say to us: "this was terrifying, dangerous, weird, wild, crazy; or amusing, hilarious, wonderful; more generally, that it was strange, uncommon, or unusual — that is, worth reporting. It was not ordinary, plain, humdrum, everyday, or run-of-the mill" (Labov 1972b: 371). Pragmatic markers in narrative are evaluative devices that *do* carry all that force, not necessarily because of its full descriptive content, but because of its pragmatic functions, which are context-dependent. Thus, it is neither to the grammatical nor to the semantic content of the narrative that the above quotation refers; it is the narrator's attitude towards the events that s/he is reporting by the telling of the story of his/her personal experience.

Considering that most studies on pragmatic markers are based on conversational discourse, a study such as this one is meant as a contribution to the understanding of the role of pragmatic discourse markers in a specific text-genre that takes the form of spontaneous oral monologue. The point made is that the apparent null function of markers is not such on a genre which requires not only an ideational structure but a solid pragmatic one.

The content of this book has been divided in two parts. The first part provides the theoretical and methodological framework of the study. It presents and discusses those general concepts that do not always have a unique reading and therefore require some clarification. This first part includes Chapters 2, 3 and 4. In Chapter 2, terms such as *text*, *discourse*, and *context* are discussed. A definition of their use in this particular work follows. Chapter 2 also includes the explanation of the text-genre of the database, oral narrative of personal experience, following Labov's model (1972). This involves the definition of narrative and its overall structure, as well as the evaluative elements that Labov proposes. A final recapitulation sums up the most relevant points to bear in mind, which is necessary for the framing of the variable under analysis, that is, pragmatic discourse markers, which are discussed in the following chapter.

Chapter 3 accounts for the role that pragmatic markers play in discourse structure and in coherence relations. Taking the notion of *source of coherence* (Sanders et al. 1993, Sanders 1997) as point of departure, it is argued that these linguistic cues set up pragmatic (versus semantic) coherence relations. According to Sanders, "a relation is pragmatic if the discourse segments are related because of the illocutionary meaning of one or both of the segments. In pragmatic relations the CR [coherence relation] concerns the speech act status of the segments." (1997: 122). I sustain that, if the relation that they specify is pragmatic, their

presence can be accounted for through the pragmatic discourse structure components, rhetorical and sequential in particular (Redeker 1990, 1991). From this argumentative line, their role in the narrative text-genre and the significance of linguistic boundary marking is considered. The relevance of discourse markers is argued, at length, in proposals that, to the author's understanding, follow two mainstream views: one that approaches them as pieces that function at distinct discourse planes and, ultimately, as structural pieces, and another that views their role in cognitive-interpretive terms. An intersection of the models belonging to these two approaches will allow for a proposal of an alternative model that may account for their presence in the oral monologued text-genre under analysis. Chapter 3 also deals with the actual use of pragmatic markers in oral narrative and proposes an integration of their functions in a discourse coherence model. The branching of functions into the distinct structural components (ideational, rhetorical, sequential, and inferential) will provide a sound basis for the study of particular English and Catalan markers. Chapter 4, which bridges the gap between part I and part II, from theory to empirical analysis, includes the general aims and hypotheses, information on the corpus and the informants, the methodology used and, finally, the way the transcription and coding of data were done.¹

Part II includes the rest of the chapters, from 5 to 8, which are devoted to the discussion of pragmatic markers found in English and Catalan narratives and their formal and functional similarities and differences. The detailed study of English and Catalan markers will be done in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 deals with the English markers *well, so, then, I mean, you know* and *anyway*. Chapter 6 deals with the Catalan markers *bé, bueno, clar, doncs, pues, llavors, aleshores, no* and *eh*. At the end of both chapters, the phenomenon of marker pairing, a linguistic phenomenon which has barely been touched on in the literature dealing with the issue, is approached. The results of the empirical analysis will be contrasted and discussed in Chapter 7, following the aforementioned discourse structure branching into ideational, rhetorical, sequential, and inferential components. From that point, a form-function English and Catalan contrast of pragmatic markers, signalling lexical and/or functional equivalences and distinctions will be established. Finally, Chapter 8 recapitulates the findings and points out the most significant results.

Linguistic analysis of natural language involves close observation of data, elaboration of assumptions and subsequent work on the systematicity and regularity of the pattern or variable under study. It also involves taking risks and making predictions that are not always fulfilled. But the ultimate goal of the researcher that investigates a natural language phenomenon is to prove that there is an underlying regularity in what is, apparently, a linguistic chaos of overlappings, repetitions, pauses, and unfinished sentences. I will try to provide plausible explanations that account for the presence of given structural patterns (for instance, marker pairing

or what has been named *compound pragmatic markers*) and functions performed by certain units at given parts of the narrative. My ultimate goal is to make a general contribution to the field of linguistic pragmatics, and to the subdomain of pragmatic markers in particular, bearing in mind the potential applications that the findings and reflections may have for those studying the areas of second language acquisition and translation.

PART I

Theoretical and methodological framework

CHAPTER 2

Preliminary definitions

2.1 General concepts

The study of pragmatic markers in oral narrative requires working in the field of discourse analysis. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss terminological preliminaries and concepts used in discourse analysis that are going to be referred to in this book, so as to clarify and set their use in the present study.

Discourse analysis is a vast field of study that often presents a lack of definition and precision. As pointed out by Schiffrin (1994a: 5), this is because of the great number of academic disciplines, models and methods from which this field of study has developed, ranging from linguistics to anthropology, sociology or philosophy. Prince (1988: 164) offers still another reason for the “looseness” of the term ‘discourse analysis’ when claiming that “no one theory or account of discourse has had a wide or strong enough acceptance to have an imperialistic monopoly on it.”

In this chapter, formal and functional perspectives on discourse phenomena will be considered. The reason is that the use of pragmatic markers involves taking into account the form (i.e. structure) of the text within which they are found, as well as their function (i.e. use) within the text. Theoretical implications of the terms *text*, *discourse* and *context* will be equally discussed. The aim is to clarify their features and scope in the domain of pragmatics.

2.1.1 Formal versus functional approaches to discourse

Although formal and functional approaches to discourse do not fully oppose or exclude each other, they apply a different criterion and methodology of analysis. In this section, both perspectives are discussed and the approach that the present study is going to take is determined.

Thus, whereas formal approaches tend to put more emphasis on the linguistic code and on the relationship between constituents and structures, functional approaches refer to social, cultural or communicative contexts. Nevertheless, as Leech (1983) suggests and we will see further on, to a certain extent both perspectives are not, in any case, conflicting:

“As two approaches to linguistics, formalism and functionalism tend to be associated with very different views of the nature of language... On the face of it, the two approaches are completely opposed to one another. In fact, however, each of them has a considerable amount of truth on its side. To take one point of difference: it would be foolish to deny that language is a psychological phenomenon, and equally foolish to deny that it is a social phenomenon. *Any balanced account of language has to give attention to both these aspects: the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ aspects of language. More generally, my conclusion will be that the correct approach to language is both formalist and functionalist.*”² (p.46)

In what follows, these two different approaches, which will frame the present study, are reviewed. In the formalist approach, we find disciplines that, building on linguistic structure, seek to determine the function of certain lexical pieces or discourse units. This is the case of *conversation analysis* and the *variationist approach*, which view discourse as “language above the sentence” (Schiffrin 1994a: 23).³

Conversation analysis, which follows an ethnomethodological tradition, was developed in the seventies by Goffman, Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson. It centers on the sequential structure of conversations to find the underlying discourse functions that participants establish. It subordinates the analysis of the function to the analysis of the structure in such a way that the function of a certain unit or linguistic segment can only be determined by analyzing its location in relation to the other units, that is to say, according to its sequential distribution. *Variation analysis* of discourse, as developed by Labov and Waletzky (1967) and Labov (1972b), aims at discovering the structural regularities of texts. The objective is to find out how linguistic variation (phonological, syntactic and morphological) and syntactic structure help define and form such structural regularities. Labov emphasizes the role of participants (what they say and how they pronounce an utterance) and linguistic structure. According to him, textual coherence builds upon the relationship which is established between clausal structure and the meaning of underlying actions of the utterances (relationship form-meaning). The discourse unit that Labov uses for his analysis is the oral narrative of personal experiences (*narratives*). According to the author, oral narratives offer a series of advantages that are not to be found in other discourse units: they are independent of the rest of structures that can be found in an oral exchange (a conversation, for instance), they show a functional interdependency between subunits and clauses, they reflect the narrator’s print (by means of the *evaluative stage*) and, finally, they provide social information as they come from a specific participant of a particular community. Labov’s model of oral narrative will be fully developed in the following section (2.2), since this is going to be the text-genre used to analyse pragmatic markers.

In the functionalist approach, the subdisciplines start out from function to discover structure.⁴ Consequently, discourse is viewed as “language use” (Schiffrin

1994a: 31). Such is the principle of *speech act theory*, the *ethnography of communication*, *interactional sociolinguistics*, and *pragmatics*.

Developed by two philosophers, Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), *Speech act theory* grounds its principles in speaker intention and action and in language functions. Thus, language is not just a linguistic code that describes the world, but a system whose function is to undergo certain actions that take place at the moment a speaker utters a word or segment.

The *ethnography of communication* has its roots in anthropology. Hymes (1971) introduced the notion of *communicative competence* as a reaction to what he considered was a static vision of language, so far provided by formalist linguists (specifically, Chomsky's vision of language as an abstract knowledge of a series of rules).⁵ According to Hymes, language should be studied in a socio-cultural context, as a communicative tool used by speakers.⁶

Interactional sociolinguistics builds upon the fields of anthropology, sociology and linguistics. Language is socially and culturally contextualized. Gumperz (1982a) shows how people from different cultural backgrounds, who share a unique grammatical knowledge of a language, contextualize a message differently and get different messages. Interpretation and interaction depend, therefore, on the relationship between social and linguistic meanings. Goffman (1981) and his followers provide another sociolinguistic point of view; in this case, language is studied as a reflection of a specific context and social circumstance.

Finally, *pragmatics*, whose scope as an area of inquiry is extremely wide,⁷ views language as a phenomenon whose main constructs are located outside of language, in speaker meaning or intention and in rational communicative principles, i.e. the *cooperative principle*.⁸ According to Levinson, pragmatics is "the study of those relations between language and context that are grammaticalized, or encoded in the structure of language" (1983: 9). Gricean pragmatics (Grice 1975) breaks with the notion of literal meaning (referential, truth-conditionally based) to step into what the philosopher calls inferred meaning, that is to say, a series of assumptions made by the listener to discover the underlying meaning of the speaker's message. Then, communication will be possible not just because of a shared code, linguistic structures and referential meanings, but because of a speaker-listener cognitive process to make use of a context that will allow a range of inferences. Grice's cooperative principle is formed by four maxims or major norms of cooperation: relevance, truthfulness, quantity, and clarity.

Nevertheless, pragmatic phenomena in language can be treated and, therefore, understood from different perspectives, from a linguistic and thus formal approach, to an applied one, depending mainly on the aspect of language on which we wish to focus. Although it could be argued that, to a certain extent, choosing a particular approach might not be of vital importance if we take into consideration that both

perspectives, formal and functional, often converge and nurture each other,⁹ as Schiffrin's approach shows (1994a: 361), in agreement with Vallduví (1992) pragmatics, as an area of linguistic inquiry, must have its different subdomains of inquiry narrowed down:

“if we want to gain insight into the pragmatic end of language, plausible subdomains of inquiry must be teased apart and their role in the linguistic system and its relationship with other better-known areas of linguistic competence must be studied.” (1992: 9)¹⁰

Vallduví's claim makes full sense when he asserts that whereas linguistic competence is fully reflected in clearly delimited linguistic areas of inquiry such as semantics, syntax, morphology or phonology, the area of pragmatics presents blurred limits within which a variety of phenomena seem to fit, from illocutionary acts, to reference, implicature, information packaging or discourse structure; certainly, the cognitive mechanisms and processes that account for a certain pragmatic subfield do not necessarily apply to them all (Vallduví 1992: 11).

Moreover, there is another important aspect to bear in mind. As it will be argued in the following section, the notion of *context* included in the definition of pragmatics can be understood very broadly since it implies any extralinguistic element that can affect the linguistic structure or semantics of language production. From a situational to a cognitive and linguistic context, taking one or other perspective implies working from a social, psychological or linguistic aspect of language.

The present study is framed in the pragmatic subdomain of discourse structure, adopting Levinson's view of discourse pragmatics, that is, *context* that is “encoded in the structure of language”. I will also follow Gricean pragmatics of inferred meanings. As mentioned above, according to Grice (1975), there are pragmatic mechanisms that operate above logic: the cooperative principle facilitates the bridge between truth-based logical semantics and natural language operators.

The first argument held in this work is that pragmatic markers in oral narratives are linguistic devices that signal the speaker's intention, convey the required illocutionary force to the segments, and facilitate the shifting onto the narrative structural realms (sequential, ideational, rhetorical and inferential). In addition, even though they do not have a fully established syntactic and semantic role in the overall structure of the narrative, they have a clear distinctive function in its pragmatic structure, fully reflected in the discourse structure. Following Gricean pragmatics, these lexical pieces facilitate the inferences and, thus, help the listener interpret the message intended by the speaker. In this respect, they fulfil a functional task.

Nevertheless, the text-genre within which these elements are framed — Labov's narrative — is a genre that shows structural regularities at both discourse

and clause levels. As noted above, Labov (1972b) suggests that textual coherence is built upon the relationship between clausal structure and the meaning of underlying actions of the utterances. Accordingly, the second argument is that pragmatic markers help construct the bridge between structure (form) and meaning (not truth-based but inferred) by showing a regular sequential distribution across and within segments or discourse units. In this respect, this study takes a formalist approach since it follows the line of research on discourse structure developed mainly by Redeker (1990, 1991), Grosz and Sidner (1986), Grosz, Pollack and Sidner (1989) and Polanyi (1985b, 1986, 1988). Thus, following this line of inquiry, it can be concluded that discourse markers, or *cue phrases* (as labelled by the above mentioned authors), do not contribute to the semantics of the discourse *per se*, but “convey information about the structure of the discourse containing the utterance.” (Grosz, Pollack and Sidner 1989: 443):

“There are many cases in which it is quite possible to determine the structure of a discourse, or a portion of one, that lacks any cue phrases. Likewise there are many discourses, or portions thereof, containing cue phrases that only suggest the underlying structure or, put another way, provide constraints on the range of possible structures. *Ultimately the structure of a discourse depends on the information conveyed by the utterances it comprises and the way in which that information is interconnected. Cue phrases simplify the task of determining those connections.* It has been shown that the process of determination of intersentential semantic relationships (Cohen 1984) and plan recognition (Litman and Allen 1988) can be constrained by taking into account cue phrases.” (Grosz, Pollack and Sidner 1989: 444)¹¹

The role of pragmatic markers on discourse structure will be fully developed in Chapter 3, when proposals of discourse coherence models will be reviewed.

2.1.2 Text and discourse

A narrative is oral discourse, but it is also a text structure. What do we understand by *discourse* and *text*? Does the term *discourse* always imply oral production? Is *text* always a written product? In this section, it will be observed that there is not an agreement among authors. Both terms will be discussed and their use determined.

Following the formalism-functionalism dichotomy noted above, within the discourse field we find the terms *text* and *discourse*, which also seem to follow such a criterion, though not systematically. Both approaches agree that traditional grammar does not always provide a satisfactory explanation for certain semantic and pragmatic linguistic phenomena and that, consequently, there is a need for suprasentential analysis.¹² However, they do not always agree on the register — oral or written — to which they can be applied, or on the theoretical framework — *text linguistics* or *discourse analysis* — within which they are to be placed. As Coulthard points out:

“Labels are always difficult; I have chosen to maintain a distinction between spoken *discourse* and written *text*, but this is by no means a universally accepted distinction; many German writers use ‘text’ to refer to speech as well, while Hoey (1983) and Widdowson (*passim*) use ‘discourse’ to refer to writing, and to complicate matters further ‘pragmatics’ as defined by Leech (1983) and Levinson (1983) overlaps substantially with discourse analysis as I conceive it.” (1977: 3)

Apparently, there is a relationship between two methodological schools and two distinct research interests: *text linguistics*, that follows the written tradition, and *discourse analysis*, that follows the oral one. Thus, whereas the former is methodologically focused on theoretical models and competence data, the latter is methodologically descriptive and centers its attention on data related to performance. The connection with a more or less formal or functional approach can be easily made: those authors who work with written material and follow the text linguistics school adopt a formal approach; those who follow the oral tradition and apply the discourse analysis techniques take a functional approach.

Linguists such as van Dijk (1977, 1978), Halliday (1973, 1976, 1985a), Beaugrande (1984) and Beaugrande and Dressler (1981), work on the sentential grammar ground to incorporate the notion of discourse *a posteriori*.¹³ Van Dijk uses the term *text* to refer to an abstract and theoretical construct, and *discourse* for its realization. The author defines the former as a unity formed by semantic *macrostructures* and superficial *superstructures* (1978: 165–166). Halliday, on the contrary, although coming from a structuralist tradition, develops the concept of function¹⁴ and concludes that a *text* is materialized *discourse*:

“text is language that is functional... that is doing some job in some context, as opposed to isolated words or sentences... It may be either spoken or written, or indeed in any other medium of expression that we like to think of... a text is made of meanings, it’s a semantic unit.” (1985b: 10)

Halliday’s definition, bridging the gap between a formalist and a functionalist perspective, takes us to those linguists who provide a fully functionalist approach to the terms under discussion. Such is the case of Brown and Yule (1983) and Widdowson (1978), among others, who differentiate *discourse-as-process* from *text-as-product*. According to Brown and Yule (1983: 23–25), the discourse analysts’ goal should be the study of the process, not of the discourse product. The text as product, point of interest of the above mentioned formalist linguists, is a static object that does not take into consideration the production and reception of the message, or the speaker’s intention.¹⁵ Widdowson (1979), instead of relating *text* and *discourse* to the product-process notion, establishes a link with the textual properties of coherence and cohesion: whereas the text shows *textual cohesion*, reflected on the lexicon, grammar and propositional development, the discourse

shows *discourse coherence*, reflected on the subjacent speech acts. Stubbs (1983: 22) makes a practical choice: he prefers to use the term *discourse* not for theoretical reasons, but because, according to him, the term *text* is related to the European *text analysis* school represented by van Dijk's work. He supports his arguments with the claim that his preferred term has the ethnomethodological tradition of *conversation analysis* undertaken by Sacks.

Interestingly enough, the apparently never-ending discussion around both terms seems useless if we take into account the origins of discourse as a rhetorical event (Albaladejo 1991: 51). In ancient Greece, *Rhetorics* didn't present any conflict between the orator's communicative activity, manifested in the *elocutio*, and the linguistic structuring of the event, the *dispositio* and *inventio*. It is highly important, then, not to ignore the origins of the discipline to fully grasp its scope in order to be able to find the intersection between both discursive (*verba*) and textual (*res*)¹⁶ visions.

Finally, Bernárdez suggests a definition of *text* that, to my understanding, considers both formal and functional aspects of language:

“*Texto* es la unidad lingüística comunicativa fundamental, producto de la actividad verbal humana, que posee siempre carácter social; está caracterizado por su cierre semántico y comunicativo, así como por su coherencia profunda y superficial, debida a la intención (comunicativa) del hablante de crear un texto íntegro, y a su estructuración mediante dos conjuntos de reglas: las propias del nivel textual y las del sistema de la lengua.” (1982: 85)

“The text is the fundamental linguistic unit, the product of human verbal activity, that always has a social character. It is characterized by its semantic and communicative closure, as well as by its deep and surface coherence, due to the speaker's (communicative) intention to create a complete text and to its structuring by means of two sets of rules: those of the textual level, and the ones that belong to the language system.”

The author claims that his definition is just a set of the properties that a *text* should include: (i) the communicative dimension (activity undertaken); (ii) the pragmatic dimension (speaker's intention, situation); and (iii) the structural dimension (those rules governing the textual level). Along the same line, Petöfi's notion of *textuality* provides a similar approach to the term:

“Textuality is, for us, not an inherent property of verbal objects. A producer or a receiver considers a verbal object to be a text if he believes that this verbal object is a connected and complete entirety meeting a real or assumed communicative intention in a real or assumed communication situation.” (1990)

Since the textual structure of the narrative covers all the features highlighted by these two authors, their view of the term *text* will be adopted for the narrative genre;

as for the notion of *discourse*, the anglosaxon functional oral tradition that views *discourse-as-process* seems to be the most appropriate one for the study of pragmatic markers, considering that they are linguistic cues that have a core procedural meaning.

2.1.3 Context

As noted above, within the discourse field this term covers a range of possibilities. Definitions such as: “A highly idealized abstraction of the communicative situation” (Van Dijk 1977: 273), “relevant aspects of the physical or social environment of an utterance” or “any background knowledge assumed to be shared by *s* and *h* and which contributes to *h*’s interpretation of what *s* means by a given utterance” (Leech 1983: 13) give us an idea of the wide scope of the term *context*. If we add Schiffrin’s notion of the term:

“Context is thus a world filled with people producing utterances: people who have social, cultural, and personal identities, knowledge, beliefs, goals and wants, and who interact with one another in various socially and culturally defined situations.” (1994a: 364)

we realize that the lack of conciseness is absolute. As we can see, there are several notions in play, from people, beliefs, social, cultural and physical environments to shared knowledge; all of them extralinguistic phenomena. Schiffrin (1994a) suggests a possible classification according to the discourse subdomain the term applies to. Thus, she determines three different types of context: (i) that related to the speaker-hearer shared knowledge; (ii) the situational context; and (iii) the textual context (1994a: 365). Choosing one or another will depend on the type of contextual information that is sought:¹⁷ whereas an ethnographic and social linguistic study will undoubtedly have to take into consideration the situational context,¹⁸ a pragmatic approach will consider the speaker-hearer shared knowledge, that is to say, the cognitive context; finally, a study which focuses on the structural regularities of a text will have to balance both, linguistic and cognitive contexts.

For the present study, I will deal with the aforementioned linguistic and cognitive notions of the term *context*. As far as the cognitive context is concerned, the study of pragmatic markers, as linguistic devices that help narrators get their point across and facilitate the assumptions and inferences made by the listener, involves taking into account the speaker-hearer shared knowledge. Grice’s (1975) *cooperative principle* and its maxims conform such context, divided in two different parts by the author: that aspect which comes from the propositional content (1) and that which comes from the implied content (conversational implicatures) (2):

- (1) “the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved”;
- (2) i. “the CP (cooperative principle) and its maxims”;
- ii. “the context, linguistic or *otherwise*, of the utterance”;
- iii. “other items of background knowledge”;
- iv. “the fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case.” (1975: 50)

As Schiffrin (1994a: 368) highlights, Grice’s *cooperative principle* makes it possible for the listener to infer the meaning of the message, first of all because of the linguistic information (1) and, secondly, because of the shared background knowledge coming from human nature and rationality (2i), from the text (2ii), from the situation (2iii), and from the world (2iv). However, as the author rightly asserts, Grice doesn’t explain how to account for the ‘background knowledge’ context (point 2iii), or for the implications of ‘*otherwise*’ (point 2ii); whereas the former could be explained in terms of *schema*, *frame* or *script*,¹⁹ the latter can be interpreted as the situation in which the speaker produces an utterance.

As for the linguistic context,²⁰ the study of pragmatic markers within a particular text-genre such as the narrative involves taking into consideration the linguistic structure that frames and supports their appearance at both textual and clausal levels of analysis. This point will be developed in the coming section.

2.2 The oral narrative as representation of experience: a text-genre

“... stories do not just emerge from events — they have to be constructed. Incidents have to be made into talk, by being appropriately prefaced, told and ended in conventional, rule-governed ways. Events have to be translated into speaking terms. Or, as Labov (1972) puts it, experience has to be transformed into narratives.” (Stubbs 1983: 26).

The study of oral narrative, as representation of experience, has been the object of analysis of many researchers in the last decades.²¹ From law to medicine, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, sociology and education, narrative analysis has become the instrument through which professionals have gone about interpreting human experience of past events. From other fields, such as linguistics, literary theory, developmental psychology and anthropology, the study has focused more on the analysis of the discourse.²²

The reason why narrative has been so widely studied has undoubtedly been its particular nature. Narrative is always concerned with and related to experience,

which implies someone's telling about something taking place in the past. This telling is addressed to a hearer that tries to understand and grasp the point of the story being told, imagining the scenes in which particular events occur and making associations with similar situations in which he, himself, might have been involved. Tannen (1988) presents storytelling as "an act of mind" in which both narrator and listener are deeply immersed in, thus sharing a universe of experience and understanding of the world: "Storytelling is a means by which humans organize and understand the world, and feel connected to it and to each other" (1988: 92).

The role of the narrator is crucial, in all this sharing of the world. Narrators of personal experiences create their own stories, filling them with assumptions and interpretations, subjectivity and self-identity: "Nature and the world do not tell stories, individuals do. Interpretation is inevitable because narratives are representations" (Riessman 1993: 2). Narratives can reflect experience (Polanyi 1985a), transform or represent experience (Labov 1972b and Labov and Fanshel 1977) or construct experience (Ochs *et al.* 1992; Bruner 1986) but, in any case, the narrator imposes his subjectivity on the story (Schiffrin 1994b). As we will see in the following sections, the print of the informant is present throughout the whole account, either by means of paralinguistic features or else by the use of evaluative devices, whose main function is to show the listener that the story *has* a point; prosody, repetition and direct quotes are other means used by the narrator for expressive purposes. Authors like Tannen (1988: 90) or Bauman (1984: 161) highlight the centrality of dialogue in conversational storytelling for making the story more vivid and thus become part of the listener's experience. Earlier in time, Wolfson (1978) had gone a step further asserting that "a story may be seen as theatrically staged and the performance features (i.e. direct speech, asides, repetition, expressive sounds, sound effects and motions and gestures) which are employed in its telling are quite similar to those we find in actual theatrical performance." (1978: 217). In this respect, it is important to bear in mind that the ultimate goal of the narrator is to convince the listener, not present at the time of the event, that something important took place in the past and that the account is, therefore, worth listening to.

Even though researchers basically agree that narrative is about experience, they do not fully agree on the definition of narrative. Depending on the use they make of the term in relation to their field of study, their conceptualization changes. As Riessman (1993) highlights, on the one hand there is one group whose definition is so open and broad that it practically includes anything (clinical literature references illness narratives, psychotherapy narration and life stories); on the other hand, there is another group that defines narrative in quite restricted terms, that is, as oral stories about a specific past event. An overall definition of the term could be that offered by Riessman, which includes the most important traits and which coincides with Labov's notion of narrative, to be reviewed later on:

“talk organized around consequential events. A teller in a conversation takes a listener into a past time or ‘world’ and recapitulates what happened then to make a point, often a moral one.” (Riessman 1993: 3).

In the following sections, Labov’s (1972b) model of narrative, which is adopted as textual framework for the study of pragmatic markers, is presented. In the first section, narrative framework and definition will be provided. The second and third sections will be devoted to the overall structure of narrative and narrative syntax, together with the evaluative elements.

2.2.1 Labov’s clausal framework of narrative

Narratives have a form of recurrent patterns, both at clause and discourse level. Furthermore, narratives also have a function: they are “verbal techniques for recapitulating experience, in particular, a technique of constructing narrative units which match the temporal sequence of that experience.” (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 13). The smallest linguistic unit of expression which defines narrative is the clause, though not all sequences of clauses function as “narrative clauses”. In the following example of narrative provided by Labov and Waletzky (1967) it can be seen that the second and third group do not comply with the requirements of a narrative in the strictest sense, since the order of clauses, and thus of events, is altered (p.20):

- (1) a. Well, this person had a little too much to drink
- b. and he attacked me
- c. and the friend came in
- d. and she stopped it.
- (2) c. A friend of mine came in
- d. just in time to stop
- a. this person who had a little too much to drink
- b. from attacking me.
- (3) d. A friend of mine stopped the attack.
- c. She had just come in.
- b. This person was attacking me.
- a. He had had a little too much to drink.

(1) is a narrative; (2) and (3) are not. Despite the fact that we can refer to a sequence of events differently and in a perfect logical order, not all recapitulations of experience result into a narrative. Whereas (2) shows syntactic embedding, (3) presents a sequence of four independent clauses which, nevertheless, the same as (2), do not conform a narrative.

Narrative units are to be defined “by the fact that they recapitulate experience

in the same order as the original events.” (1967: 21). Nevertheless, there are clauses that accept mobility within the narrative unit; they are the subordinate clauses. They may be placed anywhere in the narrative without really altering the temporal sequence of events and, therefore, its semantic interpretation. In fact, only main or independent clauses are relevant for temporal reference.

In order to formalize a narrative unit, Labov and Waletzky (1967: 22–24) design a *system of subscripts*, that is a system of symbols which indicate the clause(s) that can precede or follow another clause(s) without altering the temporal sequence and thus the semantic interpretation of the events.²³ The authors differentiate four different types of clauses:

- a. *Narrative clauses*: maintain the strict temporal sequence of events. As defined by Labov (1982):

“They are independent clauses with verbs in the indicative mood and (in English) one of three tenses: the preterit, the historical present, or the past progressive (...) narrative clauses can be identified by the criterion that they are appropriate answers to the criterial question, ‘And then what happened? The sequence of narrative clauses forms the COMPLICATING ACTION.” (1982: 225)

- b. *Free clauses*: can range freely through the narrative. They show no connection with the temporal sequence.
- c. *Coordinate clauses*: clauses which can be reversed without altering the temporal sequence or semantic interpretation.
- d. *Restricted clauses*: those which cannot move freely over the narrative, but have a wider range of movement than the narrative clauses.

As it has been seen, both free and restricted clauses can range quite freely between two narrative clauses. Because of this, and in order to be able to define temporal relations between two clauses which are not necessarily contiguous, Labov and Waletzky (1967) develop the concept of *temporal juncture*: “Two clauses which are temporally ordered with respect to each other are said to be separated by temporal juncture.” (1967: 25).²⁴ Once the term ‘narrative unit’ has been clarified, the concept of *narrative* will be defined.

2.2.1.1 *Definition of narrative*

The temporal organization and sequencing of past experience into a linguistic device available to speakers results in a *narrative*, a technical term coined by Labov and Waletzky in 1967 (Labov 1982: 225). Thus, as defined in Labov (1982):

“A NARRATIVE is then a sequence of two or more narrative clauses, that is, a sequence of clauses separated by one or more temporal junctures.” (1982: 226)

The following example (Labov 1972b: 361) is a narrative sequence which contains three clauses, although only two are narrative clauses:

- (4) a. I know a boy named Harry.
 b. Another boy threw a bottle at him right in the head
 c. and he had to get seven stitches.

Since (a) has no temporal juncture, it might be placed after (b) or (c) without altering the temporal order of the events. Thus, only (b) and (c) are narrative clauses. As pointed by Labov (1972b: 361), (a) is a free clause because the fact that the narrator knows a boy named Harry is equally true at the beginning and at the end of the reported event.

As was previously mentioned, only independent clauses can function as narrative clauses. Subordinate clauses do not alter the temporal sequence of events. Thus, in the following examples provided by Labov (1972b: 362) we see that only two clauses contain the events:

- (5) a. If you didn't bring her candy to school
 she would punch you in the mouth.
 b. And you had to kiss her
 when she'd tell you.

In (a), first event: you didn't bring the candy; second ordered event: she would punch you. In (b), first event: she told you; then, you kissed her. This is the order of events, although it is not the order of clauses. See how a reversal of the clauses does not alter the semantic interpretation:

- (6) a'. She would punch you in the mouth
 if you didn't bring her candy to school.
 b'. and when she'd tell you
 you had to kiss her.

In the following section, we proceed to analyze the narrative functions of the sequencing of clauses, that is, the overall structure of the narrative. It will provide us with the appropriate textual frame within which to develop the study of pragmatic markers later on.

2.2.2 Labov's overall structure of narrative

According to Labov and Waletzky (1967), a fully-formed narrative shows the following parts:

1. *Abstract*
2. *Orientation*

3. *Complicating action*
4. *Evaluation*
5. *Result or resolution*
6. *Coda*

1. *The Abstract*

The starting point of a narrative is sometimes an abstract, that is, “a brief summary statement of the substance of the narrative as viewed by the narrator” (Labov 1982: 226). In the case that the narrative is inserted within a conversation, the abstract is linked to the preceding utterance of the person with whom the conversation is held, at the very beginning of the narrative, as a means to insert the storytelling in the conversation. If the narrative is the result of a previous question asked by the interlocutor (as in the present study), the abstract bridges the gap between question and answer. The function of this first part of the narrative is to “encapsulate the point of the story” (Labov 1972b: 363). The following example,²⁵ illustrates the point:

- (7) (Were you ever in a situation where you thought you were in serious danger?)²⁶
- @Bg: a
- *NAR: I think er # situations of danger really.
- *NAR: probably the most common one in my case would be being robbed.
- *NAR: thankfully not in Spain but in England I've been robbed three or four times.
- @Eg: a
- (NAR8 Mike)

Here the narrator, responding to his interlocutor's question, provides a brief summary of what he thought had been a situation of danger, before getting into the sequencing of events. It should be said, though, that in most cases the narrator starts the account of the narrative without any preliminary summary of the events, going straight into the stage following the abstract, the *orientation*.

2. *Orientation*

Before giving an account of the events and, therefore, before any narrative clause is provided, at the outset of the narrative the speaker informs the interlocutor of the time, place, persons and situation of the participants, formally by means of a set of free clauses preceding the first narrative clause. As it will be illustrated later on, sometimes, the orientation section is displaced later, at strategic points of the narrative.

Interestingly enough, Labov and Waletzky (1967: 32) point out the fact that the orientation section is usually lacking in children's narratives and adults whose narratives do not preserve the sequencing of events. Nevertheless, Labov highlights the importance of this section when stating:

“The selection of the orientation section by the narrator is one of the crucial steps in the construction of the narrative and the theory of causality that supports it.”
(1982: 229)

As for syntactic properties, in the orientation section the narrator uses many past progressive clauses to sketch what was the ‘setting’ before the first event of the narrative took place (Labov 1972b: 364). This fact is fully illustrated in the following example:

(8)

@Bg: ei
 *NAR: Well # let me think#.
 *NAR: when I was #.
 *NAR: the most this uh # the most horrendous one and the most dangerous as as I thought.

@Eg: ei
 @Bg: *otsc*
 *NAR: *about two years ago.*
 *NAR: *when I was working in Abudhabi.*
 *NAR: *and I had never been sailing before.*
 *NAR: *and uh # this uh # this teacher.*
 *NAR: *that was working in the school.*
 *NAR: *at the time she was the head of the kindergarten.*
 *NAR: *took us down to the # to the sailing club.*
 *NAR: *so we all went out in boats with different people.*
 *NAR: *and I was given this woman.*

@Eg:*otsc*

.....
 (NAR12 Agatha)²⁷

In this narrative,²⁸ Agatha starts with a brief internal evaluation of the events that, as far as she recalls, had been ‘horrendous’ (the evaluation stage will be fully explained in brief) to go on into the orientation section, informing the listener of the time, space²⁹ and characters (or participants) of the events that were going to take place. Like in a play, the narrator behaves as an actor that, before the performance starts, sets all the elements that she considers are relevant, and thus necessary, for the audience to fully understand what is about to start. We should bear in mind that the storytelling is about a situation of danger, so it is really important to set the right scenario from the very beginning.

As mentioned above, there are cases in which the orientation section is displaced in the narrative to later points that the narrator considers strategic. The following sections belong to narrative 12 above. The first segment follows the last one just analyzed in (8):

(9)

.....
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: and from the word go I knew.
 *NAR: she was totally incompetent.
 *NAR: because she couldn't get the sail up.
 @Eg: ei
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and there were parts missing of the boat.
 *NAR: and she didn't really know.
 *NAR: what she was doing.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: oc
 *NAR: *she was a woman in her fifties.*
 @Eg: oc
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: so # she eventually she got the boat # got the boat.
 *NAR: and pulled it down to the water's edge.
 *NAR: and she put it on the water.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ot
 *NAR: *it it was a January # it was a January afternoon.*
 @Eg: ot

Agatha has already started reporting the events when she informs her interlocutor of the age of the woman. She then proceeds with the account, to stop it again and mention the time of the year it was. Both, age of the main character involved in the events (besides herself, of course) and time of the year, are key points Agatha considers that are relevant to have a full picture of the situation: the woman was quite incapable of having the situation under control; her age was a factor to be added to her incompetence, since she was not too young. Besides, the conditions could not be worse; it was January, so winter time and probably very cold. Both pieces of information serve a purpose: they prepare the interlocutor for the events which are about to happen.

As it will be seen when the evaluation sections of narratives are explained and analyzed, these displaced orientation segments often work as evaluative units. Thus, as pointed by Labov, "though the displacement of orientation can sometimes be accounted for on simple cognitive grounds, it often appears to serve an evaluative function." (1982: 226).

3. *Complicating action*

The backbone of the narrative is the section termed complicating action or compli-

cation, a unit formed mostly by narrative clauses that comprise the series of events that take place in the narrative. This section is, therefore, the most important one since it is the one the listener is looking forward to hearing, from the very moment the narrator starts his/her account.

According to Labov (1982: 228), when someone decides to tell a narrative, it is because they believe the event they are about to tell is worth listening to, it is reportable. Moreover, the event has to be credible to the audience, otherwise there will be no interest in it. As for the first property, in terms of responses from the listeners, that author classifies narrative clauses into two types (1982: 227):

1. Type A: responses which consist of expressions of ordinary understanding, such as *I see, Uh-huh, Naturally...*³⁰
2. Type B: responses which consist of expressions of ordinary surprise, such as *Really?, Is that so?, You don't mean it!, No kidding!, etc.*

What the narrator aims at, after the storytelling is over, is a type B response. Both reportability and credibility are often intertwined:

“Reportable events are almost by definition unusual. They are therefore inherently less credible than non-reportable events. In fact, we might say that the more reportable an event is, the less credible it is. Yet credibility is as essential as reportability for the success of a narrative. A narrative that is judged entirely false, ‘nothing but a big lie’, does not have the impact or acceptability of a narrative that is considered essentially true. And except for certain special storytelling traditions, the reputation of the narrator suffers if he or she is judged to be a liar.” (Labov 1982: 228)³¹

If reportability and credibility are met, every narrative clause or event will truly represent the *objective event*, a type of report that, as opposed to a *subjective event*, can be contradicted by a witness present at the time. The *objective event sequence*, then, leaves aside subjective events and evaluative clauses; it “represents the cognitive framework that is provisionally accepted as a true representation of the events reported in the narrative.” (Labov 1982: 231). In such a case, each event will answer the question: ‘And then what happened?’, which makes the sequencing of the narrative move forward.³²

4. *Evaluation*

A narrative which consists only of orientation, complicating action and result, has *no point*. This is the case of narratives of young children or of narratives of somebody else’s experience, the so-called narratives of vicarious experience, not related to the personal experience of the narrator (Labov 1982: 226). What happens in this case is that the referential function of the narrative is accomplished but the account turns out to be quite incomprehensible because it lacks significance. It is

the case of those narratives which, when over, raise the contemptuous rejoinder from the listener: 'So what?'. Labov and Waletzky (1967: 33) illustrate this fact with a narrative that only has complicating action and result:³³

- (10) a. See he - they threw him out, you know.
b. So he wanted to get back in, 'cause, you know, it was sn--raining hard.
c. So he got on this boat
d. and tried to--go somewhere else.
e. And the boat went over.
f. And he tried to swim.
g. And this other man was fishing in the rain.
h. So he seen the pig
i. and went over there
j. and picked the pig up
k. and put it in the boat
l. and brought it back to shore, so he would land there.
m. And that was that.

From the thirteen independent clauses that conform this narrative, twelve are narrative clauses. There are only events, facts, not from the narrator but from a vicarious experience, so the story has no point or *raison d'être* because the storyteller had probably no stimulus for telling it nor wished to get any point of personal interest across. Thus, in front of a question such as 'Were you ever in serious danger of being killed?',³⁴ the subject asked finds him/herself in a position where he must not show to the audience that he really was in danger since what he is narrating is an indirect experience from a third person (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 34). It is an unevaluated account of events. As these authors put it:

"The more vivid and real the danger appears, the more effective the narrative. If the narrative is weak and uninteresting, he will have made a false claim. Beyond such immediate stimulus, we find that most narratives are so designed as to emphasize the strange and unusual character of the situation — there is an appeal to the element of mystery in most of the narratives. Then, too, many narratives are designed to place the narrator in the most favorable possible light: a function which we may call self-aggrandizement." (1967: 34)

When the evaluation occurs, the complicating action is suspended. Stopping the action is a way to attract the listener's attention. It usually happens either at various points of the development of the action or else at the end of it, between the end of the action and the resolution; sometimes, evaluation occurs instead of result or they are both fused (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 35). The following segment, which also serves to illustrate the two types of evaluation we will explain in brief, followed by a coda, shows a case of evaluation instead of result:

(11)

.....
 @Bg: ei/e
 *NAR: there was nothing to do.
 *NAR: but to carry on.
 *NAR: yeah # it affects you a lot.
 *NAR: though if you've come close to nearly dying or
 something like this.
 *NAR: it makes you think a lot about your life.
 *NAR: and what you're doing.
 *NAR: and and maybe things you want to change.
 *NAR: because you realize.
 *NAR: how important it is.
 *NAR: and that you don't want to die.
 *NAR: you're thinking no # no # no # not now # please!
 @Eg: ei/e
 @Bg: c
 *NAR: that was really the worst # the worst situation I've
 ever been in.
 @Eg: c
 @End
 (NAR2Lindsay)

From the structural point of view, the evaluative section can take the form of a lexical or phrasal modifier of a narrative clause, it may be a narrative clause itself or it may coincide with the last narrative clause. In fact, this important stage of the narrative forms a sort of secondary structure that runs all through the account, sometimes concentrated in one unit, sometimes penetrating the narrative clauses. As suggested by Labov and Waletzky (1967), this is the reason why the definition of this section must lie on semantic grounds, not strictly structural ones:

“The evaluation of a narrative is defined by us as that part of the narrative which reveals the attitude of the narrator towards the narrative by emphasizing the relative importance of some narrative units as compared to others.” (1967: 37)

The evaluation section is, therefore, structurally embedded within the narrative by three different means (1967: 37–38):

- It is semantically defined by means of:
 - a. a direct statement: “I said to myself: this is it.”
 - b. lexical intensifiers: “He was beaten up real, real bad.”
- It is formally defined by the suspension of the action:
 - a. through coordinate clauses and restricted clauses.
 - b. by means of repetition: “And he didn't come back, and he didn't come back.”

- It is culturally defined by means of:
 - a. the narrator’s symbolic action.
 - b. a third person’s judgement: the entire narrative is reported to a person not present at the narrative.

The point made in the following pages is that there is a fourth means by which evaluation can be embedded within the narrative structure, pragmatically defined through pragmatic markers. This point will be fully developed in the coming section (2.2.3) when evaluative elements are discussed.

The degree of evaluative embedding or penetration in the narrative framework can range from a plain external evaluation, such as a direct statement from the narrator expressing his thoughts at the time of the event to the listener, to a statement the narrator tells himself or a highly internalized feeling or symbolic action. Labov and Waletzky (1967: 39) offer a scale of degrees of embedding of evaluation that exemplifies their claim:

- Internal*
1. And when we got down there, her brother turned to me and whispered, “I think she’s dead, John!”
 2. And when we got down there, I said to myself, “My God, she’s dead!”
 3. And when we got down there, I thought, “She’s dead.”
 4. And when we got down there, I thought she was dead.
 5. Later, the doctors told us she was close to death.
 6. I think she must have been close to death.
- External*
7. You know, in cases like this, it’s clear that she was likely as not dead.

Such scale takes us to the following point. There are two types of evaluation: internal and external evaluation, both with strongly defined characteristics. Let us see it in detail in the following sections.

4a. *External evaluation*

As explained above, evaluation serves to signal to the listener that his story has a point, that it is tellable. At this point, the narrator breaks the flow of the story to make an evaluative comment or remark:

(12)

-
- @Bg: ee
- *NAR: I # I think.
- *NAR: he was er # he was on drugs or something.
- *NAR: he er # he was trying to impress his friends.
- *NAR: I think.
- *NAR: but what I remember most about it.
- *NAR: is that # you mean.

- *NAR: you read these things in the papers all the time.
 *NAR: and you don't actually think.
 *NAR: is gonna happen to you.
 *NAR: and er # I remember at the time thinking.
 *NAR: &well # yes # here I am& you know.
 *NAR: and actually thought.
 *NAR: I could step outside of this.
 *NAR: and said.
 *NAR: &this is me with er # with the with the knife against my throat.
 *NAR: and how am I going to react&.
 *NAR: I was looking at it very abstractly.
 @Eg: ee

.....
 (NAR6 Phil)

Some narrators, like Phil, comment their impressions at length by means of statements or by the use of embedded quotations that express what was on their minds at the moment. As opposed to internal evaluations, what characterizes external evaluations is the stepping out of the narrative world to make a comment, to add some sort of information the narrator considers is relevant or important for the full understanding of the story; it may either be a remark about the main character or about the place where the event takes place, it doesn't really matter. In a few words, the narrator distances himself from the narrative world.

4b. *Internal evaluation*

Labov (1982: 230) differentiates objective from subjective events; the former are just reportable physical events that can be contradicted, at any time, by a witness present at the time; the latter, cannot: they are feelings that the narrator had at the time or things he said to himself (formally expressed by means of quotations). I suggest objective and subjective events be considered external and internal evaluation types, respectively. Contrary to external evaluation, internal evaluation, as its name aptly indicates, reflects the internal or inner feelings of the narrator at the time of the events. Thus, what characterizes this subsection is the narrator's highly subjective view. The following excerpt exemplifies an internal evaluation, in a Catalan narrative:

(13)

-
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: però la veritat és. *but the truth was*
 *NAR: que va ser. *that it was*
 *NAR: no és por ben bé. *it is not exactly fear*
 *NAR: lo que passes. *what you feel.*
 *NAR: és una sensació de # d'angoixa. *It is a feeling of anguish*

*NAR: de que allò no para no/ *that there is no end to that*
 *NAR: de que aquella bèstia no no *that that beast would never stop.*
 parava mai.

@Eg: ei

.....
 (NAR7 Montse)

Montse is giving a full account of her first experience as horse rider. (13) is an embedded internal evaluation which occurs between a complicating action and an orientation segments, in the middle of the account. We can see that she is totally involved in her telling of the experience she went through and wants the listener to fully grasp it. She does not take any step backwards from the narrative world; on the contrary, she wants her interlocutor to move *into* hers, which is a characterizing feature of internal evaluations.

5. Result or resolution

According to Labov and Waletzky (1967: 39), the resolution of a narrative comes at the end, after the complicating action and an evaluative stage; sometimes, resolution is replaced by or coincides with evaluation, followed by a coda. In this study, it has been found, in several cases, that the narrator goes on retelling and reshaping the story after the resolution, adding some more evaluative or complicating action segments to it that he considers offer a full and more exact picture of the story. Although Labov and Waletzky (1967: 41) suggest that this is the case of jokes, ghost stories and surprise endings, in the analysis of our narratives we have found several of these:³⁵

(14)

.....
 @Bg: r

*NAR: but we managed to sail through it.

*NAR: and we got back safely eventually.

@Eg: r

@Bg: ee/i

*NAR: but twenty-six hours in a storm isn't much fun.

*NAR: um # I've been sailing again # yeah.

*NAR: because I love it.

*NAR: but # um # I mean.

*NAR: we just had bad luck.

*NAR: and if we had known the forecast beforehand.

*NAR: we would have stayed.

*NAR: but it was completely unexpected.

@Eg: ee/i

@Bg: da

*NAR: and it just hit us in the middle of the ocean.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei/e
 *NAR: there was nothing to do.
 *NAR: but to carry on.
 *NAR: yeah # it affects you a lot.
 *NAR: though if you've come close to nearly dying or
 something like this.
 *NAR: it makes you think a lot about your life.
 *NAR: and what you're doing.
 *NAR: and and maybe things you want to change.
 *NAR: because you realize.
 *NAR: how important it is.
 *NAR: and that you don't want to die.
 *NAR: you're thinking no # no # no # not now # please!
 @Eg: ei/e
 @Bg: c
 *NAR: that was really the worst # the worst situation I've
 ever been in.
 @Eg: c
 @End
 (*NAR2 Lindsay*)

Lindsay has gone through a bad sailing experience and strongly wishes to transmit it to her interlocutor. Giving the account an end does not mean finishing up with the strong feelings and emotions that the telling of the story arise in her. Thus, after the two resolution clauses, there come two long external and internal evaluative sections only interrupted by a short complicating action line, finally ended by a coda. As we see, evaluative comments gain a major role in the telling of a narrative, even after this, as a mere sequential account of a series of events, is over.³⁶

6. *The coda*

Although many narratives end with resolution or evaluation sections, some close it with a few free clauses that work as a rounding off device, to let the listener know that the narrative is finished and that there is no more description or account of events:

(15)

.....
 @Bg: r
 *NAR: but what happened was.
 *NAR: he'd made his point.
 *NAR: he'd put his knife away.
 @Eg: r

@Bg: c
 *NAR: and well # that's that's the story.
 @Eg: c
 @End
 (NAR6 Phil)

The function of such discourse segment is, therefore, that of bridging the gap between the narrative-past time-world and the real-present time-world; the narrative events are then “pushed away and sealed off” (Labov 1972: 365–366). Labov and Waletzky (1967: 40) mention a few devices used in a coda, such as deixis (*that, there, those*, contrasting with *this, here, these*, used during the narrative), segments which apparently seem disconnected from the narrative, or observations made by the narrator that show the effects the events produced on him. In any case, codas are usually separated from the previous segment by a temporal juncture, since there is a reshifting of time reference. Raimon closes his account of a journey to Birmania with a long internal evaluation followed by a short coda:

(16)

.....
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: va ser # una cosa molt #.
it was something very
 *NAR: bueno # va ser una una experiència molt forta no/
well # it was a very strong experience
 *NAR: primer perquè # perquè veus realment.
first of all because you really see
 *NAR: lo malament que estan allà.
how bad their situation is there
 *NAR: i després perquè després tú # a part de que et sens # molt estrany.
and secondly because you # besides feeling very strange
 *NAR: perquè vens d'un món ben diferent.
because you come from a very different world.
 *NAR: i # a més # la meva dona que era metge i tot.
and besides # my wife that was a doctor.
 *NAR: era una cosa # una situació bastant # bastant forta no/
it was quite a serious situation.
 @Eg: ei
 @Bg: c
 *NAR: i bueno # pues això va ser una mica la història.
and well so that was the story.
 @Eg: c
 @End
 (NAR18 Raimon)

Raimon's narrative exemplifies an interesting point in relation to the above mentioned observations by Labov and Waletzky about types of coda: instead of a coda which includes observations from the narrator, most of the analyzed narratives present such comments in a separate evaluative section, preceding the coda; however, the majority of them show deixis.

Although the overall structure of narratives is not always uniform and presents structural differences concerning functions and forms, Labov and Waletzky's pattern has proved to be consistent (1967: 40). These authors present the narrative structure in a *diamond shape*, with a few modifications in a later version of Labov 1972:




Figure 1. Labov's narrative structure

“A complete narrative begins with an orientation, proceeds to the complicating action, is suspended at the focus of evaluation before the resolution, concludes with the resolution, and returns the listener to the present time with the coda.” (1972b: 369)

Finally, Labov (1972b: 370) suggests the possibility of seeing the narrative “as a series of answers to underlying questions”:

- a. *Abstract*: what was this about?
- b. *Orientation*: who, when, what, where?
- c. *Complicating action*: then what happened?
- d. *Evaluation*: so what?
- e. *Result*: what finally happened?

As he pinpoints, only (c) is needed in order to have a narrative; (a), (b) and (e) are meant to clarify referential questions, whereas (d) has a key functional purpose: why is the story told, what is the point of it. The *coda* is not included in the list, since it does not answer any question and is not found with the same frequency as the rest of the narrative segments: “The coda *puts off* a question — it signals that questions (c) and (d) are no longer relevant” (1972b: 370).

2.2.3 Narrative syntax and the evaluative elements

Labov (1972b: 376) claims that the surface structures found in the clausal framework of narratives show simple syntactic patterns and that such structures can be classified into eight grammatical elements that show no phrase structure hierarchy. They are grouped in three major sets:

Group a. The sentence adverbial:

1. Conjunctions, including temporals: *so, and, but, then*.

Group b. The subject noun phrase:

2. Simple subjects such as: pronouns, proper names (*this girl, my father*).

Group c. The verb phrase:

3. An underlying auxiliary: simple past tense marker incorporated in the verb; no member of the auxiliary appears in the surface structure except some past progressive *was ... ing* in the orientation section, and occasional quasimodals *start, begin, keep, used to, want*.
4. Preterite verbs, with adverbial particles *up, over, down*.
5. Complements of varying complexity; direct and indirect objects.
6. Manner or instrumental adverbials.
7. Locative adverbials (narrative syntax is particularly rich in this area).
8. Temporal adverbials and clauses which present a temporal slot filled by *then, when* or *ever since then*, before the subject (comitative clauses).

Such simple syntactic clause structure contrasts with the complex structure of conversational discourse, full of negatives, modals, transformations, embeddings and complex verb structures not found in narratives; any sign of departure from such basic syntax must necessarily be marked, in one form or another, by means of “minor syntactic elements” that show the narrator’s print (Labov 1972b: 378).

As was seen in the previous section, the narrator’s print or perspective in the narrative is manifested in the evaluation segments that penetrate the whole account with both external and internal evaluative comments and thoughts. Labov (1972b) classifies the *evaluative elements*, that is those elements used by the speaker to make evaluative comments, under four headings:

In fact, although Labov calls all evaluative elements “minor syntactic elements”, some of the intensifiers just presented can be viewed more as paralinguistic features than as “syntactic elements” *per se*. Gestures and expressive phonology, for example, would fall into this category. Moreover, repetition and ritual utterances are not really syntactic mechanisms, either, but rather discourse mechanisms used by the speaker for a specific purpose. Finally, quantifiers would be the only intensifying devices that could be considered to have a full grammatical category.

It is precisely for the aforementioned reasons that the present study suggests a slightly different view of intensifiers from that presented in Labov (1972b). Thus, rather than placing them within a syntactic framework, they could be situated at a discourse semantico-pragmatic level, where discourse mechanisms that sustain the pragmatic structure of the narrative could fit. Following such a line of argument, the proposal made is that some of the pragmatic markers found in narratives could be considered intensifiers, thus evaluative elements used by the narrator to strengthen one or more events taking place in the narrative. This proposal does not contemplate the whole range of markers in narratives, since some of them are not placed in the evaluative sections and, therefore, are not to be considered *evaluative elements*; as we will see in the empirical analysis, their semantico-pragmatic functions are diverse.

However, in 1984 Labov develops the notion of “intensity” further. He then defines it as:

“the emotional expression of social orientation toward the linguistic proposition: the commitment of the self to the proposition. The speaker relates future estimates of his or her honesty, intelligence, and dependability to the truth of the proposition. Intensity operates on a scale centered about the zero, or unmarked expression, with both positive (aggravated or intensified) and negative (mitigated or minimized) poles.” (1984: 43–44)

Thus, as for quantifiers, whereas *really*, *all* and *so* would fall under the category of positive intensifiers, *just* would work as a minimizer: “I didn’t yell and scream, I *just* went like this [gesture].” (1984: 45).

Labov’s definition of intensity offers a wider view of the phenomenon. In the same article, the author also points out the fact that there is not a closed list of *markers of intensity* since this feature can be signaled by devices which range from prosodic to strictly grammatical. Furthermore, that author suggests a pragmatic approach that accepts an underlying notion of “universal quantifiers” and which “tries to show how the apparent illogic of usage is the result of interaction with a larger context.”³⁸ (1984: 49). My suggestion is that some pragmatic markers found in narratives could be included in the category of *markers of intensity*.

2. Comparators

The use of negative, future and modal auxiliaries occurs mostly at evaluative segments. They are called *comparators* because they are used by the narrator to “compare the events which did occur to those which did not occur (...) They provide a way of evaluating events by placing them against the background of other events which might have happened, but which did not” (1972: 381). Labov’s narrative of *the baddest girl in the neighborhood* (1972b: 382) exemplifies it:

- (21) a. Well one was with a girl.
 b. Like I was a kid...
 c. And she was the baddest girl in the neighborhood...
 d. If you *didn't* bring her candy to school
 she *would* punch you in the mouth
 e. And you *had to* kiss her
 when she *would* tell you.
 f. This girl was only 12 years old
 g. but she *didn't* take no junk.

As pinpointed by Labov, this sample of narrative is characterized by events that *would* happen if others didn’t happen. The linguistic mechanisms, i.e. auxiliaries, used for that purpose are the so-called *comparators*, concentrated mostly in the evaluative sections. Implied threats, imperatives, questions, or-clauses, superlatives, and comparatives would also fall within this category, showing different degrees of syntactic complexity (1972b: 385).

3. Correlatives

A more complex syntactic mechanism is that of *correlatives*, which “bring together two events that actually occurred so that they are conjoined in a single independent clause.” (1972: 387). The operation implies the use of:

- a. *Progressives*, which are used in the narrative to indicate events which occur simultaneously; most of them in orientation segments. They are sometimes used to suspend the action.
 b. *Appended participles*, that is, aligned *-ing* participles used to describe simultaneous actions described by the main verb, which can also be in progressive form. Usually found in the orientation section; their function is to suspend the action by introducing simultaneous events in an evaluative section: “I was *sittin'* on the corner an’shit, *smokin'* my cigarette, you know” (1972b: 388).
 c. *Double appositive and double attributives*, which are used “to heighten or deepen the effect of a particular description.” (1972b: 388). Adult narratives, in particular, use complex noun phrases for such purpose: “You see, a *great big guy* in the back alley, ...”; “and then, they gave him a *knife, a long one, a dagger*, and I fought.” (1972b: 389)

4. *Explicatives*

These consist of separate explicative clauses that are appended to the main narrative or evaluative clause of a section. The connection may be through conjunctions such as *while*, *though*, *because* or *since*, for instance. There are three types of attachments (1972b: 390):

- a. *simple*, when there is only one clause.
- b. *complex*, when “a clause is embedded in a clause which is in turn embedded in the main clause.”
- c. *compound*, when “the two clauses are embedded at the same point in the matrix clause.”

The function of *explicatives* is to explicate the point of the narrative or to describe events or facts that the narrator considers the listener does not know, in as many clauses as it is necessary. At this point, the action is eventually suspended and the attention of the listener is held.

The syntactic mechanisms just presented, which are present in evaluative sections, are not the only ones found in narrative syntax. *Deletions*, *reorderings of sections* (*monologues*, *flashbacks*, *displacements*), use of the *passive* and *ellipsis* are among the mechanisms that could be also taken under consideration (1972b: 392).

Ultimately, the evaluative elements discussed have a clear function: intensify, compare, correlate and explain points or events of the evaluative sections of the narrative.³⁹

2.3 Recapitulation

The previous sections have served a twofold purpose. Firstly, to provide the general foundations by defining the discourse domain within which the present work will be fundamented; a full discussion of the concepts that will be used has also been offered. Secondly, to present, at length, the text genre in which the study of pragmatic markers will be framed, i.e. Labov’s narrative model (1972b).

As for the first part, the analysis which is presented in the coming chapters has both a functional and a formal facet in as much as its theoretical delimitations are to be found in inferential pragmatics and discourse structure. Most of the existing literature on discourse markers is related to their pragmatic functions in the conversational genre, with minor references to their function as discourse structuring devices. In this respect, the weight is usually much more heavily placed on functional than on formal features. The present study is situated at the interface between pragmatic functions of discourse markers and their repercussion in narrative discourse structure, so it takes both a functional and a formal approach.

Labov's overall structure of narrative serves to focus this analysis. The different sections of which it consists will define the key role of pragmatic markers as linguistic elements that sign-post the narrator's intentions and illocutionary force. In this respect, Labov's concept of *markers of intensity* plays a major role.

CHAPTER 3

The role of discourse markers in narrative structure

3.1 Markers and coherence relations

The role of discourse markers in discourse structure is directly related to *coherence*, an intrinsic property of texts that runs parallel to its counterpart, *cohesion*. On the one hand, there are authors who use only one of these terms to include two different underlying concepts; on the other hand, there are those who differentiate terms and definitions. This section will briefly discuss the literature on the topic and their relationship with discourse markers.

Similarly to what happened with the terms under discussion in the previous chapter, *cohesion* and *coherence* also present ambiguities.⁴⁰ Whereas some authors use the term *cohesion* to refer to both textual properties (the most representative are Halliday and Hasan 1976), others do the same by using the term *coherence* (Van Dijk 1977, Edmonson 1981, Hatch 1992, *inter alia*). Ultimately, there are authors who differentiate terms and concepts, using and analyzing them distinctly (Beaugrande 1984, Beaugrande and Dressler 1981, Widdowson 1978, Brown and Yule 1983, Hobbs 1985, Blakemore 1989, Charolles 1988, *inter alia*).

The first term under discussion, *cohesion*, is fully represented by the pioneering work of Halliday and Hasan (1976), who coined the term to explain the linguistic mechanism that made an English text cohesive. According to the authors, *cohesion* is ultimately explained in semantic terms. Mechanisms that work at the surface level of language structure, such as reference, substitution, ellipsis, theme and rheme and lexicon, and at the semantic underlying level, account for such textual property. However, Brown and Yule (1983), among others, have questioned Halliday and Hasan's claim that "cohesive ties between sentences stand out more clearly because they are the *only* source of texture".⁴¹ Brown and Yule provide chunks of conversational discourse that, although not explicitly cohesive in their terms, are fully coherent, i.e. understood by the listener or reader.⁴² In this respect, they highlight the importance of the receiver of the message to interpret the text:

"Within chunks of language which are conventionally presented as texts, the hearer/reader will make every effort to impose a coherent interpretation, i.e. to treat the language thus presented as constituting 'text'. We do not see an advantage

in trying to determine constitutive formal features which a text must possess to qualify as a 'text'. *Texts are what hearers and readers treat as texts.*" (1983: 198–199)⁴³

The other aforementioned term is *coherence*. Thus, Hatch (1992: 209) adopts it to refer to the textual property that makes a text "stick together" by means of a repertoire of *cohesive ties* and *cohesive markers*. Van Dijk's approach (1977) runs parallel to Hatch when he establishes the subdivision between *lineal coherence* and *global coherence*, though whereas the former would coincide with Halliday's concept of cohesion, the latter would refer to a cognitive process undergone by the speaker and hearer to elaborate, store and manipulate information (1977: 150). Edmonson (1981) refers to *textual coherence*, which accounts for thematic and semantic cohesion in Halliday's terms, and *discourse coherence*, which refers to the interactional structure.

Finally, Beaugrande (1984) and Beaugrande and Dressler's (1981) contributions illustrate the *cohesion-coherence* dichotomy as two distinct terms with different underlying concepts. *Cohesion* relates to the surface sequential organization of a text, supported by the syntactic structure through such mechanisms as paraphrasing, repetition, parallel structures, pro-forms, ellipsis and inter and intra sentential junction. *Coherence*, on the other hand, is a cognitive process that operates within the *textual world*. It implies configuration of concepts and knowledge of the world, both activated when processing a text (Beaugrande 1984).

Generally speaking, the above cognitive view is shared by many linguists who relate *coherence* to an interpretive process. Hence, Blakemore claims: "Even when two sentences are related by a cohesive tie, hearers have to go beyond their linguistic resources in order to recover an interpretation" (1989: 232). Interpretability of a text is highly related to the illocutionary acts that accompany its propositions. In fact, in front of a text, what we often do is go underneath the linguistic surface and see the illocutionary link between the utterances. The result is that whereas *cohesion* is explicit by means of linguistic mechanisms and propositional development, *coherence* is inferred by the hearer or reader of a text:

"I want to suggest that where we can establish a propositional relationship across sentences, without regard to what illocutionary acts are being performed, by reference to formal syntactic and semantic signals, then we recognize cohesion. Cohesion, then, is the overt relationship between propositions expressed through sentences. Where we recognize that there is a relationship between the illocutionary acts which propositions, not always overtly linked, are being used to perform, then we are perceiving the coherence of the discourse." (Widdowson 1978: 28–29)

At first sight, discourse markers might be related to the two aforementioned textual properties but a careful analysis shows that the relationship is not so obvious. If Widdowson's definition of the terms, for instance, is taken into account as

representative of the large group of linguists that correlate terms and concepts distinctly, the following questions arise: are discourse markers syntactic and semantic signals that establish propositional relationships across sentences and therefore operate at a surface level (in Halliday and Hasan's terms)? or, on the contrary, are they lexical forms related to the propositional illocutionary acts not always overtly linked? Ultimately, do they have a semantic, syntactic and/or pragmatic function? The affirmative answer to the first question would undoubtedly lead to *cohesion*; the same positive answer to the second, would do it to *coherence*. A third possibility is still open to discussion: that discourse markers play a threefold role, as syntactic, semantic and illocutionary marking signals.

In order to be able to provide a satisfactory answer to such questions, the conceptualization of the term *discourse marker* requires some further considerations. Not an easy task, taking into account the multiple array of terms and concepts on the matter: in the literature one term can embrace a diversity of definitions and various terms are used to refer to the same underlying notion. *Discourse markers, discourse connectives, connectors (pragmatic, argumentative, textual), particles, text organizers, modalisateurs, gambits, evincives, fillers, discourse operators, pop-markers, cue phrases or clue words* are just a few of the terms that I have encountered.⁴⁴

The definitions offered by the authors provide us with a sample of the diversity of concepts and names that revolve around the term 'discourse marker'.⁴⁵ They all share properties that are related to formal, cognitive and illocutionary textual levels. Except for *argumentative connectors*, which carry semantic propositional content and instructions, what we are basically left with are linguistic elements that operate as devices which serve to make the discourse *coherent*, bringing up the speaker's and hearer's illocutionary force, intentions, inferences and shared ground; all of it aimed at the interpretation of the message. In this respect, their activity is thus not an open one working at surface syntactic level, through the aforementioned cohesive mechanisms (ellipsis, inter and intra sentential juncture, reference, substitution and information development), but an underlying pragmatic one.

Brinton (1996) points out the array of definitions, terms, and diversity of pragmatic markers. She finally provides an exhaustive list of basic features that, although not fully manifested in all units considered pragmatic markers, suggest a range of properties that most markers display (pp.33–35). Brinton's list of features is adopted as point of departure of what is going to be considered a pragmatic marker.⁴⁶ Consider the list of features in a summarized version provided by Jucker and Ziv (1998: 3):

- Phonological and lexical features:
 - a. They are short and phonologically reduced.

- b. They form a separate tone group.
- c. They are marginal forms and hence difficult to place within a traditional word class.
- Syntactic features:
 - d. They are restricted to sentence-initial position.
 - e. They occur outside the syntactic structure or they are only loosely attached to it.
 - f. They are optional.
- Semantic feature:
 - g. They have little or no propositional meaning.
- Functional feature:
 - h. They are multifunctional, operating on several linguistic levels simultaneously.
- Sociolinguistic and stylistic features:
 - i. They are a feature of oral rather than written discourse and are associated with informality.
 - j. They appear with high frequency.
 - k. They are stylistically stigmatised.
 - l. They are gender specific and more typical of women's speech.

Jucker and Ziv (1998) point out that only the first three levels of features provide “the crucial tests”; the functional and sociolinguistic/stylistic levels are just descriptive and, consequently, non-identifying of what may be considered to be a discourse marker. But as they suggest, “it is unlikely that we would want to exclude a particular element from the set of discourse markers if it turned out that it was not gender specific or that it was more common in men's speech.” (p.4).

From all the preceding arguments, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the presence of a discourse marker is not strictly obligatory for a full understanding of the text but it is probably necessary to make the type of relationship established between preceding and following propositions explicit and clear. The example used by Schiffrin (1987a: 318) to illustrate the key function of discourse markers in a text may help to support such claim:

- (22) a. Sue dislikes all linguists.
b. I like her.

Paraphrasing Schiffrin's words, without any marker heading utterance (b), interpretations are opened to different options: if the person who reads or hears such interaction is a linguist or likes linguists, s/he will interpret that between (a) and (b) there is a relationship of contrast and, therefore, there should be a *but* heading (b); if such is not the case, there should be a *so* establishing a cause-consequence relationship. Clearly, the meaning of both utterances is open enough to two or

more possible interpretations and only its context will provide us with the correct one. The presence of a discourse marker between *a* and *b* utterances is not strictly essential but it becomes necessary to clarify the type of relationship set up, with all the inferences derived from it.⁴⁷ Hence, in Schiffrin's words:

“either relation is possible without markers, but only one relation is possible with a marker. It is for this reason that I suggest that *markers select, and then display, structural relations between utterances*, rather than create such relations.” (1987a: 321)⁴⁸

As it will be seen in the following section, research on the field of computational linguistics and natural language processing supports Schiffrin's thesis (Grosz and Sidner 1986: 189, Mann et al. 1992: 64, among others).

It can be concluded that discourse markers have fundamental illocutionary, inferential and text-structuring functions, with minimal propositional content and no syntactic restrictions. Furthermore, their presence facilitates the sort of coherence relations set up in a discourse. According to Sanders et al. (1993), coherence relations are, “cognitive entities that play a central role in both discourse understanding and discourse production.” (p.94). The following section will be dedicated to establishing the relationship between coherence relations displayed by markers and discourse structure.

3.2 Markers and discourse structure

The important role of discourse markers has been fully established by recent research undertaken by linguists who work in the field of artificial intelligence and who share a cognitive approach to linguistic phenomena. Work such as Grosz and Sidner 1986, Grosz et al. 1989, Mann et al. 1992, Sanders et al. 1993, Sanders 1997 and Oversteegen 1997 is a good example of it. The main interest of these scholars is to establish the link between discourse segments and those expressions used in natural language to structure the ongoing interaction and to signal the structure and coherence of the discourse, both in written and in spoken communication. The way structure reflects the intentions and goals of the speaker or writer has been the focus of attention of some of this research as well (Grosz and Sidner 1986 in particular).

But a closer look at a text structure tells us that, depending on the inquiry interests, the kinds of relations that join discourse segments can be established differently (Grosz et al. 1989: 439). Thus, theories whose main interests revolve around discourse meaning focus on the relations — semantic and pragmatic — established between basic discourse units (Van Dijk 1977, 1982; Schiffrin 1987a;

Mann and Thompson 1988, Mann et al. 1992; Sanders 1997; Redeker 1990), whereas language processing theories whose aim is the formalization of language will concentrate on how these meaning relations constrain and delimit units of discourse that are relevant to the interpretation of the intended message (Grosz and Sidner 1986, Grosz et al. 1989, Polanyi 1985b, 1986, 1988, Reichman 1985).

Discourse markers, or *cue phrases*, as regularly called by those scholars working in computational linguistics,⁴⁹ are, therefore, the focus of attention of both areas of inquiry for a twofold reason: because they are signals that delimit discourse units, and because they are the instruments through which semantic and pragmatic relations between utterances are established. It can be concluded that their role, as far as discourse structure and coherence is concerned, is, without a doubt, highly relevant. Consider, for instance (23), an excerpt taken from the corpus of narratives. Note the overall distribution of markers.

(23)

@Participants: NAR17 Bazil Narrator
 @Age of NAR: 30;
 @Sex of NAR: male
 @Bg: osc
 *NAR: <okay\> # I'll tell you about_.
 *NAR: when I was in Africa\
 *NAR: this is what happened\
 *NAR: <okay\> # I was living on the outskirts of the city\
 *NAR: and about five miles away a very good friend of mine lived.
 *NAR: they'd started building the motor.
 *NAR: they'd cleared.
 *NAR: they'd cleared the grass and rocks away.
 *NAR: and they left a sand track of about three kilometres.
 *NAR: this was a short cut <you see/> # a short cut from my place to my friend's\
 through the country on this sand road\
 *NAR: that was going to be a highway in the future\
 *NAR: what I used to do was.
 *NAR: I used to drive along there on my motorbike.
 @Eg: osc
 (he once lifted the front wheel and drove up; the motorbike turned over on top of him)
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: I was lying there.
 *NAR: and I did everything I could.
 *NAR: to try and free my leg.
 *NAR: but it was impossible.
 *NAR: I just couldn't get the weight off.
 *NAR: I couldn't reach far enough forward.
 *NAR: to lift the bike up.

- *NAR: or I didn't have the strength.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: I was lying there not not in agony.
 *NAR: but it was pretty sore.
 @Eg: ei
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: because my leg was twisted over to one side.
 *NAR: I was lying there thinking.
 *NAR: &<well/> # it's going to be dark soon\
 *NAR: and er # I might have to spend the night in this position/&.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: <well\> # you must remember_
 *NAR: that I was in Africa.
 @Eg: ee
 @Bg: da/otc
 *NAR: <okay\ # anyhow\> # maybe ten or something minutes later I saw down
 the # down the sand road # an approaching figure.
 *NAR: sure enough it was this black man.
 *NAR: that was approaching.
 @Eg: da/otc
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: I suppose going home to his shack somewhere.
 @Eg:ei
 @Bg:da
 *NAR: <well\> # he saw me from quite a distance\
 *NAR: and he was to the left of the path or to the left of the road.
 *NAR: and I was to the right.
 *NAR: and he didn't move over.
 *NAR: he carried on.
 *NAR: he he kept coming towards me.
 *NAR: but he didn't move over towards me.
 *NAR: <so_\> I shouted help/.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: <I mean\> # it was it was pretty obvious_
 *NAR: that I was in a a bit of a situation there\
 @Eg: ei

.....
 (NAR17 Basil)

The interest of all these studies for the variable under analysis is manifest. As it was seen in the previous chapter, when presenting Labov's narrative structure, a narra-

tive is formed by distinct discourse segments that present a coherent overall framework. Following a top-down analysis (Hatch 1992: 196), i.e. from a global view of the text structure to the specification of its components, the working assumption of this study is that discourse markers indicate discourse segments boundaries and facilitate the *discourse segment purpose* (DSP):

“Although typically the participants in a discourse may have more than one aim in participating in the discourse (e.g. a story may entertain its listeners as well as describe an event; an argument may establish a person’s brilliance as well as convince someone that a claim or allegation is true), we distinguish one of these purposes as foundational to the discourse. We will refer to it as the **discourse purpose** (DP). From an intuitive perspective, the discourse purpose is the intention that underlies engaging in the particular discourse. This intention provides both the reason a discourse (a linguistic act), rather than some other action, is being performed and the reason the particular content of this discourse is being conveyed rather than some other information. For each of the discourse segments, we can also single out one intention — the **discourse segment purpose** (DSP). From an intuitive standpoint, the DSP specifies how this segment contributes to achieving the overall discourse purpose.” (Grosz and Sidner 1986: 178)

These purposes or intentions are made explicit by both the participant who initiates the interaction — *initiating conversational participant* (ICP) — and the others present at the moment of the interaction who participate in the event — *other conversational participant(s)* (OCP). Discourse segment purposes differ from others that might be present in the interaction (for instance, a private intention) because of the willingness of the ICP to make them recognizable. It is by means of overt linguistic marking, such as the use of aspect, mood, and particular cue phrases as well as referring expressions, that these intentions can be achieved and that discourse segment boundaries can be established (Grosz and Sidner 1986: 176). As pointed out by Grosz and Sidner, the fact that a linguistic cue is at segment boundaries is not compulsory, since the ICP intentions can be inferred from previous utterances and from the overall intentional structure. Nevertheless, “cue phrases are the most distinguished linguistic means that speakers have for indicating discourse segment boundaries and conveying information about the DSP.” (1986: 188). Hockey (1988) also points at the fact that, from a processing perspective, cue phrases provide explicit marking of information that is related to discourse relations and segmentation. She argues that, in order to interpret a discourse, a hearer must first infer its structure and cue phrases help him/her to do so (p.1).

Grosz and Sidner’s discourse structure theory is not just formed by the intentional factor. In their theory, discourse structure is composed of three separate but interrelated components: the linguistic structure formed by the sequence of sentences, the intentional structure “that captures the discourse-relevant purposes

expressed in each of the linguistic segments as well as relationships among them”, and the attentional structure that “being dynamic, records the objects, properties, and relations that are salient at each point of the discourse” (1986: 175).

Besides signalling the linguistic boundaries of discourse segments, cue phrases have the capability of bridging the gap between the intentional and attentional structure of discourse. Thus, paraphrasing Grosz and Sidner, since the ICP rarely makes explicit — by means of metalanguage — his intentions or change of attention, these linguistic signs are indirect means that alert the listener that a move or change is about to come. In their words, they may indicate all the following (1986: 196):

1. that a change of attention is imminent;
2. whether the change returns to a previous focus space or creates a new one;
3. how the intention is related to other intentions;
4. what precedence relationships, if any, are relevant;

Linguistic cues can “push”, “pop to” or “complete” a discourse unit (push markers: *now, next, that reminds me, and, but*; pop to markers: *anyway, but anyway, in any case, now back to*; complete: *the end, ok, fine*), they can sign an interruption (*I must interrupt, excuse me*), show a digression (*By the way, incidentally, speaking of*), establish a “satisfaction-precedence” (*in the first place, first, second, finally, moreover, furthermore*) or a “new dominance” (*for example, first, second, and, moreover, furthermore, therefore, finally*) (1986: 198).

It was previously stated that, depending on the interests of the inquiry, the relations established between discourse segments could be analyzed from two standpoints. The one just discussed, illustrated by Grosz and Sidner’s theory of discourse structure, directs its attention to the constraint that meaning relations have on units of discourse that disclose participants’ intentions and text organization. The other perspective, mainly proposed by those scholars working on discourse meaning, is that which establishes segment relationships in semantic and pragmatic terms. Once the relevance of the first perspective for the present study has been established, providing the theoretical framework for a top-down analysis of the narrative discourse segments by means of linguistic cues, i.e. discourse markers, it is necessary to establish the relevance of this second perspective for the specific variable under analysis, i.e. pragmatic markers.

Recent research in the field of discourse markers has deepened the specification of their role in discourse coherence. Sanders (1997) has developed a test that clarifies the distinction between semantic and pragmatic relations set up by connectors, the *Basic Operation Paraphrase Test*.⁵⁰ By means of this test, he has found out the link between text type and relation type, among other important findings. Thus, a recent study he has undertaken concludes that, whereas informative texts are

dominated by semantic relations, persuasive and expressive texts are dominated by pragmatic relations (1997: 119). According to Sanders, although there have been many attempts to use relations to explain coherence (Martin's conjunctive relations or Mann and Thompson's Rhetorical Structure Theory, for instance), no one presents a closed list of possible relations. In his words, they "appear unorganized and can be extended endlessly" (p.120). Hence, in order to establish a sound theory of coherence relations, Sanders goes to the *source of coherence*,⁵¹ which can be semantic or pragmatic:

"A relation is semantic if the discourse segments are related because of their propositional content, i.e., the locutionary meaning of the segments."

Thus, "Theo was exhausted *because* he had to run to the university", is a coherent sequence because the fact that running causes fatigue is part of our "world knowledge" (p.122)

"A relation is pragmatic if the discourse segments are related because of the illocutionary meaning of one or both of the segments. In pragmatic relations the CR [coherence relation] concerns the speech act status of the segments."

Thus, "Theo was exhausted, *because* he was gasping for breath" is a coherent sequence because the cause-consequence relationship determined by the connector is based on a "real world link": "the state of affairs in the second segment is not the cause of the state of affairs in the first segment, but the justification for making that utterance." (p.122).

According to Sanders (1997), the two levels — semantic/locutionary/propositional and pragmatic/illocutionary/speech act — are not always strictly separable. In fact, pragmatic relations are not always overtly linked to the real world, although this is what characterizes them:

"... pragmatic relations *can*, but *need not* be based on a connection in the real world. The distinction implies that in the case of a pragmatic relation the level of connection of the CR [coherence relation] is the illocutionary level. This connection possibly exists in addition to a locutionary connection, but the *relevant* level of connection is the illocutionary one." (1997: 123)

Distinctions similar to Sander's 'source of coherence' are *pragmatic vs semantic* connectives (Van Dijk 1977, Briz 1994), *internal vs external* uses of conjunctions and relations (Halliday and Hasan 1976, Martin 1992), *presentational vs subject-matter* relations (Mann and Thompson 1988) or *pragmatic vs ideational* discourse markers (Redeker 1990), to mention some. Bateman and Rondhuis (1997: 25) present an insightful account of both coherence relations that, according to them, provide two kinds of information. It is presented as a clarifying summary of the above.

- Logical, informational, world-related or natural ontological categories of the commonsense world (causal, temporal, and so forth), which would correspond to Redeker's *ideational component* or Martin's *external* relations, for example.
- Rhetorical, intentional goals for constructing texts concerning speakers and hearers and their interactions in the world, which would correspond to Redeker's *pragmatic component*, Martin's *internal* relations or Grosz and Sidner's *intentional* structure.

The semantic versus pragmatic dichotomy is a fundamental piece for understanding the nature of discourse markers.⁵² A broad interpretation of the term 'discourse marker' includes lexical items which carry out both pragmatic and semantic functions. Thus, as it was seen in the previous section when going through a range of definitions of the term, some authors (Schiffrin 1987a, Fraser 1990, 1996, 1999, Blakemore 1987, 1989, 1992, *inter alia*) consider *discourse markers* or *connectives* to be units which establish both a logical, informational, world-related relation between segments, i.e. a semantic relation (*however, moreover, furthermore*, some uses of *so, then* and *but*), and a relation that reflects the participants' intentions, presuppositional value and illocutionary meaning of the sequence, i.e. a pragmatic relation (*now, well, and, you see*), without establishing a distinction between the different coherence relations set up.

Lexical units such as *however, moreover, nevertheless* or some uses of *but* with an adversative function, show concessive, additive and oppositional relations that are not linked to the illocutionary and inferential discourse component, but to the propositional argumentative domain. They have representational meaning and denote concepts. Putting these units that have a clear semantic function in the same basket as those which display a core pragmatic role does not help delimit formal and functional boundaries. The view held in this book is thus on the line of those linguists who follow the above stated criteria on coherence relations and, consequently, differentiate semantic from pragmatic relations.⁵³

Bearing all the above discussion in mind, the present study takes *pragmatic discourse markers* to be those lexical pieces which fulfil pragmatic coherence relations, established by Bateman and Rondhuis as rhetorical, intentional goals for constructing texts concerning speakers and hearers and their interactions in the world.⁵⁴

The following section presents markers framed within different models of discourse coherence. The various approaches will be discussed and contrasted so as to finally offer the view held on this issue.

3.3 Markers in discourse coherence models

Discourse markers have been analyzed as lexical pieces that realize a variety of functions from a diversity of disciplines interested in discourse analysis. Thus, in teacher-student exchanges and academic lectures, they *frame* an interaction (Sinclair and Coulthard 1995: 3, Francis and Hunston 1995: 128) and *organize* information (DeCarrico and Nattinger 1988); in discourse processing, they *signal* and *trace* discourse segmentation and production difficulties (Bestgen 1998: 753); in text analysis, they delimit 'episodes', working as *episode markers* (Van Dijk 1982: 177); in context analysis, they behave as utterance *indices* of the local, interpretive, and social contexts (Schiffrin 1987b: 12); and in literature, they are used to *organize space referents* (Luna 1993).

All the above functions have, nevertheless, a common denominator: they all make use of these small, apparently empty,⁵⁵ lexical pieces to: (i) sustain the discourse network; (ii) help the listener interpret the intended message. The two lines are not mutually exclusive. Hence, theories and models integrate components from both macrofunctions, since they all intend to provide satisfactory explanations that account for the presence of a given discourse marker in a discourse sequence.

What follows aims at providing a theoretical basis that may explain these two important macrofunctions. Firstly, two approaches that deal with discourse markers as structural pieces of discourse (Schiffrin 1987a and Redeker 1990) will be presented and discussed. Secondly, two frameworks will be discussed: Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986) and Roulet's modular approach, integrated within the Geneva School. These two frameworks provide a different perspective on the presence of markers in discourse. Without neglecting the important structuring function of markers, the two schools approach these elements as signals that facilitate the interpretation of a given message or sequence of utterances. Their proposals put more weight on the cognitive aspect of discourse markers than the former macrofunction, leaving other aspects on a second plane.

3.3.1 Discourse markers as structural pieces of discourse

Under the apparent anarchy of an oral discourse that is full of repetitions, juxtapositions, unfinished sentences, pauses and expressions that seem to be meaningless, there is systematicity and regularity of patterns and structures. This is the reason why communication between people is possible and the messages that reach listeners are intelligible. The underlying factors that make a text understood, i.e. coherent, are multiple. These factors can range from purely linguistic, thus related to the form and meaning of the devices, to mainly pragmatic, which would link them to the subjacent speech actions.

The study of discourse markers as lexical devices that integrate form, meaning, and function is embodied in Schiffrin's pioneering work *Discourse Markers* (1987a):

“The analysis of discourse markers is part of the more general analysis of discourse coherence — how speakers and hearers jointly integrate forms, meanings, and actions to make overall sense out of what is said.” (1987a: 49)

Hence, as pointed out by Schiffrin, the integration of these components and planes is facilitated by these lexical pieces that have the capacity to “anchor an utterance into more than one discourse component at once” (p.330). Structure, meaning and action form the network on which discourse markers operate.

In the lines to follow, Schiffrin's model of discourse coherence concerning the indexical function of markers will be discussed. Her model will provide sound argumentative lines that will eventually be of great value for the grounding of the empirical analysis of narrative markers. This will be followed by Redeker's proposal, which suggests some changes to Schiffrin's model and redefines the concept of discourse marker.

3.3.1.1 *Markers in Schiffrin*

Schiffrin's study of discourse markers responds to three questions that the author poses at the beginning of her work (1987a: 314):

1. What do discourse markers add to coherence?
Do markers create, or display, relationships between units of talk (ideas, actions, turns, etc.)?
2. Do markers have meanings?
If so, are those meanings referential and/or social and/or expressive meanings?
If so, how do those meanings interact with the discourse slot to influence the total communicative force of an expression?
3. Do markers have function?
If so, in what discourse component of a discourse system (exchange, action, ideational, information, participation)?
Are markers multi-functional?
Are markers ever functional equivalents of each other?

The three questions have an aim: find out the role that discourse markers play in the mechanics of discourse coherence, providing a satisfactory answer to the question, *why do we use discourse markers?* (1987a: 315). In the present work, the question will be restricted to: *why do we use discourse markers in English and Catalan narratives?* The ultimate goal is to try to offer an explanation that accounts for their presence along the two aforementioned macrofunctions of discourse markers, a) as structuring devices of narrative discourse segments, and b) as procedural lexical pieces that facilitate the hearer's interpretive and inferential task. They both have a common aim: account for narrative discourse coherence.

Schiffrin's definition of discourse markers — “*sequentially dependent elements which bracket units of talk*” (1987a: 31) — has to be understood within the discourse model that she proposes. Within this framework, discourse markers move freely, sequentially and distributionally speaking. The notion of sequentiality has to be taken as an intrinsic anaphoric and cataphoric characteristic of discourse markers. It is this special property that makes them what Schiffrin calls *contextual coordinates of talk* (1987a: 322), that is to say, deictic centers of the utterance, points of reference from which speaker and listener depart in order to interpret the message. Schiffrin's idea is illustrated in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Why use discourse markers? (Schiffrin 1987a: 315)

If markers have the capacity to situate the utterance in a specific discourse plane, they automatically become elements that have the potential to call more than one contextual coordinate. Therefore, it is not as much their function *per se* that makes them special, but the context on which they focus.

Taking a multidisciplinary concept of *discourse analysis* as a starting point, Schiffrin sets the ground on which to construct her discourse model. This concept embodies three intertwined properties of discourse: structure (form), meaning and action. According to Schiffrin, a complete discourse model cannot present these properties as autonomous; one cannot be understood without the others (1987a: 2). Schiffrin's model of discourse coherence consists of five discourse levels that are reflected in five structure types (1987a: 25–28):

- The *exchange structure*, which consists of units of talk organized in turns or adjacency-pairs (e.g. questions and answers, greetings). Participants thus establish and define the alternation of sequential roles. Speakers and hearers negotiate their organization. The units are not linguistic *per se*; they are realized by the use of language.
- The *action structure*, which refers to speech act structure. It defines the speakers' identity and social situation, the type of action taking place, the one at which participants intend to arrive and what they actually get to. They are related to ritual constraints. As in the structure type, speakers and hearers negotiate their organization. Likewise, the units are not linguistic *per se*; they are realized by the use of language.

- The *ideational structure*, which includes propositions which carry semantic content, ideas and the different relationships that can be established between them for a satisfactory discourse organization. The relations are cohesive, topical and functional. The units, in this case, are linguistic.
- The *participation framework*, which refers to the different types of relations that a speaker and a hearer can set up and the way they are related to their propositions, acts and turns. As with exchange and action structures, participation framework relates language to its users. In this respect, the three components are related to social interactional capacities.
- The *informational state*, which is related to the cognitive capacity of the participants, how they organize their knowledge and what they know or assume they know of their shared knowledge. Since not all the information flowing between both participants is relevant, this level involves an inferential internal process they have to go through.

All these discourse levels can be found in dialogues and in monologues. Narratives consist of a story told by just one participant to a verbally passive listener. Thus, they take a monological form since the only feed back provided to the listener is kinesic language, i.e. extra-linguistic signs of surprise, exclamation or sympathy. Nevertheless, narratives are also to be considered a type of conversational discourse in the sense that the person who reports a series of events does it in response to a previous question posed by somebody who will become the recipient of the requested information. In this respect, it must be taken into account that, in the reporting of a narrative of personal experience, narrators gather all their efforts to transmit the illocutionary force that they consider is necessary to persuade the listener that what they went through in the past is worth listening to. Both participants are, in this sense, *active* participants.

According to Schiffrin, discourse markers are linguistic mechanisms to be accounted for wherever they occur. In everyday conversation, there is a “fluid and open nature of conversational genres” (1987a: 71) that accounts for the presence of descriptive, narrative, and argumentative segments. Oral narratives are also formed by a diversity of text types. Thus, besides a reporting of events, there is a great deal of description of places, characters and situations, usually embedded within the development of the action or at the beginning of the narrative, in the orientation section; there is argumentation as well, present in the external evaluation, for example, when the narrator steps out of the narrative to make an additional comment that s/he considers is relevant for the full understanding of the story. All this coming in and out of the account is bridged by discourse markers, specially present at segment boundaries, framing them, linking ideas, facilitating the speaker-listener inferential cognitive process and, ultimately, relating apparently

independent *units of talk*, term used by Schiffrin in her definition of discourse marker.⁵⁶ The following figure from Schiffrin (1987a: 316) shows the five planes of talk on which markers operate.

| Information state | Participation framework | Ideational structure | Action structure | Exchange structure |
|-------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| *oh | oh | | oh | |
| well | *well | well | well | well |
| | | *and | and | and |
| | | *but | but | but |
| | | *or | | or |
| so | so | *so | so | so |
| because | | *because | because | |
| | now | *now | | |
| then | | *then | then | |
| I mean | *I mean | I mean | | |
| *y'know | y'know | y'know | | y'know |

Figure 3. Planes of talk on which markers function. Schiffrin (1987a). The asterisk signals the primary plane.

It is interesting to observe that lexical units that would appear to be very different were they considered from other linguistic perspectives share functions within the same discourse plane (such is the case of *I mean* and *now*, both in the participation framework). In contrast, expressions which would be expected to be at the same discourse level, are in separate planes (*now* and *then*, both temporal deictics, but only the latter is found at the action structure). Furthermore, as pointed by Schiffrin, “the primary functions of all the conjunctions are in ideational structures. But each conjunction also has additional functions in other components of talk” (1987a: 316). Let us recall that, whereas the ideational structure refers to the propositional content and relations of ideas (cohesive, topic and functional) between utterances and discourse segments, the action structure refers to participants’ speech acts. Therefore, these are the two levels that require the greatest discourse organization, according to Schiffrin’s model.

The presence of *well* and *so* in all discourse levels suggests, as pointed by Marsà, that “the elements with less propositional content are precisely those which present a higher degree of functionality” (1992: 87). The issue will be resumed in later chapters, in the database discussion section.

The five discourse structures of Schiffrin’s model do not totally match those which are the object of analysis in this study. Exchange (turn-taking) and action (participants speech acts organization) structures do not actively operate in narratives; ideational structure, participation framework and informational state do.

Schiffrin's work on discourse markers meant the opening up of future research on a subfield of inquiry that at the time presented, and to a large extent still presents, great confusion, in both methodological and conceptualising terms. The model has been questioned and reviewed by recent theoretical and field work. Hence, Marsà (1992: 90) highlights the lack of specification of the 'marking intensity' of the units treated by Schiffrin as discourse markers. Certainly, in a linking intensity degree scale, a *but* with an adversative function, for example, is not at the same level as *well* or *oh*. In Sander's terms, the *sources of coherence* are different. Whereas the conjunction presents a contrast between two propositions in such a way that its omission might lead the listener or reader to a confusion,⁵⁷ the interjections signal a communicative intention or reorientation of the message that do not alter the propositional content of the preceding or following utterance or segment. Following Marsà's argumentation, although Schiffrin certainly suggests a graduality in terms of form (grammatical) versus function (discourse) in such a way that conjunctions and temporal deictics have more propositional content than particles and lexicalized clauses, the way she defines discourse markers ("elements which bracket units of talk") leaves the range of linguistic devices with a potential discourse marker function too loose.

Nonetheless, the main criticism of Schiffrin's discourse model will come from computational linguists (Polanyi and Martin 1991) and from Redeker (1990, 1991). Polanyi and Martin (1991) argue that Schiffrin does a very thorough descriptive work on functions of markers but does not provide a characterization of discourse structure that accounts for their presence.⁵⁸ Redeker had treated discourse markers in depth when writing her dissertation on language use in informal narratives.⁵⁹ She carries out an exhaustive and rigorous revision of Schiffrin's work:

"This model of discourse coherence is intended to link the discourse markers' inherent lexico-grammatical contribution to their contextualized interpretation. I will argue that DS's [Deborah Schiffrin's] minimalist approach to the semantics of discourse markers places too heavy a burden on the syntactic and contextual determination of marker meanings." (1991: 1139)

In the coming section, Redeker's revision of Schiffrin's model and treatment of discourse markers is presented and discussed. Based on Redeker's proposal, I will suggest an integration of pragmatic markers in a discourse coherence model.

3.3.1.2 *Markers in Redeker*

Redeker's evaluation of Schiffrin's model comprehends both theoretical and methodological issues. As for the theoretical comments, Redeker maintains that Schiffrin's five planes of talk do not contribute to discourse coherence equally. Whereas the *information state* and *participation framework* "concern individual

utterances”, the others are related to “relational concepts” (Redeker 1991: 1162).

“The speaker’s information status and attitude should better be seen as contributing indirectly to coherence by motivating the speaker’s choices at the pragmatic planes: markers function in action or exchange structures by virtue of indicating or predicating changes in the speaker’s cognition and attitudes.” (Redeker 1991: 1162)

The conception of the relational components, i.e. ideational, exchange and action structures, is reviewed as well. Thus, Redeker points out the “haziness” of the notion of *ideational structure*, used as synonymous of *propositional* (1991: 1162). If the ideational structure comprehends ‘cohesive, topic and functional relations’, it means that (i) cohesive links are included (which is not the case, as Schiffrin indicates in pp.53–61); (ii) that, consequently, the range of relations is wider than just propositional since it includes functional relations. The change Redeker proposes in the definition of ideational structure is “in terms of *relations predicated of the world the discourse describes*⁶⁰ (as opposed to relations that hold between discourse units of any kind)” (1991: 1163).

Around the notion of *exchange structure* Redeker makes some insightful remarks that have important consequences for the study of monologued discourse. The difference between action and exchange structure is basically in terms of distributional differences in the way discourse markers are used. But the problem arises when, in the exchange structure, Schiffrin restricts their use to turn-taking, that is, to dialogues. According to Redeker, the notion should be extended to the wider notion of discourse *segmentation*:

“What an exchange structure (or rather: *segmentation*) marker indicates is whether the speaker wants to continue with a particular segment or considers it closed and wants to move on, for instance by taking or relinquishing the turn, or by simply using the marker for segmentation inside her own turn. Turn transitions should thus be seen as a special case of discourse-segment transitions. Or, in a diachronically more adequate formulation, the sequential structure of monological discourse is a direct extension of the conversational turn-taking structure”. (1991: 1163)

Needless to say, Redeker’s comments involve an important change in the conception of the notion of turn-taking, widely used to refer to a minimum of two-participants-interaction holding a conversation, or in question-answer adjacency pairs. What Redeker claims is that back-channeling and turn-taking (moves) are part of the same component. The database oral narratives are not part of a conversational flow, strictly speaking. But taking into consideration Redeker’s redefinition of the term, it could be concluded that exchange structure *is* found in narratives.

In order to support the evidence of her claim, Redeker exemplifies it with the use of clause-final tags such as *y’know*, *all right?* and *okay?*, “used to signal the end of an event, episode, or aside even in strictly monological talk without any feedback

possibility.” Similarly, she mentions uses of *well* and *y’know* as turn initiators enquoting devices “to mark the transition from the speaker’s own talk to a direct-speech report.” (1991: 1163). In this line of argumentation, Redeker refers to the use of discourse markers as *push* or *pop* markers with a parenthetical discourse segment use, as suggested by Polanyi and Scha (1983) or Grosz and Sidner (1986), discussed in previous sections (3.2). According to Redeker, the *sequential-structuring function* of discourse markers is treated by Schiffrin quite unsystematically, since some uses of *but* or *so* with this function are assigned to action and exchange structures and participation framework (1991: 1164); similarly, some uses of *so*, *oh*, and *now* have the capacity to introduce a new segment, thus working as discourse-segment boundary signals.

Another interesting point Redeker evaluates is the notion of *marker discrimination*. The planes that Schiffrin proposes do not account for it. The model has to resort to additional lexico-grammatical, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic specifications. Redeker proves this claim by filling the slots of Schiffrin’s chart of functions of discourse markers (Figure 3) with other uses of the same markers that could be attributed to the unfilled planes. The result is that, in the end, only three cells are left empty (1991: 1159). Furthermore, the minimal meaning attached to the markers analyzed by Schiffrin appears to be insufficient, as far as marker discrimination is concerned. Thus, in Redeker’s words, “the core meaning should specify the marker’s intrinsic contribution to the semantic representation that will constrain the contextual interpretation of the utterance” (1991: 1164). Whenever there is minimal core meaning, distributional differences should be taken into account.

Methodological issues are evaluated by Redeker as well. This author considers that Schiffrin’s study lacks theoretical grounding and follows, therefore, too inductive a methodological approach. As Schiffrin herself admits in her study, she starts by analyzing the data — discourse marker use in conversation — without a previous theoretical framework as a starting point. The result is, as suggested by Redeker, “flexible, rather eclectic use of theoretical concepts and analytical methodology, which unfortunately leads to some disturbing inconsistencies” (1991: 1160). Reference to quantitative information is also present in Redeker’s evaluation of the study. Thus, although Schiffrin refers to ‘distributional’ and ‘sequential accountability’ (Schiffrin 1987a: 69–71), her interpretations are based on a few tests of distributional predictions and an unspecified amount of analyzed discourse material (1991: 1161).

Nevertheless, of all the discussion and remarks presented above, what will be fully integrated in the present study is Redeker’s different conceptual status of Schiffrin’s model. Thus, instead of Schiffrin’s five discourse planes, Redeker proposes three components of discourse coherence: (i) *ideational structure*, (ii) *rhetorical structure*, and (iii) *sequential structure* (1991: 1167–68).

- The *Ideational structure*, which is defined as: “Two discourse units are ideationally related if their utterance in the given context entails the speaker’s commitment to the existence of that relation in the world the discourse describes.” The relations are thus those found in temporal, cause, consequence, reason, elaboration, etc. types of sequence⁶¹
- The *Rhetorical structure*, which is defined as: “Two discourse units are considered to be rhetorically related if the strongest relation is not between the propositions expressed in the two units but between the illocutionary intentions they convey.” The relations are, in this case, related to “the listener’s or reader’s conception of the discourse purpose.” Examples are evidence, justification, conclusion, and so forth.
- The *Sequential structure*, which is defined as: “When two adjacent discourse units do not have any obvious ideational or rhetorical relation — while still being understood as belonging to the same discourse — their relation is called sequential” (1990: 369). *Sequential transitions* can be related to two kinds of relations between two adjacent discourse segments: (i) paratactic or (ii) hypotactic.⁶²

The first component establishes semantic relations; the latter two establish pragmatic ones. However, there is a difference between the second and third. Although both are pragmatic, while the second is related to illocutionary intentions of the speaker, the third deals with all those relations attached to discourse structure, that is, the ‘sequential’ relations among segments. The significant role of markers as discourse segments structuring devices was stated in previous pages, when Grosz and Sidner work was discussed at length. The application of the sequential component onto the structuring of a narrative is manifest since it follows a segmental pattern (abstract, orientation, developing of action, evaluation, result and coda).

Hence, according to Redeker (1991: 1167), the three components “are roughly equivalent to Schiffrin’s ideational and action structures and an extended variant of her exchange structure. A crucial difference lies in the conceptual status of these structures.”

The three planes are thus defined in coherence relation terms, following Sander’s *source of coherence* framework presented in the previous section (3.2.), independently of discourse markers functions. This is actually pointed out by Redeker, who considers that Schiffrin’s five planes of talk are only operative in relation to the functions displayed by markers: “It is not clear in such a model whether and how coherence options can be realized without a discourse marker being used” (1991: 1167).⁶³

Redeker’s discourse structures offer a clear-cut distinction between semantic and pragmatic coherence relations. From this frame, she proposes the following classification of discourse markers (1990): (i) *markers of ideational structure*, and

(ii) *markers of pragmatic structure*.⁶⁴ She defines *discourse marker* as “a linguistic expression that is used to signal the relation of an utterance to the immediate context” (1990: 372).⁶⁵

The author’s classification only contemplates inter-clausal relations, not intra-clausal ones. The clauses have to be tensed clauses, which include embedded and subordinate clauses. Reduced clauses, fragments and false starts are left aside. The relations between tensed clauses are expressed by means of conjunctions, adverbials, interjections, and comment clauses, considered markers only if they fit into the functional definition (1990: 371).

The classification of both types of discourse markers is the following (1990: 372–374):⁶⁶

1. *Markers of ideational structure*, which are of three kinds:
 - a. *Simple connectives*. They include *that* subordinator (with sentential complements), and the relative pronouns *that*, *who* and *which*, with their variants. *And* and *or* are excluded. The former because it is considered an “unmarked mode of connection” in narratives⁶⁷ and the latter because it is usually an editing self-repair form.
 - b. *Semantically rich connectives*, which are conjunctions and adverbial connectives that signal a semantic relation. Examples of these are the adversative *but*, question words introducing embedded questions (*what*, *how*, *why*, etc.), temporal connectives (*when*, *as*, *while*, *meanwhile*; *(and) then*, *next*, *now*, *before*, *after*, etc.) and causal conjunctions (*because*, *so*). In this category, there are only clause-initial connectives.⁶⁸
 - c. *Other temporal adverbials*, which comprehend those not considered in (b). Their position is, in this case, utterance-internal or final. Units that specify the time of the event in the current utterance in relation to the time expressed in the preceding one are: *now*, *then*, *after that*, and *all this time*. Similar uses of locative expressions belong to this class, too.
2. *Markers of pragmatic structure*, which include pragmatic uses of conjunctions, connective uses of interjections, and discourse-structuring uses of comment clauses.
 - a. *Pragmatic uses of conjunctions*. This refers to conjunctions which are considered to have a pragmatic use “if the semantic relation between the conjoined utterances does not correspond to the propositional meaning of the conjunction”. In this classification, the author includes *(and) so*, to mark the speaker’s summing-up or conclusion (often found in narratives), *because*, to evidence a relation (totally distinct from the semantic causal relation), and *but*, used to signal the return to the main discourse after a digression or aside (similarly, very different use from the semantic adversative relation).

- b. *Interjections*. These include utterance-initial uses of *oh*, *all right*, *okay*, *anyway*, and *well*. Also utterance-final tags like *okay?* or *right?*, with the main function of eliciting acknowledgment from the listener and signal discourse segment boundaries in monologues (e.g. narratives).
- c. *Comment clauses*. These usually occur, as do interjections, at the beginning of direct quotes. In this case, they function as ‘enquoting devices’ (Schourup 1985). It is not always easy to see if they are in or out of the direct quote. Comment clauses include units such as *you know* (*y’know*), *I mean* and *mind you*.

Following Redeker’s proposal, my research interests lie in discourse markers found in the pragmatic structure of English and Catalan narratives. These lexical items will be called *pragmatic markers* and will be considered a type of discourse marker.

Redeker’s proposal facilitates the subdivision of discourse markers in two clear-cut distinct categories, separating those which display relations linked to the world that the discourse describes — temporal, causal, reason, consequence, and elaboration types of sequences — that is, semantic/ideational, from those which are related to the illocutionary intentions and to discourse segmentation, both of these pragmatic.

In sum, two distinct, but at the same time complementary, proposals of discourse coherence models have been evaluated. They both share a common goal, which is to account for the function of discourse markers in a monological or dialogical text. Schiffrin proposes a model with five planes of talk, the function of discourse markers being that of bridging them all. In this framework, these lexical items function as index devices that work as ‘contextual coordinates of talk’. Redeker’s proposal, on the other hand, restricts the five planes to three. These reflect and differentiate semantic from pragmatic coherence relation types. Although both of them apparently are based on a similar discourse model, a close analysis tells us that this is not the case. Schiffrin’s analysis of conversational data results in a theoretical framework that explains the functions of discourse markers in relation to their context. Her methodological approach is inductive. Redeker’s proposal, in contrast, is based on formal discourse structure models (Grosz and Sidner 1986, Mann and Thompson 1988, Polanyi 1988, among others) that set the ground for the classification of discourse markers in two different categories; they reflect two distinct coherence relations widely discussed in the literature and in the preceding pages.

The following section will be devoted to two frameworks that have treated discourse markers from a rather different perspective. Their referents are not so much linguistic as cognitive. They are thus based on mental processes that account for the presence of certain linguistic phenomena at both the sentential and the discourse level. The reason why they are presented and discussed is because some of their points will be integrated in the final proposal (3.4).

3.3.2 Discourse markers as interpretive signals of discourse

A text can be approached from different perspectives depending on the inquiry interests of the discourse analyst. Hence, broadly speaking, a formal approach concentrates on *how* the text is structured; a functional perspective focuses on the *purpose* of the text; finally, a cognitive approach aims at discovering *why* the text is structured in a particular way. The following lines present and discuss the work on discourse markers of those researchers working within the cognitive approach. Their concern is mainly about explanatory issues, not including descriptive ones.

The usefulness of this approach for the present study lies on the twofold nature that the proposal made in this book attaches to markers and that was presented in previous pages under two broad macrofunctions: (i) markers as text-structuring devices; (ii) markers as inferential facilitators that help the hearer interpret the intended message. The first macrofunction was presented and discussed through Schiffrin's and Redeker's work. Now, the aim is to present and discuss the second suggested macrofunction through two main works, that of Relevance-based approaches to markers (cf. Relevance Theory: Sperber and Wilson 1986) and that of the Geneva School, which proposes a modular approach that brings points of interest to the matter.

Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986) approaches linguistic phenomena within a general view of human cognition. According to the theory, they are integrated in the study of human communication. The approach to utterance interpretation proposed by Sperber and Wilson aims at providing a satisfactory explanation to linguistic occurrences which, according to them, are not well-accounted for from truth-based and coherence-based approaches. Hence, a relevance-based pragmatic criterion approaches what they call *bridging* differently: it fills the gaps through inferences.⁶⁹ Sperber and Wilson's theory has created a following in many subfields of linguistic inquiry. As far as the study of discourse markers is concerned, there have been a large number of studies that have taken its theoretical grounding and have accounted for the presence of markers in discourse — named *discourse connectives* by Blakemore — in purely cognitive terms (Blakemore 1987 and 1992, Blass 1990, Brockway 1982, Nolke 1990, Jaubert 1993, Andersen and Fretheim 2000, among the most representative ones).

Part of the theoretical framework of the Geneva School comes from Relevance Theory but theirs is a reflex of interdisciplinarity. Their common interest has turned around the study of those linguistic cues that present some problems if analyzed only in strictly grammatical and semantic terms. The Geneva School linguists have named them *pragmatic connectors*.

3.3.2.1 *Relevance-based approaches to markers*

According to Wilson and Sperber, “relevance, and the maximisation of relevance, is the key to human cognition” (1994: 91). Thus, cognitive processes aim at achieving the greatest possible effects with the smallest processing effort. Communication involves calling for attention. Hence, a communicative event is possible because the speaker makes an effort to conform to the hearer’s expectation of *optimal relevance*; otherwise, s/he risks being misunderstood (Sperber and Wilson 1986: vii). Sperber and Wilson sustain that the *principle of relevance* is enough to account for utterance interpretation at both semantic and pragmatic, i.e. contextual, levels. They spell out the presumption of optimal relevance and the principle of relevance in the following way (1986: 158):

Presumption of optimal relevance

- a. The set of assumptions which the communicator intends to make manifest to the addressee is relevant enough to make it worth the addressee’s while to process the ostensive stimulus.
- b. The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the communicator could have used to communicate.

Principle of relevance

Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance.

The basic linguistic text features of cohesion, understood as the formal connectivity of texts, and coherence, viewed as connectivity at a deeper semantic level, do not, according to the authors, provide a satisfactory explanation for all those context-related cases of utterance interpretation.⁷⁰ Hence, a text can show both text properties and yet be incomprehensible to the reader or listener since s/he does not see *the point* of it, that is, its relevance; the appropriate pragmatic link between text and context is lacking (Blass 1990: 19). Wilson and Sperber claim that all that is verbally communicated is not linguistically encoded (1990: 18). Hence, an utterance can convey two distinct types of meaning: propositional and illocutionary. Propositional information is representational, i.e. truth-based, and descriptive; non-propositional information is computational and procedural. The former deals with propositions; the latter with the way these propositions are to be manipulated and understood (1990: 14). Both of them can be linguistically encoded or not. The issue of message codification and decodification is one of the central points of interest for Relevance Theory. Thus, Sperber and Wilson have severely criticised those approaches which are strictly semiotic, claiming that an adequate pragmatic theory should go beyond semantic representation and deal with other discourse phenomena commonly found in everyday speech (1986: 36). Linguistic communication, they sustain, also

involves stylistic effects such as irony or metaphoric use of language, semantic indeterminacies, implicits, ambiguities, figurative interpretations and illocutionary force. They claim that a sound pragmatic theory should provide a theoretical framework that accounts for all of these linguistic issues.

Sperber and Wilson state that the Gricean cooperative principle does not, on its own, explain why utterances are interpreted in the way they are. Hence, without denying its validity and plausibility, they go a step further. Following Grice's argumentative line, the authors conclude that an information will be relevant if it provides *contextual implications*. In this case, the listener will not only understand the propositional content of the message, but will not pose the feared question, *so?* or *so what?*, expecting to find further implications to the information he receives (Blakemore 1987: 48). In order to achieve contextual implications, the speaker's *contextual assumptions* interact with the listener's existing assumptions about the world.⁷¹ The result is a series of *contextual effects*. Thus, "the more contextual effects an information has, the more relevant it will be" (Wilson and Sperber 1994: 93). Contextual effects can be derived from contextual assumptions for three possible reasons: (i) to draw a contextual implication; (ii) to strengthen an existing assumption; and (iii) to eliminate and/or contradict an existing assumption (1986: 108–117). The contextual assumptions supplied by the speaker are, in Sperber and Wilson's terms, *implicatures*.

Implicatures do not contribute to the propositional content of the utterance, nor do they convey additional information. Their only role is "to guide the interpretation process by specifying certain properties of context and contextual effects" (Blakemore 1987: 72). Since in a relevance-based framework the aim is to minimize processing costs, the use of linguistic expressions that carry out this task will be highly significant and valued. Hence, according to Blakemore (1992: 135–7), a *discourse connective* will constrain or inhibit the possible interpretations of an utterance becoming, in the author's words, a "constraint on implicatures". The following examples, supplied by the author (1992: 136), illustrate this claim:

- (24) a. Barbara isn't in town. **So** David isn't here.
 b. Barbara isn't in town. **After all**, David isn't here.
 c. Barbara isn't in town. **Moreover**, David isn't here.
 d. Barbara isn't in town. **However**, David isn't here.

According to Blakemore, the connection established by *so* and *after all*, in particular, require the elaboration of a contextual assumption on the hearer's part: *Whenever David isn't here, Barbara is in town*. There is a difference, though, pointed out by the author, between (a) and (b). Whereas the speaker in (a) suggests that the hearer does not know about David not being there, in (b) the hearer does know about it. Blakemore concludes that the use of *after all* introduces a relevant utterance in the sense that it works as a reminder to the hearer (1992: 137).

Blakemore (1992: 137–142) classifies *discourse connectives* following the aforementioned three conditions under which a hearer interprets information conveyed by an utterance, i.e. yields contextual effects: (i) derivation of contextual implications; (ii) strengthening of an existing assumption; and (iii) contradiction of an existing assumption.

(i) *Discourse connectives which introduce contextual implications.*

This type of connectives does not necessarily have to link or connect two segments of texts; their role is to bring about and constrain contextual implications. Such is the case of *so* and *therefore* in the following contexts and examples supplied by Blakemore (1992: 139):

- (25) A: You take the first turning on the left.
 B: So we don't go past the university (then).
- (26) (Hearer (who is driving) makes a left turn)
 So we're not going past the university (then/after all).

As pointed out by Blakemore, the role of *so* in these examples is to introduce a contextual implication of an assumption already made attainable. In the first case, such introduction will be accomplished by the preceding utterance from the interlocutor; in the second case, by the assumption the speaker has derived from observation. Nevertheless, there is a further example, also provided by Blakemore, that shows the interlocutor's interest in knowing the relevance of the utterance:

- (27) A: Your clothes smell of perfume.
 B: So (what)?

In this case, B, by means of a rhetorical question, is trying to draw a conclusion from A. In Blakemore's words, "a proposition that is introduced by *so* must be interpreted as a conclusion." (1992: 139). On a similar line behaves *therefore*, the only difference being that *so* can always be substituted by *therefore*, but not the other way round. The reason is, according to the author, the register issue (*so* is more informal).

- (28) This suggestion can be cancelled without contradiction. **Therefore / So** it is an implicature.
- (29) A: Your clothes smell of perfume.
 ?B: **Therefore** (what)?

(ii) *Discourse connectives concerned with strengthening.*

The aim of these connectives is varied: (a) to strengthen the interlocutor's assumptions set in the preceding utterance (*after all, indeed*); (b) to provide additional evidence for an assumption coming from the preceding utterance (*besides, moreover, furthermore, utterance-initial also*). Blakemore (1992: 140) provides the following examples:

- (30) You have to have another drink. *After all* it is your birthday.
 (31) A: Will you make pancakes?
 B: I haven't really got time tonight. *Besides* there's no milk.⁷²

According to the author, the use of this device draws the hearer to conclude that 'B will not make pancakes'.

(iii) *Discourse connectives which introduce denials*

Connectives which carry out this role (*however, still, nevertheless, but*) are those which introduce an utterance that presents evidence of inconsistency with the previous one. The hearer can or cannot believe it, depending the degree of evidence he has. Blakemore presents one example with *however* (1992: 141):

- (32) David is here. **However**, you can't see him.

In this case, the speaker assumes that the hearer has contextual implications to believe that he can see David; by using *however*, he cancels them. In Blakemore's words: "The use of *however* indicates how the speaker thought the hearer would have interpreted the first utterance" (1992: 142). Moreover, the author points out that the other units that have a similar denial role do not necessarily impose the same constraints; thus, they are not interchangeable.

As pointed above, the meaning of all these units is not representational but procedural. In this respect, Blakemore states:

"understanding utterances involves the construction of mental (propositional) representations which undergo inferential computations (...) *But, after all, moreover* and inferential *so* do not contribute to a propositional representation, but simply encode instructions for processing propositional representations." (1992: 149–150)

On similar argumentative lines, Brockway (1982) refers to the role of *after all, actually, anyway, now, still* and *well* as "*mots soumis à des contraintes trans-dérivationnelles context-sensitives*" (1982: 9) ["words subject to context-sensitive transderivational constraints"]. The author's hypothesis around this notion is that well-formed utterances plausibly depend on the context and do not rely on truth-based conditions. Moreover, contrary to Grice's conversational principles, context-sensitive constraints are not universal since they always depend on the contextual use of particular lexical devices. These devices do not only generically reveal the relevance of a linguistic segment, but a particular context-specific type of relevance as well (1982: 11–12). The role of a *connector*, in Brockway's terms, is to establish a relationship between the linguistic segment it affects and the context, which is to be understood as "*l'ensemble de croyances de la personne du point de vue de laquelle a lieu la description de l'énonciation*" (1982: 16,21) ["the set of beliefs of the person from whose point of view the description of the enunciation stems"].

Likewise, based on a relevance framework, Nolke (1990) studies the role of *illocutionary adverbs* as “*modalisateurs d’énonciation*.”⁷³ Thus, the main function of these linguistic devices (*sérieusement, à vrai dire, franchement, en fin de compte*, and so forth) would be, contrary to adverbial connectors and utterance connectors, to guide the hearer onto the interpretation of the message (1990: 109). In this respect, Nolke establishes a parallel between the role of illocutionary adverbs as inference facilitators and Blakemore’s discourse connectives; in both cases, they function as semantic constraints on relevance, concludes the author (1990: 114).⁷⁴

The perspective taken by Nolke on illocutionary adverbs as “*modalisateurs d’énonciation*” is followed by Jaubert (1993), though this author refers to the adverbials she analyzes (*à propos, que je te dise*, among others) as *pertinentiseurs*.⁷⁵ According to Jaubert, *pertinentiseurs* are to be found in the middle of the continuum formed by *modalisateurs*, in one extreme, and *connectors*, in the other. It could be said that they are units meant to bridge the gap between purely semantic links and pragmatic cues:

“... situer le *pertinentiseur* entre deux postes énonciatifs, la modalisation d’énonciation, qui participe aux contours de l’acte illocutoire véhiculé, c’est-à-dire donne une instruction quant à l’interprétation de l’énoncé, et le connecteur pragmatique qui, prioritairement, agit comme un élément de liaison” (1993: 323).

“... place de *pertinentiseur* between two enunciative spaces, the modalisation of the enunciation, which participates in the illocutionary act taking place, that is to say, it provides the instructions as far as the interpretation of the utterance is concerned, and the pragmatic connector, which has a primary linking role.”

Jaubert presents specificities not to be found in the other above mentioned works. The notion of continuum is, to a certain extent, not commonly found among research related to *markers* and *connectors*.⁷⁶ The study of lexical units whose role is not grammatically clear-cut usually falls either in one extreme or the other. Hence, generally speaking, the literature on discourse markers only discusses illocutionary force and speaker’s intentions, but does not highlight the linking property of these lexical units.⁷⁷ On the other hand, studies on *connectors* put their weight on their linking semantic and syntactic functions, leaving aside, in most cases, their important pragmatic role. In both cases, the inferential component is presented quite unsystematically. Under the term *pertinentiseur*, Jaubert includes the pragmatic, semantic and structuring roles carried out by both *markers* and *connectors*. Her approach shows some points of encounter with Redeker’s model, discussed above.

When brought to genre-specific terms, the notion of relevance is to be seen as a cognitive rule that governs the discourse unit as a whole. Thus, Blass (1990) points out that narratives start by the narrators’ setting of place, characters and time

referents because their ultimate aim is to show the listener the optimal relevance of the accounted events. Thus, in each narrative segment the speaker will try to introduce enough adequate contextual assumptions that yield the necessary contextual effects that the listener requires to achieve the optimal relevance at a minimum processing cost. Finally, “where there are several peaks of relevance, perhaps culminating in a single, overall peak, the result should be the sort of paragraph structure so often noted in narrative texts” (Blass 1990: 77). Hence, in relevance terms, the link between narrative segments is possible because the interpretation of a piece of information found in a former segment is used to build up the interpretation of the information found in the following one, and so on. Connectivity between segments responds, in this way, to a principle of relevance whose source is the narrator’s will to convey to the interlocutor that there is a reason behind his/her words, that is to say, that there is *a point* worth paying attention to. It is in this sense that a narrative displays “unity of meaning” (Blass 1990: 78–9).

Within a relevance-based framework, Blass studies the role of certain *particles* in Sissala oral narratives. Thus, according to the author (1990: 82), the role of *paragraph markers* or *discourse-unit markers* in the structuring of the narrative is to guide the interpretation process. Since a break in context continuity usually coincides with a break between paragraphs, “a marker at the beginning of a paragraph has the function of preparing the hearer for such breaks” (1990: 82). In this sense, Blass points out that these markers fall within the category of *discourse connectives* analyzed by Blakemore (1987).

Relevance-based approaches to markers offer insightful explanations to their role in discourse but the view held in this book is that not all their properties can be accounted for in relevance terms, i.e. contextual implications. First of all, taking into account that the aim of a discourse analyst can be the study of the form (*how* a text is structured), the function (the *purpose* of the text) and/or the procedural cognitive aspect of a text (*why* it is constructed the way it is), not necessarily *all* linguistic phenomena have to fall within the same basket, that is, not all require a relevance-based approach. Different inquiry interests require different methodological and theoretical approaches. Thus, without diminishing or putting down the importance of one of these aspects over another, an ethnomethodologist who is interested in the conversational mechanisms of an ethnic group may not be interested in the reasons why such and such adjacency pairs occur, if the aim is to find out the systematicity and regularity of certain discourse patterns in the conversational discourse of that specific ethnic group. It is plausible that the cognitive aspect that accounts for such discourse structure is on a second plane of interest or is non-existent at all. Secondly, setting up different text types does not say much about the function and reason why they are structured in that particular way and, again, if the aim of the researcher is to delimit structural differences, a relevance-based frame-

work will not be of much help. Thus, the conclusion would be that not all linguistic phenomena can be analyzed in *exclusively* cognitive terms.

In the following section a more holistic approach to markers is offered. The Geneva School work makes an attempt to integrate structural, illocutionary and inferential components that account for the presence of markers in discourse. Their view will be considered in the proposal on how to integrate markers within a discourse coherence model (3.4).

3.3.2.2 *The Geneva School: markers in the modular approach*

Linguists in the Geneva School integrated the findings of the Argumentation Theory (Anscombe and Ducrot 1983), and of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986).

Argumentation Theory, mainly developed around the notion of poliphony, found earlier in the work of the philosopher Bakhtine⁷⁸ (1977), concludes that all discourses have an argumentative orientation that leads towards a conclusion. Thus, departing from the notion of *visée argumentative*,⁷⁹ Ducrot (1983) differentiates the role of an *argumentative connector*, which carries out a purely argumentative (logico-semantic) function, from that of an *argumentative operator*, which does not modify the truth-based conditions of the utterance and sets the conditions under which it is to be interpreted (1983: 9). The former, generally referred to in the literature as *connectors*, “*sont des signes qui peuvent servir à relier deux ou plusieus énoncés, en assignant à chacun un rôle particulier dans une stratégie argumentative unique*” (1983: 9) [“are signs that can be used to link two or more utterances, assigning to each of them a particular role in a unique argumentative strategy”]. The latter, on the other hand, have an argumentative potential but operate within one single utterance. Argumentative operators restrict both conclusions and possible interpretations. Finally, unlike argumentative connectors, argumentative operators are not constrained to fulfil a propositional chaining function towards a conclusion but fulfil a pragmatic role that argumentative connectors leave on a second plane.

Moeschler (1983, 1989, 1992, 1994), Lusher (1993, 1994) and Roulet (1985, 1991, 1997) are representative figures of the Geneva School research. Whereas the former two closely followed Wilson and Sperber’s Relevance theoretical findings, Roulet concentrated more on the linguistic mechanisms found in text poliphony and discourse acts. According to Moeschler, pragmatic connectors and argumentative operators are among the morphemes that signal both coherence and relevance. According to Lusher (1993: 174–5), the reasons why the instructions carried out by connectors are pragmatic are: (a) because they guide message interpretation; (b) because it is the *principle of relevance* the one that moves the inferential interpretative process; (c) because, within a lexical unit, we can differentiate two properties: one constant — as *semantic operator* — and one variable — as *pragmatic connector*.

Moeschler and Luscher's work couple illocutionary and inferential pragmatics and discourse structure. Roulet proposes a *modular* approach that integrates the structural and inferential factors, found in hierarchical and relational modules, respectively. He explains the role of markers from these two modules in particular. Let us see it in the following lines.

The three components that form the skeleton of the modular model are: (a) linguistic; (b) textual; and (c) situational. All of them can be analyzed independently. Figure 4 (Roulet 1997: 130) summarizes their sub-components:

| LINGUISTIC | TEXTUAL | SITUATIONAL |
|-------------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| – syntactic | – hierarchical* | – referential |
| – lexical | – relational* | – interactional |
| – grapho-phonical | – enunciative | – psychological |
| – semantic | – periodical | |
| | – informational | |
| | – compositional | |

Figure 4. Roulet's modular approach to discourse structures. The asterisk shows those modules which account for the presence and function of *discourse markers* and *connectors* (bold face indicates the dominant modules).

The linguistic component is formed by the syntactic, lexical, phonological and semantic modules that reflect the corresponding structures of discourse. A rich linguistic tradition accounts for their description at length (1997: 129). Consequently, Roulet concentrates on the other two, the textual and the situational. The textual component accounts for those discourse properties related to the text. Hence, the hierarchical module, formed by three levels, i.e. exchange, move and act, concerns hierarchical structure of surface textual constituents. It integrates dialogical and monological discourses.⁸⁰

According to Roulet, *discourse markers* — also referred to as *pragmatic connectives* (term used by Blakemore 1987) — are accounted for in the hierarchical and relational modules, in the textual component⁸¹ (1997: 134). The relational module interrelates textual constituents and information coming from the encyclopedic knowledge, the co-text, the immediate situation or from derived inferences.⁸² Roulet defines *discourse marker* as follows:

“We define *discourse markers* as linguistic units which give instructions on hierarchical relations between discourse constituents and/or pragmatic relations between discourse constituents and information stored in what Berrendoner (1983) calls discourse memory (information which may come from the co-text, from the context, or from inferences which are derived from one or the other.” (1995: 3)

He draws a parallel between his account of discourse markers, framed in the modular approach, and Schiffrin's (1987a) proposal, integrated in a five-plane-discourse model. According to Roulet, both proposals converge because the two offer the possibility of dealing with a variety of discourse phenomena that other more restricted approaches lack. For instance, he pinpoints the differences between his and Blakemore relevance-based approach to discourse markers, which he considers ignores the importance of two key factors: (a) the hierarchical dimension of discourse; and (b) the notion of discourse units (1995: 2). Roulet classifies discourse markers into two categories that, according to him, fall into the hierarchical and relational modules: (a) *structure markers* and (b) *function markers* (1995: 5), respectively.

(a) *Structure markers* are semantically empty. They provide linear or hierarchical instructions between discourse constituents. Roulet exemplifies them alluding to Auchlin's 'conversational structure markers' (*bien, voilà*), Vincent's 'ponctuants' (*là*) and Turco and Coltier's 'markers of linear integration' (*d'une part, d'autre part*). (b) *Function markers* provide additional instructions on the illocutionary or interactive functions⁸³ of discourse constituents. 'Markers of interactive functions' (*parce que, après tout*) and 'markers of initiative and reactive illocutionary functions' (*n'est-ce pas?, en effet*) belong to this category.⁸⁴ However, Roulet suggests that there are significant differences among those markers that indicate argumentative relations. Hence, each lexical unit may require a specific analysis within a particular discourse module and, depending on the context, the function of a single unit might even be accounted for by means of distinct modules.⁸⁵

The relationship that Roulet establishes between module and marker classification presents some problems of adjustment. The tie between *structure markers* and the *hierarchical module* is easily drawn, but the connection between *function markers* and the *relational module* is not that clear. According to Roulet, this module has to do with information coming from encyclopedic knowledge, the context or derived inferences. It can be understood that the relational module is tied to the textual cognitive component. The way that this component ties in with markers that provide argumentative instructions on the interactions is difficult to see. If we go back to Sander's notion of *source of coherence* (pragmatic and semantic), the strong pragmatic content of the relational component is hard to correlate with the logico-semantic propositional content of argumentative markers.

Roulet's modular approach to discourse markers provides interesting similarities and parallelisms with models and proposals previously discussed.⁸⁶ On the other hand, a great number of linguists who do not belong to this group have similarly followed a line of inquiry that integrates distinct methodological and theoretical frameworks.⁸⁷ The following section offers the intersection of approaches just

discussed, and proposes the way that pragmatic markers can be integrated in a discourse coherence model.

3.4 Intersection of approaches and proposal: integration of pragmatic discourse markers in a discourse coherence model

The proposals discussed above broadly speaking suggest two major macrofunctions of discourse markers: (i) to display a discourse structuring function and, therefore, help sustain the discourse network; and (ii) to help the listener interpret the intended message by two means: signing the speaker's illocutionary intentions, and facilitating the interlocutor's possible inferences. Schiffrin's and Redeker's proposals have been discussed as models that deal with the first macrofunction; markers are elements that organize segments, ideas and actions. Relevance-based approaches, on the other hand, have a broad tendency towards the second macrofunction; markers are units that facilitate the sharing of the speaker and hearer's shared knowledge and the drawing of contextual effects. However, these two major macrofunctions are not exclusive of each other and show points of contact and parallelisms, as it is proposed and shown in Figure 5. The difference between Schiffrin and Redeker's Ideational and Pragmatic structure lies in their conceptual status, thoroughly discussed in previous sections. The main point of interest is possibly their different notion of 'ideational structure'. Schiffrin defines it as "cohesive, topic, and functional relations." Redeker's Ideational Structure, on the other hand, refers to the "speaker's commitment to the existence of the ideational relation in the world the discourse describes" (i.e. temporal, cause, reason, and so on). As pointed by Redeker when evaluating Schiffrin's model (3.3.1.2.), the former definition presents some inconsistencies since it includes relations which are not strictly semantic. It could be said that Redeker follows the *source of coherence* notion (Sanders 1997: 122), previously discussed (3.2), whereas Schiffrin doesn't.

Schiffrin's Exchange Structure is restricted to turn-taking conversational adjacency pairs, whereas Redeker's Sequential Structure broadens the notion to "relations between two adjacent discourse segments;" both monological and dialogical discourses are thus included in this definition. Finally, whereas Action Structure refers to the organization of speech acts, Rhetorical Structure refers to illocutionary intentions, which can plausibly embrace the first. As far as the Information State and Participation Framework are concerned, those are "relational concepts," that do not "concern individual utterances," unlike the other three discourse structures.⁸⁸ Thus, the Information State, which reflects the speaker's cognition, and the Participation Framework, which reflects the speaker's attitudes, are both cognitive components that affect the other three discourse structures directly, but which do

| | DISCOURSE COHERENCE RELATIONS | | | | |
|---------------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|
| | SEMANTIC | | P R A G M A T I C | | |
| | <i>Ideational Structure</i> | <i>Pragmatic Structure</i> | <i>Inferential Component</i> | | |
| SCHIFFRIN'S Discourse Structure | Ideational* Structure | Exchange* Structure | Action* Structure | Information* State | Participation* Framework |
| REDEKER'S Discourse Structure | Ideational* Structure | Sequential* Structure | Rhetorical* Structure | | |
| GROSZ & SIDNER | Linguistic Structure Attentional Structure | Intentional Structure* | | | |
| RELEVANCE-BASED APPROACH | | | | | Cognitive principle of human communication.* <i>Aim: optimal relevance at minimum processing cost</i> |
| ROULET'S MODULAR MODEL | · Semantic module <i>(Linguistic)</i> | · Hierarchical module* <i>(Textual)</i> | · Interactional module <i>(Situational)</i> | · Relational module* <i>(Textual)</i> | |
| | · Informational module <i>(Textual)</i> | · Periodical module <i>(Textual)</i> | · Enunciative module <i>(Textual)</i> | · Referential module <i>(Situational)</i> | |
| | | · Compositional module <i>(Textual)</i> | | · Psychological module <i>(Situational)</i> | |

Figure 5. Proposal of intersection of approaches (the diagram is described from top to bottom and from left to right. The asterisk shows the placement of discourse markers in discourse structure).

not represent, on their own, structures *per se*. It is in this respect that I propose to classify them under what I have named *Inferential Component*.

Grosz and Sidner's proposal has been included as representative of the group of linguists who work on the field of computational linguistics and whose main interest is to establish a link between discourse segments and those expressions used in natural language to signal the structure and coherence of the discourse. Markers — or cue phrases, as they regularly call them — are “the most distinguished linguistic means that speakers have for indicating discourse segment boundaries and conveying information about the DSP [discourse segment purpose]” (Grosz and Sidner 1986: 188). The intentional structure is the one that captures the DSP expressed in the linguistic segments as well as the relationships among them

(1986: 175). Since these relationships can be either pragmatic or semantic, the boundary between semantic and pragmatic components is blurred. Similarly, since theirs is a cognitive approach to linguistic phenomena, the inferential component is included too. As for the Attentional Structure, which “records the objects, properties, and relations that are salient at each point of the discourse” (1986: 175), it is suggested a possible correlation with the Semantic and Ideational Structure, although, in this case, the correspondence is not so clearly delimited. The same as Roulet’s Informational Module, this sort of structures deal with the progress of discourse information; the semantic component is closely related to the syntactic and pragmatic one.

The approaches based on Relevance Theory do not propose a particular discourse structure. The relevance-based research on discourse markers suggests that these lexical items are “semantic constraints on relevance” (cf. Blakemore). Without denying the validity of such claim, the view I hold is that the properties of these lexical devices cannot be reduced to the extreme of considering them elements whose unique role is purely inferential. Hence, as pointed out by authors whose work has been discussed in previous sections, the role that markers play as discourse segments structuring devices is essential (cf. Grosz and Sidner: *Intentional Structure*; Redeker: *Sequential Structure*; Schiffrin: *Exchange Structure*; Roulet: *Hierarchical Module*).

Roulet’s modular model and treatment of discourse markers is in fact situated at the boundary of those scholars who fully validate the structuring role of these elements and those who attach an intrinsic inferential function to them. In this sense, the Geneva School, and Roulet’s model in particular, bridges the gap between the two currents or macrofunctions presented above (3.3.1 and 3.3.2), and balances both perspectives (which, as previously stated, are by no means mutually exclusive). This balancing issue is valuable when reading the literature on the field of discourse markers. Probably for reasons having to do with scholarly traditions, there is often a divorce between those authors who strictly follow a descriptive empirical methodological approach, without the slightest mention of other textual levels of analysis worth taking into consideration — such as Roulet’s enunciative and relational textual components — and those who view these linguistic devices exclusively in procedural interpretive terms.⁸⁹

Finally, Roulet’s modular model covers all discourse planes, semantic and pragmatic. There is, however, a problematic issue related to his classification of markers within these modules. Roulet claims that discourse markers operate in the Hierarchical and Relational modules, that is, that they have a core structural and inferential function. But his classification does not really show a functional correspondence with the modules. Whereas the definition of *Structure Markers* (“semantically empty. They provide linear or hierarchical instructions between discourse

constituents”) fits perfectly within the notion of Hierarchical Module, the definition of *Function Markers* (“They provide additional instructions on the illocutionary or interactive functions of discourse constituents”), and its further sub-classification, does not totally adjust to the Relational Module concept. The question under debate is not the definition but the sub-category of *Function Markers* (*markers of interactive functions*). The dominant coherence relations that these markers set up are not pragmatic (i.e. inferential) but logico-argumentative. Considering this, *Markers of Interactive Functions* should correlate with the Semantic and Informational Modules, both under the *Semantic/Ideational Structure* (see Figure 5).

The attempts to clarify the status of discourse markers have been varied, similar to the numerous labels attached to them. Fraser (1999) offers an insightful approach and discussion on the issue. As he points out, there seems to be a general agreement that their core function is to signal a relationship between prior and following segment but, after the overview he provides, the question to pose is: what sort of relationship do markers signal? structural, involving an aspect of discourse management (rf. Schiffrin’ exchange structure; Redeker’s sequential component; Roulet’s hierarchical module)? inferential, involving constraints on implicatures and presuppositions (rf. relevance-based approaches)? illocutionary, guiding the speaker’s intentions, thoughts and actions (Schiffrin’s action structure; Redeker’s rhetorical component; Grosz and Sidner’s intentional structure)? or, finally, solely grammatical-pragmatic, making explicit the relationship between S1 and S2 (prior and following segments), as Fraser (1990: 936) suggests? Consideration should also be given to the approach taken by those researchers who study discourse markers under a discourse coherence framework (Hobbs 1985; Mann and Thompson 1988; Sanders et al. 1993; Knott and Dale 1994; Sanders 1997, among others), reviewed and discussed in previous pages and pointed out by Fraser too. In fact, my proposal is coherence relations be considered the backbone and basis of all the other approaches, since they provide the necessary information on the type of relationship and, therefore, possible interpretation of the segment or utterance introduced by the marker.

Fraser points out that a marker “reinforces a relationship between the segments S1 and S2 by virtue of the DM meaning, while on the other hand, the context, both linguistic and non-linguistic, elaborates and enriches the relationship based on the details present” (Fraser 1999: 946). One of the examples he provides to support such claim is the following (1999: 945):

- (33) a. She’s good looking. **But** he’s ugly as sin.
 b. He’s good looking. **But** that isn’t going to get him a job in this market.
 c. A: He’s late. B: **But** he’s not late at all.
 d. You say that Mary is coming. **But** we weren’t talking about Mary at all.
 e. A: James in not in his office. B: **But** I just saw him there.

The point made by Fraser is that there are not five (or more) possible *but*s, but that (i) the core meaning of the unit (adversative conjunction) indicates a relation of contrast between prior and following segments, and (ii) the discourse context (linguistic and non-linguistic) helps to derive a plausible interpretation. In addition, he suggests that discourse markers “have co-occurrence restrictions which are in complementary distribution with their conceptual counterparts.” If there is conceptual counterpart, the item “must be considered ambiguous” and, in either case, the meaning has to be stipulated (1999: 946). If the existence of a conceptual counterpart is acknowledged, that means that one lexical form can be considered discourse marker or not depending on the degree of descriptive or referential meaning it has and, consequently, on the type of relation it establishes between S1 and S2. Fraser (1999: 946) presents the examples of *and*, *after all* and *on the other hand* as units with conceptual counterparts (“difference in meaning between *and*, when used as a conjunction and when used as a DM”) and *as a consequence* and *in particular* with no conceptual counterparts. From Fraser’s argument, it is understood that the same would apply for a temporal adverbial *then* and a *then* pragmatized into a discourse marker, or a resultative *so* and a pragmatized *so*. The point is that having a conceptual counterpart involves setting up two different relation types with prior and following segments, one openly propositional or semantic, and the other pragmatic or discursive; one related to the ideas that the text describes, and the other related to the speaker’s intentions and attitudes.

Fraser’s insightful remarks on the different approaches to the status of discourse markers lead to draw the following conclusion: the polyfunctionality of these lexical units is directly related, first of all, to its propositional value and degree of lexicalization⁹⁰ and, second, to their semantico-pragmatic interface with, sometimes, blurred coherence relations boundaries. I propose an approach that takes the semantic versus pragmatic *source of coherence* (Sanders et al. 1993, Sanders 1997) as point of departure. It is true that the limits are sometimes fuzzy but, as Sanders sustains, there is always a dominant tendency. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, from the source of coherence notion two macrofunctions originate: (i) markers as structural cues (to help the speaker organize segments, intentions, ideas, thoughts and actions), and (ii) markers as interpretive cues (to link the text to the speaker and hearer’s cognitive context and shared knowledge; to help the hearer constrain possible inferences and presuppositions). These two macrofunctions emerge in the rhetorical and sequential pragmatic structures (Redeker 1990, 1991). The inferential component is not found in a specific structure but is present as cooperative principle of any communicative event and, in the case of markers, plays a key role (Blakemore 1987). Finally, I ascribe to the ideational structure (Redeker 1990, 1991) those relations which are logico-semantic argumentative, usually undertaken by units that have full referential meaning (Fraser’s conceptual counter-

parts above) and have traditionally been named in the literature *connectors*. They are not going to be dealt with in the present work although the ideational aspect will be touched on when dealing with markers whose functions are strongly tied to that component. Figure 6 presents the integrated proposal.

The distinction between two sorts of coherence relations facilitates, to a large extent, the understanding and treatment of pragmatic markers, lexical units that, as it has been seen, have little or no referential value but which have a core procedural meaning, that is, work as linguistic cues that specify how the segment they introduce is to be interpreted in relation to the prior.

As inference facilitators and restrictors, pragmatic markers help the listener constrain assumptions and presuppositions and bridge the gap between cognitive context and text-world. In addition, when dealing with *compound pragmatic markers* we will see that they work as valuable frame-shifters, making the closing and opening of new narrative segments easier. In the sequential structure, pragmatic markers are very often found at segment boundaries, working as cues that pop or push a discourse unit (Polanyi and Scha 1983) and convey information about the structure of the discourse. They also have a significant role at framing quoted




Figure 6. Proposal of the distribution of pragmatic discourse markers in the discourse structure components.

material (direct speech) found within the text. In the particular case of narratives, the development of the action is often initiated by a pragmatic marker.

The rhetorical structure is probably the one that is more directly linked to the presence of these lexical devices. They are used by speakers to guide the interlocutors through the text-world letting them know about their intentions, attitudes, beliefs, thoughts and actions. Moreover, by means of markers, speakers convey the required illocutionary force to the discourse unit. Consider, for instance, (34), a Catalan narrative. Jordi, the narrator, is explaining the problems that his brother once had when travelling by train from France. Note the presence of markers at segments shifts.

(34)

@Begin

@Participants: NAR20 Jordi Narrator

@Age of NAR: 29;

@Sex of NAR: male

@Bg: ocs

*NAR: <doncs_mira_> # era # el meu germà/.

<doncs_mira_> # it was my brother/

*NAR: va estar # estudiant\.

he was # studying\

*NAR: <bueno_> # toca la flauta\.

<bueno_> # he plays the flute\

*NAR: i va estar estudiant durant tres anys a # a Orleans # a França\.

and was studying for three years # in Orleans # in France\

*NAR: i # <bueno\> # eren # eren tres o quatre estudiants_.

and # <bueno\> # they were # they were three or four students_

*NAR: que vivien junts allà # en una casa\.

that lived all together there # in a house\

*NAR: i # em sembla_.

and # I think_

*NAR: que va ser per nadal_.

that it was at Christmas_

*NAR: que van tornar d'allà # amb tren\.

that they came back home # by train\

@Eg: ocs

@Bg: da/os

*NAR: <aleshores_> van # es van aturar un moment a_ #.

<aleshores_> they stopped # stopped for a moment at #

*NAR: no recordo_.

I don't remember_

*NAR: si era l'estació de Perpinyà o de_ # <bueno\> # allò just abans de

travessar la frontera\.

- if it was at Perpinyà train station or at _# <bueno\> # right before crossing the border\
 *NAR: per entendre'ns <eh/> o Narbona o # <bueno\> # una d'aquestes\
 you know what I mean <eh/> or Narbone or # <bueno\> one of those\
 @Eg: da/os
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: i # <bueno/> # per megafonia van dir_
 and # <bueno/> # through the loudspeakers it was announced_
 *NAR: que # que de fet el tren estaria aturat uns quants # uns minuts o _#
 that # that in fact the train would be stopped for # some minutes or _#
 *NAR: <bueno\> # van dir un un temps suficient com per #.
 <bueno\> # they said enough time to #
 *NAR: <vaja\> # que el meu germà va pensar\
 <vaja\> # that my brother thought\
 *NAR: <doncs_ mira\> # baix\
 <doncs_ mira\> # I get off\
 *NAR: truco\
 I call\
 *NAR: que encara no he avisat a casa\
 since I haven't called home yet\
 *NAR: i els hi dic_
 and I tell them_
 *NAR: <mira\> # que vindré.
 <mira\> # that I am coming.
 *NAR: he agafat aquest tren\
 I've taken this train\
 *NAR: estic a tal lloc\
 I'm at such and such place\
 *NAR: i # i vinc # <res\>.
 and # and I'm coming # <res\>.
 *NAR: aquesta tarda mateix estaré aquí\
 I'll be here this same afternoon\
 *NAR: <bueno\> # tarda no era <no/>.
 <bueno\> # it wasn't afternoon <no/>.
 *NAR: de fet era el # el vespre # nit <eh/>.
 in fact it was # evening # late evening <eh/>.
 *NAR: ah:: es # baixa\
 ah:: he # gets off\
 *NAR: sense res més que uns quants francs per trucar a casa\
 with nothing else than a few francs to call home\
 *NAR: i # es va trobar_
 and # he found himself_
 *NAR: que # en el moment en que baixava_
 that # the moment he got off_

- *NAR: i estava allà_.
and was there_
- *NAR: enganxa't al telèfon_.
talking on the phone_
- *NAR: trucant\
calling
- *NAR: <doncs_> que # el tren va agafar\
<doncs_> *the train suddenly*
- *NAR: i va marxar\
left
- *NAR: <aleshores_clar/> # es va trobar\
<aleshores_clar/> # *he found himself*
- *NAR: que no tenia documentació\
without identification
- *NAR: que no tenia només_.
that he only had_
- *NAR: que el què portava a sobre_.
what he had with him_
- *NAR: i que era un jersei prim i # res # ni cap maleta # res # absolutament res\
which was a thin pullover and # nothing # not even a suitcase
absolutely nothing
- *NAR: ah # <aleshores_> el # < bueno\ clar\> # el problema va ser\
ah # <aleshores_> the # < bueno\ clar\> # the problem was
- *NAR: diguem que els seus amics estaven dintre el tren\
his friends were in the train
- *NAR: però no # no van saber què fer\
but didn't # didn't know what to do
- *NAR: de manera que el tren va marxar\
so the train left
- *NAR: i # i ell es va quedar en allà\
and # and he remained there
- *NAR: li quedaven <res\> # molt pocs francs # de fet\
he had <res\> # very few francs left # in fact
- *NAR: i # <aleshores_> va pensar_
and # <aleshores_> he thought_
- *NAR: <bueno_> # i ara què faig/
<bueno_> # *and what am I going to do now/*
- @Eg: da
- @Bg: ee/i
- *NAR: perquè # <clar\> # no tenia ningun conegut en allà_ #
because # <clar\> # he didn't know anyone there_ #
- *NAR: <o sigui_> # la situació era bastant # bastant complicada <no/>.
<o sigui_> # *the situation was quite # quite complicated <no/>.*
- @Eg: ee/i

- @Bg: da
- *NAR: ah # i <aleshores_ bueno\> # l'assumpte es va resoldre_
 ah # and <aleshores_ bueno\> # the whole thing ended up_
- *NAR: que ell va # mmm # va trucar a casa\
 with him # mmm # calling home\
 \
- *NAR: amb els pocs francs que tenia\
 with the few francs he had\
 \
-
- (NAR20 Jordi)

Most of the above discourse markers are polyfunctional, their functions being ascribed to different discourse structures. Consider, for instance, the first lexical unit that opens up the narrative: <*doncs mira*>. It is a compound pragmatic marker that has: (i) a structural function because it is used by the narrator to open up the first narrative segment, in this case the orientation of characters and space; (ii) a rhetorical function given that it works as evidential, making the propositional content of the utterance that follows salient and indicating that the information which is about to be told is relevant; (iii) a cognitive role because it anchors the interlocutor in the narrative's world from the start, making him/her aware of the events taking place. Its scope is, therefore, three-dimensional, operating in the rhetorical, sequential and cognitive discourse structures/components. The second marker that follows, *bueno*, is used to reformulate the previous proposition and to add information that the narrator considers is relevant for the account. Certainly, the same propositional content could be conveyed without the presence of these and the following markers but, leaving aside the fact that their omission would result in lack of spontaneity and in a telegraphic text type, the illocutionary force that is needed to transmit that his brother was really in a dangerous or worrying situation, would be highly reduced. In addition, notice how markers help the speaker structure the text. After the orientation segment, Jordi initiates the development of the action by means of *aleshores*. It has a structural role, opening up a new discourse segment, and a text-world anchoring function since it places the hearer at the beginning of the complicating action. Note that *aleshores* works here as discourse marker, but it is a lexical unit that has a conceptual counterpart (temporal adverbial) with full referential meaning.⁹¹

Figure 6 above offers a theoretical framework that allows us to understand and deal with the polyfunctionality of markers. Later on, this proposal will be adopted as the framework within which to integrate their diversity of functions in oral narrative. From now on, the discussion and further analysis will concentrate on *pragmatic markers*, that is, those discourse markers that operate in the pragmatic discourse structure (Redeker 1990). The following section is devoted to the role that markers play in narrative structure.

3.5 Narrative structure and linguistic boundary marking

Literature on discourse processing mostly uses narrative as an example of a cognitive linguistic construction that dynamically unfolds over time (Schegloff 1982, Bamberg and Marchman 1991, Segal *et al.* 1991). A narrative is, in this sense, an interactional achievement “incrementally accomplished, rather than born naturally whole out of the speaker’s forehead, the delivery of a cognitive plan” (Schegloff 1982: 73).

According to Bamberg and Marchman, narrating a story implies two integrated cognitive processes, the “referential” process, which concerns the sequential unfolding of events, materialized in propositions linguistically encoded in sentences and clauses, and the “hierarchical” process, that is, the same linguistic units ordered according to the “global theme.” The result is a linguistic horizontal axis formed by bounded clauses and sentences, and a vertical thematic axis tied together by “the relevance of the particular propositions to the overall theme” (1991: 277). Bamberg and Marchman, whose research revolves around linguistic markings that identify transitions in the narrative structure, attempt to reconcile the above cognitive processes that respond to two narrative traditions not commonly found together (though the authors present Labov and Waletzky’s 1967 work as an exception to the rule). Thus, in the authors’ words, the referential narrative tradition, relying on production data, mainly investigates the way states and events are referred to in oral texts. Its inquiry interests center around how temporal events are sequentially ordered, focusing, in general, on the linguistic forms and links that make discourse cohesive.⁹² On the other hand, the hierarchical tradition attempts to account for the schemas and mental models or structures that are constructed in the cognitive process of the narrative understanding. These mental structures require that schemas which are not very relevant be embedded within more-relevant ones: “Narrating a story, according to this tradition, is a performance activity that is based on (and therefore presupposes) a conceptualization of hierarchical story structure” (Bamberg and Marchman 1991: 279). The linguistic form and conceptual structuring function bridging is thus explained by the authors in the following way:

“The choice of lexical or grammatical forms not only represents the speaker-event (referential) relationship, but at the same time the speaker-hearer (pragmatic) relationship, that is, it signals not only *what* we talk about, but at the same time *how* we talk about it, that is, how we want (what we talk about) to be understood.” (1991: 279)

The form-function issue brought up by Bamberg and Marchman is highly relevant for the study of narratives. It implies that whenever a speaker chooses a specific linguistic form to tell a story, this has a direct effect on the way events are to be

understood within the overall theme. In the authors' words, there is a complementary simultaneous process of *binding* and *unfolding* between 'local-level cohesive ties' and 'global-level hierarchy' of the narrative organization (1991: 279).

According to Bamberg and Marchman, linguistic marking that identifies transitions in the narrative structure is found at *episode boundaries*. However, the definition of *episode*, independent of linguistic information, is not uniform. Thus, the authors refer to Mandler (1984) and Tomlin's (1987) different views on the role of *episodes*, i.e. as structural units forming part of an invariant narrative structure, in a top-down process of text comprehension, or as conceptual paragraphs that operate in a bottom-up process of text production (Bamberg and Marchman 1991: 280–81).

The notion of *episode* is also elaborated, in similar referential and cognitive terms, by Van Dijk (1982), when discussing the episodic structure of newsstories:

“Roughly speaking, paragraphs or *episodes* are characterized as coherent sequences of sentences of a discourse, linguistically marked for beginning and/or end, and further defined in terms of some kind of ‘thematic unity’ — for instance, in terms of identical participants, time, location or global event or action.” (1982: 177)

Van Dijk, however, further distinguishes between ‘episode’ and ‘paragraph’. Hence, whereas the former constitutes “a semantic unit,” the latter is “the surface manifestation or the expression of such an episode” (1982: 177). The author characterizes an *episode* in the following terms: (a) it is a self-contained unit that forms part of a whole, defined in temporal terms with a beginning and an end; (b) the part and the whole follow a sequential order of events and actions; and (c) it is an identifiable independent unit. The result is, thus, “a sequence of propositions of a discourse that can be subsumed by a macroproposition” (1982: 179–80). *Episodes* necessarily involve ‘global goals’ that set up participants, actions and events. In the particular case of a narrative, the initial *episode* has a background function of setting (characters, place, time, participants, etc.). Such clearly defined text unit has what Van Dijk calls *episode markers*, that is, surface linguistic manifestations that delimit the episode boundaries⁹³ (1982: 181–82).

Other authors have referred to the above linguistic marking as *segmentation markers*,⁹⁴ devices that “point out specific aspects of the content of a text or express the semantic and pragmatic connections between discourse segments” (Bestgen and Vonk 1995: 387). Hence, the hypothesis held by Bestgen and Vonk is that *temporal segmentation markers* (*and, then, next, afterwards*) have a discourse structuring function of topic continuity and discontinuity that affect the processing of oral narratives.⁹⁵

In this argumentative line, Bestgen (1998) points out that *segmentation markers* are *traces* of production difficulties that occur when a new topic is introduced, and

signals to improve comprehension that indicate that there is a topic shift. In the first case, there are discourse production theoretical implications; in the second case, there are discourse comprehension ones. (1998: 755, 761). The use of *segmentation markers as traces* is specially patent in the retelling of a story (Chafe 1979, 1980), adds Bestgen, since the content of the story is retrieved in form of chunks of related events, not as a unified coherent and cohesive text. Thus, the markers occur because: “updating all these constituents and retrieving the next chunk is costly in terms of cognitive effort and causes the occurrence of traces of segmentation” (Bestgen 1998: 755).

Up to this point we have seen that the role of segment boundary markers in narrative structuring is twofold: referential and pragmatic, both properties tightly related and intertwined. However, the pragmatic cognitive approach seems to have, among researchers, a stronger acceptance than other plausible explanations of the function of markers in narratives. In fact, Segal et al. (1991) sustain that the presence of interclausal connectives in narrative structuring responds to a “mental model-deictic shift view,” in front of other theoretical accounts such as ‘the empty view’ (Stein and Glenn 1979, among others, for whom the interclausal relations are provided by a prior abstract schemata that does not require the presence of any linguistic mark), ‘the local cohesion view’ (Halliday and Hasan’s approach, for whom connectives mark the relationships between clauses), and ‘the global marker view’ (Schiffrin’s account, for whom discourse markers operate integrating or separating global units of discourse) (Segal et al. 1991: 28–31).

The ‘mental model-deictic shift view’, a cognitive approach, combines features from both local and global textual views, but suggests that interclausal connectives are cues that help to construct a mental model⁹⁶ (Johnson-Laird’s 1983) from a particular point of view:

“Once within the world of the story, the reader may be required to shift from one established deictic center to another, as when the story events shift to a new time, place, or character focus. The deictic shift perspective is supported by the use, in narrative text, of deictic terms to refer to times, objects, and events in the story world as well as to times, objects, and events in the world of the author and reader.” (Segal et al. 1991: 31)

Hence, according to the author, all the characters in the story imagine they are inside its conceptual world and interpret sentences along this line. Their perspectives may differ but they always assume that the story shows a continuity, i.e. *principle of continuity*,⁹⁷ which, unless there is a textual sign or cue that indicates the contrary, makes the reader or listener believe that meaning continuity is maintained. Continuity is, therefore, assumed by default; discontinuity requires the presence of a linguistic mark. The presence of an interclausal connective surely

conditions the interpretation of the following clauses since, conclude the authors, it is a signal of departure from continuity (Segal et al. 1991: 32).

The use of a cognitive frame to account for the role of discourse markers in specific text genres and typologies is common. Although the study of discourse markers has centered on the conversational genre, the function that these lexical devices have in the process of textual interpretation and production (Smith and Frawley 1983, Rudolph 1991, Berenguer 1995, Lenk 1998) has also been shown to be important in a variety of oral and written genres and typologies. Cognitive and referential models of language understanding try to account for the presence of these and other devices which facilitate the integration of large amounts of information.

3.6 Functions of pragmatic markers in oral narrative

I have proposed an integration of pragmatic markers in a discourse coherence model based on Redeker (1990).⁹⁸ Redeker suggests that markers of pragmatic structure are, together with markers of ideational structure, a type of discourse marker: “a linguistic expression that is used to signal the relation of an utterance to the immediate context” (1990: 372). I adopt her classification of markers of pragmatic structure as reference framework for my empirical analysis. According to Redeker, markers of pragmatic structure include pragmatic uses of conjunctions, connective uses of interjections and discourse structuring uses of comment clauses.

I maintain that the study of pragmatic markers in narrative structure has to take into consideration both the linguistic properties of the marker and the text-genre within which it operates. The characteristics of the text-genre have been largely discussed in Chapter 2. The analysis and discussion that follows explains the traits and functions of some of the pragmatic markers that are placed internally to and peripherally to narrative segments. In order to determine their functions, I draw the following six criteria:

1. Enunciative context of the discourse segment within which the pragmatic marker is found.
2. Descriptive/Referential meaning (i.e. semantics) of the marker.
3. Procedural meaning (i.e. inferential value) of the marker.
4. Propositional value of the utterance in which the marker occurs.
5. Prosody of the marker: rising, falling or flat final tone sequence.
6. Morphological structure of the marker: *simple* if formed by one lexical unit, or *compound* if formed by more than one unit.

The application of the above criteria resulted in a proposal of twenty three distinct functions undertaken by markers that set up pragmatic coherence relations. They have been classified according to the discourse structure/component whose definitory traits suggest a direct relationship with the marker's role. The proposal is explained and exemplified in the following section, and illustrated in Figure 7.




Figure 7. Distribution of functions of markers according to discourse structure components (from Figure 6).

3.6.1 Proposal: integration of functions in a discourse coherence model

The relationship between discourse structure and functions of markers will eventually allow us to observe and classify English and Catalan markers according to their main role in narrative structure: illocutionary — if mainly operating in the *rhetorical structure* — structural — if mainly operating in the *sequential structure* — or inference facilitator device — if its function is basically that of bridging text to cognitive context. The *ideational structure* is basically left aside, since the lexical units related to the referential text structure are what I consider *argumentative connectors*, not to be analyzed in this work. However, there are units whose grammaticalization process has not been long enough for them to lose their descriptive meaning (i.e. semantic bleaching) and, consequently, the functions that they carry out may share traits from both ideational and pragmatic structures.

The classification that I suggest does not imply that a marker whose function is basically structural, for instance, cannot also signal the speaker's intention and attitude, but the quantitative distributional analysis indicated that, most of the times, there is always a dominant tendency. My aim is to pinpoint which is the dominant role of each marker under analysis.

RHETORICAL STRUCTURE

Most of the functions that pragmatic markers fulfil in narrative are illocutionary, that is, those which belong to rhetorical discourse structure. Let us recall that relations within this structure are all linked to the listener's conception of discourse purpose; evidence, conclusion, or justification are among them (cf. Redeker 1991: 1167). The reason why these markers are profusely found in rhetorical structure makes sense if we take into account the sort of text genre under consideration. A narrative of personal experience requires an effort on the narrator's part to fully convey the point of the story. In the case of a situation of danger, the narrator has to convince the listener that s/he truly went through a dangerous or devastating life experience. The use of markers serves such a purpose, since they guide the narrator's intentions and give all the illocutionary force that the account requires. Under rhetorical structure, I have included the following functions:

Comment marker (\$COM): by means of this marker the narrator steps out of the narrative's world to introduce a personal comment or a piece of information that s/he considers is relevant for the full understanding of the story, not necessarily related directly to the events. To introduce the comment or remark, the narrator then goes back to present time. It is usually found in external evaluation segments. See an example in (35). Lindsay is explaining an unfortunate sailing experience she once had with a group of friends.

(35)

.....
 @Bg: os
 *NAR: um # I was here living in Spain.
 @Eg: os
 @Bg: ocs/da
 *NAR: and some friends of mine had a yacht.
 *NAR: and one weekend they asked me.
 *NAR: if I wanted to sail with them to Mallorca.
 @Eg: ocs/da
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: <so_> I love sailing\
 %dia: \$ev:EX
 %pra: \$FRA \$COM
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: ee
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and <so_> of course I agreed to go/.

.....
 (NAR2 Lindsay)

Clarifier (\$CLA): by means of this marker the speaker clarifies previous discourse, sometimes providing examples that justify the given argumentation. See an example in (36). Duran is telling about a journey to Nepal, with a group of friends. They once witnessed the burning of a dead man thinking that it was burned meat from an animal. He uses *bueno* to clarify a previous proposition.

Concluding marker (\$CLU): this marker introduces important information to bear in mind or take into consideration. It sometimes works as a linguistic tool for rounding off used by the speaker to go straight to the main point, to the bottomline of the issue. The Catalan marker *bueno* is twice used in (36) for such a purpose, on one occasion with a double clarifying and conclusive aim.

(36)

.....
 *NAR: i jo el què sabia és que era un lloc.
 and what I knew is that it was a place
 *NAR: on la gent s'anava a purificar.
 where people went to purify themselves
 *NAR: i # hi anaven # <bueno\> # amb els morts_
 and # they went # <bueno\> # with the dead ones_
 *NAR: deien l'últim adeu als morts/
 they said goodbye to the dead ones/
 %dia: \$da

- %pra: \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:MD MN
 *NAR: i hi ha el riu que passa pel mig de Catmandú.
and there is the river that crosses Catmandú
 *NAR: i la gent es banyava i es purificava.
and the people took a bath and purified themselves
 *NAR: <bueno\> això és tota la informació que teníem\
 <bueno\> this is all the information we had\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$CLA \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: i amb això que # a mig camí # tots vam anar sentint.
and then # at half way # we all started to notice
 *NAR: anàvem caminant <no/>.
we were walking <no/>.
 *NAR: i anàvem sentint una olor molt bona de carn.
and we were noticing a very good smell of meat

.....
 (NAR8 Duran)

Emphasizer (\$EMP): by means of this marker the speaker reinforces the propositional value of the utterance. It is sometimes used to reinforce a previous pragmatic function undertaken by the same marker. See it illustrated in (37). Sarah is explaining an encounter that she once had with a young man in the middle of the street, in the evening. Note how, in this case, the marker — *then* — is used to both present the sequence of the events and reinforce, at the same time, the temporal value.

(37)

-
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: I <then/> # I came to the end # serious # seriously/.
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$FRA \$REC \$SEQ
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: and <then/> # he said\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$SEQ \$EMP
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: &thank you&\.
 *NAR: and he tried to kiss me/.
 *NAR: and <then/> I thought\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$SEQ \$EMP
 %syn: \$d:IN MN

*NAR: &Oh God # oh no&\.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: I didn't know.
 *NAR: what to do.
 @Eg: ei

.....
 (NAR1 Sarah)

Evaluator (\$EVA): by means of this marker the speaker introduces a personal evaluation or comment of the events being told. A marker that works as evaluator is usually found in internal evaluation segments. See it exemplified in (38). Basil is explaining a motorbike accident in the desert and uses *I mean* to introduce a personal remark.

(38)

.....
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: <well\> # he saw me from quite a distance\.
 *NAR: and he was to the left of the path or to the left of the road.
 *NAR: and I was to the right.
 *NAR: and he didn't move over.
 *NAR: he carried on.
 *NAR: he he kept coming towards me.
 *NAR: but he didn't move over towards me.
 *NAR: <so_> I shouted help/.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: <I mean\> # it was it was pretty obvious_
 *NAR: that I was in a a bit of a situation there\.
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRA \$EVA
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: ei
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: but he # I shouted help.
 *NAR: and he looked.
 *NAR: and he carried on walking a little.

.....
 (NAR17 Basil)

Evidential (\$EVI): the speaker makes use of this marker to make a fact or a situation salient. By means of it, s/he highlights the illocutionary force of the utterance or segment and indicates that the information provided is highly significant for the

interpretation of the story. The example provided in (39) illustrates the use of Catalan *clar* as evidential. Jordi explains his brother's experience when he once got off the train to phone his family and, meanwhile, the train left with all his belongings.

(39)

-
- *NAR: de manera que el tren va marxar\
so the train left
- *NAR: i # i ell es va quedar en allà\
and # and he remained there
- *NAR: li quedaven <res\> # molt pocs francs # de fet\
he had <res\> # very few francs left # in fact
- *NAR: i # <aleshores_\> va pensar_
and # <aleshores_\> he thought_
- *NAR: <bueno_\> # i ara què faig/
<bueno_\> # and what am I going to do now/
- @Eg: da
- @Bg: ee/i
- *NAR: perquè # <clar\> # no tenia ningun conegut en allà_ #
because # <clar\> # he didn't know anyone there_#
- *NAR: <o sigui_\> # la situació era bastant # bastant complicada <no/>.
<o sigui_\> # the situation was quite # quite complicated <no/>.
- @Eg: ee/i
- @Bg: da
- *NAR: ah # i <aleshores_ bueno\> # l'assumpte es va resoldre_
ah # and <aleshores_ bueno\> # the whole thing ended up_
- *NAR: que ell va # mmm # va trucar a casa\
with him # mmm # calling home
- *NAR: amb els pocs francs que tenia\
with the few francs he had

.....
(*NAR20 Jordi*)

Addition marker (\$ADD): by means of it, the speaker adds more detailed information that s/he considers is relevant for the full understanding of the story. It serves to expand, explain and support previous discourse and information provided. See it illustrated by means of the second *so* in (40). Agatha is explaining a sailing lesson she once had from a woman that she considered was not a professional. Notice the polyfunctionality of the marker on the numerous occasions that she makes use of it.

(40)

-
- @Bg: da
- *NAR: and it was quite windy.
- *NAR: <so\> # and when we got in the boat\
<so\> # and when we got in the boat

%dia: \$da
 %pra: \$FRA \$TOP
 %syn: \$d:IN SB
 *NAR: and uh # it's a piece of #.
 *NAR: where they practise the sailing.
 *NAR: it's a piece of um # sea.
 *NAR: where it's cut off from the main sea.
 *NAR: but it's a causeway for the big ships.
 *NAR: that come up # metal ships with workmen on and like these big trailers.
 *NAR: <so_> going between one port # the the # navy port and the # merchant port further up the sea.

%dia: \$da
 %pra: \$ADD
 %syn: \$d:IN SB
 *NAR: <so\> # we were out in this boat\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$REC \$SIT
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: and uh # we had only got out into the # about uh # about three minutes.
 *NAR: and she said.
 *NAR: &oh # the rudder is broken&.
 *NAR: <so_> I said\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$CON \$SEQ \$DSP
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: &the rudder is broken/
 *NAR: what does that mean/&.

.....
 (NAR12 *Agatha*)

Staller or delay (\$DEL): by means of this marker the speaker plays for time to think and delays or puts off the information that follows. According to Stenström (1994), discourse markers that fulfil this function are called 'stallers'. Catalan marker *doncs* is often used for this purpose. See it illustrated in (41). Elisabet starts to tell a birthday party story in which some incidents occurred. Note the polyfunctionality of the marker, in two separate segments.

(41)

@Begin
 @Participants: NAR15 Elisabet Narrator
 @Age of NAR: 30;
 @Sex of NAR: female
 @Bg: opc

- *NAR: <a veure\> # mmmm # <bé\> # va ser una # una festa d'aniversari/
<a veure\> # mmmm # <bé\> # it was a # a birthday party/
 *NAR: que ens reuníem tota una colla_.
and a group of friends met_
 *NAR: per celebrar l'aniversari <doncs_\> d'un # d'un amic\
to celebrate the birthday <doncs_\> of a # a friend\
 %dia: \$or:CO
 %pra: \$DEL
 %syn: \$d:MD SB
 @Eg: opc
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: i # en principi # <doncs_\> no hi havia regal comú\
and # to start # <doncs_\> there wasn't a present from all of us\
 *NAR: sinó que cadascú duia el seu # el seu regal particular\
but each of us brought # a present\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$FRA \$TOP
 %syn: \$d:IN MN

.....
(NAR15 Elisabet)

Resumption marker (\$REC): by means of this marker the speaker recovers or regains the argumentative thread or line of thought usually broken up by a previous narrative segment. See the way Catalan *aleshores* is used as resumption marker in (42) twice, at a segment-boundary. David is explaining a summer holiday in Thailand.

(42)

-
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: vaig anar de vacances a Tailàndia.
I went on holiday to Thailand
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: a mi m'agrada molt anar-me'n amb una motxilleta petita.
I really like travelling with a small rucksack
 *NAR: i amb un bitllet d'avió d'anada i tornada a un país absolutament llunyà.
and with a round-trip plane ticket to a very far away country
 *NAR: i passar-me un mes o un mes i mig allà.
and spend a month or a month and a half there
 *NAR: voltant # al meu aire.
wandering around
 *NAR: i veient # <doncs_\> # ficant-me per tot arreu <no/>.
and seeing # <doncs_\> # going everywhere <no/>.
 @Eg: ee

- @Bg: osct
- *NAR: <aleshores_> # a Tailàndia/ # amb dos amics meus ens en vam anar al nord de Tailàndia/ # pràcticament a la frontera # a la frontera # amb Birmanïa # en un lloc absolutament verge_.
<aleshores_> # in Thailand/ # with two friends of mine we went to the North of Thailand/ # almost to the border # to the border # with Birmania # to a very wilde place
- *NAR: on pràcticament no hi havia res\
where there was practically nothing\
%dia: \$or:SO,CO
%pra: \$FRA \$REC
%syn: \$d:IN
- *NAR: i vam fer el *tricking*.
and we did the 'tricking'
- *NAR: que consistia bàsicament en una excursió de tres # quatre dies.
which basically consisted of an excursion of three # four days
- *NAR: <és a dir_> # hi havia tres nits # tres nits\
<és a dir_> # there were three nights # three nights\
*NAR: ara no recordo.
I don't remember now
- *NAR: si eren tres dies i dues nits o quatre.
if it was three days and two nights or four
*NAR: em sembla que eren quatre #.
I think it was four #
- *NAR: vam dormir a tres llocs # sí # tres llocs diferents.
we slept in three places # yes # three different places
*NAR: per tant eren quatre dies.
so it was four days
- *NAR: vam fer una excursió de quatre dies per la selva # del nord.
we did an excursion of four days to the north jungle
- @Eg: osct
@Bg: ee
- *NAR: <aleshores_> allà es van produir diverses situacions.
<aleshores_> there there took place several situations
- *NAR: es pot dir.
we could say
- *NAR: que eren # eren perilloses <no/>.
that were # were dangerous <no/>.
- *NAR: que tenien un cert perill <no/>.
that entailed some danger <no/>.
- %dia: \$ev:EX
%pra: \$FRA \$REC 2PRO 2CTX 3REF 3PRO 3CTX
%syn: \$d:IN SB 2FN SB 3FN SB
-
(NAR2 David)

Topic shifter (\$TOP): used by the speaker to shift topic. See an instance of *anyway* with this function in (43). Donna is explaining a skiing experience in Italy. Note that it is also used to frame the new segment (structural function to be seen further on) and to regain argumentative thread, so it is a polyfunctional marker.

(43)

.....
 *NAR: and we could hardly move our faces.
 *NAR: the gloves and the clothes.
 *NAR: which previously had been fine for the weather.
 *NAR: they just didn't keep us warm anymore.
 *NAR: uh # one of my friends lost her camera.
 *NAR: and another girl was crying.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: she was really scared.
 @Eg: ei
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: <anyway\> # in the end we stopped at this bar_.
 *NAR: and we had a coffee to warm us up a bit\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$FRA \$REC \$TOP
 %syn: \$d:IN MN

.....
 (NAR10 Donna)

SEQUENTIAL STRUCTURE

As discourse structuring devices, pragmatic markers have a relevant role in the sequential structure: most markers have a primary segment delimiting function, opening and closing up narrative segments and story.⁹⁹ Within the sequential structure there can be found all those relations which are neither ideational nor rhetorical, but which make two adjacent discourse units belong to the same discourse (cf. Redeker 1991: 1167). The functions that I have identified linked to this component are four. Compared to the numerous functions related to rhetorical structure (seen in the previous section), four functions do not seem to be significant in quantitative terms, but the number of times that a marker is used to sign a discourse unit boundary (\$FRA), for instance, is worth being taken into consideration. In fact, with the exception of *you see*, all markers analyzed undertake such function. We will see exact data in the following chapter. See now the four text-structuring functions carried out by pragmatic markers.

Opening segment boundary marker (\$FRA), also referred to as ‘opening frame marking device’ (Jucker 1993): the speaker makes use of such a marker to initiate a narrative segment, be it the first of the account or another. It is one of the commonest functions carried out by pragmatic markers in monologued discourse. It was found in (42) and (43), for instance, next to other rhetorical functions. But some particular markers (English *well* and *so*, Catalan *bueno*, *bé*, *clar*, *doncs*) undertake the segment-delimiting function constantly. See it now exemplified in (44), where three excerpts from Heather’s story have been chosen to illustrate it by means of *well*.

(44)

@Begin

@Participants: NAR13 Heather Narrator

@Age of NAR: 25;

@Sex of NAR: female

@Bg: ocp/da

*NAR: eh:: yes # eh:: <well\># I’ve lived in Belfast for seventeen years.

%dia: \$or:ST

%pra: \$FRA \$SIT

%syn: \$d:IN MN

*NAR: and I studied in Edimbourgh.

*NAR: in the summers I went back to Belfast.

*NAR: and I worked in the law courts in Belfast.

*NAR: and # one day # there was a girl leaving to get married.

*NAR: and we all dressed her up in a stupid costume.

*NAR: and tied her to the railings outside the building.

@Eg: ocp/da

.....
*NAR: and we saw a van pulling up and stopping.

*NAR: a man got out of the van with a briefcase.

*NAR: and he shouted.

*NAR: &get out of here.

*NAR: there is a bomb in this briefcase&.

*NAR: and suddenly the whole the whole street just cleared completely except for this girl.

*NAR: who was tied to the railings outside outside the # outside the law courts.

@Eg: da

@Bg: ei/da

*NAR: <well\> # fortunately # some firemen # a fireman ran out and untied her\ # fortunately enough\.

%dia: \$ev:IN \$da

%pra: \$FRA \$EVA

%syn: \$d:IN MN

@Eg: ei/da
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and we had to run as quickly as possible.
 *NAR: we'd to belt through the through the corridors to the other side of the building.

 @Bg: r
 *NAR: it broke windows and things like.
 @Eg: r
 @Bg: c
 *NAR: <well\> # that was about it\
 %dia: \$co
 %pra: \$FRA \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: c
 @Bg: da/opc
 *NAR: we decided then.
 *NAR: we would go to the pub # to calm our nerves.

.....
 (NAR13 Heather)

Closing segment boundary marker (\$FRC): by means of a closing 'frame marking device', the speaker closes the narrative segment. As boundary marker, it shares similar characteristics with its opening counterpart, but it is much less frequently used. See it illustrated in (45). Jo makes use of *so* to close the last part of her story. She is explaining how her brother's girlfriend fell from a waterfall, in Australia.

(45)

.....
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: and I think.
 *NAR: she broke her collar bone.
 *NAR: and she was really lucky # really lucky.
 *NAR: but <I mean\> # that was sort of an awful moment # just like a film or something\
 *NAR: where you sort of see their hands slipping away.
 *NAR: and you're thinking.
 *NAR: &oh my god&.
 *NAR: but um # <anyway\> # she was all right\
 *NAR: <so_> that was really lucky\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRC \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: ei

@End

(NAR16 Jo)

Development of action initiator (\$INI): by means of this marker the narrator starts the complicating action segment, be it the first in the narrative or other in-between. See the story told by Pepa, in (46). She is explaining her friend's unfortunate meeting with a group of boys, in a night club.

(46)

.....

@Begin

@Participants: NAR10 Pepa Narrator

@Age of NAR: 30;

@Sex of NAR: female

@Bg: octp

*NAR: <doncs_> aquesta és la història_.

<doncs_> *this is the story_*

*NAR: que em va explicar la Mercè # una amiga meva # ah# estudiant de filologia anglesa/.

that Mercè # a friend of mine # told me # ah # she's an English philology student

*NAR: i que sortíem molt sovint per la nit <no/>.

and we used to go out a lot at night <no/>.

*NAR: i <llavors_> hi havia un lloc aquí al carrer Escudellers/.

and <llavors_> there was a place here on Escudellers street/

*NAR: que es diu La Macarena/.

that is called La Macarena/

*NAR: que és de flamenc # flamenc\.

that has flamenco dancing

@Eg: octp

@Bg: ee

*NAR: i # i ella és molt apassionada.

and # and she's very passionate

*NAR: per tot lo que és.

for all that has to do

*NAR: és molt calenta # per entendre'ns <no/>.

she's very passionate # you know what I mean <no/>.

@Eg: ee

@Bg: opc

*NAR: i <llavors_> anava molt sovint allà/.

and <llavors_> she went there very often/

*NAR: i es veu que una nit hi havia una taula amb molts nois # nois.

and one night there was a table with many guys # guys

*NAR: eren tot nois.

- they were all guys*
- *NAR: pel que em va explicar.
according to her
- @Eg: opc
- @Bg: da
- *NAR: i # <bé\> # van començar a beure junts/
and # <bé\> # they all started drinking together/
- *NAR: a xerrar i tal <no/>.
chatting and so on <no/>.
- %dia: \$da
- %pra: \$FRA \$INI 2PRO 2CTX
- %syn: \$d:IN MN 2FN MN
- *NAR: mmmm # va acabar # <bueno_> # mmm # s'en van cansar d'estar allà\
mmmm # it ended up # <bueno_> # mmm # they all got tired of being there
- @Eg: da
- @Bg: da/opt
- *NAR: i sembla que van marxar a un altre local de Barcelona.
and apparently went to another pub in Barcelona

.....
(NAR10 Pepa)

Direct speech initiator (\$DSP): by means of this marker the speaker introduces quoted material, i.e. direct speech. It can be found either in or out of the quotation. See (47). The function is exemplified by means of two Catalan markers: *bueno* and *doncs*. Rosa is explaining a summer holiday in Israel and Jordania, with a friend.

(47)

-
- @Begin
- @Participants: NAR12 Rosa Narrator
- @Age of NAR: 26;
- @Sex of NAR: female
- @Bg: otcs
- *NAR: <bueno\> # va ser aquest agost passat/
<bueno\> # it was last August/
- *NAR: vaig anar amb una amiga a un viatge organitzat a Israel i Jordània\
I went with a friend of mine on an organized trip to Israel and Jordan
- *NAR: <aleshores_> # quan erem a Jordània/
<aleshores_> # when we were in Jordan/
- *NAR: vam anar fins a Petra\
we went up to Petra
- @Eg: otcs
- @Bg: da
- *NAR: i va resultar.
and the thing is

- *NAR: que ens van dir.
that they told us
- *NAR: <bueno\> # els que tinguin humor\
<bueno\> # those that feel like it\
i # siguin prou joves/
and # are young enough/
- %dia: \$da
%pra: \$DSP \$EVI
%syn: \$d:IN SB
@Eg: da
@Bg: ee
- *NAR: perquè # <és clar/> # hi havia molta gent gran\
*because # <és clar/> # there were a lot of elderly people\
que no era # no ho podia pas fer\
that weren't # couldn't do it\
@Eg: ee
@Bg: da*
- *NAR: <doncs_> poden anar a visitar un temple_
<doncs_> can go visit a temple_
*NAR: però que s'ha de caminar així en plan escales amunt/
but they have to go up a lot of steep steps /
- %dia: \$da
%pra: \$FRA \$REC \$DSP
%syn: \$d:IN MN
@Eg: da

.....

(NAR12 Rosa)

INFERENCE COMPONENT

There are some pragmatic functions that are linked to the role of markers as inference facilitators and restrictors. Although not overtly shown in the discourse structure, inferencing is present as a cognitive principle of human communication (cf. Relevance Theory). Markers become interpretive signals of discourse since they help the listener understand the intended message, bridging text to cognitive context. In this sense, they have procedural meaning (as opposed to the referential meaning of *connectors*) because they help the listener interpret and therefore process the given message. In the narratives analyzed, I have identified six pragmatic functions under this component.

Contextual constringer (\$CTX): by means of this marker the speaker constrains the contextual effects that the proposition may have on the hearer. It stops, softens or narrows down the range of inferences and effects that the account may have on the listener. See the use of Catalan tag-marker *no* in (48). Notice that the constrain-

ing function pairs with another cognitive related one, that of showing proximity with the hearer (\$PRO). This will be seen further on.

(48)

-
- *NAR: vam dormir a tres llocs # sí # tres llocs diferents.
we slept in three places # yes # three different places
- *NAR: per tant eren quatre dies.
so it was four days
- *NAR: vam fer una excursió de quatre dies per la selva # del nord.
we did an excursion of four days to the north jungle
- @Eg: osct
- @Bg: ee
- *NAR: <aleshores_> allà es van produir diverses situacions.
<aleshores_> there there took place several situations
- *NAR: es pot dir.
we could say
- *NAR: que eren # eren perilloses <no/>.
that were # were dangerous <no/>.
- *NAR: que tenien un cert perill <no/>.
that entailed some danger <no/>.
- %dia: \$ev:EX
- %pra: \$FRA \$REC 2PRO 2CTX 3REF 3PRO 3CTX
- %syn: \$d:IN SB 2FN SB 3FN SB
- *NAR: i que després ho mires des d'aquí.
and that afterwards you see it in perspective
i penses # déu-ni-do <no/>.
and you think # not bad <no/>.
- %dia: \$ev:EX
- %pra: \$PRO \$CTX
- %syn: \$d:FIN SB
- @Eg: ee
-

(NAR2 David)

Justification marker (\$JUS): by means of this marker the speaker introduces a justification of the propositional content of the previous or following utterance. See the way David makes use of *clar* in (49), when explaining his journey to Thailand.

(49)

-
- @Bg: ei
- *NAR: <bueno\> # va ser també eh #.
<bueno\> # it also was eh #
- *NAR: de de de les tres situacions que estic explicant\
from the three situations I'm describing

- *NAR: la de travessar pel pels abismes\
*that of going through cliffs\
 *NAR: la de caure\
 that of falling\
 *NAR: i la de baixar el riu\
 and that of going down the river\
 *NAR: aquesta era # on vaig tenir una sensació més llarga de # de perill\
 this was # where I had the most persistent feeling of # of danger
 *NAR: perquè # <clar/> # això va durar ben bé #.
 because # <clar/> # the whole thing took really #
 *NAR: devia durar un(a) hora\
 it must have taken an hour/
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$JUS \$EMP \$EVA
 %syn: \$d:IN SB
 *NAR: i era # era un(a) hora.
 and it was # it was an hour
 *NAR: que passa que passa ràpida.
 that goes by that goes by quickly
 *NAR: i que passa lenta <no/>.
 and that goes by slowly <no/>.
 *NAR: depèn dels moments <no/>.
 it depends on the moment <no/>.
 *NAR: però que # que <bé\> # que va ser eh # fotuda <no/>.
 but that # that <bé\> # that was eh # horrible <no/>.*

.....
 (NAR2 David)

Face threat mitigator (\$MIT): by means of this marker the speaker mitigates the effects that the proposition s/he is going to introduce may have on the hearer. See the functioning of *well* in (50). Totty has a premonition about her grandmother's imminent death, while she is travelling in Europe.

(50)

-
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and all the way for the rest of the journey.
 *NAR: I had the sensation.
 *NAR: that I must get back to England.
 *NAR: and when we arrived back to England.
 *NAR: the first thing I did.
 *NAR: was telephone # my family.
 *NAR: my cousin answered.
 *NAR: I didn't even say hello.
 *NAR: I just said.

*NAR: &how's granny/#.
 *NAR: <you know_> is granny all right/&.
 *NAR: and he said\
 *NAR: &<well\> # actually\& <you know\>.
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$DSP \$DEL \$MIT 2DSP 2PRO
 %syn: \$d:IN MN 2IN 2MN
 *NAR: &hi Totty # it's really nice to hear_
 *NAR: you're back again\ <you know\>.
 *NAR: she's died\&.
 @Eg: da

.....
 (NAR4 Totty)

Presupposition marker (\$PRE): by means of this marker the speaker helps the hearer process a presupposition, that is, a piece of information that s/he assumes is shared knowledge with the hearer. Let us see it in (51) through the Catalan marker *clar*. Elisabet is explaining a birthday party. By accident, her scarf caught fire with a candlelight.

(51)

.....
 *NAR: al mirar pel damunt de l'espatlla.
 when looking over my shoulder
 *NAR: em vaig adonar.
 I realized
 *NAR: que se m'havia encès.
 that it had caught fire
 *NAR: em vaig acostar massa a l'espelma.
 I had got too close to the candle
 *NAR: se'm va encendre el # el mocador.
 the # the scarf had caught fire
 *NAR: i que se'm va començar a cremar el # el mocador i la banda de # la
 màniga del del jersei.
 and that the # the scarf and one side of the sleeve of the pullover had started burning
 *NAR: i em vaig trobar.
 and I found myself
 *NAR: que no sabia exactament.
 that I didn't know exactly
 *NAR: què havia de fer <no/>.
 what I had to do <no/>.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: era la sensació.

- it was the feeling*
- *NAR: <clar/> # d'entrada de de picar-te amb la mà # amb l'altra mà # amb la mà lliure_
<clar/> # first reaction is to hit it with your hand # with the other hand # with the free hand_
- *NAR: el # el què se t'encén/
what # what is burning/
- %dia: \$ev:IN
- %pra: \$EVA \$EVI \$PRE
- %syn: \$d:IN MN
- *NAR: per altra banda la sensació que has de treure't el el mocador.
but also the feeling that you have to take off the scarf
- *NAR: i # al dur-lo embolicat al #
and # because you have it round the #
- *NAR: no només passat.
not only hanging
- *NAR: sinó fent volta pel coll.
but round your neck
- *NAR: no # no saps ben bé <no/> com # com fer-ho.
you don't # don't really know <no/> how # how to do it

@Eg: ei

.....
(NAR15 Elisabet)

Text-world's anchorer (\$SIT): by means of this marker the speaker anchors the hearer in the narrative's world. S/he makes the interlocutor aware of the events that are taking place or of the important point(s) to bear in mind in the text-world that is being constructed. In the case of a narrative, this usually occurs at the beginning of the story, in the orientation. See it in (52). Anna is starting to talk about her travelling experience, by car, in Mexico. Notice that before using the Catalan marker *bé*, she does some digression. The marker works as a sort of halt to the hearer, a warning sign that alerts him/her that something important is about to start.

(52)

.....
@Begin

@Participants: NAR4 Anna Narrator

@Age of NAR: 29;

@Sex of NAR: female

@Bg: ei

*NAR: sí # <bueno\># es que # mmm# situació de perill es aixó <no/> una situació de vulnerabilitat\
yes # <bueno\># the thing is # mmm# a situation of danger is that <no/> a situation of vulnerability

- @Eg: ei
 @Bg: osc
 *NAR: era durant un # un viatge que vam fer a Mèxic # el meu home i jo.
it was during a # a journey that my husband and I went on to Mexico
 *NAR: hi vam anar pel nostre compte.
we went on our own
 *NAR: i # <bé\> # vam arribar <doncs_> a # a Mèrida # al Yucatán/.
and # <bé\> # we arrived at <doncs_> at # at Merida # in the Yucatan/.
 %dia: \$or:SO
 %pra: \$\$SIT 2DEL
 %syn: \$d:IN MN 2MD MN
 @Eg: osc
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: i vam llogar un cotxe.
and we rented a car
 @Eg: da

 (NAR4 Anna)

Monitoring marker (\$PRO): the speaker makes use of this sort of marker to show proximity with the interlocutor, in an attempt to look for understanding and complicity. It highly facilitates the sharing of common ground and mutual background knowledge. See an instance in (53). Misha is explaining a dangerous skiing experience she had in the Alps with her friend. Note the two occasions on which she makes use of *you know*: both are polyfunctional and share the monitoring feature, but whereas the first works also as evidential, the second belongs to an external evaluative segment, introducing extra information that Misha considers is worth knowing. In this second case the marker not only facilitates the transmission of propositional content (i.e. extra information) but makes the utterance be highly expressive, to the point of being ironic.

(53)

-
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: when you # I'm not sure.
 *NAR: if you've been skiing.
 *NAR: but to stop you have to you have to turn quite.
 *NAR: you need a bit of space to stop.
 @Eg: ee
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and there wasn't enough space to stop.
 *NAR: if I take.
 *NAR: if I took to the right.

*NAR: I'd go down the side of the mountain.
 *NAR: <so_> I had to turn to the left\
 *NAR: and I went straight straight into the rock.
 *NAR: I was going really fast # as well.
 *NAR: my skies hit the rock # the base of the mountain.
 *NAR: my head # my face was striken into the rock.
 *NAR: and I knocked myself out into #.
 *NAR: it was freezing cold <you know\
 *NAR: people didn't see me\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$EVI \$PRO
 %syn: \$d:FN MN
 *NAR: and I was laying there for about ten minutes.
 *NAR: and I couldn't move.
 *NAR: but eventually I just forced myself up.
 *NAR: took my skies off.
 *NAR: and walked back.
 *NAR: but it took me about three hours.
 *NAR: to get out from this situation.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: I could have I could have killed myself.
 *NAR: and that was not the end.
 *NAR: because all the time we were there #.
 *NAR: all the conditions were really # really bad.
 *NAR: and aparently # my friend # <you know\
 *NAR: he's really clever#.
 %dia: \$ev:EX
 %pra: \$PRO \$ADD
 %syn: \$d:MD SB
 *NAR: he thought.
 *NAR: that if you cross from one mountain to the other mountain.
 *NAR: he had this concept.
 *NAR: that if you go so high.
 *NAR: and go up the clouds.
 *NAR: <then\
 @Eg: ee
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: <so_> # what we did is\

(NAR18 Misha)

IDEATIONAL STRUCTURE

Finally, there are markers that set up relations in both pragmatic and ideational discourse structure and whose division of functions is complicated and sometimes even impossible. See, for instance, (54). It is an excerpt that belongs to Misha's story, above. Notice the semanticopr pragmatic richness of *so*: it frames a new discourse segment, it works as resumptive device — or pop marker — and it introduces a resultative relationship with previous argument (because you get bored going sideways ... you let yourself go). The second instance is a *compound pragmatic marker*, that is, a functional co-occurrence of two pragmatic markers (to be seen in Chapters 5 and 6) that works as frame shifter.

(54)

.....
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and I was coming down sideways as well.
 *NAR: and ah:: # <well> # now and again_.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: <I mean> # you get bored going sideways for about three kilometres\
 @Eg: ee
 @Bg: da/ei
 *NAR: <so_> I let myself go\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$FRA \$REC \$CON
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: and I was going down this mountain really dangerous.
 *NAR: one side of the mountain was straight up.
 *NAR: one side of the path # if you want # of the sloan was straight up on the
 mountain.
 *NAR: and the other side was straight down.
 @Eg: da/ei
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: <so_# you know\> # do you understand the shape_
 *NAR: I'm talking about/
 %dia: \$ev:EX
 %pra: \$FRA \$REC \$COM
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: ee
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and I let myself go.
 *NAR: and I started to go quite fast.
 @Eg: da

.....
 (NAR18 Misha)

So is a conjunctive device whose main function in discourse is that of signalling a cause-consequence resultative relation between two propositions. It is a logico-semantic relation found in the ideational structure, but this is not its unique role because, at the same time, it also has a primary role framing discourse units (function that belongs to the sequential structure) or recovering the speaker's train of thought (function that belongs to the rhetorical structure). Another instance of the sort is English *then* and Catalan *llavors* and *aleshores*. As temporal adverbs, they operate in the ideational discourse structure, but there are significant interface cases, in the rhetorical and sequential pragmatic structure. See an example of the Catalan marker *llavors* in (55). It is a long excerpt from Cristina's narrative, where she explains her first rafting experience in a river, with a group of friends. They finally had to be rescued by a group of French. There are several instances of *llavors*, all polyfunctional belonging to different discourse structures.

(55)

-
- @Bg: da
 *NAR: però va arribar un moment.
but there reached a point
- *NAR: que el riu anava baixant.
that the river kept going down
- *NAR: però a més # <clar/> # se'n # apart d'encanonar-se / mmmm.
but what is more # <clar/> # it # besides narrowing down / mmmm
- *NAR: el pendent queda més_.
the slope is more_
- *NAR: és més pronunciat/.
is greater/
- @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: i # <o sigui_> # la sensació de no poder-te agafar enlloc\
and # <o sigui_> # the feeling of not being able to hold on to anything
- *NAR: ni amb ningú perquè tothom anava caient # al riu\
nor to anyone because everybody kept falling # to the river
- @Eg: ei
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: i <llavors_> sabíem que hi havia un salt d'aigua_.
and <llavors_> we knew that there was a waterfall_
- %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$FRA \$REC \$SIT
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: i que la # havia # les instruccions que portàvem deien.
and that # it had # the instructions we carried said
- *NAR: que # que es necessitava.
that # that it was necessary

- *NAR: que s'havia de fer un ràpel si hi havia aigua.
that we had to rappel if there was water
- *NAR: però # si no hi havia aigua # no passava # no passava res.
but # if there wasn't water # nothing # nothing happened
- @Eg: da
- @Bg: ee
- *NAR: i jo no # en ma vida havia fet un ràpel # això per descomptat.
and I never # never in my life had I rappelled of course
- @Eg: ee
- @Bg: da
- *NAR: i <bé doncs_> vam arribar a la zona del # del # del salt aquest/
and <bé doncs_> we got to that part where the # the # the waterfall was/
- *NAR: i # no teníem cordes.
and # we didn't have ropes
- *NAR: erem vuit persones sense res # a més allò.
we were eight people without anything # and then that
- *NAR: i que començava a fer-se de nit.
and that it had begun darkening
- @Eg: da
- @Bg: ei
- *NAR: i # <bueno_> la sensació de mmm # de # més que res la # la por
que passés alguna cosa <no/>.
*and # <bueno_> the feeling of mmm # of # in fact the # the fear that
something might happen <no/>.*
- *NAR: perquè # dius.
because # you tell yourself
- *NAR: no puc avisar a ningú
I can't call anyone
- *NAR: és una sensació com molt # com de molta solitud.
it's a feeling like # a feeling of great loneliness
- @Eg: ei
- @Bg: oc/da
- *NAR: i # <llavors_> # per punyetera casualitat # van aparèixer quatre francesos/
amb vestits d'aquests de neoprè # amb # cordes i no se què\
*and # <llavors_> # by pure chance # four french guys showed up/
with water suits # with # ropes and I don't know what*
- %dia: \$or:CO
- %pra: \$FRA \$SEQ \$STOP
- %syn: \$d:IN MN
- @Eg: oc/da
- @Bg: da
- *NAR: i <llavors_> ens van ajudar <no/>.
and <llavors_> they helped us <no/>.
- %dia: \$da

%pra: \$FRA \$SEQ \$EVI 2PRO 2CTX
 %syn: \$d:IN MN 2FN MN
 *NAR: ens van ajudar a fer el ràpel i això.
 they helped us to rappel and all.

.....
 (NAR1 Cristina)

Notice that the first *llavors* in (55) does not have a time-sequencing role, presenting a chronological order of the events, as the second and third do. The first *llavors* is used by Cristina to frame a new segment, to regain the action broken by an in-between internal evaluation, and to anchor the hearer in the text-world. The second and third instances share framing and time-sequencing roles. But the second also facilitates a topic shift, and the third works also as evidential. If we tried to draw a clear-cut distinction between ideational and pragmatic functions, we would clearly incur an omission of some sort, either referential or pragmatic.

Although the above lexical units are generally treated in the literature as textual *argumentative connectors*, that is, linguistic pieces with full referential meaning that set up logico-argumentative relations between S1 and S2, I treat them as discourse markers because their role in the pragmatic structure of the genre under analysis is highly significant.

On the other hand, there are lexical units that are traditionally considered discourse markers, that is, units which have not referential but procedural meaning, and yet sometimes set up argumentative relations. Such is the case of English *well* and *I mean*, and Catalan *bueno*. They are all markers that have a significant reformulative role, reformulation being an argumentative activity which is generally treated in the literature in logico-semantic terms, especially in the Romance languages.¹⁰⁰ In this sense, only those exceptional cases undertaken by discourse markers will be illustrated. I will not discuss lexical units which are treated in Catalan studies as primarily reformulative, as it is the case of Catalan *o sigui*, *vull dir*, and *és a dir*,¹⁰¹ since their analysis would require a different approach and framework from the ones used here.

Bearing all the above in mind, I have included three functions under the ideational structure which are relevant to discourse markers analysis in the narrative genre: resultative (\$CON), temporal (\$SEQ) and reformulative (\$REF).

Resultative (cause-consequence) marker (\$CON): by means of this marker the speaker introduces a consequence of the argument provided in the previous proposition. See it illustrated in (56) by means of *so*. Heather is telling a story about a bomb explosion in a pub, while she was living in Belfast.

(56)

.....
 @Bg: r
 *NAR: it broke windows and things like.
 @Eg: r
 @Bg: c
 *NAR: <well\> # that was about it\
 @Eg: c
 @Bg: da/opc
 *NAR: we decided then.
 *NAR: we would go to the pub # to calm our nerves.
 *NAR: <so_> we went to the pub\
 %dia: \$da \$or:PO,CO
 %pra: \$CON
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: and when we were sitting in the pub having a drink.
 *NAR: a soldier came in and said.
 *NAR: &get out of here.
 *NAR: there's a bomb across the road&
 *NAR: <so_> we had to leave there\
 %dia: \$da \$or:PC
 %pra: \$CON
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: da/opc
 @Bg: r
 *NAR: and the bomb exploded again a couple of minutes later.
 @Eg: r

.....
 (NAR13 Heather)

Temporal marker (\$SEQ): it is used to introduce a sequential order of events. It organizes the discourse in chronological order, i.e. temporal. See it illustrated in (57) by means of *then*. Andy is explaining a fight that he once had with a bunch of guys, in a pub.

(57)

.....
 *NAR: five people came in quite sho# <well\># short # relatively\
 *NAR: gipsy looking\ # mmm.
 *NAR: and asked me for a cigarette\
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: I smoked then\
 @Eg: ee

@Bg: da
 *NAR: and # <so_> I said to them\
 *NAR: that they sold them at the bar/
 *NAR: and <so_> for them to go and buy them themselves/
 *NAR: <then\> I walked through the bar\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$SEQ
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: <well\> # I finished playing\
 *NAR: and I had a drink.
 *NAR: and on the way out.
 *NAR: I was leaving the bar by now.
 *NAR: one of them hit me.
 *NAR: and I went to the ground.
 *NAR: and <then_> the others jumped on top of me\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$SEQ
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: and started.
 *NAR: hitting me.
 *NAR: and kicking me.
 *NAR: and punching me.
 *NAR: and smashed bottles and glasses.
 *NAR: and <then_> I managed somehow to get up_
 *NAR: I ran round behind the bar/
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$SEQ
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: one of them followed me/
 *NAR: and <then_> I saw the knife in his hand/
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$SEQ
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: da

.....
 (NAR3 Andy)

Reformulative marker (\$REF): this marker is used to introduce a proposition that reformulates previous discourse, usually by means of paraphrasing. See the way Catalan *bueno* is used in (58) by Raimon. He is explaining a painful experience he had while visiting a hospital in Birmania, where he went with his girlfriend for a holiday.

(58)

.....
@Bg: da*NAR: no hi havien ni metges.
*there were not even doctors**NAR: només hi havia dos infermeres.
*there were only two nurses**NAR: que no es guanyaven la vida.
*that could barely support themselves**NAR: i <llavors_ pues> tenien de # que guanyar-se la vida_.
*and <llavors_ pues> they had to # to make a living_**NAR: tenir un xiringuito a fora/.
*to have a stand outside/**NAR: que venien coca-colas/.
*that sold cokes/**NAR: i venien arròs i així\.
*and they sold rice and so on**NAR: i vam # vam #.
*and we # we #**NAR: <bueno\> # com que la meva xicoteta és metge/.
<bueno\> # because my girlfriend is a doctor/*NAR: vam anar a veure l'hospital/.
we visited the hospital/

%dia: \$da

%pra: \$REF \$ADD

%syn: \$d:IN SB

*NAR: i les infermeres aquelles ens van ensenyar les les estadístiques de les coses.
*and those nurses showed us the statistics of everything**NAR: <bueno_> # les malalties que hi havien allà <no/>.
<bueno_> # of the illnesses that they had <no/>.

%dia: \$da

%pra: \$REF 2PRO 2CTX

%syn: \$d:IN MN FN MN

.....
(NAR18 Raimon)

We have seen all the functions that were singled out in the narrative database with a proposal for their integration within the discourse coherence model that was fully presented and discussed in the previous section. All of them have been exemplified by means of markers that are often polyfunctional, although with a dominant tendency that allows their classification under a given discourse structure or component. The aim of this classification is to integrate, as much as possible, the variety of functions that a marker may have under broad macrofunctions that provide markers with a distinctive trait that unifies them and avoids dispersion and exces-

sive descriptive detail. According to my proposal, the distinctive trait may be *rhetorical* — if related to the speaker's intentions and attitudes, thoughts, and actions — it may be *sequential* — if related to the segment structural features — it may be *ideational* — if related to the ideas described in the text-world — or, finally, it may be *inferential* — if related to the cognitive context shared between speaker and hearer.

The proposal here presented will be used to frame the analysis and discussion of pragmatic markers in English and Catalan narrative structure, presented in Chapters 5 and 6, as well as the contrastive analysis presented in Chapter 7.

3.7 Recapitulation

The aim of this chapter has been to frame the role of discourse markers in discourse coherence and structure theoretically. The notion of *source of coherence* — pragmatic versus semantic — has laid the ground on which to construct a model that may serve to account for the presence of pragmatic markers in a text. According to Sanders (1997: 122), “a relation is pragmatic if the discourse segments are related because of the illocutionary meaning of one or both of the segments. In pragmatic relations the coherence relation concerns the speech act status of the segments.” I have defined *pragmatic markers* in accordance with the notion of pragmatic source of coherence. Studies have shown that these lexical devices, although not essential for the propositional content of the text, are highly relevant and necessary for the interpretation of the intended message that the speaker tries to convey. Their structural role is equally significant. Not only do they organize the overall textual frame and development of ideas, thoughts and actions, but work as delimiters of segments or chunks. In this respect, discourse markers facilitate and help the listener or reader integrate, within a mental model, large amounts of information that, otherwise, may appear disconnected. Their absence can, moreover, eventually lead to possible interpretive misunderstandings. From Redeker's proposal on the integration of markers in a discourse coherence model (1990, 1991), it has been suggested that pragmatic markers operate in the pragmatic structure at three levels: rhetorical, sequential, and cognitive. From these, two broad macrofunctions have been proposed: markers as structural pieces of discourse (3.3.1), and markers as procedural devices that specify how the segment they introduce is to be interpreted (3.3.2). Finally, the role of segment boundary markers in narrative structuring has been highlighted from a cognitive approach, which suggests that these cues help construct a mental model from a particular point of view (Segal et al. 1991).

CHAPTER 4

The study

4.1 General aims and hypotheses

As mentioned in the introduction, the main aim of this study is to prove that pragmatic markers play a key role in the textual organization of an oral narrative and that their semantic-pragmatic traits make them appropriate for their use in specific narrative segments. The relationship between text-genre and function of markers that I establish stems from the relevance that these linguistic devices have in discourse structure, widely studied by researchers working in the field of artificial intelligence and by those who share a cognitive approach to linguistic phenomena (Grosz and Sidner 1986, Polanyi 1988, Redeker 1990, Mann et al. 1992, Sanders et al 1993, Sanders 1997, Oversteegen 1997, among others). The main interest of this line of research is to set up a link between discourse segments and those expressions used in natural language to structure the interaction and to signal the structure and coherence of discourse. This involves taking into consideration the way a given structure reflects the speaker's illocutionary intentions and attitude, the discourse organization and the semantic-pragmatic meaning of the units in question.

In this line of work, my first hypothesis was that pragmatic functions of discourse markers were not generic but, to a certain extent, text-genre dependent; to my understanding, there is a direct relationship between the presence of certain markers and the different parts or segments of the *narrative*. The reason why this is bound to occur is double: first of all because of the pragmatic functions of discourse markers, linked to the illocutionary force of the different narrative segments; secondly, because of the delimiting boundary function that some of these lexical units perform. In this sense, it was expected that certain pragmatic markers, such as English *well* and *so*, and Catalan *bé*, *bueno* and *doncs* would be consistently present at certain segment boundaries, both framing and recovering the discourse thread interrupted by another segment. Thus, when a narrator starts the telling of a past personal experience, s/he does not make use of *any* marker, but of one that has a core structural function that permits the framing of the story. Similarly, when an evaluation is embedded within the story, it is going to be a marker that allows for the sharing of common ground and beliefs that will follow. During the telling of the events, in complicating action segments, markers whose referential meaning makes them useful for the sequencing of the events will mostly be used.

My working assumption is that the text-genre specificity of pragmatic markers has to do with the nature of the genre under analysis, in this particular case oral narratives of personal experience. In Labov and Waletzky words (Labov and Waletzky 1967), “he [the narrator] finds himself in a position where he must demonstrate to the listener that he really was in danger. The more vivid and real the danger appears, the more effective the narrative”. My second aim is to prove that both English and Catalan narrative patterns use pragmatic markers as key pieces in the communicative event that takes place between the narrator and hearer. Thus, a second hypothesis was that both English and Catalan narrators would use these devices to help the hearer ‘visualize’ the event vividly, as a real world experience that took in fact place. Taking into account that “narratives are usually told in answer to some stimulus from outside, and to establish some point of personal interest” (Labov and Waletzky 1967), markers can display an essential role in the presentation of the events since, without conveying referential meaning to the propositional content of the message, they carry out one of the most important functions in the telling of a narrative, that is, show the hearer that the narrator was *really* in that situation. The role of these pragmatic devices will therefore be not only text-structural but also highly dynamic in illocutionary terms. They help the storytellers go through their personal experiences at length, conveying the force that their words need to convince the listener, not present at the time of the event, that something important took place and that the story *has* a point and is, therefore, worth listening to.

In this respect, and linked to Labov’s theoretical narrative framework, the presence of certain pragmatic markers can be related to the so-called *intensifiers*, that is, one sort of *evaluative element* that narrators use to show their perspective (Labov 1972b: 378). As shown in Chapter 2 (2.2.) an *intensifier* is a linguistic or paralinguistic device that the narrator uses to strengthen or intensify one of the events taking place in the narrative. As opposed to the other three types of evaluative elements (*comparators, correlatives and explications*), intensifiers do not interfere in the basic narrative syntax. Labov includes gestures, expressive phonology, quantifiers, repetition and ritual utterances in the list of intensifiers (1972b: 378). The reason why these elements are called *evaluative* is because the print of the narrator is overtly shown through them. In addition, their presence is possible in any of the narrative segments and in different clause types, from narrative clauses to free clauses.

Linked to the above framework, my proposal is that some pragmatic markers are another sort of *intensifiers*, in this case lexical devices that, in different degrees or rank-scale, ‘intensify’ some parts of the narrator’s account by selecting an event and highlighting its force. My suggestion would be to add one more element to Labov’s list of intensifiers, which could be considered linguistic and non-linguistic devices that carry a clear pragmatic function that help sustain the pragmatic structure of the

narrative. It should be borne in mind that Labov's term *evaluative* is clearly related to the *evaluation* stage of the narrative, "a secondary structure which is concentrated in the evaluation section but may be found in various forms throughout the narrative" (Labov 1972b: 369). As was shown in the presentation of narrative structure (Chapter 2), the evaluation of the narrative is what conveys the point of the story, its *raison d'être*, that is, the reason why it was told and what the narrator is getting at. Thus, when finishing a narrative, a good narrator will never hear the listener or listeners say: "So what?" but instead, "he did?" (Labov 1972b: 366). This sort of expectancy on the listener's part is conveyed through the evaluative linguistic and paralinguistic devices that say to us: "this was terrifying, dangerous, weird, wild, crazy; or amusing, hilarious, wonderful; more generally, that it was strange, uncommon, or unusual -that is, worth reporting. It was not ordinary, plain, humdrum, everyday, or run-of-the mill" (Labov 1972b: 371).

Some pragmatic markers that are found in English and Catalan oral narratives are evaluative devices that *do* carry all that force, not necessarily because of their propositional content (as opposed to ideational markers and/or argumentative connectors), but because of their pragmatic illocutionary functions, which are context-dependent. I suggest that such is going to be the case of English *you know* and *I mean*, and Catalan *clar*. Thus, it is neither the grammatical nor the semantic content of the narrative that the above quotation refers to; it is the narrators' attitude towards the events that they are reporting by the telling of the story of their personal experience.

An oral narrative is a text genre that takes the form of spontaneous oral monologue. Most of the studies on discourse markers are based on conversational genre that takes the form of adjacency pairs and turn-taking moves. In this context, the participants often make use of discourse markers to hold the floor, save face or express deference. Storytelling embedded in conversational discourse presents similar characteristics since the speaker is either interrupted by the hearer or offers him/her the speech turn. Although the telling of an elicited narrative also involves a speaker-hearer interaction, the fact that the hearer does not verbally interrupt the speaker until the narrative is over¹⁰² results in a long textual piece that presents structural differences from dialogic discourse and has a regular pattern within which markers display significant ideational, rhetorical, sequential, and inferential functions. It is therefore in these terms that I refer to narrative as monologued discourse, never in terms of lack of interaction between the two participants. My point is that the apparent null function of pragmatic discourse markers (i.e. 'fillers') is not such on a genre which requires not only an ideational structure but a solid pragmatic structure.

Finally, the reason why this study takes a contrastive approach between two languages is related to the scarce information available on Catalan markers and on

their incidence in text structure. The interest in the study of these linguistic devices stems, therefore, from a curiosity to find out possible similarities and differences between the functioning of English and Catalan markers in an oral text. Considering the large amount of information and literature on English markers, a thorough study of the use of these linguistic devices in Catalan seemed appropriate.

The general aims and hypotheses presented above are summarized in the following points:

Aim (1):

To show the linguistic form-textual function relationship by means of specific lexical units — *pragmatic markers* — present in a specific text genre, the oral narrative, in English and Catalan. Once the relationship in each separate language is established, the correspondence or non-correspondence between form and function in the two languages will also be established.

Hypothesis (1):

It is hypothesized that pragmatic markers help in the organization of the narrative segments. Because of their illocutionary and procedural meaning, certain markers are bound to occur at particular narrative segments. Similarly, because of their structural function, some of these units will be systematically found at particular segment boundaries.

Aim (2):

To prove that both English and Catalan narrative patterns use pragmatic markers as key pieces in the communicative event that takes place between the narrator and hearer.

Hypothesis (2):

It is hypothesized that both English and Catalan narrators will use pragmatic markers to help the hearer ‘visualize’ the event vividly, as a real world experience that in fact took place. Narrators use them to convey the necessary force to their account of a situation of danger, in an attempt to convince their interlocutor that their story has a point. More specifically, it is hypothesized that certain pragmatic discourse markers are a sort of *intensifiers*, evaluative devices used by narrators to convey and show their perspective.

4.2 Corpus and informants

The analysis of pragmatic markers was carried out on an English and Catalan corpus of forty oral narratives, twenty in English and twenty in Catalan.

The informants from which the oral narratives were elicited are all native speakers of Catalan and English. The forty informants are adult men and women whose age ranges from twenty-five to thirty-five years old. Their educational level is university studies.¹⁰³ The variables which have been controlled are, therefore, mother-tongue (English and Catalan), age, and educational level; sex was not taken into account, so both men and women were chosen at random. External variables were not taken into consideration.

English informants are all from different areas of Great Britain; Catalan informants are all from different parts of Catalonia. Since the aim of this work is not the study of markers according to dialectological variables, the particular places of origin of the informants were not taken into account, the requisite being that they were native speakers whose mother tongue was English or Catalan.¹⁰⁴ It was the *vernacular principle* of the language sustained by Labov (1972c) that ruled the choice of the potential narrators, not the specificities of dialectological variables. The *vernacular principle* sustains “that the style which is most regular in its structure and in its relation to the evolution of the language is the vernacular, in which the minimum attention is paid to speech. (...) This most spontaneous, least studied style is the one that we as linguists will find the most useful as we place the speaker in the overall pattern of the speech community.” (1972c: 112).

The issue of spontaneous style is raised by Labov (1972a: 85–87) repeatedly throughout his work. Hence, Labov suggests two language styles depending on the context, the relationship being:

| | | |
|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| <i>Context:</i> | <i>Informal</i> | <i>Formal</i> |
| <i>Style:</i> | Casual | Careful/Spontaneous |

The problem Labov foresees related to this classification is related to the sociolinguistic interview, instrument used to elicit oral narratives. The keypoint lies in the possibility of constructing interview situations in which casual and spontaneous speech emerge. By *casual speech*, Labov understands “everyday speech used in informal situations, where no attention is directed to language.” By *spontaneous speech*, he refers “to a pattern used in excited, emotionally charged speech when the constraints of a formal situation are overridden.” (1972a: 86). Although spontaneous speech is not commonly related to formal contexts, whenever a sociolinguistic interview takes place this context becomes possible just because it is “the counterpart of casual speech which does occur in formal contexts, not in response to the formal situation, but in spite of it” (1972a: 86). The principle that ruled the choice of the interlocutors in terms of language was the vernacular principle, the language style being, therefore, spontaneous.

4.3 Methodology

The instrument used to elicit the forty oral narratives was one of the modules of the sociolinguistic interview (Labov 1972a). The usefulness and appropriateness of this method of eliciting data has been profusely valued by many scholars working in the field of discourse analysis. Schiffrin (1987b), for instance, refers to it when addressing the issue of empirical data in discourse analysis,¹⁰⁵ pointing at the fact that sociolinguistic interviews contain a range of textual structures and patterns that offer a series of advantages to the discourse analyst: they allow quantitative as well as qualitative analyses, they include a variety of conversational exchanges (adjacency pairs, explanation, directions, clarifications), they present fragments of monologic discourse (narratives, argumentations, descriptions) and, finally, they include a wide variety of speech acts (requests, challenges, boasts) (1987b: 15).

The sociolinguistic interview was first tried by Labov in 1966, in field work on the Lower East Side of New York City and in Harlem.¹⁰⁶ In that social situation, Labov explored different ways to override the formal constraints that a tape recorder may impose on a speaker, the aim being to elicit vernacular language that would break the *principle of formality*.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, there was another issue that Labov encountered: the *observer's paradox*. The paradox occurs because “to observe the data most important for linguistic theory, we have to observe how people speak when they are not being observed” (Labov 1972c: 113). In order to break both principles, Labov pinpointed five contextual situations that facilitated the recording of vernacular speech: *Speech Outside the Formal Interview*, *Speech with a Third Person*, *Speech Not in Direct Response to Questions*, *Childhood Rhymes and Customs*, and *The Danger of Death* (1972a: 87–92). It is, in fact, this last contextual situation that I have used to elicit the oral narratives used as corpus of this study. According to Labov (1972c: 113), *Danger of Death* is one of the most successful questions to involve the speaker to such an extent that the formal situation (i.e. *principle of formality* and *observer's paradox*) is frequently overridden. The question posed by the interviewer is then as follows:

Have you ever been in a situation where you thought you were in serious danger of being killed — where you thought to yourself, “This is it?” (Labov 1972a: 93).

If the response is affirmative, then the following question is: “What happened?” At that point, the interviewee feels obliged to show the interviewer that the story that is about to follow is about a personal experience of a real situation of danger and is not a fiction story. As Labov puts it, “often he becomes involved in the narration to the extent that he seems to be reliving the critical moment, and signs of emotional tension appear.” (1972a: 93).

Labov and his research group reworded the question in different ways (Turell 1995). Accordingly, the question I posed to the informants did not exactly match Labov's original one; I omitted the fragment '*of being killed*' since I considered that very few people would be able to respond 'yes' to such an extreme situation: whereas practically everybody has sometimes felt in a situation of danger, barely anybody has been in a situation of serious danger of being killed. With the changes made, the question was then: "*Have you ever been in a situation where you thought you were in serious danger?*." With the exception of three informants (one English and two Catalan), who responded 'no' and went on with somebody else's experience (rf. vicarious experience), the rest answered 'yes' and got involved in the telling of the story.

4.4 Transcription of data and coding

The transcription of the oral narratives was done in CHAT format (*Codes for the Human Analysis of Transcripts*), which is the standard transcription system used for face-to-face conversational interactions of the CHILDES Project (*Child Language Data Exchange System*, MacWhinney, 1995). Although this project was formerly designed for the study of language acquisition data, it has been widespread among other linguistic fields.¹⁰⁸ The CHAT format system provides general and specific options for basic discourse transcription, as well as phonological and morphological analysis; all of the transcripts in the CHILDES database are in CHAT format. This format is, at the same time, specifically designed to facilitate the automatic analysis of transcripts by the CLAN Programs (*Computerized Language Analysis*).

The CHAT format has a set of standards which must be followed for the CLAN programs to run successfully on CHAT files.¹⁰⁹ One of these standards is the transcription of data in *independent* and *dependent tier* lines. Although the basic unit of independent tier lines is the utterance, I adopt the clause unit as basis, following Labov's model of narrative textual structure.¹¹⁰ Hence, the *independent tiers* that I transcribe are all formed by main and subordinate clauses (these are indented). These main lines begin with an asterisk plus a three-letter code in upper case letters that abbreviate the name of the participant who was the speaker of the utterance being coded; since narratives have only one participant-speaker, I use, throughout, the generic term *narrator* (*NAR).

Dependent tiers are placed below independent ones. They can contain anything the researcher considers of interest for the data analysis. The dependent tiers of the narratives include all the contextual information that I consider is relevant for the analysis of their pragmatic markers, that is, discourse structure (centered in the specific narrative segment, codified as *discourse act*), pragmatic function(s) (ide-

ational, illocutionary and inferential) and syntactic distribution (initial, mid or final position within the clause). The coding of dependent tiers is thus formalized as: %**dia**: [discourse act or narrative segment], %**pra**: [pragmatic function(s) of discourse markers] and %**syn**: [syntactic distribution of discourse markers].

The CHAT system has three major components: the independent tier, the dependent tiers and the file headers. These headers can be obligatory, constant, and changeable. Obligatory headers are those without which the CLAN programs do not run correctly: @**Begin**, @**Participants**, and @**End**. Constant headers tell us useful information that is constant throughout the file; I have included participant's name, age and sex. Changeable headers contain information that can change within the file. I include just one sort of changeable header that is used to mark the beginning and end of a narrative segment, a "gem", label used for analysis by the CLAN GEM program: @**Bg** (Begin gem) and @**Eg** (End gem). Thus, I have labelled the **narrative gems** according to the narrative parts:

Bg: begins gem [beginning of narrative segment or discourse act]

Eg: ends gem [end of narrative segment or discourse act]

- a abstract
- o orientation
 - os – space orientation (geographic)
 - ot – time orientation
 - oc – characters orientation
 - op – place orientation (concrete place of events)
- e evaluation
 - ee – external evaluation
 - ei – internal evaluation
- da development of action (or complicating action)
- r result
- c coda

I introduce three **dependent tiers** (%**dia**, %**pra** and %**syn**). In the first dependent tier (%**dia**) I include the corresponding name of the narrative segment or discourse act. It is, therefore, contextual information about narrative discourse structure. The second dependent tier (%**pra**) includes information about the pragmatic functions of the narrative discourse markers. I pinpointed 23 different pragmatic functions, so 23 codes are included. Finally, a third dependent tier informs of the syntactic distribution of the marker (%**syn**): whether it is found in main or subordinate clausal initial, mid or final position. Sometimes, what I have found is not a full clause but a fragment. In these cases, I have adopted the term 'fragment' — of main or subordinate clause.

The following lines detail all the coding that I propose followed by an explanation. It is to be found in the three dependent tiers above mentioned.

%dia: [discourse act or narrative segment]

\$ab abstract

\$or orientation

\$or: SO [space orientation]

\$or: TO [time orientation]

\$or: CO [characters orientation]

\$or: PO [place orientation]

\$sevaluation

\$ev: EX [external evaluation]

\$ev: IN [internal evaluation]

\$da development of action (or complicating action)

\$re result

\$co coda

%pra: [pragmatic functions of discourse markers]¹¹¹

Code Function

\$ADD adds more detailed information that the narrator considers is relevant for the account. Expands, explains and supports previous proposition or information provided.

\$CLA clarifies previous discourse (sometimes providing examples to justify the argumentation given).

\$CLU concluding device. Introduces important fact to bear in mind or take into consideration. Works as rounding off tool.

\$COM introduces personal comment not directly related to the events. The narrator goes back to the present time and makes a comment or remark that s/he considers is important or relevant for the understanding of the story. Usually found in external evaluation.

\$CON resultative marker. Introduces a consequence of previous proposition or act. Semantic relation, though sometimes difficult to differentiate from pragmatic one. Generally related to logico-argumentative function of connectors.

\$CTX constrains the contextual effects that the proposition may have on the listener. Stops, softens or narrows down the range of inferences and effects that the account may have on the listener. Inference facilitator.

\$DEL delays, puts off information. Plays for time to think (cf. Stenström 1994: discourse markers that fulfill this function are called 'stallers').

\$DSP introduces direct speech. Either in or out of quotation. Structuring role.

\$EMP emphazier. Reinforces propositional value of the utterance or previous pragmatic function.

- \$EVA** evaluator. Introduces evaluation or comment from narrator related to the events taking place (evaluates the events). Usually found in internal evaluation.
- \$EVI** evidential. Makes a fact or a situation salient. Highlights the illocutionary force of the utterance or discourse segment. Indicates that the information provided is highly relevant for the interpretation of the story.
- \$FRA** opening 'frame marking device' (cf. Jucker 1993) used to initiate narrative segment. Structuring role.
- \$FRC** closing 'frame marking device' used to close the narrative segment. Structuring role.
- \$INI** initiates development of action, whenever this occurs. Structuring role.
- \$JUS** introduces justification of previous or following proposition. Inference facilitator.
- \$MIT** 'face threat mitigator' (cf. Jucker 1993). Inference facilitator.
- \$PRE** introduces presupposition. Inference facilitator.
- \$PRO** monitoring feature. Facilitates proximity with interlocutor. The narrator uses the marker to share mutual background knowledge. When using it, the narrator is looking for understanding and complicity. Inference facilitator.
- \$REC** recovers or regains argumentative thread or line of thought, usually interrupted by a narrative segment.
- \$REF** reformulator. Reformulates previous proposition, usually by means of paraphrasing. Semantic relation, though sometimes difficult to differentiate from pragmatic one. Generally related to logico-argumentative function of connectors.
- \$SEQ** introduces sequential order of events. Organizes the discourse in chronological order (i.e. temporal). Semantic relation, though sometimes difficult to differentiate from pragmatic one. Generally related to logico — argumentative function of connectors.
- \$SIT** anchors the interlocutor in the narrative's world. Makes interlocutor aware of the events that are taking place or of the important point(s) to bear in mind in the narrative world that is being constructed.
- \$TOP** topic shifter.

%syn: [syntactic distribution]

\$d: IN [clause distribution: initial position]

\$d: MD [clause distribution: mid position]

\$d: FN [clause distribution: final position]

MN [main clause]

SB [subordinate clause]

FM [fragment of main clause]

FS [fragment of subordinate clause]

The following excerpt illustrates the format of a narrative, according to the CHAT format and codification above proposed:

```
@Begin
@Participants:          NAR1 Sarah Narrator
@Age of NAR:          28;
@Sex of NAR:          female
@Bg:    otp
*NAR:                A few years ago.
*NAR:                when I was at university # um.
*NAR:                I used to go to aerobics.
*NAR:                and it was winter.
*NAR:                so_ it was after my aerobics class\
%dia:                $or: TO
%pra:                $SIT $REC
%syn:                $d:IN MN
*NAR:                and it was quite dark\
*NAR:                and I had.
*NAR:                to walk home along this dark road.
*NAR:                and there was nobody there # no cars # no people or anything.
@Eg:    otp
.....
(NAR1 Sarah Narrator)
```

Finally, a prosodic aspect of the markers is also included in the transcription: the rising (/), falling (\) or sustaining (_) terminal tone of the lexical unit as well as of the clause within which the unit is included. Although the transcription of narratives has been done from the point of view of clause structure, without getting into further detail, prosodic information of the markers has been included because, as it will be seen in the empirical analysis, intonation offers significant information about the pragmatic meaning of the units under analysis. This information is to be found in the main tier.

The CLAN Programs of the CHILDES Project facilitate the automatic analysis of the transcribed data. The analysis of the data requires the running of several of these programs: the CHECK Program (*Verifying Data Accuracy*), to test that the transcriptions adjust to the format required by the CLAN Programs, the GEM Program (*Tagging Interesting Passages*), designed to mark particular parts of the transcript for further analysis, the KWAL Program (*Key Word and Line*), for the searching of lexical units and their contexts, the FREQ Program (*Making Frequency Counts*), for the counting of lexical units, and the GEMFREQ (*Frequency Counts by*

Activity Types) and GEMLIST (*Profiling GEMs within Files*) Programs, for the counting and listing of narratives segments and tiers (i.e. clauses).

PART 2

Pragmatic markers in narrative structure

CHAPTER 5

Pragmatic markers in English narrative structure

5.1 Pragmatic markers in English narrative

Nine lexical units were identified in the corpus under analysis as pragmatic markers in English narrative: *so*, *well*, *then*, *I mean*, *you know*, *anyway*, *you see*, *okay*, and *now*. In order to discriminate the markers to be analyzed, I used the following methodology: first of all, I ordered them according to a frequency degree scale; my goal was to see how often a storyteller used a specific marker. Secondly, I observed where it was used, that is to say, in what discourse segment the marker appeared, so as to be able to eventually establish the link between marker and narrative segment. Thirdly, and now concentrating on each marker, I centered on the functions that the marker in question had on each one of the narrative parts.

In my analysis, I present plausible interpretations and conclusions when I discuss each individual marker. Now, as a starting point, let us see the number of markers found, in absolute and relative terms:

Table 1. Frequency scale of English pragmatic markers found in the narratives (N and %)

| | | |
|--------------------|-----|-------|
| 1. <i>so</i> | 65 | 37.0% |
| 2. <i>well</i> | 36 | 20.6% |
| 3. <i>then</i> | 28 | 16.0% |
| 4. <i>I mean</i> | 15 | 8.6% |
| 5. <i>you know</i> | 13 | 7.4% |
| 6. <i>anyway</i> | 11 | 6.3% |
| 7. <i>you see</i> | 3 | 1.7% |
| 8. <i>okay</i> | 2 | 1.2% |
| 9. <i>now</i> | 2 | 1.2% |
| Total | 175 | 100% |

According to data on Table 1, there is a considerable gap between the frequency of appearance of *anyway* and that of the following markers. Since I consider that 1.7% (and below) of occurrences of a given marker is not representative enough of the way it operates, my analysis will leave *you see*, *okay* and *now* aside, and will concentrate on the former six: *so*, *well*, *then*, *I mean*, *you know*, and *anyway*. Table 2 shows the distribution of pragmatic markers in narrative segments.

Table 2. Distribution of English pragmatic markers in narrative segments (N and %)¹¹²

| | ABSTR. | ORIENT. | ACTION | I.EVAL. | E.EVAL. | RESULT | CODA | total |
|---------------------|-------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|
| well | 1 (2.8%) | 4 (11.1%) | 13 (36.1%) | 9 (16.7%) | 6 (25%) | 1 (2.8%) | 2 (5.5%) | 36 |
| so | – | 4 (6.2%) | 46 (70.8%) | 10 (15.4%) | 3 (4.6%) | 1 (1.5%) | 1 (1.5%) | 65 |
| then | – | 1 (3.6%) | 22 (78.6%) | – | 1 (3.6%) | 4 (14.2%) | – | 28 |
| I mean | – | 2 (13.3%) | 3 (20.0%) | 8 (53.4%) | 2 (13.3%) | – | – | 15 |
| y ³ know | – | – | 6 (46.1%) | 2 (15.4%) | 4 (30.8%) | 1 (7.7%) | – | 13 |
| anyway | – | 1 (9.0%) | 5 (45.6%) | 3 (27.4%) | 1 (9.0%) | 1 (9.0%) | – | 11 |
| Total N | 1 | 12 | 95 | 32 | 17 | 8 | 3 | 168 |
| % | 0.6% | 7.1% | 56.5% | 19.1% | 10.1% | 4.8% | 1.8% | 100% |

The distribution of the markers into narrative segments correlates with the weight that the segment has in the narrative. So it is the *action* and *evaluation* segments that show the highest presence of markers. Furthermore, *internal evaluation* presents some particularities that the rest of segments do not present, i.e. the important role of *I mean* and the high presence of *so*. Notice that the total number of markers in *internal evaluation* almost doubles the *external*. Although it makes sense that most markers appear in *development of action* units, taking into account that these are the backbone of the narrative, their recurrence in *internal evaluation* requires further thought. Frequently, the narrator uses pragmatic markers in this section to introduce personal comments directly related to the events taking place in the story or to let the interlocutor know the feelings or thoughts about the past experience. Contrary to *external evaluation*, *internal evaluation* is the means by which the narrator conveys all the illocutionary force that a narrative of personal experience requires; s/he wants to make sure that not only the facts reach his/her interlocutor, but also the emotional load that hides behind them. Notice, for instance, the relevance of *so*, *well* and *I mean*, all three to be commented on later.

There are units which are totally absent from some segments. Thus, there is only one case of marker in *abstract* (*well*), and two in coda. (*so* and *well*). Only in one case a marker appears in all narrative segments: *well*. This fact confirms Schiffrin's proposal that this marker operates at various discourse planes of talk (rf. Chapter 3), with a varied range of discourse functions (see Figure 3). In the case of *so*, it operates in all narrative segments except in the *abstract*. As will be discussed later on in detail, the majority of cases of this marker appear in *development of*

action segments, forming part of the discourse ideational structure. It is, in all these cases, an argumentative resultative marker.

A similar case is that of *then*, also with a relevant role in *development of action* segments. In most cases, this lexical unit introduces a sequential order of events, working as temporal discourse organizer. *You know* and *anyway* play an important role in *action* and *evaluation* segments.

In the following pages, I will present and discuss the particularities of each of the six above mentioned markers, providing a plausible explanation of their *modus operandi*. However, before getting into such detail, it is interesting to see the number of times that they carry out a particular pragmatic function in the narratives analyzed, so as to have an initial overview of the data. This is shown on Table 3.

Table 3. Frequency table of pragmatic functions of PMs in English narrative¹¹³

| ENGLISH PRAGMATIC MARKERS | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|-------|
| <i>coherence relations</i> | <i>functions</i> | well | so | then | I mean | y'know | anyway | total |
| Ideational Structure | CON | | 29 | 2 | | | | 31 |
| | REF | 8 | | | 6 | 1 | | 15 |
| | SEQ | | 2 | 21 | | | | 23 |
| Rhetorical Structure | ADD | 4 | 5 | | 3 | 2 | | 14 |
| | CLA | 2 | | | 1 | | | 3 |
| | CLU | 5 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 9 | 28 |
| | COM | 5 | 3 | | 2 | 2 | 1 | 13 |
| | DEL | 3 | 2 | | 1 | | | 6 |
| | EMP | | 1 | 3 | 2 | | | 6 |
| | EVA | 5 | 7 | | 6 | 1 | 1 | 20 |
| | EVI | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 12 |
| | REC | 2 | 16 | 3 | | | 4 | 25 |
| TOP | 2 | 4 | 2 | | | 2 | 10 | |
| Sequential Structure | DSP | 5 | 2 | | 1 | 5 | | 13 |
| | FRA | 17 | 24 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 54 |
| | FRC | 2 | 4 | | | 2 | 1 | 9 |
| | INI | | 3 | 1 | | | | 4 |
| Inferential Component | CTX | | | | | | | |
| | JUS | | | | | | | |
| | MIT | 2 | | | | | | 2 |
| | PRE | | | | | | | |
| | PRO | | | | | 12 | | 12 |
| SIT | 4 | 5 | 2 | | | | 11 | |
| Total | N | 69 | 117 | 44 | 29 | 28 | 24 | 311 |
| | % | 22.2% | 37.6% | 14.2% | 9.3% | 9.0% | 7.7% | 100% |

Key to pragmatic functions coding: see Appendix 2.

Note that the polyfunctional property of markers results into a much higher number of functions than of occurrences.

According to my findings, *well*, *so* and *I mean* are the three markers that present the highest range of functions. In the case of *well*, it is the framing function, distantly followed by reformulation, the one that appears the most. In the case of *so*, it is the logico-semantic resultative function the one that rules; however, as we will see later on, the framing and resumption functions follow it closely. The evaluative and reformulative roles of *I mean* are the most relevant ones of this marker. *You know*, on the other hand, has a primary role showing proximity and sympathy with the narrator, behaving as a monitoring feature. It is also an important direct speech marker.

The important role of discourse markers as discourse structuring devices is clearly proved by the high frequency of the framing function (FRA), basically disclosed by *well* and *so*. The four functions that, on a frequency degree scale, pragmatic markers carry out the most are conclusion (CLU), recovering of the train of thought (REC), sequentiality of events (SEQ) and evaluation (EVA). However, all this is a broad picture that deserves close attention since the value of all these findings lies, to my understanding, on the nature of the text-genre on which these units operate, and on the pragmatic marker-narrative segment relationship. The following lines are devoted to the discussion of the role that the six English pragmatic markers play in the building up of a narrative. The pragmatic functions of each marker will be presented taking into account the narrative segment in which it appears.

5.1.1 *Well*: segment frame and reformulation

Among all the pragmatic markers discussed in the literature, *well* is the one that deserves most attention from authors. Thus, Svartvik (1980), Owen (1981), Schourup (1985), and Schiffrin (1987a) devote a whole chapter of their work on discourse markers and conversational discourse to its study. They do it from a functional perspective, analyzing its different pragmatic functions in conversation. Murray (1979) and Jucker (1993), on the other hand, offer a core relevance-theoretical account of its polyfunctionality, while Watts (1989) and Greasley (1994) pinpoint specific uses of the marker in social settings.¹¹⁴ Finally, a different approach is given by Finell (1989), who provides a historical background of the marker to explain why we use the marker in responses, and where the pragmatic force it carries comes from.¹¹⁵

In general, the literature on *well* refers mostly to its use in conversational moves and responses, so the adjacency pair of question-answer becomes its most common context of use.¹¹⁶ But the results of the narrative database analysis prove what was

expected about *well*: a) that the functions carried out are not only restricted to those found in question-answer adjacency pairs; and b) that although present throughout all narrative parts, the marker is dominant in certain story segments, where the illocutionary force of the narrator is more overtly present.

In relation to the first point, as Greasley (1994) claims, it is difficult to see ‘dispreferred’ responses, ‘insufficient’ answers or ‘face-threatening’ situations in a one-speaker discourse that takes the textual form of a monologue (p.480). Hence, it is precisely because of its textual form, which does not offer an overt verbal response on the listener’s part, that one of the main functions of *well* in narratives is that of segment frame marking, followed by what Schiffrin calls the ‘self-repair’ function (1987a: 123), that is, when the speaker shifts toward his/her own talk.¹¹⁷

Data suggest that the frame function of *well* occurs mostly in *internal evaluation*, which doesn’t confirm what was expected, that is, that *well* appeared spread throughout all narrative segments. *Well* has a core structuring role, so it occurs either in the first clause of the narrative, at the very outset, or between two discourse units. Although Svartvik (1980: 174) notes that “*well* in its framing function normally occurs non-initially, embedded in discourse”, the opening up of the story by this marker is frequent, as data show.¹¹⁸ Example (59) illustrates such finding.

(59)

@Begin
 @Participants: NAR12 Agatha Narrator
 @Age of NAR: 28;
 @Sex of NAR: female
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: <well\> # let me think\#.
 *NAR: when I was_#.
 *NAR: the most this uh # the most horrendous one and the most dangerous as as I
 thought\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRA \$COM
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: ei
 @Bg: otsc
 *NAR: about two years ago.
 *NAR: when I was working in Abudhabi.
 *NAR: and I had never been sailing before.
 *NAR: and uh # this uh # this teacher.
 *NAR: that was working in the school.
 *NAR: at the time she was the head of the kindergarten.
 *NAR: took us down to the # to the sailing club.

@Bg: ei
 *NAR: and uh # <well> # until now it was the most horrendous_.
 %dia: :\$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRA \$EVA
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: <well> # close to death I would say\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$REF \$ADD
 %syn: \$d:MD
 *NAR: I thought.
 *NAR: I was going to die.
 *NAR: I thought.
 *NAR: I was starting to say my prayers.
 *NAR: I thought.
 *NAR: it was the the um # the last moments.
 @Eg: ei
 @Bg: c
 *NAR: <so> # that's it\
 %dia: \$co
 %pra: \$FRC
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: c
 @End

.....
 (NAR12 Agatha)

The framing (FRA) *well* within *evaluation* is mostly accompanied by evaluative comments (EVA and COM, internal and external evaluation respectively).¹¹⁹ In the above narrative, Agatha opens and closes up her story about a bad sailing experience by means of *well*; the last unit reformulates and adds some more information to the previous proposition.

The results of the study (see Table 3 above and coming) reveal that, besides the segment-boundary structural function (which is the main role), *well* also indicates addition of information, clarification, conclusion, delaying of information, self-correction, introduction of an external or internal comment (in external and internal evaluation), introduction of direct speech, recovering of the train of thought, anchoring of the interlocutor in the narrative world, evidence of a fact or situation, and topic change. So the narrator makes use of *well* to introduce subjective and also objective elements in the narrative. This becomes highly relevant if the claims made about the marker on its core subjective role are taken into account.

Hence, according to Lakoff (1973), who was a pioneer in the analysis of *well* in conversation, the presence of this marker is only justified in two cases: (1) “when

the answer sought can only be obtained by the questioner by deduction from the response given” and (2) “when the reply is directed to a question other than the overt one.” (1973: 460). However, as Finell (1989) suggests, both uses are related to Gricean conversational implicatures: “*well* is a device by which attention is drawn to the implicit assumptions the speaker is making in his/her utterance” (p.654).¹²⁰

Further support for Lakoff’s account is also provided by Owen (1981) and Schiffrin (1987a), who have noted an association between the presence of *well* and dispreferred responses, that is to say, non-compliance or disagreement. Thus, Owen points out that *well* is used by the speaker as a “strategy for signalling that a face-threat is about to occur, thereby giving attention to alter’s face and reducing the subsequent threat” (1981: 110). Schiffrin concludes that *well* is “a response marker which anchors its user in an interaction when an upcoming contribution is not fully consonant with prior coherence options” (1987a: 102); the more options a question offers, the more frequent the use of *well* is, to the extent that in questions whose answer is a straightforward ‘yes/no’, there is no presence of the marker (ibid.:106–107). Consider, for instance, the following interaction. A assumes that B’s response will be a straightforward answer but since this is not the case, B introduces the non-compliance by means of *well*.

- (60) A: Are you from Barcelona?
B: Well I was born in Girona but I grew up in Barcelona.

Now, see that other type of interaction that requires a straightforward yes/no answer:

- (61) A: Is it ten o’clock already? I have an important meeting.
B: No. It’s only nine thirty.

On similar lines of argumentation, but trying to account for the different approaches and explanations given to the marker by means of Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory, Jucker (1993: 438) distinguishes four uses of *well*: (a) *marker of insufficiency*, indicating problems on the content level of current or preceding utterance, (b) *face-threat mitigator*, indicating problems on the interpersonal level, (c) *frame marking device*, indicating topic change or introducing direct speech, and (d) *delay service*, used as a delaying tactic by the speaker. According to Jucker, all of these uses are, however, related to one core meaning: “a signpost signalling to the hearer that the context created by the previous utterance — whether produced by the current speaker or the current listener — is not the most relevant one for the interpretation of the impending utterance” (1993: 440).

Nevertheless, previous to Jucker and also based on relevance theory, Murray (1979) had already offered a core explanation of *well* that cancelled Lakoff’s account on the marker, providing examples that invalidated the use of the marker in

dispreferred responses: “The following generalization captures every use of *well* so far: when a speaker prefaces an answer with *well*, he signals that he is aware that what immediately follows is not just what he assumes the asker wants to be told” (1979: 728–729). Both Jucker’s and Murray’s accounts are based on Gricean pragmatics, the same as Schourup’s (1985), who treats *well* as an *evincive*,¹²¹ that is, a linguistic mechanism that helps the speaker communicate his thought without having to display it completely (1985: 18–20). Thus, according to Schourup (1985: 20):

“The need for evincives such as *well* arises primarily from a general restriction on conversational behaviour formulated in one clause of Grice’s Maxim of Quantity: ‘Do not make your contribution more informative than is required’ (Grice 1977: 45).”

Even though Schourup refers to the use of evincives basically in conversation, its occurrence in narratives can also respond to that need. However, his claim that “the basic evincive use of *well* is to indicate that the present speaker is now examining the contents of the private world” (1985: 66) seems too narrow when applied to narratives of personal experience (and a situation of danger in particular). On the other hand, this principle does not only apply to *well*, but to all pragmatic markers, as Marsà (1992: 135) points out.

Schourup suggests that *well* in a narrative may indicate the inclusion of subjective material on the narrative account (1985: 87). Although it is true that the narrator tries, by means of pragmatic markers (i.e. interjections or evincives for Schourup), to convey all the illocutionary force of his/her past experience, my findings reveal that the use of such linguistic devices responds to other expressive and text structuring functions as well, affecting ideational, rhetorical, sequential, and inferential text structure components.

Apart from its frequent use as an introductory piece of evaluative comments, *well* is frequently used with a text structuring function in *orientation* segments, also at the narrative outset. It is in this sense that Leech and Svartvik (1975) refer to *well* as a ‘signpost’ (together with *now* and all those “words and phrases which have a connecting function”) that is used to “signal a new start in the train of thought” (p.156).¹²² Even though their analysis is restricted to conversational discourse, opening up a new turn in a dialogue, their observations can also be applied to monologued discourse. See, now, on Table 4 the distribution of pragmatic functions of *well* in narrative segments, linked to the corresponding discourse components. The most outstanding correlations between functions and narrative segments for *well* will be considered in the following sections.

Table 4. Distribution of pragmatic functions of *well* in English narrative

| | | WELL | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|--------|------|-------|
| <i>coherence relations</i> | <i>functions</i> | ABSTR. | ORIENT. | ACTION | I.EVAL. | E.EVAL. | RESULT | CODA | total |
| Ideational Structure | CON | | | | | | | | |
| | REF | | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | | 8 |
| | SEQ | | | | | | | | |
| Rhetorical Structure | ADD | | | 2 | 1 | 1 | | | 4 |
| | CLA | | | 1 | 1 | | | | 2 |
| | CLU | | | | 2 | 1 | | 2 | 5 |
| | COM | | | | 1 | 4 | | | 5 |
| | DEL | | | 3 | | | | | 3 |
| | EMP | | | | | | | | |
| | EVA | | | | 5 | | | | 5 |
| | EVI | | | 3 | | | | | 3 |
| | REC | | | 2 | | | | | 2 |
| | TOP | | | 2 | | | | | 2 |
| Sequential Structure | DSP | | | 4 | | 1 | | | 5 |
| | FRA | 1 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 3 | | 1 | 17 |
| | FRC | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 2 |
| | INI | | | | | | | | |
| Inferential Component | CTX | | | | | | | | |
| | JUS | | | | | | | | |
| | MIT | | | 2 | | | | | 2 |
| | PRE | | | | | | | | |
| | PRO | | | | | | | | |
| | SIT | | 3 | 1 | | | | | 4 |
| Total | N | 1 | 8 | 24 | 19 | 12 | 1 | 4 | 69 |
| | % | 1.4% | 11.6% | 34.8% | 27.6% | 17.4% | 1.4% | 5.8% | 45.0% |

Key to pragmatic functions coding: see Appendix 2.

The use of *well* in orientation segments is illustrated in example (62), with a text-world anchoring function (SIT). Heather, the narrator, is telling a story about a bomb explosion, while she was living in Belfast. By means of this marker, not only does she orient the listener in terms of the place and characters involved but, what is more important, she anchors her interlocutor, from the very beginning, to the story she is about to tell.

(62)

@Begin

@Participants: NAR13 Heather Narrator

@Age of NAR: 25;

@Sex of NAR: female
 @Bg: ocp/da
 *NAR: eh:: yes # eh:: <well\># I've lived in Belfast for seventeen years.
 %dia: \$or:ST
 %pra: \$FRA \$SIT
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: and I studied in Edimburgh.
 *NAR: in the summers I went back to Belfast.
 *NAR: and I worked in the law courts in Belfast.
 *NAR: and # one day # there was a girl leaving to get married.
 *NAR: and we all dressed her up in a stupid costume.
 *NAR: and tied her to the railings outside the building.
 @Eg: ocp/da

 (NAR13 Heather)

After framing, the second most common function of *well* in narratives is that of reformulation of the preceeding proposition (REF) or, as Schiffrin calls it, 'self-repair' function (1987a: 123). With framing, reformulation is commonly concentrated on evaluative segments, followed by *development of action* ones. Sample (63) is an excerpt of a narrative that illustrates various uses of *well* in three narrative segments: *evaluation*, *development of action* and *result*. Whereas the presence of this marker in *action* and *evaluation* segments is quite high, its use in the rest of narrative segments falls to the point that it is only found once in an *abstract* and a *result*. The story of (63) is about Andy's encounter with a bunch of guys who entered a bar and addressed him asking for a cigarette. After he told them to go and buy the cigarettes at the bar, they started kicking and punching him; they ended up taking out a knife.

(63)

.....
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: it wasn't very long #.
 *NAR: it's any about # I don't know #.
 *NAR: it was a small pen # like that # about three inches long.
 *NAR: and # I realized.
 *NAR: that # <well\> # I was in danger\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$CLU \$EVA
 %syn: \$d:IN SB
 @Eg: ei
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: <so_> I jumped over the bar/.
 *NAR: and I ran out/.

%dia: \$da
 %pra: \$FRA \$REC \$CON
 %syn: \$d: IN MN
 *NAR: and <then_ # well\> # I just ran and ran for about a kilometer\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$SEQ \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: when I stopped.
 *NAR: I noticed.
 *NAR: that I was bleeding in my # <well\> # in my bottom # on inside of
 my leg # over here\ #.
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$MIT
 %syn: \$d:MD SB
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: r
 *NAR: and when I went back there/.
 *NAR: <well\> # I didn't really got back there/.
 *NAR: but when I spoke to the person_.
 *NAR: who was at the bar/.
 %dia: \$re
 %pra: \$REF
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: he said that #.
 *NAR: that they # the boys # had said.
 *NAR: that I had stabbed one of them.
 *NAR: but I hadn't.
 *NAR: <so_> I think_.
 *NAR: probably what happened was # on the floor/.
 *NAR: when there was a lot of confusion/.
 *NAR: one of them had stabbed his friend\
 %dia: \$re
 %pra: \$CLU
 %syn: \$d: IN MN
 @Eg: r
 @Bg: c
 *NAR: and that was that\
 @Eg: c
 @End
 (NAR3 Andy)

Table 3 presented all the pragmatic functions of *well* independently of the narrative section in which they appeared; Table 4 revealed its functioning in narrative segments. Focusing on data from Table 3, I highlighted two main functions of *well*

in narratives: framing (FRA) and reformulation (REF). But its use in the introduction of concluding remarks (CLU), commentaries (COM and EVA), direct speech (DSP), and of the important events of the narrative's world to bear in mind (SIT) is also highly relevant. In fact, the general idea that this marker (similarly to the rest of discourse markers) is used to 'fill' the time that the speaker spends thinking about what s/he is about to say proves to be rarely the case: only three times in the twenty narratives analyzed has the narrator used *well* with such delay function (DEL). They all occurred in *development of action* segments and in two cases they also carry out a discourse structuring function, introducing direct speech (DSP):

(64)

.....
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and I had my handbag.
 *NAR: and I took my handbag.
 *NAR: and I just hit him with it.
 *NAR: <well> I went\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$DSP \$DEL
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: &go away&/ or something like that\
 *NAR: and I ran.
 *NAR: and he came after me.
 *NAR: and he was going.
 *NAR: &no # come on # please # please&
 *NAR: and I just swore at him.
 *NAR: and ran away.
 *NAR: ran straight back to my house.
 @Eg: da

.....
 (NAR1 Sarah)

(65)

.....
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and all the way for the rest of the journey.
 *NAR: I had the sensation.
 *NAR: that I must get back to England.
 *NAR: and when we arrived back to England.
 *NAR: the first thing I did.
 *NAR: was telephone # my family.
 *NAR: my cousin answered.
 *NAR: I didn't even say hello.
 *NAR: I just said.

*NAR: &how's granny/#.
 *NAR: <you know_> is granny all right/&.
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$DSP \$REF \$ADD
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: and he said\
 *NAR: &<well\> # actually\& <you know\>.
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$DSP \$DEL \$MIT 2DSP 2PRO
 %syn: \$d:IN MN 2IN 2MN
 *NAR: &hi Totty # it's really nice to hear_
 *NAR: you're back again\ <you know\>.
 *NAR: she's died\&.
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$DSP \$PRO \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: da

.....
 (NAR4 Totty)

Excerpt (64) is from a story by Sarah, who has a bad experience with a boy she has encountered in the street and has asked her for the time. This piece belongs to the end of the narrative, just before the result, and is therefore particularly expressive and emotionally charged. The second excerpt (65) belongs to a story about a premonition. Totty, the narrator, is travelling around Europe and feels that something wrong is about to occur soon. When she calls her family, they tell her that her grandmother has passed away. Notice that the speaker, on the phone, does not really know how to approach the matter, knowing how much the news will affect Totty. The speaker makes use of two discourse markers, *well* and *you know*. *Well* is used to delay the information, to introduce direct speech and to mitigate the news; besides being used in the introduction of direct speech as well, the speaker on the phone makes use of *you know* to show proximity and sympathy with his interlocutor, Totty, since what he is going to tell her is a sad piece of news.

As an introductory device of concluding remarks (CLU), *well* has also an important function. Such function is present in *evaluation* and *coda* segments. In (66), Misha closes up her terrible skiing experience with an *evaluation* segment; *well* is used by the narrator to introduce it.

(66)

.....
 @Bg: r
 *NAR: and my # when we got up to the other end.
 *NAR: my friend explained to me.

*NAR: he'd been parachuting # jumping in parachutes.
 *NAR: and he said.
 *NAR: he had never # ever been through so much fear in all his life.
 @Eg: r
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: <well\> # that's the worst_.
 *NAR: that I've been through\
 *NAR: and I can remember\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRC \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: ei
 @End
 (nar18 Misha)

The rounding off of a narrative by means of a *coda* introduced by *well* occurs only twice. In both cases this marker has a concluding function since the narrator makes use of it to finish up the story and let the listener know that s/he is back to the present time.

(67)

.....
 @Bg: r
 *NAR: but what happened was.
 *NAR: he'd made his point.
 *NAR: he'd put his knife away.
 @Eg: r
 @Bg: c
 *NAR: and <well\> # that's that's the story\
 %dia: \$co
 %pra: \$FRC \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: c
 @End
 (NAR6 Phil)

(68)

.....
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and we had to run as quickly as possible.
 *NAR: we'd to belt through the through the corridors to the other side of the building.
 *NAR: and about a minute later the bomb went off.
 *NAR: and the building was.
 *NAR: <well\> # nothing much happened\
 @Eg: c
 @End

```

%dia:      $da
%pra:      $CLA
%syn:      $d:IN MN
@Eg:      da
@Bg:      r
*NAR:      it broke windows and things like.
@Eg:      r
@Bg:      c
*NAR:      <well\> # that was about it\
%dia:      $co
%pra:      $FRA $CLU
%syn:      $d:IN MN
@Eg:      c

```

.....
(NAR13 Heather)

In excerpt (68) there are two occurrences of *well*. The one that appears in *development of action* has a clarifying function (CLA). In the middle of the telling of a terrible experience with a bomb explosion at the working place, the narrator makes use of that marker to clarify and, at the same time, specify that ‘nothing much happened’.

Table 4 showed the distribution of *well* in narrative segments with the corresponding pragmatic function. Most of its occurrences appear in *development of action* and *evaluation* segments. Only in one narrative *well* is found in the *abstract*. This is not surprising taking into account that the narrator barely introduces the account by means of an *abstract*; he does it either through *evaluation* or *orientation* units. The following excerpt illustrates this finding.

(69)

```

@Begin
@Participants:      NAR15 Rosemary Narrator
@Age of NAR:      28;
@Sex of NAR:      female
@Bg:      a
*NAR:      emm # <well\> # I've had my handbag snatched\
%dia:      $ab
%pra:      $FRA
%syn:      $d:IN MN
@Eg:      a

```

.....
(NAR15 Rosemary)

There are several reasons that could explain the systematic presence of *well* in *development of action* and *evaluation* segments. The majority of functions that *well*

displays are illocutionary, in the rhetorical structure; as a rule, illocutionary functions are mostly found in action and evaluation sequences.¹²³ In evaluation segments, *well* systematically introduces comments and evaluations of the narrator, both of them belonging, again, to the rhetorical structure. On the other hand, notice that, as inference facilitator, its role is barely significant: out of 69 functional uses of the marker, the narrator has used it only twice to mitigate the message and four times to situate the listener in the narrative's world which, as previously shown, mostly takes place in the orientation. Table 5 summarizes the findings shown on Table 4, according to discourse components.

Table 5. Incidence of *well* in narrative discourse structure (N and %).

(*) Reformulative (*\$ref*)

| IDEATIONAL STRUCTURE | | PRAGMATIC STRUCTURE | |
|---------------------------|--|--|---|
| logico-semantic relations | RHETORICAL STRUCTURE Illocutionary intentions | SEQUENTIAL STRUCTURE Structuring device | INFERENTIAL COMPONENT Inference facilitator/restrictor |
| *11.5% | 45.0% | 34.8% | 8.7% |
| 8 | 31 | 24 | 6 |

Source: data taken from Table 4.

Results show that the functions linked to the rhetorical structure have the greatest number of occurrences (45.0%), followed by those related to the sequential structure (34.8%). They are distantly followed by reformulative *well*, attached to the ideational structure (11.5%), and functions that have to do with the inferential component, that is, anchoring and mitigation: 8.7%. Such findings respond to expectations about the marker, present throughout the story but dominant and richer as illocutionary force marker in the rhetorical structure. Another finding which was not hypothesized and which turns out to be of great interest is the strong role that *well* has in the sequential structure of the narrative, working mainly as segment-boundary and direct speech frame marker (FRA and DSP, respectively).

Another interesting feature of *well* to consider is related to a prosodic feature, i.e. intonation.¹²⁴ Only four occurrences of *well* in the twenty narratives analyzed have a fall-rise intonation contour; the rest all have a rise-fall. In this respect, Murray (1979) refers to O'Connor and Arnold's (1970) suggestion that "in general, all statements associated with tone groups containing falling nuclear tones ... sound definite and complete; in contrast, those associated with rising tones sound indefinite and incomplete."¹²⁵ Nevertheless, Murray explains that there is no requirement of incompleteness for an utterance to be introduced by *well* with a rising intonation (as Lakoff suggests as well). Whenever there is "expectation, hope, fear,

or other nominalization of an intensional verb”, the conditions for its presence are appropriate (Murray 1979: 730). Such is the case of those instances found in the narrative. They are all utterances associated with evaluative comments. Excerpt (70) illustrates it. It is taken from a story by Zoe, who was once walking on the street at night by herself and, when entering a telephone box, was surrounded by a group of boys who were following her. There are two instances of such use of *well* within the same narrative. Previous to the evaluative unit, there is a development of action segment that provides contextualization.

(70)

.....
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and it was raining very heavily.
 *NAR: I remember that clearly.
 *NAR: and I got to the telephone box.
 *NAR: and they surrounded the telephone box.
 *NAR: <so_> I couldn't get out\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$CON
 %syn: \$d:IN SB
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: <well/> # it was very frightening/.
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRA \$EVA
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: more of the fact that # <I mean_> # with the weather how it was as well\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$REF
 %syn: \$d:MD
 @Eg: ei

 @Bg: ei/e
 *NAR: but # <I mean\> # that's just a case of_
 *NAR: &are you being paranoic/.
 *NAR: are they really following you/&.
 *NAR: because nothing actually ever happened\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRA \$DSP \$EVA
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: <well/ # I mean_> # I think you are paranoic_
 *NAR: when you're on your own\
 %dia: \$ev:EX
 %pra: \$REF \$COM

%syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: ei/e

.....
 (NAR14 Zoe)

None of the occurrences of *well* found in the narratives suggest incompleteness or vagueness, no matter the sort of tone, falling or rising. A plausible explanation is related to the text-genre, i.e. a narrative, a one-speaker monologue which does not require verbal answer from the interlocutor. Notice that the claim that *well* is used in dispreferred responses (rf. Lakoff 1973, Owen 1981, Schiffrin 1987a, inter alia) is only valid for conversational discourse. From all the functions presented in Table 4, it is clear that none of them indicates that the narrator uses *well* to introduce an utterance that shows disagreement or non-compliance. As we have previously seen, the narrator uses the marker for illocutionary and text-structuring purposes, mainly. Only in two cases (NAR3 and NAR4) it is used as a face threat mitigator (MIT).

Syntactic distribution was also considered whenever *well* was found. As was explained in Chapter 4, the position of the marker in the clause was an aspect to be taken into account since it was considered to have, in some instances, a direct relationship with the marker's pragmatic meaning. The three possibilities that were observed are: initial, mid or final position, in main or subordinate clause. Of the 36 occurrences of *well* that were found in the narratives (see Table 1), there were only seven cases in which the marker was not initiating a main clause. Three occurred in the same narrative (NAR3): one in mid-position of a main clause and two in initial and mid-position in a subordinate clause. Three others occurred in mid-position of a main clause and the last case was found at the beginning of a fragment. It is highly significant that the four instances of mid-position *well* share the same pragmatic function, that is, reformulation. This finding does not appear surprising if the intrinsic nature of a reformulative operation is taken into account, often occurring as an afterthought, once the speaker has started his/her utterance. The two small excerpts in (71) illustrate reformulative *well*:

(71)
 @Begin
 @Participants: NAR9 Hellen Narrator
 @Age of NAR: 25;
 @Sex of NAR: female
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: yes # I have # <well\># almost in danger\
 *NAR: it felt quite frightening at the time\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRA \$REF \$CLA
 %syn: \$d:MD MN

@Eg: ei

.....
(NAR9 Hellen)

@Bg: ee

*NAR: it was about # <well> # for a young girl\#.

*NAR: it was about thirty feet high\.

%dia: \$ev:EX

%pra: \$REF \$ADD

%syn: \$d:MD MN

@Eg: ee

.....
(NAR20 Jill)

The *well* in NAR9 is placed in the first clause of the story, at the very outset of the narrative. Hellen is answering the interviewer whether there has been any occasion that she has felt in danger. First, she responds straightforwardly; then, she reformulates the previous proposition by means of *well* and clarifies that she was ‘almost’ in danger. The second excerpt (NAR20) is about a bad experience climbing a cliff. Jill introduces some relevant information in the middle of her account of the events (an *external evaluation*), informing the interlocutor how high the cliff was. She was going to inform of it directly when, all of a sudden, she realizes that the high becomes relevant because of her being a ‘young girl’, so she interrupts what she is about to say and, by means of *well*, reformulates her previous proposition and adds that information to it.

As previously noted, in NAR3 there are three occurrences of *well* that serve to illustrate three position cases: mid of main clause and initial and mid of subordinate clauses. Only in two occasions was *well* found in a subordinate clause; the rest were all in main clauses. See (72). The story is by Andy, who entered a bar to see a friend and had a dangerous experience with a group of guys. They asked Andy for a cigarette and he sent them to the bar to buy some.

(72)

.....
*NAR: and # the bar was more or less empty\.

*NAR: and <then> what happened was\.

*NAR: five people came in quite sho# <well># short # relatively\.

*NAR: gipsy looking\ # mmm.

%dia: \$da

%pra: \$REF

%syn: \$d:MD MN

*NAR: and asked me for a cigarette\.

@Eg: da

.....

- *NAR: one of them followed me/.
 *NAR: and <then_> I saw the knife in his hand/.
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$SEQ
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: it wasn't very long #.
 *NAR: it's any about # I don't know #.
 *NAR: it was a small pen # like that # about three inches long.
 *NAR: and # I realized.
 *NAR: that # <well> # I was in danger\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$CLU \$EVA
 %syn: \$d:IN SB
 @Eg: ei

 *NAR: when I stopped.
 *NAR: I noticed.
 *NAR: that I was bleeding in my # <well> # in my bottom # on inside of
 my leg # over here\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$MIT
 %syn: \$d:MD SB
 @Eg: da

 (NAR3 Andy)

The first subordinate is a *that*-relative object clause. *Well* is used right before the subject of the subordinate. The second subordinate is also a *that*-relative object clause but, on this occasion, *well* is placed between the verb and the prepositional phrase. Unlike those *well* placed in mid-position of the main clause, in subordinate clauses *well* does not share any pragmatic function, so it can be concluded that, whereas clause distribution does seem to affect the pragmatic meaning of the marker, clause type — main or subordinate — does not.

Nonetheless, most of the *well* analyzed in the narratives are placed at the beginning of a main clause. Watts (1989: 210) maintains that, whenever the discourse marker is placed prefacing a tone unit, there is no saliency and thus there is non-stigmatization of the user. On the contrary, if the discourse marker concludes a tone unit, it is salient and the user is therefore negatively evaluated or stigmatized within a social group. Watts proposes two terms for such cases, depending where the marker is positioned in the clause: *lefthand discourse brackets* for those

prefacing a tone unit and *righthand discourse brackets* for those concluding it.¹²⁶ Besides the user being socially stigmatized for using a righthand discourse marker, whenever a marker is salient, the marker is “open to interpretation as an evaluative cue” (ibid. p.219).

In the narratives analyzed there have been no instances of righthand *well*. Nonetheless, contrary to Watts’ suggestion, out of the seven non-initial main clause position markers, five are in internal evaluation, functioning as evaluative cues.

In sum, we have seen that *well* in narratives operates in *action* and *internal evaluation* segments, mainly. As was expected, its role in the pragmatic structure of the narrative is mainly illocutionary, expanding the number of functions that the marker has in conversational genre, as turn-taking facilitator. Results have also shown that *well* has a significant text-structuring function. As for the former, reformulation is the function that *well* introduces most often. As discourse structuring device, *well* systematically appears at narrative segments’ boundaries, working as a text-delimiter (i.e. frame); both functions operate in rhetorical and sequential discourse structures, respectively. As an inference facilitator, its role is low; only in *orientation* is its presence highly relevant, working as a device that anchors the interlocutor in the events of the narrative world. As opposed to conversational genre, a monologued discourse like a narrative cannot have dispreferred responses, insufficient answers or face-threatening situations. It is because of its textual form that, on a frequency scale of pragmatic functions, *well* works, above all, as a segment structuring device. The general belief that this marker is used by speakers as a ‘filler’ proves thus to be generally incorrect. As for prosodic features, *well* presents a rise-fall intonation contour, generally associated with definite and complete tone groups. Those very few cases of *well* with a fall-rise intonation carry out an evaluative function, mainly. An analysis of the syntactic distribution of the marker confirms that *well* is a *lefthand discourse bracket*, that is, it is mostly placed at the beginning of the main clause.

5.1.2 *So*: segment frame and resumption

Most of the literature on this conjunctive device treats it exclusively from a sentential perspective, ignoring its discourse function. Those many cases in which *so* does not allow a grammatical analysis do not always find a proper explanation. My findings suggest that, besides establishing a cause-consequence semantic relation with the previous proposition, *so* conducts other relevant relations that are closely related to the structural discourse component. Consider, for instance, excerpt (73). It is the beginning of a story by Lindsay, who once went sailing with some friends and the experience ended up in disaster.

(73)

@Begin

@Participants: NAR2 Lindsay Narrator

@Age of NAR: 26;

@Sex of NAR: female

@Bg: ee

*NAR: I myself was quite recently in a pretty dangerous situation.

@Eg: ee

@Bg: os

*NAR: um # I was here living in Spain.

@Eg: os

@Bg: ocs/da

*NAR: and some friends of mine had a yacht.

*NAR: and one weekend they asked me.

*NAR: if I wanted to sail with them to Mallorca.

@Eg: ocs/da

@Bg: ee

*NAR: <so_> I love sailing\.

%dia: \$ev:EX

%pra: \$FRA \$COM

%syn: \$d:IN MN

@Eg: ee

@Bg: da

*NAR: and <so_> of course I agreed to go/.

%dia: \$da

%pra: \$FRA \$REC

%syn: \$d:IN MN

*NAR but it's twenty hours sailing.

.....

(NAR2 Lindsay)

Notice that the two utterances which are introduced by *so* would perfectly keep their truth-value and syntactic structure were the conjunctive devices taken out. Thus, what Lindsay is doing by means of *so* is not establishing an exclusively resultative relation with the previous proposition, but, in the first case, introducing an external evaluation (informative comment for the listener) and, in the second case, besides using the unit to indicate a cause-consequence relation ('because I love sailing, I agreed to go'), regaining the argumentative thread that was broken by the introduction of the comment. Moreover, since both *so* are used by the narrator to start a new narrative segment, they both have a segment structuring function. The expectations are, therefore, that *so* does not only have a sound presence in the narrative ideational structure, but a core one in the rhetorical and sequential.

The importance of *so* as discourse structural device has been pointed out by Reichman (1985), who maintains that it is often used to signal a restatement and/or a resumption of a claim: “Resumptions can either return us to an original issue [context] space or create a new issue [context] space with a modified claim” (p.39).¹²⁷ The way Reichman explains the context space-pragmatic markers relationship is as follows: “Speakers use specific surface linguistic signals — *clue words* — that usually accompany different types of conversational moves in a discourse. These clue words signal that a context space boundary point has been reached; and simultaneously they specify the kind of shift (the kind of conversational move) about to take place” (p.36).

The notion of context space boundary introduced by Reichman is essential to understanding the role of *so* — and other pragmatic markers — as segment frame marker. As I discuss in the following pages, Reichman’s context space bears special significance in explaining the role of markers in narrative, since the shift to which she refers can be applied not only to structural but also to cognitive frame shiftings.

According to Schiffrin (1987a), *so* is a ‘result’ marker whose grammatical properties and semantic meaning contribute to its discourse use. However, in order to fully grasp the role it plays in discourse coherence, Schiffrin clarifies that the notion of ‘result’ has to be understood from a broad perspective:

“A ‘result’ is a change in circumstance which is brought about by a prior cause — a transition of some kind (...) Thus, when *so* prefaces the functional transition from one idea segment to another, even when that transition is to the support rather than position segment of an argument, its use may still reflect its ‘result’ meaning — but only the ‘transition’ component of that meaning.” (1987a: 224–225)

It is because of this wide operative scope of *so* that this marker can have both referential and pragmatic meaning, claims Schiffrin. According to her, the transitions undertaken by this marker are found in three planes of talk, basically:¹²⁸ Ideational structure, Information state and Action structure. The way Schiffrin explains the role of *so* in such discourse planes is shown in Figure 8:

| Discourse Plane | | |
|---|---|---|
| Ideational structure fact-based | Information state knowledge-based | Action structure action-based |
| ‘result’ | ‘inference’ | ‘action’ |

Figure 8. Semantic realization of *so* according to Schiffrin (1987: 202)

The semanticopragmatic nature of *so* is not restricted to the three levels above.¹²⁹ Schiffrin does not mention the role of *so* in exchange structure, equalled to Redeker’s

sequential structure in this work. Its significance in my data is fundamental because the second most repeated function of *so* in narrative (and I suggest that this finding might be expanded to other monologued discourses) is that of segment boundary frame.¹³⁰ The third is resumption of context space, a core function of *so* pointed out by Reichman (1985: 39).

I will not treat ideational *so* because, as I explained at length in previous pages, it sets up logico-semantic relations (rf. *connectors*). The relations held in the action structure are illocutionary. From my findings, *so* undertakes a wide range of illocutionary functions in narrative that I will show and discuss in the following pages. Finally, Schiffrin suggests that *so* can also facilitate knowledge-based relations. She defines them as follows: “A knowledge-based causal relation holds when a speaker uses some piece(s) of information as a warrant for an inference (a speaker-inference), or when a speaker intends a hearer to do so (a hearer-inference).” (1987a: 202). As it will be shown in the following pages, *so* has a low inferential role in narrative: only on three occasions has the narrator used the marker to anchor the listener in the narrative’s world.¹³¹

Because a narrative is monologued discourse, the shift of responsibility from speaker to hearer does not take place. Thus, instead of working as turn-taking transition signal, *so* functions as conclusion summing-up marker in narrative, bridging previous and following proposition. Figure 9 shows the changes that I propose on Schiffrin’s analysis on *so*.

| Discourse Plane | | | |
|------------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Ideational structure fact-based | Information state knowledge-based | Action structure action-based | → Schiffrin (1987a) (Figure 8) |
| ‘result’ | ‘inference’ | ‘action’ | |
| CONNECTOR | Inferential Component | Rhetorical Structure | Sequential Structure |
| DISCOURSE MARKER | Inference restrictor and facilitator | Illocutionary indicator | Segment boundary frame |

Figure 9. Proposal of discourse realizations of *so* (additions from Figure 8).

So far I have discussed the framework that accounts for discursive *so*. Now, let us make the connection with the text-genre under analysis. Table 6 shows the distribution of pragmatic functions of *so* in narrative segments. Note that there are three ruling functions of *so* in narrative: (a) resultative (CON); (b) framing (FRA); and (c) resumptive (REC), following a frequency degree scale.

The first most significant function of *so* is referential. As it was explained at length in previous pages, the resultative function is part of the ideational discourse structure. It is the grammatical conjunctive *so* that introduces a fact-based consecutive relation from the previous proposition and is usually treated in the literature as a *connector*.

Table 6. Distribution of pragmatic functions of *so* in English narrative.

| | | SO | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|--------|------|-------|-----|
| <i>coherence relations</i> | <i>functions</i> | ABSTR. | ORIENT. | ACTION | I.EVAL. | E.EVAL. | RESULT | CODA | total | |
| Ideational Structure | CON | | 1 | 25 | | 2 | 1 | | 29 | |
| | REF | | | | | | | | | |
| | SEQ | | | 2 | | | | | 2 | |
| Rhetorical Structure | ADD | | | 4 | | 1 | | | 5 | |
| | CLA | | | | | | | | | |
| | CLU | | | 4 | | 3 | | 1 | 8 | |
| | COM | | | | | | 3 | | 3 | |
| | DEL | | | 2 | | | | | 2 | |
| | EMP | | | 1 | | | | | 1 | |
| | EVA | | | | | 7 | | | 7 | |
| | EVI | | | 2 | | | | | 2 | |
| | REC | | 1 | 13 | | 1 | | | 15 | |
| | TOP | | 1 | 3 | | | | | 4 | |
| Sequential Structure | DSP | | | 2 | | | | | 2 | |
| | FRA | | 1 | 17 | | 5 | 1 | | 24 | |
| | FRC | | | | | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 | |
| | INI | | | 4 | | | | | 4 | |
| Inferential Component | CTX | | | | | | | | | |
| | JUS | | | | | | | | | |
| | MIT | | | | | | | | | |
| | PRE | | | | | | | | | |
| | PRO | | | | | | | | | |
| | SIT | | 2 | 3 | | | | | 5 | |
| Total | N | | 6 | 82 | | 21 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 117 |
| | % | | 5.2% | 70.0% | | 18.0% | 5.2% | 0.8% | 0.8% | |
| | | | | | | 23.2% | | | | |

Key to pragmatic functions coding: see Appendix 2.

The second most significant function of *so* in narrative is pragmatic. It is the segment boundary frame, found in the sequential structure. In the narratives analyzed, *so* is the marker that the narrator uses the most to introduce the action (see Table 3), closely followed by *well*. However, if we compare it to framing-*well*

(see Table 4) we see that, whereas *well* is regularly distributed through all narrative segments, framing-*so* is mostly present in development of action units, being totally absent in *abstract*, *result* and *coda*. This is because framing-*so* often carries out another important function which takes place in action segments: the resumption of train of thought or, in Reichman's terms, contextual space.

Excerpts in (74) illustrate a polyfunctional *so*. It carries out a framing (FRA) and events initiating function (INI) on the first development of action segment, and a framing (FRA) and resumption (REC) in the second and third one. Analysis of data reveal that these two roles — one structural, the other rhetorical — often go together.

The story is by Bazil, who was at the time living in Africa. He explains a motorbike accident that he had on the desert. The account is introduced by a long orientation (place and characters) segment and an internal evaluation. Afterwards, he introduces the events by means of *so*. In between action segments, he introduces several external comments.

(74)

.....
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: <so_> as I had one of those motorbikes_.
 *NAR: that are designed for off road use\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$FRA \$INI
 %syn: \$IN SB
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: what do they call them/ scramblers or enduros.
 *NAR: had one of those.
 @Eg: ee
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: <so_> what I used to do was jump over the ramps # over the mounds\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$FRA \$REC
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: and that was good fun.
 @Eg: ei

 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: the mudguard is.
 *NAR: what covers the wheel and the chassis.

@Eg: ee
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: <so_> my leg got pulled in by the wheel # by the turning wheel into the frame # the mudguard\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$FRA \$REC
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: it was my left leg\
 *NAR: and the bike fell down with my leg entangled in it.

.....
 (NAR17 Basil)

Basil interrupts his story several times to introduce an explanation that he considers can help the listener to contextualize the account (external evaluation), or an evaluative comment of the events which took place in the past (internal evaluation).¹³²

A close analysis of Table 6 shows that *so* plays a major part in narrative rhetorical structure. It adds detailed information that the narrator considers is relevant for the full understanding of the account, it works as a conclusive summing-up device that introduces important facts to bear in mind or take into consideration; sometimes, it works as a staller, emphaziser or evidential. Finally, the narrator also makes use of it to anchor the interlocutor in the narrative’s world or to make a topic shift. As a means to summarize all the above findings, I present Table 7, which shows the incidence of *so* in narrative discourse structure.

Table 7. Incidence of *so* in narrative discourse structure (N and %).
 (*) Resultative (*\$con*) and temporal (*\$seq*).

| IDEATIONAL STRUCTURE | PRAGMATIC STRUCTURE | | |
|---------------------------|--|--|---|
| logico-semantic relations | RHETORICAL STRUCTURE Illocutionary intentions | SEQUENTIAL STRUCTURE Structuring device | INFERENTIAL COMPONENT Inference facilitator/restrictor |
| *26.5% | 40.2% | 29.1% | 4.2% |
| 31 | 47 | 34 | 5 |

Source: data taken from Table 6.

Note that the rhetorical and the sequential are the two pragmatic discourse structures where *so* has more incidence. See it exemplified in excerpts (75). They are from a narrative about a bad sailing experience. Agatha, the narrator, makes frequent use of the marker for both illocutionary and text-structuring purposes.

(75)

.....
@Bg: otsc

*NAR: about two years ago.

*NAR: when I was working in Abudhabi.

*NAR: and I had never been sailing before.

*NAR: and uh # this uh # this teacher.

*NAR: that was working in the school.

*NAR: at the time she was the head of the kindergarten.

*NAR: took us down to the # to the sailing club.

*NAR: <so_> we all went out in boats with different people/.

*NAR: and I was given this woman\.

%dia: \$or:TSC

%pra: \$SIT

%syn: \$d:IN MN

@Eg: otsc
.....

@Bg: oc

*NAR: she was a woman in her fifties.

@Eg: oc

@Bg: da

*NAR: <so\> # she eventually she got the boat # got the boat\.

*NAR: and pulled it down to the water's edge_.

*NAR: and she put it on the water\.

%dia: \$da

%pra: \$FRA \$STOP

%syn: \$d:IN MN

@Eg: da

@Bg: ot

*NAR: it was a January # it was a January afternoon.

@Eg: ot

@Bg: da

*NAR: and it was quite windy.

*NAR: <so\> # and when we got in the boat\.

%dia: \$da

%pra: \$FRA \$STOP

%syn: \$d:IN SB

*NAR: and uh # it's a piece of #.

*NAR: where they practise the sailing.

*NAR: it's a piece of um # sea.

*NAR: where it's cut off from the main sea.

*NAR: but it's a causeway for the big ships.

*NAR: that come up # metal ships with workmen on and like these big trailers.

*NAR: <so_> going between one port # the the # navy port and the # merchant port further up the sea.

%dia: \$da

%pra: \$ADD

%syn: \$d:IN SB

*NAR: <so\> # we were out in this boat\.

%dia: \$da

%pra: \$REC \$SIT

%syn: \$d:IN MN

*NAR: and uh # we had only got out into the # about uh # about three minutes.

*NAR: and she said.

*NAR: &oh # the rudder is broken&.

*NAR: <so_> I said\.

%dia: \$da

%pra: \$CON \$SEQ \$DSP

%syn: \$d:IN MN

*NAR: &the rudder is broken/.

*NAR: what does that mean/&.

*NAR: and the next move sshou # the the boat was out of control # <you see/>.

%dia: \$da

%pra: \$EVI

%syn: \$d:FN MN

*NAR: and it was going up and up and up and up and up and up.

*NAR: <so\> she # we were trying to get_.

*NAR: she was screaming_.

*NAR: &get under the boom_&.

*NAR: and the boom was swinging totally uncontrollably\.

%dia: \$da

%pra: \$ADD

%syn: \$d:IN MN

.....
(NAR12 *Agatha*)

The first *so* that Agatha uses introduces the first important event that takes place: "... *so* we all went out in boats with different people." What she is doing is anchoring, from the start, her interlocutor in the narrative's world. The second *so* occurs after two segments. From commenting on the teacher's age, she shifts to another topic by starting a new action segment. Similarly, she does the same thing with the third, after letting the listener know what time of the year it was. After a while, Agatha adds some extra information about the place where they are sailing; it is a causeway for big ships, so it is important that the listener copes the danger that the situation involves. The following *so* regains the story's thread and, at the same time, introduces another important event to bear in mind. Then, there is one

referential *so* that also has a text organizing function since it introduces direct speech. Finally, the last one is informative, since it serves to introduce information about the teacher that Agatha considers is important for the full understanding of the situation.

So far I have basically presented and discussed occurrences of *so* that the narrator uses in action units. We have seen that it is precisely in this discourse segment where the three main functions of the marker appear, i.e. consequential, boundary segment frame, and resumption of previous argument. Moreover, we have also seen different illocutionary contexts in which the narrator makes use of the marker to fully express his/her ideas and intentions. If we look at the total number of functions undertaken by *so* in action segments (Table 6), we see that it goes up to 70%. It is an important figure that includes the 25 resultative referential occurrences. Notice that even if resultative *so* is subtracted from the total amount, the incidence of *so* as pragmatic marker is still highly relevant in action units: 48.7%. This finding confirms the expectations about the marker, that is, that besides its descriptive referential function as sentence connector, this conjunctive device also has a preponderant role in the rhetorical and sequential discourse structures, working as pop and segment-boundary marker.

After action units, the second narrative segment in which *so* acquires more relevance is *internal evaluation*. The narrator uses it for illocutionary and structural purposes, basically. As for the first, the narrator uses *so* to introduce concluding or summing-up remarks and evaluative comments; as for the latter, *so* has a primary role opening up evaluative segments. Excerpts (76) illustrate such uses of the marker. It is a story about a dangerous car experience.

(76)

.....
 *NAR: and # we were sneaking through these little country roads.
 *NAR: and we came down a hill to a very sharp bend.
 *NAR: and as I # as we came round the bend # round the walls.
 *NAR: there was a coach.
 *NAR: also coming round the other way.
 *NAR: and because the the roads are very narrow.
 *NAR: it was in the middle of the road.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: <so\> # I didn't know what to do\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRA \$EVA
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: ei

*NAR: we drove up the wall.
 *NAR: and as we got almost past the coach.
 *NAR: coming the other direction.
 *NAR: it kind of slid back down again behind the coach.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: <so_> we had a very strange situation\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRA \$EVA
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: ei

.....
 (NAR5 CR)

The two internal evaluation units which the narrator introduces by means of *so* occur after two long development of action segments. The narrator is explaining his dangerous driving on a wet narrow country road when a coach came round the other way. The story is getting to a climax, and it is at this point that CR explicits his feelings at the moment: “*so* I didn’t know what to do”, and then goes on with the account. The second occurrence is also after a long explanation of the events; he interrupts the telling and evaluates the situation: “*so* we had a very strange situation”. In both cases, *so* works as transition signal between two discourse units with a result illocutionary meaning (cf. Schiffrin 1987a: 224 and Figure 8).

After evaluation units, orientation is the narrative segment where *so* is also present, although in a smaller proportion compared to the other two segments mentioned above, i.e. action and evaluation. From the five different functions undertaken by the marker (see Table 6), it is the anchoring in the narrative world (SIT) the most relevant one. Sample (77) is from a story by Sarah, who was once walking home when a boy stopped her in the middle of the street. The narrative starts with an orientation segment that contains a *so* that has two functions: the recovering of the argumentative line — since she stopped it to let the interlocutor know that it was winter time — and the listener’s anchoring in the narrative world.

(77)

.....
 @Begin
 @Participants: NAR1 Sarah Narrator
 @Age of NAR: 28;
 @Sex of NAR: female
 @Bg: otp
 *NAR: A few years ago.
 *NAR: when I was at university # um.
 *NAR: I used to go to aerobics.

*NAR: and it was winter.
 *NAR: <so_> it was after my aerobics class\
 *NAR: and it was quite dark\
 %dia: \$or:TO
 %pra: \$SIT \$REC
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: and I had.
 *NAR: to walk home along this dark road.
 *NAR: and there was nobody there # no cars # no people or anything.
 @Eg: otp

 (NAR1 Sarah)

Excerpt (77) illustrates the prosodic norm of the marker: flat intonation contour. Thus, from the 65 occurrences of *so* found in the narratives (see Table 1), 75% of the units have a flat intonation, 23% have a rise-fall, and 0.2% have a fall-rise. The significance of these data on particular narrative segments was not found. The rise-fall cases of *so* were found in action units mainly, but also in evaluation and orientation segments. Nevertheless, there were only a few functions linked to the rise-fall *so*: the framing, topic shifting, concluding, and evaluative functions, following a frequency degree scale. There is a plausible explanation for the phenomenon: in all these cases there is a break in the story, either rhetorical or structural. Thus it is very significant that most of the framing rise-fall *so* have either a topic shifting function or an evaluative function: by means of the marker, the narrator pauses to start a new narrative unit, to shift to another topic or to evaluate the events. Such findings confirm O'Connor and Arnold's (1970) claim that the statements that contain a falling nuclear tone sound definite and complete.¹³³ Excerpts (75) and (76) have a few instances of rise-fall *so* that illustrate the above pragmatic functions.

As for syntactic distribution, *so* was primarily found at the beginning of a main clause; only seven out of 65 occurrences of *so* were found opening up a subordinate clause. There were no cases of mid or final-clause position. When the syntactic distribution of *well* was analyzed, it was mentioned that whenever a marker prefaces a tone unit, there is no saliency and thus there is no stigmatization from a social group (Watts 1989). Such is the case of *so*. It is always a *lefthand discourse bracket*¹³⁴ (Watts 1989: 211) that, because of its mostly flat intonation contour, is practically embedded within the utterance. I would therefore say that what really makes the difference with this marker is not its syntactic distribution, which shows no variation, but its intonation contour, which the speaker uses to convey a certain illocutionary intention (topic shifting, summing-up conclusion, evaluative comment) or to begin a new discourse unit (segment boundary framing).

In sum, *so* plays a key role in the *development of action*. First, in the ideational structure as logico-semantic argumentative connector. Secondly, in the sequential and rhetorical discourse structure as segment framer and train of thought recoverer, respectively. Its role as inference facilitator and restrictor is barely significant; only in *action* and *orientation* segments *so* acquires relevance as anchoring device. Its high presence in *internal evaluation* indicates that, besides being a conjunctive resultative grammatical unit, *so* can be a pragmatic marker too: among seven different illocutionary functions, its role as evaluator and framer is highly relevant. As for prosodic features, *so* presents a flat intonation contour, basically. Whenever this is not the case, it has a rise-fall intonation, associated with definite and complete utterances; the pragmatic functions linked to it are those which imply a break in the narrative, either rhetorical or structural: a topic shift, an evaluative remark, a summing-up conclusion, and a segment boundary framing. The syntactic distribution of *so* demonstrates that it is always a *lefthand discourse bracket*, that is, placed at the beginning of the main and, very few times, of the subordinate clause.

5.1.3 *Then*: succession of events

In general, most instances of this lexical device occur in the ideational discourse structure, signalling a time relationship between a proposition and the time of its utterance, that is, between two different time periods. In all these cases, *then* is analyzed as a deictic time adverbial because it depends on situational parameters. Example (78) illustrates this time-referential *then*:

- (78) a. I never go to the cinema *now*.
 b. I used to go to the cinema every week *then*.

As Schiffirin points out, reference time is not only indicated by means of a shift from present to preterit tense, but also by the shift in time indicated by *now* and *then* (1987a: 228). In accordance with the framework adopted in this study, I consider this use of *then* a *connector*, which means that their instances will not be discussed.

Nevertheless, there are other instances which appear in the pragmatic discourse structure that require an analysis that takes into consideration the internal sequencing of events as well as the speaker's successive display of ideas, thoughts and actions. It is within such contextual use that *then* can be analyzed as a pragmatic marker. As such, it is expected to be found in complicating action parts, mainly, with low incidence in evaluative units. This hypothesis responds to the core referential nature of the marker, suitable, to my understanding, for the objective telling of events, thoughts and action, but unsuitable for the transmission of subjective material of any sort.

Schiffrin (1987a) suggests that the internal sequencing of events follows an *event time*, whereas the speaker's succession of ideas, thoughts and actions follow a *discourse time*. She defines both terms as follows: "Event time differs from reference time because it is not a deictic relationship: rather than indicate the temporal relationship between a proposition and its presentation in an utterance, event time indicates the temporal relationship between propositions themselves." (...) "Discourse time refers to the temporal relationship between utterances in a discourse, i.e. the order in which a speaker presents utterances in a discourse" (p.229).

Consider, for instance, (79). It is an excerpt from a story by Karen. She is explaining a dangerous driving experience she had with her brother, while being chased by some prison wardens' car. It serves to illustrate event time.

(79)

.....
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: we went down the hill.
 *NAR: and there was a crossroads.
 *NAR: and er # it was really steep.
 *NAR: and the car endeavoured to two wheels.
 *NAR: but that was okay.
 *NAR: <then_> up the hill\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$SEQ
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: and the car still chasing us # though.
 *NAR: and er # and somebody said.
 *NAR: &turn off the road.
 *NAR: turn off the road&
 *NAR: and my brother then just turned right.
 *NAR: to go off onto the grass.
 *NAR: and of course there was a big mound.
 *NAR: and the car hit the land.
 *NAR: and flew up into the air.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: <well/> # it's funny now/.
 %dia: \$ev:EX
 %pra: \$FRA \$COM
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: ee
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and <then_> it went bump on the ground\
 %dia: \$da

%pra: \$FRA \$REC \$SEQ

%syn: \$d:IN MN

*NAR: and I saw stars.

@Eg: da

.....
(NAR7 Karen)

The two *then* found in the above excerpt are anaphoric and ruled by event time. They both go back to previous clauses and indicate a temporal sequencing of two events that take place internally and are “coterminous” (Schiffrin 1987a: 249), since both take place in past time (note preterit verb):

event 1: “we went down the hill”

event 2: “*then* up the hill”

event 1: “and flew up into the air”

event 2: “and *then* it went bump on the ground”

The only difference is that, whereas the first *then* has only a sequencing function, the second *then* is polyfunctional since it conducts two more functions: besides indicating the sequence of two events (SEQ), it recovers the story line broken by an external evaluation (REC), and it signals a new segment boundary (FRA). I suggest that in these cases, *then* works as transition signal since it bridges two discourse units and opens up a new narrative segment (cf. Marsà 1992: 188, in conversation). Hence, besides being a temporal discourse marker, *then* is also a pragmatic device that is often used by the speaker for illocutionary and text-structuring purposes.

What Schiffrin calls discourse time is the succession of the speaker’s talk (or the other’s talk, if it is a dialogue). The way utterances are presented in discourse time usually mirror event time, that is, the speaker utters and sequentially organizes his/her talk following a temporal order of events. As Schiffrin suggests, this is the way many narratives are organized (cf. Labov 1972b) but it is not the only way: sometimes there is a mismatch between both temporal sequencings.¹³⁵ It is precisely in discourse time sequences where a wider variety of pragmatic functions are found in the corpus of narratives. For instance, notice how, in (80), there is not event sequencing between the first and second utterance introduced by *then*. This second instance follows a discourse time relationship with the former, not an event time, since it follows the narrator’s presentation of the events that does not mirror their real time sequencing. It is an excerpt taken from Karen’s story, above.

(80)

.....

@Bg: da

*NAR: <so_> we leapt out of the car\.

%dia: \$da
 %pra: \$FRA \$REC
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: oc
 *NAR: there were five of us # maybe.
 @Eg: oc
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: leapt out of the car.
 *NAR: and ran towards these trees.
 *NAR: and there was a barbed wire fence.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: which isn't very comfortable.
 @Eg: ee
 @Bg: r
 *NAR: and <then_> into the fields\
 %dia: \$re
 %pra: \$FRA \$ REC \$SEQ
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: and <then\> of course the car had stopped chasing us before.
 %dia: \$re
 %pra: \$EVI \$EMP
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: r

.....
 (NAR7 Karen)

After Karen and her brother had leapt out of the car, they went into the fields, but the car that was following them did not stop afterwards; it had stopped doing it prior to their going into the fields. Such a discourse organization can be presented in the following way:

[event time]

utterance 1 / event 1 : “so we leapt out of the car”

utterance 2 / event 2: “and *then* into the fields”

[discourse time]

utterance 1 / event 1: “so we leapt out of the car”

utterance 2 / event 3: “and *then* into the fields”

utterance 3 / event 2: “and *then* of course the car had stopped chasing us before”

Separating event time from discourse time presents, however, serious difficulties. What I have found is that the sequencing of events often runs parallel with other

pragmatic functions, as (79) and (80) illustrate. Schiffrin suggests that *then* seems to be an adverb when discourse time mirrors event time and a discourse marker when discourse time does not mirror event time, but another sort of successive relationship (1987a: 264). But analysis of data proves that markers are usually polyfunctional, so functions of adverbs and markers are often intertwined. I have placed succession of events (ruled by event time) in the ideational narrative structure (see Figure 7, Chapter 3), but I include this function in the analysis because, as just explained, separating referential from pragmatic functions is highly difficult and even impossible, sometimes.

For example, let us see instances from (80). The two *then* accomplish several functions: the first instance frames a new segment unit and regains the train of thought of the story; the second one, evidences an event and reinforces the illocutionary force of the proposition. They are both lexical devices used by the speaker to signal a temporal succession of events but, at the same time, they are also used with a pragmatic purpose. I would therefore suggest that separating adverb from marker results highly complicated, the only exception being when *then* is a clear time-referential adverb that is ruled by situational parameters, as in (78).

All the narratives analyzed present many cases of *then* that signal a succession of events ruled in terms of event time (SEQ). In fact, out of 34 functions of the marker in action segments, 18 belong to this category, the rest being scattered all through narrative rhetoric and sequential structure. Table 8 summarizes such findings.

Contrary to what happened with previous markers, *then* is barely present in evaluation segments (2.3% — in front of 45% of *well* and 23.2% of *so*). In fact, as Table 8 shows, most of its occurrences are found in the complicating action (77.2%), which makes sense if we take into account that this marker is mainly used by the speaker to signal the succession of events and ideas. Evaluative units are mere comments that the narrator makes, either about the story itself or about an important information that s/he considers is relevant for the full understanding of the narrative; the use of *then* is therefore not strictly necessary in these parts. On the other hand, there is a significant presence of the marker in result units: 18.2% (in front of 1.4% of *well* and 0.8% of *so*). Again, it is the sequencing of events, in the first place, and the framing function, secondly, the two functions that occur the most. Extract (79) above illustrates them both. See all these findings summarized in Table 9, which shows the incidence of the marker in narrative discourse structure.

Table 8. Distribution of pragmatic functions of *then* in English narrative.

| | | THEN | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|-------------|-------|
| <i>coherence relations</i> | <i>functions</i> | ABSTR. | ORIENT. | ACTION | I.EVAL. | E.EVAL. | RESULT CODA | total |
| Ideational Structure | CON | | | 1 | | 1 | | 2 |
| | REF | | | | | | | |
| | SEQ | | | 18 | | | 3 | 21 |
| Rhetorical Structure | ADD | | | | | | | |
| | CLA | | | | | | | |
| | CLU | | | 3 | | | | 3 |
| | COM | | | | | | | |
| | DEL | | | | | | | |
| | EMP | | | 2 | | | 1 | 3 |
| | EVA | | | | | | | |
| | EVI | | | 1 | | | 1 | 2 |
| Sequential Structure | REC | | | 2 | | | 1 | 3 |
| | TOP | | | 2 | | | | 2 |
| | DSP | | | | | | | |
| | FRA | | | 3 | | | 2 | 5 |
| Inferential Component | FRC | | | | | | | |
| | INI | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| | CTX | | | | | | | |
| | JUS | | | | | | | |
| | MIT | | | | | | | |
| Inferential Component | PRE | | | | | | | |
| | PRO | | | | | | | |
| | SIT | | | 1 | 1 | | | 2 |
| Total | N | | 1 | 34 | | 1 | 8 | 44 |
| | % | | 2.3% | 77.2% | | 2.3% | 18.2% | |

Key to pragmatic functions coding: see Appendix 2.

Table 9. Incidence of *then* in narrative discourse structure (N and %).

(*) Temporal (*\$seq*) and resultative (*\$con*).

| IDEATIONAL STRUCTURE | PRAGMATIC STRUCTURE | | |
|---------------------------|--|--|---|
| logico-semantic relations | RHETORICAL STRUCTURE Illocutionary intentions | SEQUENTIAL STRUCTURE Structuring device | INFERENTIAL COMPONENT Inference facilitator/restrictor |
| *52.3% | 29.6% | 13.6% | 4.5% |
| 23 | 13 | 6 | 2 |

Source: data taken from Table 8.

After the ideational structure, where *then* carries out temporal and resultative functions, rhetorical and sequential components are those that deserve most attention. In the rhetorical structure, the narrator makes use of *then* to sum up thoughts and actions, to make a fact salient, to regain the argumentative thread, or to facilitate a topic shift. In the sequential structure, it basically works as segment boundary frame and events' initiator. The only two times that *then* worked as inference facilitator, it was as an anchoring device, in orientation and action segments. It can therefore be concluded that its role in this discourse component is barely significant. Findings confirm what was expected about the marker, that is, that it would mainly appear where a succession of events occurred, in action parts mainly, with an extremely low presence in evaluative units.

As for prosodic features, out of 28 occurrences of *then* (see Table 1), 53.6% have a rise-fall intonation contour, 35.7% have a flat intonation and 10.7% have a fall-rise contour. The significance of these data lies not on the segments in which the instances were found since, as we have seen, most *then* appear in action and result units, but on the functions linked to them. The analysis showed that most flat *then* were monofunctional (signalling sequency of events) whereas fall-rise and rise-fall *then* were polyfunctional (signalling sequency of events and other pragmatic functions). A plausible interpretation for monofunctional flat *then* could be that, whenever the marker is only used to temporally order the events, the narrator does not put a special emphasis on its utterance; s/he utters it just as another word that forms part of the stretch of speech. In contrast, when there are other pragmatic functions linked to it, there is a marked intonation (falling or rising).

The analysis of its syntactic distribution showed that *then* occurs in main clause-initial position; there were only two cases in which this was not so: one found at the beginning of a subordinate clause and another found in main clause-final position. So, following Watts (1989) terminology, it can be affirmed that *then* is basically a *lefthand discourse bracket*, independently of its intonation contour.

In sum, *then* is a temporal adverb that is not only used by the speaker as time-referential sign, but also as pragmatic marker that introduces the succession of events, intentions and thoughts in the narrative. It is because of this that its presence is highly significant in *development of action* segments. Such a succession occurs intra and inter narrative segments, which means that *then* operates at both rhetorical and sequential discourse structures. In the rhetorical structure, it reinforces the narrator's account of the events, summing-up his/her thoughts, evidencing a fact, recovering the train of thought or facilitating a shift in topic; in the sequential structure, it works as segment boundary frame and events' initiator. As inference facilitator and restrictor, *then* is barely significant; the only two occurrences in the corpus had an anchoring function. Contrary to what happened with *well* and *so*, *then* is not present in evaluation units but it gains relevance in result

segments. This makes sense if we consider its succession role, not necessary in evaluation but indispensable in the summing-up of the narrative. An analysis of the prosody shows that *then* is uttered either with a flat intonation or, more often, with a falling intonation. When it is flat, it is monofunctional, working as a signal of the succession of events; when it is uttered with a falling or rising intonation, it is polyfunctional. An analysis of its syntactic distribution shows that *then* is mostly a *lefthand discourse bracket* that is placed at the beginning of independent clauses.

5.1.4 *I mean*: evaluation and reformulation

There is a trait that makes *I mean* different from previous markers analyzed, directly related to the text genre within which the marker operates. In the case of *so* and *well* there was significant quantitative information to take into consideration (see Tables 1 and 2), but in the case of *I mean* it is segment distribution that makes the difference. Moreover, the analysis of data shows that the semantic and pragmatic properties of this marker and its placement within the story are closely related, a fact which was expected about *I mean*. Most occurrences of *I mean* are found on evaluative segments (53.4% in internal, and 13.3% in external evaluation), evaluation being that part of the narrative where the narrator's voice is more overtly shown. In this respect, the recurrent and systematic presence of this marker in such a personalized part of the narrative can respond to the pragmatic nature of *I mean*, in Schourup's words an *evincive* that "is tied to its moment of utterance and indicates but does not itself specify the nature of the nonequivalence the speaker finds to exist between what is said and what is meant." (1985: 148).

In the case of narratives of personal experience, the use of this marker becomes, undoubtedly, highly useful when it comes down to letting the passive listener know what and how the narrator felt at the moment of the events, i.e. in the situation of danger. Let us see it in (81), for instance, where Zoe, the narrator, is explaining how she felt the night that she was walking alone on the street and was being followed by a man:

(81)

.....
 @Bg: a
 *NAR: there was another situation of danger.
 *NAR: just being followed home # the same kind of thing.
 @Eg: a
 @Bg: op
 *NAR: but this was in Brighton.
 @Eg: op
 @Bg: ei/e

*NAR: but # <I mean\> # that's just a case of_
 *NAR: &are you being paranoid/.
 *NAR: are they really following you/&.
 *NAR: because nothing actually ever happened\.
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRA \$DSP \$EVA
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: <well/ # I mean_\> # I think you are paranoid_
 *NAR: when you're on your own\
 %dia: \$ev:EX
 %pra: \$REF \$COM
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: ei/e

.....
 (NAR14 Zoe)

The above excerpt shows a segment which contains both an internal and an external evaluation, after a place-orientation segment. The first use of the marker frames the segment and the reflexion, opening up a new section in the narrative. It also introduces a comment about herself at the moment of the events: “are you being paranoid? are they really following you?”. As can be seen, its propositional value does not play a decisive role since the speaker is not trying to clarify, add or reformulate previous information; rather, what the narrator is doing is supplying her view on the event to her interlocutor, which she probably feels is worth mentioning. The second occurrence of *I mean* is used next to another marker, *well*. It is a case of *compound marker* (to be commented on later) which is basically used by the speaker to reinforce previous propositional and pragmatic discourse content. Zoe jointly uses both devices to reformulate and introduce an external comment to the events, that is, an objective remark — “*well I mean*, I think you are paranoid when you’re on your own.” — meant to support and clarify her previous proposition.

Schourup’s notion of *evincive*, above, takes us to an interesting feature of this marker. From the semantic point of view, *I mean* can be interpreted literally, as a mark that modifies and/or clarifies previous discourse, thus paraphrasing and sometimes expanding the message. This can occur in conversation as well as in monologued discourse. As such, it can be considered a metalinguistic expression that orients the listener towards the content of the message (Cristal & Davy 1975: 97; Schourup 1985: 147; Schiffrin 1987a: 303; Marsà 1992: 172). But there is more to be said about this lexical unit, since the way it operates in discourse seems to go beyond its literal use. Hence, from the pragmatic perspective, *I mean* is used by the speaker to open up his/her thoughts, ideas and intentions about a particular fact or event. As Schourup suggests, it is “an item with a disclosure function” (1985: 147).

According to Schiffrin (1987a: 295), *I mean* functions within the participation framework, that is, that discourse plane which involves the speaker's relation to the hearer (in action and turn-taking situations) but also towards his/her own talk, as far as ideas and intentions are concerned. Although Schiffrin analyzes the use of *I mean* in conversational discourse, that is, in interactional moves, her suggestion seems to apply to monologues as well. It is clear that, in the case of *I mean*, semantics and pragmatics are closely intertwined since, very often, its literal meaning influences its discourse use; it is in this sense that Schiffrin claims that *I mean* has 'ideational meaning' (p.296). But its recurrent distribution in internal evaluation segments (see Table 2: it is the marker that appears the most in evaluation units) also suggests that this linguistic expression presents some traits that other

Table 10. Distribution of pragmatic functions of *I mean* in English narrative.

| | | I MEAN | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|-------------|-------|
| <i>coherence relations</i> | <i>functions</i> | ABSTR. | ORIENT. | ACTION | I.EVAL. | E.EVAL. | RESULT CODA | total |
| Ideational Structure | CON | | | | | | | |
| | REF | | | 1 | 4 | 1 | | 6 |
| | SEQ | | | | | | | |
| Rhetorical Structure | ADD | | | 1 | 2 | | | 3 |
| | CLA | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| | CLU | | | 1 | 1 | | | 2 |
| | COM | | | | | 2 | | 2 |
| | DEL | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| | EMP | | 2 | | | | | 2 |
| | EVA | | | 1 | 5 | | | 6 |
| | EVI | | 2 | | | | | 2 |
| | REC TOP | | | | | | | |
| Sequential Structure | DSP | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| | FRA | | | | 2 | 1 | | 3 |
| | FRC | | | | | | | |
| | INI CTX | | | | | | | |
| Inferential Component | JUS | | | | | | | |
| | MIT | | | | | | | |
| | PRE | | | | | | | |
| | PRO | | | | | | | |
| | SIT | | | | | | | |
| Total | N | | 4 | 4 | 17 | 4 | | 29 |
| | % | | 13.8% | 13.8% | 58.6% | 13.8% | | 72.4% |

Key to pragmatic functions coding: see Appendix 2.

markers do not present. In Table 10 we see that the functions that the marker undertakes are varied and reflect its semanticopragmatic nature: it adds and clarifies information, it works as a concluding summing-up device, it introduces a comment or evaluation of the events, it is used by the narrator to emphasize and highlight relevant information, it works as a structuring device that frames direct speech and narrative segments and, finally, it reformulates previous discourse.

Most of the above functions are found in the rhetorical structure; there are a couple in the sequential structure (segment and direct speech framing) and one in the ideational structure (reformulative). But the point is: why do all these functions occur mostly in internal evaluation and not in action units, for instance, where all other markers are basically found? It is evident that the answer cannot be sought in the functions, which show no particularities other than signaling intentions and thoughts, but in the properties of the segment where the narrator makes most use of the marker. Internal evaluation is the narrative segment which truly shows the point of the story, since it is in this particular part of the narrative where the narrator openly expresses his/her personal feelings and attitudes towards his/her past experience and conveys all its force to the listener. In the case of a situation of danger, this point becomes even more outstanding, since the narrator's effort to 'convince' the other that s/he really was in danger is specially remarkable. In this respect, Schiffrin's claim that the "use of *I mean* can be interpreted as overinvolvement with the self" (1987a: 311) makes full sense. Schiffrin makes this claim when trying to provide an explanation for the social stigmatization of the use of the marker¹³⁶ (p. 310), but that interpretation can also serve to explain the existing connection between the pragmatic properties of the marker and its systematic presence in evaluation segments.

Bou, Garcés and Gregori (1993) refer to *I mean* (and *you know*) as a lexical resource that the speaker uses to mitigate Grice's Maxim of quantity. According to them, the speaker uses mitigators when s/he considers that the listener is not necessarily interested in, or coincides with, what s/he is communicating, in order to preserve his/her face. Moreover, these authors claim that a speaker uses this marker to compensate for the negative image resulting from a long speech turn, or when s/he expresses an opinion on issues that may be difficult to tackle (p.169). The functions shown on Table 10 partly illustrate this point: some uses of *I mean* could respond to the narrator's need to add, clarify, emphasize or highlight information so that the interlocutor sympathises and shows interest in his/her words. The text genre we are dealing with, i.e. oral narrative, can also serve to explain its presence: the narrator makes use of a long speech turn, telling a story of personal experience to a passive listener, and has to 'justify' it by showing the point of the story. Excerpt (82) serves to illustrate this use of the marker. Misha, the narrator, starts his story by pointing at what he considers to be the most dangerous situa-

tions he has been in. After informing the listener that he can ski (so he includes information that he considers is relevant for the point of the story that he is about to tell — external evaluation), he starts the complicating action, preceded by space and time orientation.

(82)

@Begin

@Participants: NAR18 Misha Narrator

@Age of NAR: 29;

@Sex of NAR: male

@Bg: a

*NAR: I've been in one or two situations of danger.

*NAR: but the worst was recently.

*NAR: which is probably the most exciting.

*NAR: it's when we went skiing.

@Eg: a

@Bg: ee

*NAR: I can ski.

*NAR: I've been skiing quite a lot.

*NAR: that's one of the reasons.

*NAR: why I stay in Spain.

@Eg: ee

@Bg: ost/da

*NAR: but we went on an excursion to France last winter.

*NAR: before Christmas # in December # some time.

*NAR: it was for four days.

*NAR: and when we got there # to the Alps.

*NAR: the conditions were so bad.

*NAR: and it was snowing really # really heavily # torrential conditions # blizzards
everday # every moment.

*NAR: <I mean\> # and that was in the village\.

%dia: \$or:SO

%pra: \$EVI \$EMP

%syn: \$d:IN MN

*NAR: if you can imagine.

*NAR: what it was like at four thousand metres.

*NAR: or whatever it was.

*NAR: it was really high.

@Eg: ost/da

.....

(NAR18 Misha)

As we can see, the use of *I mean* comes quite late in the above narrative. It is the first marker that the narrator uses, after a long introduction. Misha is explaining the

terrible weather conditions that they found in the Alps; he has been talking for quite a while and probably feels that he has to justify it. At that point, by means of *I mean*, he introduces an utterance that makes his account significant, since it underscores a part of the story that he regards as key for the interpretation of the events: “*I mean* and that was in the village, if you can imagine what it was like at four thousand metres...”. By so doing, he involves himself and the listener in the world of the narrative, tying the interlocutor down to his words and forcing him to “maintain hearer focus on prior material... [and] instruct the hearer to continue attending to the material of prior text in order to hear how it will be modified” (Schiffrin 1987a: 309).

Table 10 above shows the two most common functions of *I mean*: reformulation of previous information — what Schiffrin calls “replacement repairs” (1987a: 300) — and internal evaluation of the events, both illustrated in (81). These two main roles of the marker are followed by two other uses that help define its nature: addition of further information that may serve to support a previous argument, and segment boundary framing. This latter function, called by Schiffrin ‘adjustment of frame’ (1987a: 306), was illustrated on (81) too. As Table 10 shows, all the framing *I mean* were found at evaluation segments boundaries, meant to introduce an appraisal of the situation. This finding could be interpreted in Schiffrin’s terms: “*I mean* is thus used remedially to reinvoke an interactional frame in which one speaker is presenting a point of her own, rather than jointly establishing a shared perspective with her interlocutors” (1987a: 307).

As for the use of *I mean* with an adding function, the introduction of new information can be viewed as another means used by the speaker to reformulate a previous argument through expansion. But I differentiate reformulation from addition because I consider that, whereas reformulation restates a previous proposition or argument that the speaker may find insufficiently clear for getting his/her point across, the addition of further arguments may respond to the speaker’s need to provide new material that helps him/her and the listener move on with the story; reformulation does not necessarily imply further supply of informational material, whereas addition does. What is more, in the case of an oral narrative, the addition of new arguments has a twofold purpose: firstly, to help the speaker progress in the telling of the account and, therefore, in the unfolding of the events and, secondly, to help the listener process the information given. In this respect, *I mean*, like the rest of the pragmatic markers, facilitates both the narrator’s and the listener’s producing and processing tasks, respectively.

Sample (83) illustrates both the reformulative and the additive functions of *I mean*. It is from a narrative by Mike, who is telling his encounter with a group of boys who were following him and started beating him. The only two tokens of this

marker in the whole narrative appear in an internal evaluation segment. I provide the whole segment so as to contextualize the occurrences.

(83)

.....
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: <so_> # it was a bit absurd\
 *NAR: I didn't really understand\ um #
 *NAR: what the motive of the attack was\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRA \$EVA
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: although they did they said something to me.
 *NAR: which suggested.
 *NAR: that perhaps they'd confused me uh # mistaken me for
 another person.
 *NAR: um # <so_> it was # that was the reason_
 *NAR: I think_
 *NAR: that they attacked me\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$CON \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: <I mean\> um # I'm not sure_
 *NAR: if I was carrying money\
 *NAR: they they did steal my jacket and my watch\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$REF \$ADD
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: but # <I mean_> # for example_
 *NAR: they handed me back the credit cards and things\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$REF \$CLA
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: <so_> # I think_
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$REC \$ADD
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: there might have been five pounds or something # a little bit of
 money there as well\
 *NAR: and they gave me that back.
 *NAR: it was # it was a bit strange.
 *NAR: I was # I was not seriously hurt.
 @Eg: ei

(NAR8 Mike)

After the telling of events — complicating action — Mike evaluates them. He starts by expressing his wonder and goes on to plausible interpretations. After providing one — *perhaps they'd confused me uh # mistaken me for another person um # so it was, that was the reason I think that they attacked me* — he uses *I mean* to introduce a proposition that reformulates and, at the same time, adds more information to, his previous argument: *I mean um # I'm not sure if I was carrying money. They did steal my jacket and my watch*. The second instance of the marker again reformulates but, in this case, it also helps support his reasoning about the events by providing an example (handing him back credit cards and things).

According to Schiffrin (1987a: 301), the replacement repair function of *I mean* responds to the speaker's will "to substitute prior material" and hence "lead forward to the ideas of the upcoming discourse on the basis of the material in the repair itself." Although my findings agree with Schiffrin's claim about the reformulative function of *I mean* in the narratives, in her primary work on the marker (1987a), she does not mention its important additive function, further supported by other studies (Marsà 1992: 175).

Let us see, now, a piece of a narrative that exemplifies the above uses separately. It is a unique sample of three instances of the marker in a row (84). They all belong to a complicating action segment that is found at the end of the narrative, preceding evaluation and result. The story is from Misha, who is explaining his unforgettable experience on a cablecar that was hanging above a precipice and started swinging back and forth and side to side.

(84)

.....
 *NAR: <so_> started swinging forwards and backwards # side to side # up and
 down\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$CON
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: and we stayed there for about thirty minutes.
 *NAR: and the conditions were terrible.
 *NAR: and nobody # nobody said a word.
 *NAR: because what happened is.
 *NAR: that the wheels of the pulleys # they were frozen.
 *NAR: they were stopped.
 *NAR: there was nothing.
 *NAR: they could do.
 *NAR: <I mean\> # we were there for half an hour_
 *NAR: and nobody said a word\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$ADD

%syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: <I mean\> # nothing happened/.
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$REF
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: <I mean\> # you could not say_.
 *NAR: it was a situation of danger\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$CLU \$EVA
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei/e
 *NAR: but it was the most petrifying situation.
 *NAR: I've ever been in my life.
 *NAR: and worse things have actually happened to me.
 *NAR: but that was the worst.
 *NAR: I've ever felt.
 @Eg: ei/e

.....

(NAR18 Misha)

The first occurrence of *I mean*, by means of expansion, adds information that the narrator probably considers it relevant for the listener to know, in order to cope the seriousness of the situation: the time spent in the cablecar. By verbalizing such information, the narrator conveys a stronger feeling of panic and involves the listener in the story. The second instance reformulates the previous proposition: ... *and nobody said a word. I mean, nothing happened*. However, this reformulation is not done from the referential meaning of the previous proposition, but from the implicit expectation that the hearer of the story may have that something happened for sure. Hence, by means of *I mean* Misha makes it clear that 'nothing happened' and that there was not any accident. Both, not saying a word and nothing happening, transmit a feeling of tension; the story is getting to its climax and, by means of the marker, such feeling is explicited.¹³⁷ By means of the third marker, the narrator finally concludes the telling of events and appraises the whole situation. In fact, this third instance aims at bridging the complicating action segment and the evaluative one. By the three correlative uses of *I mean* the speaker modifies ideas and intentions and "instructs the hearer to continue attending to the material of prior text in order to hear how it will be modified (...) [it] can also function as a marker of salient information, i.e. as an indicator of information which is highly relevant for interpretation of the speaker's overall message" (Schiffrin 1987a: 309).

Table 11 summarizes the above findings, showing the incidence of *I mean* in narrative discourse structure.

Table 11. Incidence of *I mean* in narrative discourse structure (N and %).
 (*) reformulative (*\$ref*).

| IDEATIONAL STRUCTURE | | PRAGMATIC STRUCTURE | |
|------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| logico-semantic relations | RHETORICAL STRUCTURE | SEQUENTIAL STRUCTURE | INFERENTIAL COMPONENT |
| | Illocutionary intentions | Structuring device | Inference facilitator/restrictor |
| *20.7% | 65.5% | 13.8% | – |
| 6 | 19 | 4 | |

Source: data taken from Table 10.

Data prove what was expected about the marker: that its referential meaning had a strong influence on its discourse use, highly subjective and thus preponderant in those narrative parts that require an overinvolvement with the self, that is to say, in internal evaluation.

In the ideational structure, *I mean* functions as reformulative marker exclusively. In the rhetorical structure, it is often used to evaluate the events and to add the information that is considered necessary for the elaboration of the story. As for the role of *I mean* as text-structuring device, it is used at segment boundaries. As Table 10 showed, most of the functions undertaken are concentrated in internal evaluative units. Interestingly enough, the marker does not work as inference facilitator in any of the narratives analyzed, a fact which may respond to its still strong referential value and slow pragmatization process. The result is that it often works literally, that is, as a mark that modifies and/or clarifies previous discourse, paraphrasing and sometimes expanding the message.

Sample (84) illustrated what is the commonest prosodic feature of *I mean*: rise-fall intonation contour. Hence, out of all the occurrences of *I mean* (see Table 1), 73.3% of the units have falling intonation, 20% are flat and 6.7% are fall-rise. The common denominator of the flat *I mean* is the pragmatic function and narrative segment where the markers appear: they are all units used by the narrator to reformulate a previous proposition, and are all found in internal evaluation segments. Example (85) illustrates it. It is a story by Zoe, who is explaining her experience when being followed, one evening, by a group of boys, after leaving the university club.

(85)

.....
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: <well/> # it was very frightening/.
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRA \$EVA

%syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: more of the fact that # <I mean_> # with the weather how it was as well\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$REF
 %syn: \$d:MD
 @Eg: ei

.....
 (NAR14 Zoe)

Prosody and pragmatic function can be closely related. Hence, a flat intonation of the marker as in (85) can only be interpreted in terms of non-saliency. According to the above argumentative lines, reformulation of a previous proposition is just a substitution which does not necessarily imply a especial intention from the speaker. In contrast, a marker uttered with a rising intonation, may carry a purpose: *I mean* in (86) is found in an orientation segment; it works as evidential and emphaziser. The excerpt belongs to Zoe's narrative above, and is uttered towards the end:

(86)

.....
 @Bg: ots
 *NAR: it was definitely after eleven.
 *NAR: but it wasn't a far distance.
 *NAR: but # <I mean/> # when I was living # living in Cardiff.
 *NAR: the amount of attacks in Cardiff alone were incredible # really\
 %dia: \$or:TS
 %pra: \$EVI \$EMP
 %syn: \$d:IN SB
 @Eg: ots

.....
 (NAR14 Zoe)

The use of the marker with a rising intonation, plus the preceding adversative conjunctive *but*, denotes a change in both pragmatic and semantic terms between the arguments that precede and those that follow the marker. As for the rise-fall cases of *I mean*, which are the majority, there is not functional regularity; nevertheless, it should be pointed out that, as the rest of pragmatic markers previously analyzed, the statements that contain a falling nuclear tone share the common trait of sounding definite and complete (O'Connor and Arnold 1970, from Murray 1979: 730).

As for the distribution of *I mean* in the clause, all devices, except one, are found at the beginning of a main clause, with 33.3% of cases preceded by the adversative coordinating conjunction *but*. This fact does not apparently seem to have functional significance, since this linguistic phenomenon is not systemati-

cally linked to a particular pragmatic function; on the contrary, there is a diversity of functions that present this pattern;¹³⁸ similarly, on prosodic terms, the <*but I mean*> pattern presents falling (NAR2, NAR14), rising (NAR14), and flat (NAR14) intonation contours.

A plausible explanation for the coordinating conjunction-discourse marker pairing could be found in the role of *I mean* as mitigator (*matizador*), a notion developed by Barrenechea & Manacorda (1971) and adopted by Franchini (1986) to explain the distributional function of certain parenthetical units whose main purpose is that of facilitating and/or specifying the semantic relation between two propositions. Although a mitigator, in Franchini's terms, is characterized by a free distribution within the clause, it is usually found between commas, after a coordinator (p.194–95). Cuenca (1990, 2002) has studied the grammatical and functional status of these *parenthetical connectives*, a term that she adopts instead of Franchini's. However, according to Cuenca, in order for a unit to be considered a parenthetical connective there has to be a certain degree of grammaticalization, that is, of structural fixation, which is not the case of the <*but I mean*> pattern (adversative coordinating conjunction followed by pragmatic marker) since its frequency of appearance in the database does not provide enough evidence to make this claim. Hence, what can be concluded is that there is a syntactic and functional cooccurrence of two units, each establishing a separate semantic and pragmatic relation with the preceding and following proposition.

As for the position of *I mean* within the clause, the regular placement of the marker at the beginning of the clause tells us that it is a *lefthand discourse marker* (Watts 1989), independently of its intonation contour.

In sum, from the analysis described above it can be concluded that *I mean* plays a key role in narrative *internal evaluation* segments. This implies involvement of the self and of the listener. Its significant presence in the rhetorical structure of the narrative means that this marker is mainly used by the speaker to make his/her intentions explicit and convey the required illocutionary force to the discourse segment, this being internal evaluation, basically. Among other uses, *I mean* functions mainly as marker of reformulation, evaluation and addition of information whenever the narrator considers that his/her message requires further elaboration and/or expansion. As for its role in the sequential discourse structure, it can be found at evaluation segments boundary. There are no instances, in the narratives analyzed, of functionally inferential *I mean*. Prosodically speaking, *I mean* has mostly a rise-fall intonation contour, hence conveying assertiveness and completeness; in these cases, it is polyfunctional. In contrast, when it is uttered with a flat or a fall-rise intonation, the marker is monofunctional: reformulative, in the first case, and with an emphasizing and evidential function in the second case. An analysis of syntactic distribution in the clause proves that *I mean* is a *lefthand discourse marker*

that is systematically placed at the beginning of the main clause. Moreover, it is often found next to the adversative conjunction *but*, semantically working, in these cases, as a mitigating unit (*matizador*) (Franchini 1986).

5.1.5 *You know*: inference facilitator and direct speech frame

Compared to the previous pragmatic markers analyzed, *you know* presents a striking difference in terms of functional distribution in narrative discourse structure. Hence, whereas *well*, *so*, *then* and *I mean* have a relevant role in rhetorical, sequential and ideational narrative structure (see summarizing tables at the end of each marker's discussion), with a low or null weight as inference facilitators and restrictors, the analysis of oral narratives showed that 42.9% of *you know* functions have to do with that cognitive component.

The piece of narrative in (87) illustrates what is expected about the marker, that is, that *you know* is a linguistic device primarily used by the narrator to look for understanding and proximity (as a kind of monitoring feature), as well as for common ground; it also serves to illustrate the second most common function of *you know* in the narratives analyzed: introduce the narrator's direct speech. The story is by Totty, who is narrating a premonition she had of her grandmother's death while travelling around Europe. I provide a co-text so as to cope with the expressive meaning of the marker.

(87)

.....
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: there was no way I could contact England.
 *NAR: there was nothing I could do.
 *NAR: but I knew.
 *NAR: I had to ring my grandmother.
 @Eg: ei
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and the others said.
 *NAR: &no # no # don't worry about it&.
 *NAR: <you know/>.
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$DSP \$PRO
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: &it's fine.
 *NAR: it's fine&.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: but I had this real sensation.

*NAR: there was something very very wrong.
 @Eg: ei
 @Bg: os
 *NAR: and # eventually # we were on our way back home <anyway\>.
 *NAR: we were coming back to England\
 %dia: \$or:SO
 %pra: \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:FN MN
 @Eg: os
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and all the way for the rest of the journey.
 *NAR: I had the sensation.
 *NAR: that I must get back to England.
 *NAR: and when we arrived back to England.
 *NAR: the first thing I did.
 *NAR: was telephone # my family.
 *NAR: my cousin answered.
 *NAR: I didn't even say hello.
 *NAR: I just said.
 *NAR: &how's granny/#.
 *NAR: <you know_> is granny all right/&.
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$DSP \$REF \$ADD
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: and he said\
 *NAR: &<well\> # actually\& <you know\>.
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$DSP \$DEL \$MIT 2DSP 2PRO
 %syn: \$d:IN MN 2IN 2MN
 *NAR: &hi Totty # it's really nice to hear_
 *NAR: you're back again\ <you know\>.
 *NAR: she's died\&.
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$DSP \$PRO \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: da

.....
 (NAR4 Totty)

Whereas the first, third and fourth instances of *you know* are used by Totty's interlocutors to facilitate understanding and to introduce quoted material, the second occurrence is used by Totty to reformulate her previous proposition. It is the only case of *you know* reformulator in all the narratives analyzed. Totty is going through a difficult time, thinking about her grandmother's possible death, and all

through the telling of her painful experience she and her interlocutor use the marker to share such experience; it is as if they do not dare, but at the same time want to, openly explicit the facts.

Notice that the third occurrence of *you know* is preceded by *well* [*actually*]. I have analyzed both markers separately because of the conjunctive adverbial device found in between, but it is a case of functional complementation, generally found in *compound discourse markers* (to be presented and discussed later on), since the face-threat mitigating function of *well* is further complemented by the experience sharing function of *you know*. Note that Totty's cousin uses them both to let Totty know of her grandmother's death, so Totty is not only using the marker to introduce her words but to reproduce her cousin's words, transforming the listener of the story into audience of what really went on (cf. Schiffrin 1987a: 282). Moreover, the use of *you know* can also be seen as a mitigating introductory piece of a topic which seems difficult to tackle, such as the death of a beloved one. Schourup (1985: 108) suggests that, among other discourse functions, this marker, "used to introduce a new topic, serves to alleviate the face threatening potential of an obvious and abrupt topic change."

The primary inferential function of *you know* has been pointed out by most empirical studies done on the marker (Jucker and Smith 1998, Schiffrin 1987a, Östman 1981, inter alia). Hence, Schiffrin (1987a) suggests that *you know* operates within the information state of talk, information being, in her discourse model, that plane of talk related to the cognitive capacity of the participants to organize their knowledge and what they know or assume they know of their shared knowledge; since not all the information shared with the hearer is relevant, this discourse plane involves an inferential internal process that both speaker and hearer have to go through (1987a: 25–28). *You know* would facilitate such a sharing of information: "*you know* marks consensual truths which speakers assume their hearers are likely to share (because of co-membership in the same culture, society, or group) as well as general descriptions within which specific descriptions are assumed to be included" (1987a: 278–279). Jucker and Smith (1998: 172) analyze the use of this marker from a cognitive-interactional perspective, discussing its use as a speaker's negotiating strategy: "Discourse markers for us are one type of cue that conversationalists use to negotiate their common ground."

A similar stance is taken by Östman (1981), who concludes that, in the use of *you know*, "the speaker strives towards getting the addressee to cooperate and/or to accept the propositional content of his utterance as mutual background knowledge" (1981: 17). This 'striving' for cooperation could be related to the involvement of the self and the other undertaken also by *I mean*, previously analyzed in the current chapter. Both markers are, in this respect, highly subjective,¹³⁹ as far as the speaker's use of them is concerned, and both are very much present in evaluative

segments, although this is less the case with *you know* than with *I mean*. Besides, just as with *I mean*, the literal meaning of *you know* influences its use in discourse: *know* is a cognitive state that implies 'having information about something', and this information can be about oneself or about what one assumes to share with the other(s) (Schiffrin 1987a: 268). However, whereas *you know* is hearer-oriented or addressee-centered (Jucker & Smith 1998), *I mean* is speaker-oriented.

According to my findings, *you know* can be found both in complicating action and evaluation segments indistinctly and with similar pragmatic functions, a fact which seems to contradict Schiffrin's (1987a) claim that the use of *you know* in narratives occurs in internal and external evaluation exclusively (p.281). Table 12

Table 12. Distribution of pragmatic functions of *you know* in English narrative.

| | | YOU KNOW | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|----------|---------|--------|---------|---------|-------------|-------|
| <i>coherence relations</i> | <i>functions</i> | ABSTR. | ORIENT. | ACTION | I.EVAL. | E.EVAL. | RESULT CODA | total |
| Ideational Structure | CON | | | | | | | |
| | REF | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| | SEQ | | | | | | | |
| Rhetorical Structure | ADD | | | 1 | | 1 | | 2 |
| | CLA | | | | | | | |
| | CLU | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| | COM | | | | | 2 | | 2 |
| | DEL | | | | | | | |
| | EMP | | | | | | | |
| | EVA | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| | EVI | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| Sequential Structure | REC | | | | | | | |
| | TOP | | | | | | | |
| | DSP | | | 4 | | | 1 | 5 |
| | FRA | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| Sequential Structure | FRC | | | | 1 | 1 | | 2 |
| | INI | | | | | | | |
| | Inferential Component | CTX | | | | | | |
| JUS | | | | | | | | |
| MIT | | | | | | | | |
| PRE | | | | | | | | |
| PRO | | | | 5 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 12 |
| total | SIT | | | | | | | |
| | N | | | 13 | 5 | 8 | 2 | 28 |
| | % | | | 46.4% | 17.9% | 28.6% | 7.1% | |
| | | 46.5% | | | | | | |

Key to pragmatic functions coding: see Appendix 2.

illustrates these and other findings, concerning the functional distribution of *you know* in narrative segments.

One of the reasons why *you know* appears in complicating action segments as much as in evaluative ones is because the reproduction of direct speech always occurs while the narrator is telling the development of events. This may find a plausible explanation in the social role that this marker often has. Thus, according to Holmes (1986): “*you know* occurs much less often in sections of discussion, argument, planning or ‘phatic’ talk, for instance, where there is more frequent speaker-change (...) The narration of interesting or amusing personal experiences most appropriately characterizes more ‘social’ contexts perhaps, where the speaker feels some social obligation to entertain the addressee (s).” (p.15). Holme’s impression confirms the findings and provides a plausible explanation of the balanced appearance of *you know* in action and evaluation segments.

Data in Table 12 show that the presence of *you know* in external evaluation is slightly higher than in internal evaluation. This implies that the narrator often uses the marker to introduce a comment or an information that is outside the story frame but that he considers is important for reaching a full understanding of the story or of the point of it; he does it to a greater extent than when introducing internal evaluative comments which affect the story itself. Notice that with *I mean*, exactly the opposite occurred (see Table 10). Again, those data reveal that, whereas *I mean* implies overinvolvement with the self and the others (typically found within the story frame, in internal evaluative segments), *you know* implies reaching out to and sharing with other peoples’ experiences and thoughts (commonly found outside the story frame, in external evaluative segments). Schiffrin (1987a: 295) puts it in this way:

“And in narratives, *y’know* helps the hearer filter through the story and select what is important for understanding the narrative point — and thus respond to the story as an audience.”

When analyzing the linguistic variability of *you know/I think* in working-class speech, Huspek (1989) also refers to the fact that the former is frequently found bridging the complicating action-evaluation border. Hence, among the list of functions of *you know* sequences for working-class speakers, derived from Bernstein (1971), he presents two that are specially relevant for narrative evaluation segments:

A4. A shift from narrative or description to reflection — from the simple ordering of experiences to abstracting from experience — also may signal a shift from we centered to *individuated* experience ...

The [you know] sequences may then function as feelers towards a new equilibrium for the group ...

A5. [you know] sequences help reduce the sociological strain inherent in producing a verbally individuated message. (Huspek 1989: 672)

The opening and closing up of a narrative segment by means of *you know* proves therefore to be common. The speaker uses the marker to focus attention on a piece of information that breaks with the previous one. Samples (88) and (89) illustrate two cases of the use of the marker to initiate and close up an internal and external evaluative/coda segment respectively. They are both found after the *result*, at the end of two narratives. The first belongs to a story by Sarah, who is explaining her unpleasant encounter with a young man in the middle of the street. The second is from Karen, who is telling of an exciting driving experience with her brother.

(88)

.....
 @Bg: r
 *NAR: and and I just # eugh # I just had.
 *NAR: to wash my hands.
 *NAR: and try.
 *NAR: and forget about it.
 @Eg: r
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: but # <you know\> # he didn't do anything to me\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRA \$EVA \$PRO
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: but I was a bit scared # <anyway\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRC \$CLU \$EVI
 %syn: \$d:FN MN
 @Eg: ei
 @Bg: c
 *NAR: that's all.
 @Eg: c
 @End
 (NAR1 Sarah)

(89)

.....
 @Bg: r
 *NAR: and <then_> into the fields\
 %dia: \$re
 %pra: \$FRA \$ REC \$SEQ
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: and <then\
 %dia: \$re
 %pra: \$EVI \$EMP
 %syn: \$d:IN MN

@Eg: r
 @Bg: ee/c
 *NAR: but yeah # my brother # <you know\> # is often in dangerous situations\
 %dia: \$ev:EX \$co
 %pra: \$FRC \$COM \$PRO
 %syn: \$d:MD MN
 @Eg: ee/c
 @End
 (NAR7 Karen)

If (89) had finished with the result segment, the story would have had an abrupt ending. By adding an extra final evaluative/coda segment Karen rounds it off and closes up the circle, coming back to present time. By using the marker, Karen informs of, and at the same time justifies, her brother's dangerous driving. As Schourup (1985) suggests, in this case the use of *you know* "indicates that the speaker expects that there is no communicatively significant discrepancy between what is now in the private world and what is now in the other world, with respect to what is now in the shared world" (1985: 102). Moreover, it illustrates a possible case of grammaticalization of an original question that has evolved towards a fixed expression with a pragmatic-discourse use.

As a means to summarize all the above findings, I present Table 13, which shows the incidence of *you know* in narrative discourse structure.

Table 13. Incidence of *you know* in narrative discourse structure (N and %).
 (*) reformulative (\$ref).

| IDEATIONAL STRUCTURE | PRAGMATIC STRUCTURE | | |
|---------------------------|--|--|---|
| logico-semantic relations | RHETORICAL STRUCTURE Illocutionary intentions | SEQUENTIAL STRUCTURE Structuring device | INFERENTIAL COMPONENT Inference facilitator/restrictor |
| *3.5% | 25.0% | 28.6% | 42.9% |
| 1 | 7 | 8 | 12 |

Source: data taken from Table 12.

Note the predominance of the inferential component, largely discussed above and, according to the data, found much ahead of the rest. The sequential structure is found second in order of importance. This is due to the ruling framing function of *you know* at segment boundaries and before quoted material. Finally, its presence in the rhetorical structure is because of the role that the marker has facilitating the addition and clarification of information, introducing external comments, evaluating the events and evidencing a situation.

There is a relevant issue to consider about this marker that may have pragmatic effects. It has to do with its distribution within the clause — initial, mid or final — and its intonation contour.

All occurrences of *you know*, except two, had falling intonation; these two exceptions are illustrated above, in (87); both belong to action units and are used by the speaker to introduce quoted material, the only difference being that the one that is uttered with flat intonation has a reformulative function. The relationship between flat intonation and the reformulative function was pointed out earlier, when analyzing the prosody of *so*. In relation to the varying pragmatic effect of intonation, Schiffrin (1987a) argues: “rising *y’know* reflects less certainty about shared knowledge than falling *y’know*”, since rising implies asking for hearer’s recognition of previous proposition or piece of information (p.291–92). She maintains that consensual truths in her data are marked with falling intonation, the only exception being an utterance that includes a *you know* that can be perfectly paraphrased by means of a question (“*Y’know* they say an apple a day keeps the doctor away?” > *Do you know that*), point which has also been remarked by Marsà (1992: 153).

As for clause distribution, the analysis of *you know* in my corpus of narratives showed that 53.8% of occurrences appeared clause-initially, that is, as *lefthand discourse brackets*, 23.1% occurred in mid-position and 23.1% in clause-final position.¹⁴⁰

Schiffrin (1987a) establishes a relationship between rising or falling intonation and clause distribution. Hence, according to her, when *you know* is found at the beginning of the clause, that is, as a lefthand discourse bracket, it precedes new information (i.e. information which the speaker does not assume or expect the hearer knows) which is uttered in a rising contour; in contrast, when *you know* occurs at the end of the clause, that is, as a righthand discourse bracket, it follows familiar information (i.e. information which the speaker assumes to be held by the hearer) which is uttered either in a rising or falling contour (p.293). Schiffrin illustrates it with these examples:

- (a) ‘Y’know X?’ >> lefthand discourse bracket > rising contour
 (b) ‘X, y’know?’ or ‘X, y’know.’ >> righthand discourse bracket > rising or falling contour

However, as pointed out above, when the *you know*-utterance can be paraphrased by means of a question, as in (a): *Do you know X?*, it cannot be considered a discourse marker but a verbal constituent that forms part of the syntactic structure of the clause (cf. Schourup 1985,¹⁴¹ Marsà 1992). Hence, if we compare it to (b), for instance, we observe that, in the two cases, the *you know* is syntactically independent, as in Sarah’s narrative above (88): “but, *you know*, he didn’t do anything to me.” or Karen’s (89): “but yeah, my brother, *you know*, is often in dangerous

situations.” In both cases, the *you know* does not affect the syntactic clause structure. Along Schourup and Marsà’s line, only in this latter case do I consider *you know* a pragmatic discourse marker.

Moreover, my findings do not totally coincide with the relationship that Schiffrin establishes between the location of *you know* and its intonation contour. As stated above, she maintains that when the marker is clause-initial the intonation is rising; when clause-final, the intonation can be rising or falling. More than half of *you know* occurrences in the narratives database are lefthand discourse brackets (53.8%), that is, they occur clause-initially (which, except in two cases — NAR14 and NAR18 — are all independent clauses) and all are uttered by the narrator with a falling contour. Sarah’s narrative above (88) can serve to illustrate such point, but we can also observe it in Totty’s narrative above (87) and in Zoe’s narrative that follows (90):

(90)

.....
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and it was raining very heavily.
 *NAR: and I couldn’t get a taxi home.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: and I’d never # even at eleven o’clock # walk home on my own.
 *NAR: which # <you know\> # here is not a problem\
 %dia: \$ev:EX
 %pra: \$COM \$PRO
 %syn: \$d:IN SB
 *NAR: <well\> # I think\
 %dia: \$ev:EX
 %pra: \$REF \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: ee
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and I went to the telephone.
 *NAR: to try and phone for another taxi.

(NAR14 Zoe)

(90) illustrates one of the two only cases found of *you know* in subordinate clause-initial position. As in (88) and (89), the marker has falling intonation contour and precedes new information (as all lefthand discourse brackets do). The only case of rising contour I found is in Totty’s story (87) above:

.....

@Bg: ei
 *NAR: there was no way I could contact England.
 *NAR: there was nothing I could do.
 *NAR: but I knew.
 *NAR: I had to ring my grandmother.
 @Eg: ei
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and the others said.
 *NAR: &no # no # don't worry about it&
 *NAR: <you know/>.
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$DSP \$PRO
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: &it's fine.
 *NAR: it's fine&
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: but I had this real sensation.
 *NAR: there was something very very wrong.
 @Eg: ei

.....
 (NAR4 Totty)

Totty has a premonition of her grandmother's death. She is travelling around Europe and wants to contact home, in England. Her friends keep telling her not to worry about it. It is at this point, when she is reproducing her friends' words (direct speech) that she introduces *you know* in-between two quotations. The story has got to its climax and Totty is trying to convey to the hearer all the anxiety that she was going through at that moment. The rising contour of *you know* makes it more vivid and expressive and it definitely adds all the illocutionary force that the situation requires.¹⁴²

In the corpus database, those cases in which *you know* is a righthand discourse bracket, that is, is located in clause-final position (23.1%), have falling intonation. Out of the three occurrences that follow such pattern, two appear after quoted material. (91) and (92) illustrate it. In (91) Phil is explaining his experience with a group of boys that he met at a club and, late at night, after leaving the club, followed him. In (92) Jo is telling of an experience that her brother had with his girlfriend, while swimming near a waterfall.

(91)

.....
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: I # I think.
 *NAR: he was er # he was on drugs or something.
 *NAR: he er # he was trying to impress his friends.
 *NAR: I think.
 *NAR: but what I remember most about it.
 *NAR: is that # you mean.
 *NAR: you read these things in the papers all the time.
 *NAR: and you don't actually think.
 *NAR: is gonna happen to you.
 *NAR: and er # I remember at the time thinking.
 *NAR: &<well/> # yes # here I am/& <you know>.
 %dia: \$ev:EX
 %pra: \$DSP \$COM 2PRO
 %syn: \$d:IN MN 2FN MN
 *NAR: and actually thought.
 *NAR: I could step outside of this.

.....
 (NAR6 Phil)

(92)

.....
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: <anyway> # he let go\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$FRA \$REC \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: and the last he saw of Evelyn was sort of this
 expression_
 *NAR: as she went over the side of this waterfall\
 *NAR: and <then> they ran down to the bottom\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$SEQ
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: to where the waterfall came down into the lake\
 *NAR: and um # they couldn't see her # <anyway> #.
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$EVI \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:FN MN
 *NAR: and &oh my god! she's drowned& # <you know>.
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$PRO

%syn: \$d:FN MN

@Eg: da

.....

(NAR16 Jo)

As we saw in Chapter 2, use of direct speech is quite common in oral narratives of personal experience. Not only does this use provide a more vivid impression of the events, but it also involves the hearer in the story: (91) and (92) serve to illustrate it. The two linguistic mechanisms together — quotation of one's thoughts plus use of pragmatic marker — definitely help Phil and Jo to get their points across. The other clause-final *you know* (93) may also be interpreted as a checking up of the communicative effect on the listener, but notice that it is used by the narrator after a weather description ('it was freezing cold') that is key for the hearer to fully cope the risk of the whole situation, a terrible skiing experience.

(93)

.....

*NAR: and I went straight straight into the rock.

*NAR: I was going really fast # as well.

*NAR: my skies hit the rock # the base of the mountain.

*NAR: my head # my face was striken into the rock.

*NAR: and I knocked myself out into #.

*NAR: it was freezing cold <you know\>.

*NAR: people didn't see me\.

%dia: \$da

%pra: \$EVI \$PRO

%syn: \$d:FN MN

.....

(NAR18 Misha)

Schourup (1985) suggests that when *you know* follows an utterance, "a speaker might wish to check up on the correspondence of his or her own communicative aims to what the addressee has been able to grasp from what has been said" (p.128), whereas utterance-initial *you know* "posits the presumed correspondence before the utterance in question has in fact been spoken into the shared world" (p.109). In other words, whereas lefthand *you know* predicts a common ground between speaker and hearer,¹⁴³ righthand *you know* aims at checking the felicity of the communicative act. Watts (1989) argues on similar lines. From a sociolinguistic perspective, Watts suggests that *you know* as a righthand discourse bracket "is perceptually salient and open to interpretation as an evaluative cue." If the marker is a lefthand discourse bracket, exactly the opposite occurs (p.219).

Present findings, exemplified in (91) and (92) above, agree with Schourup and Watts's interpretations of the clausal position of *you know*, although the data

analysis showed that not all righthand *you know* function as evaluative cues. In (91) and (92) the narrators use them at the peak of the story, after providing a proper setting of the events by quoting their own thoughts at that moment.

My data do not exhibit the relationship that Shiffrin establishes above between rising/falling intonation of the marker and its distribution in the clause. Schourup's explanation, on the other hand, to my understanding provides a more plausible interpretation. However, neither refers to those cases in which *you know* is placed in the interior of the clause. As stated earlier, 23.1% of the occurrences follow this pattern; (89) above illustrates it. In this case the marker is placed between the subject and the verb: "but yeah, my brother <*you know*> is often in dangerous situations." This utterance belongs to the last narrative segment and, as in (94), the narrator uses it as rounding-off linguistic mechanism to close the story up (*frc*). Nevertheless, the placing of the marker, in this case, presents some specificities since there are two possible interpretations. In (94) *you know* appears after a subject complement, preceding a time adverbial adjunct; if we consider that adverbial adjuncts are not obligatory constituents of the clause, then the marker is clause-final, but if we take the adjunct as part of the clause structure, then the marker can be considered clause-internal. I opted for this latter possibility.

(94)

.....
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: oh # I was lucky.
 *NAR: <I mean_> # it's not people I knew\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$REF \$ADD \$EVA
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: it was just reported incidents # <you know\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRC \$PRO
 %syn: \$d:MD MN
 @Eg: ei
 @End
 (NAR14 Zoe)

The other clause-internal *you know* occurs in Misha's skiing story (95), in the middle of an external evaluation. In this case, the marker appears between the subject and the verb, preceding a non-specifying relative clause that is placed in-between. Misha uses *you know* not only in its core function, but also to add an information that he considers is relevant for the understanding of the events (what his friend is like).

(95)

.....
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: I could have I could have killed myself.
 *NAR: and that was not the end.
 *NAR: because all the time we were there #.
 *NAR: all the conditions were really # really bad.
 *NAR: and aparently # my friend # <you know> # who thinks_.
 *NAR: he's really clever\#.
 %dia: \$ev:EX
 %pra: \$PRO \$ADD
 %syn: \$d:MD SB
 *NAR: he thought.
 *NAR: that if you cross from one mountain to the other mountain.
 *NAR: he had this concept.
 *NAR: that if you go so high.
 *NAR: and go up the clouds.
 *NAR: <then\> the weather is fantastic\.

.....
 (NAR18 Misha)

While recognizing the importance of the analysis of linguistic features of *you know* such as intonation and syntactic position, it should not be forgotten that the analysis of pragmatic markers should primarily take into account the illocutionary point of the particular discourse unit that frames them, in the case of the present study, a narrative segment. *I mean* and *you know* have proved to be highly relevant in this respect.

After all the above analysis and discussion, what can definitely be concluded is that pragmatic markers such as those are, by no means, 'fillers', as Keller (1981: 110) suggests when dealing with 'gambits':¹⁴⁴ "Some other expressions that could be taken for gambits, such as the heavily used term "you know" were not identified as such (...) They act predominantly as fillers for time presumably spent searching for the right word or for an adequate means of structuring discourse". In the corpus of analysis, I did not find any occurrence of *you know* that worked as a 'filler', a term which, I suggest, should be avoided since it does not really provide any valuable categorial or functional information as far as the linguistic description and functioning of a lexical unit is concerned.¹⁴⁵ On similar lines, Jucker and Smith (1998) discuss Erman's (1987: 137) examples of *you know* "as a staller for time and as an appeal to the listener to have patience".¹⁴⁶ They conclude that what the speaker is appealing for is not patience, but "participation in the construction of the argument on the floor" (Jucker and Smith 1998: 197).

The relevance of discourse markers as structural, interactional and cognitive

cues has been proved not only throughout this study but by a vast theoretical and empirical research. Jucker and Smith's study on *you know* (1998), for instance, points out the importance of this marker to dynamically help the speaker and hearer to make the representations of common ground. Hence, they claim: "assumptions are believed to be embedded in a dynamic network in which they lead to somewhat predictable new assumptions that the partner is expected to generate" (p.173). It is precisely these assumptions that discourse markers put into focus, Jucker and Smith claim, since what becomes important is not the information that they introduce or present, but the presuppositions or implications they carry along.¹⁴⁷

In sum, we have seen that, responding to expectations, *you know* is a pragmatic marker whose main function in the narrative is the sharing of common ground between narrator and hearer, operating as an inferential linguistic device that facilitates the transmission of the illocutionary point of the narrative. By means of *you know*, the narrator looks for cooperation and mutual background knowledge, showing proximity with the interlocutor. It is equally present in complicating action and in evaluation segments, external and internal, but its role as external evaluative cue is highly significant. *You know* also has a key role in the sequential structure of the narrative. In action segments, it functions as direct speech frame marker, used by the narrator to introduce quoted material, either his/her own or somebody else's; in the opening and closing up of internal and external evaluation segments, it is often used by the narrator to strongly convey the point of the story. The prosody and clause distribution of *you know* have proved to be significant, too. Most occurrences of the marker have a falling intonation contour, conveying a meaning of assertiveness and consensual truth. An analysis of the syntactic distribution of *you know* has proved that it can occur in initial, mid and final clause position, so it can be a *lefthand* and a *righthand discourse bracket*, although it is mostly found clause-initially. The distribution within the clause influences its pragmatic meaning: whereas utterance-initial *you know* carries out a sense of 'intimacy' and 'folksiness' presuming, on the speaker's part, a mutual shared knowledge with the listener, utterance-final *you know* aims at checking whether the point of the story has got across.

5.1.6 *Anyway*: Conclusion, resumption, and segment frame

The analysis of narrative data showed that all pragmatic functions carried out by *anyway* were found in the rhetorical structure, in the first place (79.2%), and in the sequential structure, in the second place (20.8%).¹⁴⁸ From all the pragmatic markers previously analyzed, *anyway* is the only one that does not undertake any function in the ideational narrative structure, or work as an inference facilitator for the speaker (in this latter component, it coincides with *I mean*). Although such

findings broadly respond to expectations, the study has shown interesting features of the marker that are related to prosody and syntactic distribution within the clause. These and other data will be discussed in the following pages.

Compared to other pragmatic markers, *anyway* has deserved little attention in the literature, but those who have written about it seem to agree that it is a cue used by the speaker to mark the end of a digression (Reichman 1985, Takahara 1998). Reichman (1985) suggests that *anyway*—like ‘*in any case*’—indicates that a return to an interrupted context space is about to occur, usually after a digression (p.39), but Takahara (1998) goes a step further concluding that *anyway* not only brackets off information that the speaker may consider of secondary importance, but directs the hearer’s attention back onto previous information that he views as being of primary importance (p.328). This observation comes from the fact that *anyway* can be used in clause-initial or clause-final position (as we will see later on), and such free distribution influences its functions.

In the following pages we will see that my findings partly coincide with Reichman’s and Takahara’s, specially on the narrative uses of *anyway*, which the latter discusses (1998: 337). In addition to the literature on the term, let us see how the Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary (1987) defines the term:

1. to indicate that a statement explains or supports a previous point or makes that point seem less important, as in: *I decided to postpone the idea of doing a course, and anyway I got accepted by the council.*
2. to suggest that a statement is true or relevant in spite of other things that have been said, as in:
‘I can give you a lift if you wait.’ — ‘No, I’ll walk. Thanks, anyway.’
3. to correct or modify an opinion or statement, for example to limit it to what you definitely know to be true, as in: *‘All of them?’ I ask. ‘Some, anyway,’*
4. to indicate that you are asking what the real situation is or what the real reason for something is, as in:
‘What are you phoning for, anyway?’ — ‘To see if you need a visa.’
5. to change the topic or return to a previous topic, as in: *She was on trial for his murder. It sounds like a squalid business. Anyway, Agate was in court when the woman was asked what was her first thought when she realized what had happened.*
6. to indicate that you are missing out some details in a story and passing on to the next main point or event, as in: *I’d heard there was a flat available, so I went. Anyway, I didn’t get it.*
7. when you want to end the conversation, as in: *Anyway, I’ve got to go. I’ll see you tonight, then.*

The above uses of *anyway* are contextualized in both dialogued and monologued discourse although, as is usual in empirical studies on pragmatic markers, the former outnumbers the latter. The analysis of the marker in oral narratives led to the following observations, not all reflected in the examples provided above:

- a. that the concluding or summing-up pragmatic function is the one that *anyway* undertakes most often (related, to a certain degree, to points 1, 4, 6 and 7 above).
- b. that it has a key role as segment boundary marker, framing the opening up of action units mainly (a function not illustrated in any of the above points, although pointed out in Takahara 1998: 337). This structural task becomes specially salient in the text-genre under analysis, a monologued discourse.
- c. that it is often used by the narrator as a resumption cue, after a digression (related to point 5 above). This resumption usually ends up with a concluding or summing-up assertion; in the data, it also accompanies a change in topic.

Whereas (a), (b), and (c) would be the pragmatic functions that *anyway* carries out most often, there are other secondary functions found in the narratives that are worth mentioning. Hence, I concluded that *anyway* is also present when:

- d. there is a salient fact or situation, highlighting the illocutionary force of the utterance or discourse segment which contextualizes it; in this case, *anyway* indicates that the information provided is highly relevant for the interpretation of the story (this evidential role can be related to points 2 and 4 above).
- e. the narrator introduces a personal comment or an evaluation of the events (function not illustrated in any of the above points), as a rounding off linguistic tool.

Both (d) and (e) will be illustrated in the following pages. Excerpt (96) illustrates (a), (b) and (c) functions of *anyway*, the three most recurrent ones found in the narratives analyzed. The story is from Jo, who is explaining a dangerous swimming experience that her brother and his girlfriend went through at a lake, in Australia.

(96)

-
- *NAR: because he couldn't hold on any longer.
 *NAR: and it was sort of like #.
 *NAR: he had to make a decision.
 *NAR: whether to let go or to hold on.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: which must be awful.
 *NAR: to have to make that sort of a decision.
 @Eg: ee
 @Bg: da

*NAR: <anyway\> # he let go\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$FRA \$REC \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: and the last he saw of Evelyn was sort of this
 expression_
 *NAR: as she went over the side of this waterfall\

(NAR16 Jo)

Jo's brother is holding his girlfriend's hand so she would not fall over the side of a waterfall. In the middle of the complicating action, Jo makes an external evaluation: she considers that making a decision such as her brother's 'must be awful'. She breaks the flow of the telling to say so; afterwards, she regains the thread by means of *anyway*, introducing the end of the episode — '*anyway*, he let go.' This use of the marker to introduce a concluding final remark could be related to (1) and (6) above, when the speaker uses *anyway* to introduce a point that gains significance over the previous ones, so in this sense *anyway* works not only as a plain concluding device, but as a linguistic tool that allows the speaker to present the point of the proposition or story.¹⁴⁹ In fact, within the same story, we find it several times doing this function. (97) is the continuation of (96). It serves to illustrate the concluding and evidencing roles of *anyway*. Notice that in-between the two occurrences of the marker there is an instance of *you know*, following quoted material, that aims at sharing the excitement of the moment with the interlocutor.

(97)

.....
 *NAR: and <then\> they ran down to the bottom\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$SEQ
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: to where the waterfall came down into the lake\
 *NAR: and um # they couldn't see her # <anyway\> #.
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$EVI \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:FN MN
 *NAR: and &oh my god! she's drowned& # <you know\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$PRO
 %syn: \$d:FN MN
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: because all that water falling #.
 *NAR: if you get trapped.

*NAR: because of the weight of the water coming down.
 *NAR: it stops you from coming up to the top.
 @Eg: ee
 @Bg: r
 *NAR: and eventually # <anyway\> # they found her\
 *NAR: she bobbed up somewhere\
 %dia: \$re
 %pra: \$REC \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: r

 (NAR16 Jo)

Table 14. Distribution of pragmatic functions of *anyway* in English narrative.

| | | ANYWAY | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|-------------|-------|
| <i>coherence relations</i> | <i>functions</i> | ABSTR. | ORIENT. | ACTION | I.EVAL. | E.EVAL. | RESULT CODA | total |
| Ideational Structure | CON | | | | | | | |
| | REF | | | | | | | |
| | SEQ | | | | | | | |
| Rhetorical Structure | ADD | | | | | | | |
| | CLA | | | | | | | |
| | CLU | | 1 | 4 | 3 | | 1 | 9 |
| | COM | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| | DEL | | | | | | | |
| | EMP | | | | | | | |
| | EVA | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| | EVI | | | 1 | 1 | | | 2 |
| REC | | | 3 | | | 1 | 4 | |
| TOP | | | 1 | | | 1 | 2 | |
| Sequential Structure | DSP | | | | | | | |
| | FRA | | | 3 | 1 | | | 4 |
| | FRC | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| Inferential Component | INI | | | | | | | |
| | CTX | | | | | | | |
| | JUS | | | | | | | |
| | MIT | | | | | | | |
| | PRE | | | | | | | |
| | PRO | | | | | | | |
| Total | SIT | | | | | | | |
| | N | | 1 | 12 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 24 |
| | % | | 4.2% | 50.0% | 29.2% | 8.3% | 8.3% | |
| | | | | | | | | 37.5% |

Key to pragmatic functions coding: see Appendix 2.

The last use of the marker in (97) again illustrates the recovering of the argumentative thread, interrupted by the narrator's inclusion of additional information that she considers is relevant for the story. This function of *anyway* is mostly present in action units, although in (97) it occurs in a result segment. Table 14 partly summarizes all the above findings, showing the functional distribution of *anyway* in narrative segments.

The data above show that *anyway* appears in action and internal evaluation segments mainly (50% and 29.2% of functions, respectively).

Present findings suggest that the narrator makes use of *anyway* in the middle of the telling of events — to open up a new discourse unit, to regain the thread, or to introduce a final concluding remark or assertion, basically — and when s/he is involved in trying to convey the point of the narrative, offering a personal opinion on what was, at the time, going on. There is little presence of the marker in the rest of narrative segments. The performance of *anyway* in narrative can be related to that of *so*, previously analyzed. In this case, action and internal evaluation segments were also those which showed more functional frequency (70% and 18% of functions, respectively), coinciding also in the primacy of segment framing and concluding roles.

See the above data summarized in Table 15, according to discourse structures. Notice the lack of functions in the ideational and inferential components. Its dominant presence in the rhetorical structure is mainly due to its resumptive and summing up conclusive role.

Table 15. Incidence of *anyway* in narrative discourse structure (N and %).

| IDEATIONAL STRUCTURE | | PRAGMATIC STRUCTURE | | |
|---------------------------|--|--|---|--|
| logico-semantic relations | RHETORICAL STRUCTURE Illocutionary intentions | SEQUENTIAL STRUCTURE Structuring device | INFERENTIAL COMPONENT Inference facilitator/restrictor | |
| – | 79.2% 19 | 20.8% 5 | – | |

Source: data taken from Table 14.

The relevance of *anyway* in internal evaluation deserves some further consideration. Besides carrying out an evaluative comment, most *anyway* found in internal evaluation are also conclusive. Interestingly enough, in some cases the marker is preceded by *you know* and *I mean*, both highly relevant as indicators of shared knowledge and facilitators of speaker's understanding.¹⁵⁰ The cooccurrence of these pragmatic markers is not a coincidence. They all share the trait of marked speaker's involvement in the telling of the message: as we have seen, *I mean* and

anyway carry out this function in internal evaluation, whereas *you know* carries it out in external evaluation. (98) illustrates this cooccurrence. It belongs to the end of Sarah's personal experience, after the result. Sarah closes up her telling of the events with an evaluation of what she went through.

(98)

.....
 @Bg: r
 *NAR: and and I just # eugh # I just had.
 *NAR: to wash my hands.
 *NAR: and try.
 *NAR: and forget about it.
 @Eg: r
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: but # <you know\> # he didn't do anything to me\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRA \$EVA \$PRO
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: but I was a bit scared # <anyway\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRC \$CLU \$EVI
 %syn: \$d:FN MN
 @Eg: ei
 @Bg: c
 *NAR: that's all\
 @Eg: c
 @End
 (NAR1 Sarah)

First, Sarah uses *you know* to share with the hearer that her experience did not have a fatal ending ('he didn't do anything to me'), but then she has an afterthought and wants to point out that, even though he did not do any harm to her, she was 'a bit scared, *anyway*'. In this context, *anyway* carries a concessive meaning¹⁵¹ that is partly due to the adversative conjunction — *but* — that introduces the clause. Hence, the pragmatic marker is used by the narrator to both close up the story and point out a fact.

The cooccurrence of these highly subjective pragmatic markers can also be observed in (99), with an internal evaluation after a result segment as well. In this instance, Jo, the narrator, also adds, at the end of the telling of events, a personal impression that, partly because of the use of these specific markers, reinforces the feeling of closeness between narrator and hearer.

(99)

.....
 @Bg: r
 *NAR: and eventually # <anyway\> # they found her\
 *NAR: she bobbed up somewhere\
 %dia: \$re
 %pra: \$REC \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: r
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: and I think.
 *NAR: she broke her collar bone.
 *NAR: and she was really lucky # really lucky.
 *NAR: but <I mean\> # that was sort of an awful moment # just like a film or something\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$EVA
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: where you sort of see their hands slipping away.
 *NAR: and you're thinking.
 *NAR: &oh my god&.
 *NAR: but um # <anyway\> # she was all right\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: <so_> that was really lucky\
 %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$FRC \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: ei
 @End
 (NAR16 Jo)

The first pragmatic marker found in the internal evaluation introduces a reflection and personal interpretation: 'but *I mean*, that was sort of an awful moment... where you sort of see their hands sleeping away...'; afterwards, there is a return to reality, a down-to-earth concluding sentence that is introduced by *anyway*: 'but, *anyway*, she was all right.' The unit carries out, as in (98), a closing or summing-up function that aims at finishing with the previous digression. In this respect, as I pointed out in previous pages, *anyway* resembles *besides*: both introduce the most important point to bear in mind.¹⁵²

Notice that, in both cases, the pragmatic markers are preceded by a conjunctive *but*, a connector that sets up an adversative semantic relation between two proposi-

tions. The <*but anyway*> pattern can be explained in the same terms as <*but I mean*>, analyzed and discussed in previous pages. About this construction, I coincide with Takahara's (1998) suggestion that the adversative conjunction reinforces and complements the core meaning of *anyway*, according to him a cue mainly used by the speaker to make a shift of topic and to signal the end of a digression. Hence, according to Takahara (1998: 339) <*but anyway*> "is used to express the contrast between the expected weighting, significance and importance of the current topic and its actual importance and weighting in comparison with the preceding and the following topic."

Observation of data revealed that the coordinator plus pragmatic marker structure is not fixed enough to speak of a case of *parenthetical connector* (cf. Cuenca 1990, 2002). Consequently, to my understanding we have a case of functional cooccurrence of two lexical units that bears a twofold significance: first, because of the strong opposition relation carried out by the conjunction, placed right before *anyway*; second, because of the syntactic distribution of the marker, placed at the beginning of the clause. Let us see this latter point in more detail.

Similarly to *you know*, *anyway* can open or close up a proposition, thus, as it was stated in previous pages, it can work as a righthand and a lefthand discourse bracket. Such syntactic mobility has semanticopragmatic consequences since the resulting meaning is not exactly the same. Hence, the analysis of data led me to conclude that when *anyway* is a lefthand bracket it carries a much stronger illocutionary force than when it is uttered at the end of the clause, as a righthand bracket. Although conclusion seems to be the core function that operates all through, clause-initial *anyway* is also used by the narrator as resumption cue, to recover the thread broken usually by an evaluative segment (96) or/and to make a shift in topic, as in (100) and (101), following.

(100)

.....
 *NAR: I waited for twenty minutes.
 *NAR: he didn't return.
 *NAR: and <so_> I asked the cloakroom attendant to help me/.
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$CON
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: I told him about the passport/.
 *NAR: and everybody was in a state of panic/.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: because it was illegal at that time for a member of the German Democratic Republic to have in their possession a foreigner's passport.

*NAR: <anyway\> # it was a long story_
 %dia: \$ev:EX
 %pra: \$TOP \$COM
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: ee
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: but I went to the police station\.

.....
 (NAR9 Hellen)

(101)

.....
 *NAR: and we could hardly move our faces.
 *NAR: the gloves and the clothes.
 *NAR: which previously had been fine for the weather.
 *NAR: they just didn't keep us warm anymore.
 *NAR: uh # one of my friends lost her camera.
 *NAR: and another girl was crying.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: she was really scared.
 @Eg: ei
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: <anyway\> # in the end we stopped at this bar_
 *NAR: and we had a coffee to warm us up a bit\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$FRA \$REC \$TOP
 %syn: \$d:IN MN

.....
 (NAR10 Donna)

The fact that clause-initial *anyway* seems to be 'more conclusive' can also be seen in (99), when there is only a conclusive function linked to it but the force it carries is stronger than that of (97) and (98), for instance. Notice that in these two latter cases, where *anyway* is used clause-finally, there is a further common pragmatic function linked to it, that of evidencing a fact: <and um they couldn't see her, *anyway*> (97); <but I was a bit scared, *anyway*> (98). Furthermore, note that in neither (97) nor (98) is the marker used to open up a segment, recover the argumentative line, or make a shift in topic, as it happened in (100) and (101). What these findings tell us is that the use of *anyway* as a lefthand bracket involves a text structural (segment framing and/or topic shift) and cognitive (recovering of train of thought) boundary within the text, whereas its use as a righthand bracket involves a conclusion that can be interpreted more in terms of summing-up and evidencing of a situation or event. In addition, because of the delimiting role, the

conclusive function of lefthand *anyway* carries a stronger illocutionary force than righthand *anyway*.

| | | | |
|-------------|-----------------------------|----|---|
| <anyway, X> | lefthand discourse bracket | >> | structural and cognitive text delimiting role |
| <X, anyway> | righthand discourse bracket | >> | summing-up and evidencing role |

The syntactic distribution of this pragmatic marker does not show any correlative variation in terms of prosody: all instances found in the narratives had falling intonation contour. As was pointed out for markers previously analyzed, a nuclear falling contour entails speaker's assertiveness in the proposition that follows, which, in this particular case, makes sense if we consider the predominant concluding role of *anyway*.¹⁵³

In sum, *anyway* in narratives basically is used in *development of action* and *internal evaluation* segments. The narrator makes use of it to introduce or close-up a concluding remark, to resume the thread broken by a previous segment, usually evaluative, and to frame a new narrative segment. All of these functions can be related to a core structural and cognitive text-delimiting role of the marker, especially significant when it is found clause-initially, that is, as *lefthand discourse bracket*. The pragmatic functions of *anyway* are exclusively found in the rhetorical and sequential narrative structures; the findings show that the marker never acts as inference facilitator. Furthermore, of all the markers analyzed so far, it is the only one that does not bear any function in the ideational narrative structure. Although all the above broadly responds to expectations, the study has brought out an unexpected finding, that is, the close relationship between the distribution of *anyway* in the clause and its discourse meaning. The syntactic distribution of *anyway* proves that this pragmatic marker conveys a different meaning depending on its position in the clause: as a *lefthand discourse bracket*, *anyway* has a structural and cognitive text-delimiting role; when it appears clause-finally, as a *righthand bracket*, it has a summing-up evidencing role. Even though the concluding function is present throughout, it is reinforced when used clause-initially. As for prosodic features, *anyway* does not present any intonation variation: all occurrences have a rise-fall contour, generally associated with definite and complete tone groups. This trait can be related to the core concluding meaning of the marker, especially relevant when found as *lefthand bracket* following an adversative conjunctive *but*.

5.2 English compound pragmatic markers

The issue of connector-marker pairing was introduced in previous pages, when the finding of two patterns in the narratives analyzed — <*but I mean*> and <*but anyway*> — brought me to conclude that these were two cases of semanticopragmatic functional cooccurrence. I suggested that the pattern in question was a conjunctive adversative unit (a *connector*, in functional terms) plus a polyfunctional pragmatic marker that, together, set up a semantic and pragmatic coherence relation between the previous and the following proposition. Although the two relations came from different sources, that is, from two lexical units, they complemented each other, specially in the case of <*but anyway*>, where the core conclusive role of the pragmatic marker, mainly found clause-initially, was reinforced by the adversative conjunction that preceded it (finding supported by Takahara 1998). I concluded that, in these cases, *I mean* and *anyway* behaved as pragmatic markers that showed functional cooccurrence with a preceding connector.

What we are going to treat in this section is a parallel linguistic phenomenon: the pairing of two (sometimes more) pragmatic markers. Consider, for instance, (102). It is an external evaluation segment that is placed in the middle of the telling of events. Misha, the narrator, is explaining a dangerous skiing experience that she had in France; because of the bad weather conditions, she and her friends had difficulties coming down.

(102)

.....
 *NAR: and I was going down this mountain really dangerous.
 *NAR: one side of the mountain was straight up.
 *NAR: one side of the path # if you want # of the sloan was straight up on the
 mountain.
 *NAR: and the other side was straight down.
 @Eg: da/ei
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: <so_# you know\> # do you understand the shape_
 *NAR: I'm talking about/.
 %dia: \$ev:EX
 %pra: \$FRA \$REC \$COM
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: ee
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and I let myself go.
 *NAR: and I started to go quite fast.
 @Eg: da

.....
 (NAR18 Misha)

Misha breaks the flow of the telling of events to pause for a moment and make sure that her interlocutor gets her point; she has described the shape of the mountain in detail so as to convey all the risk involved in going down. The *so* intends to regain the thread of the story, but Misha wants to check whether her interlocutor understands her words so as to cope the danger involved. It is because of that that she uses *you know*. From an objective description, she jumps onto a straightforward question addressed to her interlocutor: “so, you know, *do you understand the shape I’m talking about?*” By means of *you know* there is an intended sharing of narrator-interlocutor implicit common ground that aims at facilitating the illocutionary point of the narrative. The combination of these two markers, from two very distinct discourse structures (sequential and rhetorical), results into a shift of focus of attention and speaker’s cognitive frame.

The narrator’s move from *so* to *you know* in (102) involves a shift of ‘contextual realm’.¹⁵⁴ Hence, in my terms, a *compound pragmatic marker* (from now on CPM) could be defined as a functional co-occurrence of two (sometimes more) pragmatic markers whose combinatory functions result into: a) a change of attentional state of the speaker (cf. Grosz & Sidner 1986) or shift in his/her cognitive frame; and/or b) a remarkable emphasis on the illocutionary point of the segment.

Nevertheless, what CPMs supply to the text should be explained in exclusively pragmatic functional terms. A combination of two units that set up a semantic plus pragmatic relation between previous and following proposition (as happened with *<but I mean>* and *<but anyway>*) cannot be considered a CPM, but the cooccurrence of two coherence relation type units that present a fixed syntactic distribution (coordinating conjunction followed by pragmatic marker). However, in both cases there is a common denominator: none of these combinations respond to an evident process of grammaticalization, at least not in the narrative database, since the analysis showed that their frequency of appearance is too low to claim a fixed functional and formal structure. I would conclude that the richness of CPMs in general, and in this work in particular, lies on their qualitative, rather than quantitative, potential: type of coherence relation they set up, procedural and propositional meaning of the unit, sentence distribution, grammatical properties, prosody, etc.¹⁵⁵

Maschler’s (1998) study of the use of discourse markers for segmenting Israeli Hebrew talk-in-interaction discourse deals with the notion of ‘frame shifting’, coming from Goffman’s work (1981). She argues that, according to Goffman, a change of frame (or footing, as also termed by Goffman) “implies a change in the alignment we take up to ourselves and the others present as expressed in the way we manage the production or reception of an utterance” (Goffman 1981: 128).¹⁵⁶ Maschler investigates discourse markers as one of the main cues through which frame shifts become manifest. These shifts involve distinct ‘contextual realms’ since they refer to not only the speaker’s alignments, but also the text-world, the lingu-

tic structures, the prior and shared knowledge, etc. (Maschler 1998: 24). Following Labov's scheme of narrative, Maschler defines a 'narrational frame shift' in terms of a three-level-hierarchy in the story, where discourse markers would function as referential, interpersonal, structural, and cognitive cues (1998: 32). She points out that 'discourse marker clusters' (term used "for at least two consecutive discourse markers", p.47) "result from shifts in constraints from a number of contextual realms, such that each marker in the cluster marks a shift in a different realm" (p.48). I can see a plausible parallelism between Maschler's contextual realms and the four discourse structure components (i.e. ideational, rhetorical, sequential, and inferential) that I propose as framework for the study of pragmatic markers in oral discourse. Similarly, the notion of CPM that I suggest runs parallel to Maschler's discourse marker clusters definition.¹⁵⁷

Although the cooccurrence of two pragmatic functions does not result in a unitary function, it can be said that they both complement each other. Similarly to what happens when a pragmatic marker is omitted from an utterance, if one of the units forming a CPM is taken out, the ideational meaning of the utterance is not altered; it is just restricted as far as explicitness of speaker's intentions and illocutionary force of the utterance is concerned. Let us see this in (103), an excerpt from a narrative by Jo, who is explaining her brother's travelling experience in Australia, with his girlfriend.

(103)

.....
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: and they went.
 *NAR: decided to go swimming one day.
 *NAR: and they met somebody from the local area.
 *NAR: who said.
 *NAR: &oh # there's a beautiful # um # lake with a waterfall&.
 *NAR: and they said.
 *NAR: &let's go there&.
 *NAR: <so_# um # anyway\> # they went up to this lake\
 %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$REC \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: and they went swimming and everything.
 *NAR: and they were at the top of the waterfall.
 *NAR: and it was quite a long way.

 (NAR16 Jo)

The function undertaken by *so* is like that of (99): regain the argumentative thread broken up by the report of a brief encounter with someone from the area. It can

therefore be paraphrased as: “they decided to go swimming one day *so* they went up to this lake”. After *so* there is a pause followed by *anyway*, a core concluding device that returns to previously interrupted space (especially when found clause-initially, as we saw in previous pages) and introduces the most relevant point that the hearer should bear in mind. By using *anyway*, Jo suddenly stops the flow of the telling of events (a continuing process indicated by the use of *so*) to let the interlocutor know their final decision: ‘they went up to this lake’; with it, she wants to cut down and make the story short. Without the use of *anyway*, the CPM second member, there would not have been any marked change in the attentional state of the hearer, from a consecutive to a conclusive point. Because of the use of this CPM, there is, therefore, a pragmatic explicitness of the narrator’s intentions and, at the same time, a stronger illocutionary force in the action.

As mentioned above, the significance of CPMs in my corpus of oral narratives cannot be accounted for in quantitative terms since the total amount of occurrences is not representative enough to make specific claims about each single pattern found there (only 3.84% English and 7.70% Catalan CPMs were found). But, qualitatively speaking, I consider that the issue deserves some attention since CPMs offer, at least, two points of interest for the linguist: (a) a regular structure (pairing of two or more pragmatic markers); and (b) a one-coherence-type functional cooccurrence.

In Table 16 I present their distribution in narrative segments; in Table 17, their functional distribution.

Table 16. Distribution of English CPMs in narrative segments.¹⁵⁸

| | ABSTRACT | ORIENTATION | ACTION | INT.EVAL. | EXT.EVAL. | RESULT | CODA |
|---------------|----------|-------------|--------|-----------|-----------|--------|------|
| <then well> | | | 1 | | | | |
| <okay anyhow> | | 1 | | | | | |
| <so anyway> | | | 2 | | | | |
| <so you know> | | | | | 1 | | |
| <well I mean> | | | | | 1 | | |
| <well so> | | | | | | | 1 |

The distribution of CPMs in the narratives analyzed is quite regular throughout all the segments, although the sample is small. Table 16 shows that, except in the abstract and the coda, all the rest of narrative units have a CPM; action and external evaluation are those with a highest rate. Table 17 presents their functional distribution: conclusion and recovering of train of thought are the most relevant roles undertaken. In (102) and (103) we saw them exemplified.

The use of concluding <well so> is illustrated in (104). Basil, the narrator, has just given an account of a motorbike accident that he had when living in Africa. His leg got pulled in into the mudguard and he could not move; while lying on the floor, a strange man approached him.

Table 17. Functional distribution of English CPMs in narrative.

| <i>coherence relations</i> | <i>functions</i> | <well I mean> | <well so> | <so anyway> | <so you know> | <then well> | <okay anyhow> | total |
|----------------------------|------------------|---------------|-----------|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------|
| Ideational Structure | CON | | | | | | | |
| | REF | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| | SEQ | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| Rhetorical Structure | ADD | | | | | | | |
| | CLA | | | | | | | |
| | CLU | | 1 | 2 | | 1 | | 4 |
| | COM | 1 | | | 1 | | | 2 |
| | DEL | | | | | | | |
| | EMP | | | | | | | |
| | EVA | | | | | | | |
| | EVI | | | | | | | |
| REC | | | 2 | 1 | | 1 | 4 | |
| TOP | | | | | | 1 | 1 | |
| Sequential Structure | DSP | | | | | | | |
| | FRA | | | | 1 | | 1 | 2 |
| | FRC | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| | INI | | | | | | | |
| Inferential Component | CTX | | | | | | | |
| | JUS | | | | | | | |
| | MIT | | | | | | | |
| | PRE | | | | | | | |
| | PRO | | | | | | | |
| SIT | | | | | | | | |
| Total | | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 16 |

Key to pragmatic functions coding: see Appendix 2.

(104)

.....

@Bg: r

*NAR: and he just grabbed the motorbike.

*NAR: grabbed it # kind of wrenched it off my leg.

*NAR: threw it to the side very angrily.

*NAR: and walked off.

*NAR: marched off.

*NAR: stormed off # really.

*NAR: <well\ # so\> I rubbed my leg_.

*NAR: and thought\.

*NAR: &hah # lucky lucky\&.

%dia: \$re

%pra: \$FRC \$CLU

%syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: r
 @Bg: c
 *NAR: and that was it # really.
 @Eg: c
 @End
 (NAR17 Basil)

Basil is at the end of his account. His story responds to a canonical narrative scheme, in Labovian terms: he finishes with a result and coda segments. At the end of the result, he closes up an in-crescendo three-verbal sequence with a segment-final framing *well*. By means of it, followed by *so*, Basil stops telling the man's activities and switches to his. This is a common role undertaken by CPMs: to work as a hinge between two characters' acts. The *so* that follows *well* has a twofold purpose: to shift onto a new 'contextual realm', the rhetorical (from the sequential one, marked by framing *well*), and to strengthen the concluding force of the segment.

Because of the procedural meaning of pragmatic markers, when a CPM is used the processing cost of information is lowered. This works for the sequential, rhetorical, ideational, and cognitive narrative structures/components. Moving from one of these contextual realms to another, in Maschler's terms, becomes easier for the speaker who, by means of the CPM, segments and at the same time facilitates the possible inferences to the hearer. See the structural shifts carried out by English CPMs in Figure 10.

| | Sequential | Rhetorical | Inferential | Ideational | structural shift |
|---------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------------|
| <well I mean> | | com | | ref | (RHE > IDE) |
| <well so> | frc | clu | | | (SEQ > RHE) |
| <so anyway> | | rec clu | | | (RHE > RHE) |
| | | rec clu | | | (RHE > RHE) |
| <so you know> | fra | rec com | | | (SEQ > RHE > RHE) |
| <then well> | | clu | | seq | (IDE > RHE) |
| <okay anyhow> | fra | rec top | | | (SEQ > RHE > RHE) |

Figure 10. English CPM structural shift.¹⁵⁹

According to the data above, the commonest shift is from sequential to rhetorical structure functions: <*well so*> is used to close a segment (frc) and to introduce a conclusive remark (clu); <*so you know*> is used to open up a new segment (fra), to regain the argumentative thread (rec), and to introduce a comment (com); <*okay anyhow*> is used to open up a narrative segment (fra), to regain the argumentative thread (rec), and to shift topic (top). There are two instances that involve a functional shift from ideational to rhetorical structures: <*well I mean*> is used to

introduce a comment and reformulate previous discourse; <*then well*> is used to introduce the sequencing of events and to introduce a concluding remark. Finally, there are two cases of illocutionary force reinforcement, that is, when the shift occurs within the same contextual realm: the two instances of <*so anyway*> are used to regain the argumentative thread and to introduce a conclusion.

From the data in Figure 10 it can be concluded that, as with single pragmatic markers, functions linked to the rhetorical structure are the most frequent ones, followed by those related to the sequential component. This may suggest that the richness of CPMs lies, to a great extent, on their expressive value, in the first place, and on their effect in the processing cost of information, in the second place.¹⁶⁰ See it illustrated in the following examples. In (105) we find a <*well I mean*> that bridges an internal-external evaluation. Zoe has been telling about a situation where she was followed home by a man. She stops and thinks about another. Then, she reflects about it; first, internally and, then, taking distance from the event, externally.

(105)

```

.....
@Bg:   a
*NAR:   there was another situation of danger.
*NAR:   just being followed home # the same kind of thing.
@Eg:   a
@Bg:   op
*NAR:   but this was in Brighton.
@Eg:   op
@Bg:   ei/e
*NAR:   but # <I mean\> # that's just a case of_.
*NAR:   &are you being paranoic/.
*NAR:   are they really following you/&.
*NAR:   because nothing actually ever happened\.
%dia:   $ev:IN
%pra:   $FRA $DSP $EVA
%syn:   $d:IN MN
*NAR:   <well/ # I mean_\> # I think you are paranoic_.
*NAR:   when you're on your own\.
%dia:   $ev:EX
%pra:   $REF $COM
%syn:   $d:IN MN
@Eg:   ei/e
.....

```

(NAR14 Zoe)

What we have in (105) is another example of contextual shift, now from the ideational to the rhetorical realm: by means of this CPM Zoe switches from the

actual events ('nothing actually ever happened') to a reflection on the fact of being 'on your own' ('well, I mean, I think you are paranoid when you're on your own').

But maybe the most striking case of shift can be found in (106), a segment belonging to Bazil's narrative above, where the CPM is used to regain the argumentative threat broken by the preceding external evaluation, and shift topic. We can see that it really works as a 'barrier' that first delimits and then reintroduces the point, thus from sequential to rhetorical discourse structures/contextual frames.

(106)

.....

@Bg: ee

*NAR: <well\> # you must remember_.

*NAR: that I was in Africa.

%dia: \$ev:EX

%pra: \$FRA \$COM

%syn: \$d:IN MN

@Eg: ee

@Bg: da/otc

*NAR: <okay\ # anyhow\> # maybe ten or something minutes later I saw down
the # down the sand road # an approaching figure.

%dia: \$da \$or:TC

%pra: \$FRA \$REC \$TOP

%syn: \$d:IN MN

*NAR: sure enough it was this black man.

*NAR: that was approaching.

@Eg: da/otc

.....

(NAR17 Bazil)

In all the above examples of CPMs the prosody is not uniform. There is always an in-between pause that separates the equal or different intonation contours of the constituents. However, most of them have a final rise-fall intonation sequence that helps reinforce their textual and cognitive core shifting role.

On the other hand, their syntactic distribution is uniform: all CPMs found in the narratives are clause-initial, that is, they work as *lefthand discourse brackets*. This regularity may be due to the distributional nature of the first pragmatic marker that co-occurs; we have seen that all of them were systematically found at the beginning of the clause. The grammatical categories of the CPM constituents are diverse. The cooccurrences found in the database are basically formed by conjunctions, adverbs and interjections, with no consistent formal systematicity. Hence, among the commonest cooccurrences we find two-adverb-pairing (<then well>), adverb plus conjunction (<well so>), adverb plus clause (<well I mean>), and conjunction plus adverb (<so anyway>).

As previously discussed, there is not enough structural fixation of any CPM analyzed to claim that there is an evident process of grammaticalization, contrary to what occurs with its individual constituents, that in everyday oral speech have lost their original referential meaning to become pragmatic cues.

5.3 Recapitulation

Markers of pragmatic discourse structure are cues used by the speaker to signal his/her intentions, to convey illocutionary force to the discourse, to focus the hearer's attention onto a specific contextual space, and to facilitate and restrict the hearer's possible inferences for interpreting the message.

In English oral narratives, we have seen that these marks appear within and across narrative segments as real footprints left by the narrator to delimit segment boundaries and shift onto a new contextual realm. This realm is linguistically materialized through different discourse structures: ideational, rhetorical, and sequential. Whereas the ideational structure is related to semantic discourse coherence relations (i.e. logico-semantic argumentative), thus to the ideas that the narrative world describes, the rhetorical and sequential structures have to do with pragmatic coherence relations (i.e. speaker's illocutionary force and intentions, and discourse structure). Although the inferential component is present all through, it has a key-role in the pragmatic structure. Because of the procedural meaning of pragmatic markers (as opposed to the referential meaning of connectors), this component helps the hearer interpret the intended message and link text to cognitive context and shared knowledge.

The incidence of pragmatic markers in English oral narrative structure is summarized in Table 18.

Table 18. Functional incidence of pragmatic markers in English narrative discourse structure (%). (for absolute figures, see Table 3)

| | IDEATIONAL STRUCTURE | PRAGMATIC STRUCTURE | | |
|----------|------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| | logico-semantic relations | RHETORICAL STRUCTURE | SEQUENTIAL STRUCTURE | inferential component |
| well | 11.5 | 45.0 | 34.8 | 8.7 |
| so | 26.5 | 40.2 | 29.1 | 4.2 |
| then | 52.3 | 29.6 | 13.6 | 4.5 |
| I mean | 20.7 | 65.5 | 13.8 | – |
| you know | 3.5 | 25.0 | 28.6 | 42.9 |
| anyway | – | 79.2 | 20.8 | – |

The data above show that most functions carried out by pragmatic markers are found in the narrative rhetorical structure, followed by the sequential, and ideational ones. Within the rhetorical, *anyway*, *I mean*, *well*, and *so* are the primary markers. The narrator makes use of them to sum up an argument, to regain the train of thought broken up by an evaluative segment, to comment and evaluate a situation or event, to anchor the listener in the narrative's world, and to add relevant information to the message, mainly. *Anyway* and *I mean* are the two markers most frequently used by the narrator to convey all these primary and other secondary functions (see Table 3, for detailed functions).

In the sequential structure, *well*, *so*, *you know*, and *anyway* are the markers with the most significant roles. They act, primarily, as segment boundary frames, opening and closing up narrative discourse segments and quoted material. Among them, *well* and *so* are the most significant ones. The role of pragmatic markers as inference facilitators is exemplified by *you know*, a lexical device that the narrator often uses to involve the hearer into the narrative's world and share with him/her mutual background knowledge and possible implications. Markers whose main role is inferential facilitate the transmission of the illocutionary point of the narrative.

The value of the above findings lies in the nature of the text-genre where these units are found and, along this line, on the pragmatic function-narrative segment relationship. Their functional distribution per narrative segments is shown in Table 19, where we can see, in absolute and relative terms, the number of times that a pragmatic marker operates in a narrative unit.

Table 19. Results of the functional distribution of English pragmatic markers in narrative segments (N and %)

| | ABSTR. | ORIENT. | ACTION | I.EVAL. | E.EVAL. | RESULT | CODA | total |
|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|--------|-------|-------|
| well | 1 | 8 | 24 | 19 | 12 | 1 | 4 | 69 |
| so | – | 6 | 82 | 21 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 117 |
| then | – | 1 | 34 | – | 1 | 8 | – | 44 |
| I mean | – | 4 | 4 | 17 | 4 | – | – | 29 |
| y'know | – | – | 13 | 5 | 8 | 2 | – | 28 |
| anyway | – | 1 | 12 | 7 | 2 | 2 | – | 24 |
| total N | 1 | 20 | 169 | 69 | 33 | 14 | 5 | 311 |
| % | 0.32% | 6.43% | 54.34% | 22.19% | 10.61% | 4.50% | 1.61% | |

The results in Table 19 suggest that the narrator's use of pragmatic markers is not arbitrary and context-independent. The pragmatic functions of the markers are linked to specific narrative segments. Hence, *so* and *then* have an important presence in action units, which can be explained by the fact that *so* has a primary role as marker of result and recoverer of train of thought, and *then* is a marker whose main

function is that of introducing the succession of events and intentions. In both cases, their referential meaning directly influences their pragmatic use. *Well* is used by the narrator in action and evaluative units, mainly. Its richness as illocutionary and text structuring marker can help explain it, taking into account the action-evaluation-action segment sequencing typical of oral narratives.

When telling a narrative of personal experience, the narrator often looks for understanding and, if possible, common ground sharing. Furthermore, s/he tries to help the listener find out the hidden implications, if any, of the message. *You know* helps her/him in such a task, either in the telling of the action or in the evaluative units, although it is in the latter where it works as an essential linguistic tool that conveys the point of the story. The key role of *I mean* in evaluative segments, especially in internal evaluation, also responds to its core function. *I mean* is a marker used by the speaker to show involvement of the self and of the listener. This is specially significant in internal evaluation, a part of the narrative where the subjectivity of the narrator is more overtly shown.

Finally, *anyway* is mostly present in action and internal evaluation segments, where its core function as a cue used by the speaker to return to a previously interrupted context space and concluding summing-up device is fundamental. In this respect, the narrator uses *anyway* not only to recover the argumentative thread, but to introduce what s/he considers is the most important part of the message to bear in mind, in order for the hearer to fully grasp the magnitude of the situation.

All the findings summarized in the above tables partly show that, as was hypothesized in Chapter 4 (4.1), pragmatic functions of discourse markers in oral narratives are not generic but, to a certain extent, text-genre dependent. If the narrator uses *I mean* in internal evaluation more often than in action units, for instance, this responds to the intrinsic procedural and referential meaning of the lexical unit, not to an arbitrary free choice. The same occurs with *so* and *then*, two markers whose core referential meaning basically influences their pragmatic use in complicating action units.

Moreover, Table 19 highlights another significant fact: after complicating action, internal evaluation is the narrative segment where English pragmatic markers have the highest functional incidence. This confirms the hypothesis that certain pragmatic markers are *markers of intensity* or *intensifiers*, one of the evaluative elements that the narrator uses to show his/her perspective (Labov 1972b: 378). This proved to be specially true of *well*, *I mean*, *you know*, and *anyway*. Hence, although they do it in different degrees or rank-scale, some of them are real cues used by the narrator to 'intensify' some parts of the account by selecting a situation or event and highlighting its illocutionary force.

CHAPTER 6

Pragmatic markers in Catalan narrative structure

6.1 Pragmatic markers in Catalan narrative

In this chapter, I will try to prove the hypothesis that pragmatic markers are not interchangeable and indistinctly used by the speaker in any part of the narrative but are, to a great extent, genre-specific, in the sense that they are tools that make the text hang together in terms of segmental structure and illocutionary intentions and force of the narrator. Since these expectations respond to general hypotheses on pragmatic markers (presented in Chapter 4), I will narrow them down when I analyze and discuss the units under study, at the beginning of each marker's section.

Twenty three lexical units were identified as pragmatic marker in Catalan narrative: *no, bueno, doncs, llavors, clar, bé, aleshores, o sigui, vull dir, eh, pues, res, és a dir, mira/guaita, a veure, vaja, va, total, en fi, vegem, home, saps, and escolta'm*. The analysis of narratives revealed that Catalan speakers use pragmatic markers profusely when telling someone a past personal experience. However, not only are the texts rich in quantitative terms but also in qualitative terms: there are two cases of language contact (*bé/bueno, doncs/pues*) which involve standard and non-standard forms and one case of two standard forms (*llavors/aleshores*). In order to discriminate the markers to be analyzed, I followed three steps: first, I ordered the markers according to a frequency scale, in order to see how often a narrator used a given unit. Secondly, I observed the segment where the marker in question appeared, so as to eventually establish the relationship between marker and narrative part. Thirdly, I focused on the functional distribution of markers per segments and drew plausible conclusions and interpretations.

Table 20 shows the Catalan pragmatic markers found in the narratives with their total number of occurrences, in absolute and relative terms. Although the list is long, not all units are equally significant in terms of frequency. I will exclude from the study those units that, because of their low frequency of appearance, I consider are not representative of the way they operate. The exclusion is from number 12 to 23, that is, where the frequency is below 2%.

Table 20. Frequency scale of Catalan pragmatic markers found in the narratives (N and %).

| | | |
|------------------------|-----|-------|
| 1. <i>no</i> | 149 | 28.6% |
| 2. <i>bueno</i> | 93 | 18.3% |
| 3. <i>doncs</i> | 48 | 9.1% |
| 4. <i>llavors</i> | 40 | 7.7% |
| 5. <i>clar</i> | 28 | 5.4% |
| 6. <i>bé</i> | 27 | 5.4% |
| 7. <i>aleshores</i> | 20 | 4.1% |
| [8. <i>o sigui</i> | 20 | 3.9%] |
| [9. <i>vull dir</i> | 15 | 3.0%] |
| 10. <i>eh</i> | 14 | 2.7% |
| 11. <i>pues</i> | 14 | 2.7% |
| 12. <i>res</i> | 10 | 1.9% |
| 13. <i>és a dir</i> | 10 | 1.9% |
| 14. <i>mira/guaita</i> | 7 | 1.3% |
| 15. <i>a veure</i> | 5 | 1.0% |
| 16. <i>vaja</i> | 3 | 0.6% |
| 17. <i>va</i> | 3 | 0.6% |
| 18. <i>total</i> | 3 | 0.6% |
| 19. <i>en fi</i> | 2 | 0.4% |
| 20. <i>vegem</i> | 1 | 0.2% |
| 21. <i>home</i> | 1 | 0.2% |
| 22. <i>saps</i> | 1 | 0.2% |
| 23. <i>escolta'm</i> | 1 | 0.2% |
| Total | 515 | 100% |

In addition, among the first eleven markers there are two units that I will not treat: *o sigui* and *vull dir*. Although they are quantitatively significant, as I explained in my proposal (Chapter 3) they are primarily reformulative units whose treatment in the literature has predominantly been done within the argumentative framework (rf. Argumentation Theory: Anscombe and Ducrot 1983), an approach not taken in this study.

Taking all the above into account, the rearrangement of Table 20 results into a list of nine pragmatic markers that I present and discuss in the following pages and that I have ordered as follows: *bé*, *bueno*, *clar*, *doncs*, *pues*, *llavors*, *aleshores*, *no* and *eh*. See their distribution in narrative segments in Table 21.

Table 21. Distribution of Catalan pragmatic markers in narrative segments (N and %).¹⁶¹

| | ABSTR. | ORIENT. | ACTION | I.EVAL. | E.EVAL. | RESULT | CODA | total |
|-----------|-------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------|-------------|------------|
| bé | – | 10 (37.0%) | 11 (40.8%) | 3 (11.1%) | 1 (3.7%) | 2 (7.4%) | – | 27 |
| bueno | 1 (1.1%) | 13 (14.0%) | 45 (48.4%) | 15 (16.0%) | 9 (9.7%) | 9 (9.7%) | 1 (1.1%) | 93 |
| clar | – | 1 (3.6%) | 7 (25.0%) | 10 (35.7%) | 7 (25.0%) | 3 (10.7%) | – | 28 |
| doncs | – | 11 (23.0%) | 20 (41.7%) | 5 (10.4%) | 6 (12.5%) | 4 (8.3%) | 2 (4.1%) | 48 |
| pues | 1 (7.1%) | 2 (14.3%) | 6 (42.9%) | 3 (21.4%) | 2 (14.3%) | – | – | 14 |
| llavors | – | 7 (17.5%) | 23 (57.5%) | 3 (7.5%) | 3 (7.5%) | 4 (10.0%) | – | 40 |
| aleshores | – | 4 (20.0%) | 12 (60.0%) | 2 (10.0%) | 2 (10.0%) | – | – | 20 |
| no | – | 15 (10.1%) | 51 (34.2%) | 43 (28.9%) | 26 (17.4%) | 14 (9.4%) | – | 149 |
| eh | – | 2 (14.3%) | 4 (28.6%) | 3 (21.4%) | 2 (14.3%) | 3 (21.4%) | – | 14 |
| Total N | 2 | 65 | 179 | 87 | 58 | 39 | 3 | 433 |
| % | 0.5% | 15% | 41.3% | 20.1% | 13.4% | 9% | 0.7% | 100% |

The above distribution of Catalan pragmatic markers per segments confirms the significance of action and internal evaluation units, which is consistent with the weight that the segments have on the narratives. It can be seen that, whereas some markers have a steady presence throughout all narrative segments (e.g. *no*, *bé*, *clar*, *eh*), others show striking differences, with high accumulation in one of the two. Such is the case of *bueno*, *llavors*, and *aleshores*, for instance, which have 48.4%, 57.5%, and 60.0% of occurrences in action units, or *clar*, *no* and *eh*, with 60.7%, 46.3%, and 35.7% of occurrences in evaluation units. However, the primacy of all these markers in action and evaluation segments is not a coincidence: *llavors* and *aleshores*, two linguistic variants of the same variable, have a strong weight in the ideational narrative structure, transmitting the narrator's sequencing of ideas and intentions (*llavors* in particular; see Table 22 following); this occurs in complicating action, mainly. On the other hand, *clar* and *no* are basically used by the narrator to facilitate the listener's task as far as drawing all the possible implications and inferences that the story may have. It is precisely in evaluative units where all this work is done, specially in internal evaluation, where the speaker tries to connect with the inner-feelings of the other and convey the point of his/her personal experience.

There is only one pragmatic marker that appears all through: *bueno*; the rest are absent in abstract and/or coda segments. These findings confirm the closeness of

bueno with English *well*,¹⁶² which, according to Schiffrin's data (1987), operates in all discourse planes of talk. Both markers have a high range of pragmatic functions.¹⁶³

The following pages will be devoted to the presentation and discussion of the particularities of each of the nine markers mentioned above. I will do it in this order and pairing: *bé* and *bueno*, *clar*, *doncs* and *pues*, *llavors* and *aleshores*, *no* and *eh*. The pairing of *bé/bueno*, and *doncs/pues* responds to standard and non-standard variants of the same variable; *llavors/aleshores* are two standard variants of the same variable; finally, I will pair *no* and *eh* because of the sharing of one core pragmatic function.

Table 22 shows the number of times that a marker carries out a particular function in the narratives analyzed. This will provide us with an overview of the data, to be detailed later on, in the following pages. Notice the polyfunctional property of markers, which results in a much higher number of functions than of occurrences. According to present data, *bueno*, *bé*, *doncs*, and *llavors* are the markers that display the highest range of functions. Although *clar* and *llavors* follow them closely in quantitative terms, their functions are not so varied and show a higher concentration of a particular use. Hence, *clar* has a primary role as evidential and presupposition marker, and *llavors* as events sequencing marker. On the other hand, there are markers like *no* and *eh* that are basically monofunctional since they are essentially used by the speaker to narrow down the range of inferences and contextual effects that the account may have on the listener. A close analysis of *bueno*, a linguistic non-standard Catalan form borrowed from Spanish, tells us that this unit is primarily used by the narrator to open-up a new discourse segment, reformulate a previous proposition, or introduce a summing-up concluding remark. In contrast, *bé*, the standard variant, has a lower range of functions and appearance (157 versus 53 pragmatic functions, respectively). *Bueno*, *bé*, *doncs*, *clar*, and *aleshores* have a key-role as text structuring devices. They are used by the narrator within and across discourse segments, at their boundaries and when direct speech is introduced. *Bueno*, in particular, is the Catalan pragmatic marker most often used to reformulate previous discourse.

If we were to make a degree scale of the most relevant pragmatic functions undertaken by Catalan markers analyzed, we would find that, after the highly repeated use of *no* and *eh* as markers that facilitate the sharing of mutual background knowledge, framing, conclusion, reformulation and event-evidencing are the four most repeated ones. However, Table (22) provides a broad picture that deserves close attention and discussion. In the following pages I will present and discuss the performance of the nine Catalan markers that, in terms of frequency, are most representative. I will equally discuss expectations about the markers performance and, at the end of the discussion, confirmation of hypotheses.

Table 22. Frequency table of pragmatic functions of DM in Catalan narrative.

| CATALAN PRAGMATIC MARKERS | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|-----------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|----------------|------------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|
| <i>coherence relations</i> | <i>functions</i> | <i>bé</i> | <i>bueno</i> | <i>clar</i> | <i>doncs</i> | <i>pues</i> | <i>llavors</i> | <i>aleshores</i> | <i>no</i> | <i>eh</i> | <i>Total</i> |
| Ideational Structure | CON | | | | 2 | 3 | 5 | | | | 10 |
| | REF | 2 | 25 | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 29 |
| | SEQ | | | | | | 28 | 9 | | | 37 |
| Rhetorical Structure | ADD | | 8 | | 1 | | 2 | | | | 11 |
| | CLA | | 4 | | | | | | | | 4 |
| | CLU | 5 | 19 | | 18 | 6 | 2 | 1 | | | 51 |
| | COM | 1 | 7 | 3 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | 14 |
| | DEL | 2 | 13 | | 9 | | 1 | | | | 25 |
| | EMP | | 4 | 2 | 1 | | | | | | 7 |
| | EVA | 2 | 11 | 10 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | | | 32 |
| | EVI | 1 | 5 | 19 | 2 | | 7 | | 148 | 14 | 196 |
| | REC | 3 | 11 | | 6 | 1 | 4 | 4 | | | 29 |
| | TOP | | 3 | | 3 | | 2 | 2 | | | 10 |
| Sequential Structure | DSP | 3 | 3 | | 3 | | 1 | 2 | | | 12 |
| | FRA | 13 | 27 | 10 | 9 | 4 | 7 | 10 | | | 80 |
| | FRC | 2 | 3 | | 2 | | 2 | | | | 9 |
| | INI | 3 | 2 | | 1 | | | 2 | | | 8 |
| Inferential Component | CTX | | | 2 | | | | | 148 | 14 | 164 |
| | JUS | | | 6 | 1 | | | | | | 7 |
| | MIT | | | | | | | | | | |
| | PRE | | | 19 | | 1 | | | | | 20 |
| | PRO | | | | | | | | 148 | 14 | 162 |
| | SIT | 16 | 12 | | 5 | 2 | 2 | 3 | | | 40 |
| total | N | 53 | 157 | 71 | 67 | 22 | 66 | 35 | 444 | 42 | 957 |
| | % | 5.5% | 16.4% | 7.4% | 7% | 2.3% | 6.9% | 3.7% | 46.4% | 4.4% | 100% |

Key to pragmatic functions coding: see Appendix 2.

6.1.1 *Bé* and *Bueno*: anchoring in the text-world, segment frame, reformulation and conclusion

There are significant qualitative and quantitative reasons for presenting *bé* and *bueno* as separate pragmatic markers under a unique heading. The most outstanding one is that, although from the perspective of standard Catalan *bueno* is not an accepted form and it should be replaced by *bé*, both units will be considered variants of the same variable. However, it will be pointed out that they perform very different pragmatic functions.

Bé is the accepted Catalan standard form and *bueno* is the non-standard but widely accepted form that, due to language contact, is generally used by Catalan speakers. *Bueno* is a linguistic borrowing or transfer from the Spanish language. Payrató (1985, 1988) explains such linguistic phenomenon in the following way:

“El registre col·loquial català presenta nombrosos exemples d'elements de tota mena — paralingüístics, fònics, lèxics, gramaticals — que són deguts a la influència de la llengua amb què es troba en contacte: l'espanyol a la Península Ibèrica i a les Illes Balears, el francès a la Catalunya Nord, i el sard i l'italià en el cas de l'alguerès. (...) En qualsevol cas, però, aquests elements, originàriament *estranyos* o *forans*, constitueixen *interferències*, en el sentit que són mostres materials de processos de canvi lingüístic que es donen en una llengua (o varietat) i que són motivats directament per la influència d'una altra llengua (o varietat).” (1988: 151)

“Catalan colloquial register presents numerous examples of all sorts of elements — paralinguistic, phonic, lexical, grammatical — that result from the influence of the languages with which it is in contact: Spanish in the case of the Peninsula and the Balearic Islands, French in North Catalonia, and Sardinian and Italian in the case of the variety spoken in l'Alguer. (...) In any case, however, these elements, originally *strange* or *foreign*, are *interferences*, inasmuch as they are material tokens of processes of linguistic change that occur in a language (or variety) and that are directly motivated by the influence of another language (or variety).”

The use of *bueno* in Catalan colloquial registers¹⁶⁴ is, therefore, a language contact phenomenon, a lexical transfer from the closest language it is in contact with, i.e. Spanish. As pointed out by Turell (1995: 286), Payrató (1988: 152) and Espuny (1998: 280), such transfer is *hybrid* in the sense that speakers do not fully borrow the word as it is but adapt it to the Catalan morphophonetic system.¹⁶⁵

The second reason for presenting *bé* and *bueno* as separate markers is their distinct pragmatic meaning, related to the specific hypotheses on both markers. Hence, I hypothesize that their appearance will differ not only in terms of narrative segments but also, related to this, in terms of intentionality: *bueno* is going to be used by the speaker in segments where there is more involvement of the self and also of the other and where the subjectivity of the narrator is more overtly shown. Previous studies done on the marker support this hypothesis (González 1994, 1998). Since this function occurs in evaluation units, *bueno* is expected to occur more often in these narrative segments. This expectation is based on the fact that this marker is very often used by Catalan speakers in colloquial register when the speech formality is low and the interlocutors are involved in relaxed talk. In contrast, *bé* will be more frequent in contexts where there is an objective telling of events and a signalling of structural changes, such as the opening and closing up of the story or new narrative segments. In addition, it is expected that the total number of pragmatic functions carried out by *bueno* exceed those of *bé*. The few studies done on the matter have agreed on the widespread use of *bueno* among Catalan speakers (Payrató 1988: 152, González 1998: 249, Espuny 1998: 281, Vila 1998: 260, Cuenca 2002).

Vila (1998) points out that the reasons for this phenomenon do not lie in the ignorance of the standard form or poor knowledge of the language, but rather in the speaker's willingness to use a unit that s/he considers transmits a particular meaning, be it pragmatic or propositional (p.260). In fact, what we are going to see in the following pages supports this claim and proves that Catalan speakers use the non-standard form three times more than the standard variant when narrating an event and, what is more important, not indistinctly: whereas *bé* is used by narrators at the beginning of the story, in orientation segments, to anchor the listener to the narrative world from the start, *bueno* is repeatedly used in evaluation segments where, as we have seen, the narrator conveys the true point of the story as well as his/her full involvement in it. Moreover, as we will see, both units present significant differences as far as pragmatic functions are concerned, not only qualitatively but also quantitatively speaking. If we can talk about functional variation in terms of different uses of a language according to field, mode, tenor and tone (Gregory and Carroll 1978), I suggest considering instances of functional variation those cases which, not affected by these four contextual factors, present intra-textual variation in terms of text-genre and pragmatic functions.¹⁶⁶

The third reason for presenting the two units as separate pragmatic markers is, therefore, their different co-textual pragmatic variation. The analysis of the corpus of narratives showed that the types of pragmatic functions carried out by *bueno* exceeded that of *bé*. Besides, when concluding, reformulating, anchoring the listener in the narrative world, and framing the start of a new segment (the four more recurrent functions of both markers), Catalan speakers used the non-standard form three times more than the standard form, that is, *bueno* much more often than *bé* (see Table 22). Hence, as we will see, not only is the use of the units distinct in terms of narrative segments (what I have called co-textual variation), but also in terms of pragmatic functions (what I have called pragmatic variation).

There is still a fourth significant consideration worth making in relation to the use of these two pragmatic markers. Contrary to what Beinhauer (1978) suggests when dealing with Spanish *bueno* (versus *bien*) in colloquial Spanish, its frequency of appearance does not imply speaker's lack of education. As Cortés (1991: 99) rightly asserts, it cannot be stated that those who make use of *bueno* (and pragmatic markers in general)¹⁶⁷ are "uneducated people who do not know how to construct a sentence" (Beinhauer 1978: 354). While users may be unaware of this, there are numerous pragmatic reasons for doing so, from textual to illocutionary and/or context-inferential. Taking the issue to the Catalan-Spanish field, Payrató (1992: 6) provides a valuable remark on the question.

“... no debería olvidarse que la interferencia representa en cualquier lengua minoritaria muchos otros valores al margen de la simple incorrección. En efecto,

la interferencia constituye a menudo un recurso comunicativo más, utilizado por los hablantes para aportar al discurso numerosas significaciones adicionales, tanto pragmáticas o expresivas (irónicas, humorísticas, desambiguadoras) como sociales (marcas de variedad social, de acercamiento al interlocutor y neutralización de posibles conflictos, etcétera).” (Payrató 1992: 6)

“... we should not forget that interference has, in any minority language, many other values besides simple incorrectness. In fact, interference is often another communicative resource, used by speakers to provide their discourse with a variety of additional meanings, which might be pragmatic or expressive (ironic, humorous, clarifying) as well as social (signs of social variety, of intimacy with the interlocutor and cancellation of possible conflicts, etc.).”

Moreover, my findings suggest that the use of *bueno*, as a Spanish *lexical transcodic marker* (Vila 1998), does not really depend on the “formal instruction in Catalan language arts” (Vila 1998: 268, 316) but on the speaker’s intentions and purpose when using it.¹⁶⁸

Finally, there is a reason for presenting both markers under the same heading: their cooccurrence within the same narrative. In Table 23 I present the number of

Table 23. Cooccurrence of *bé* and *bueno* in Catalan oral narratives. Distribution of *compound pragmatic markers* in narratives.

| narratives | B É | BUENO | [CPM] |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|---|
| 1 | – | 2 | <bé doncs> |
| 2 | 3 | 6 | |
| 3 | – | – | |
| 4 | 9 | 1 | <bé doncs> <bé llavors> <bé llavors doncs> <bé o sigui> |
| 5 | – | 2 | |
| 6 | – | 6 | <bueno és a dir> |
| 7 | – | 6 | <bueno llavors> |
| 8 | 1 | 15 | <bé bueno> |
| 9 | – | 2 | |
| 10 | 2 | 2 | |
| 11 | 1 | 10 | <bueno doncs> <bueno vull dir> |
| 12 | – | 5 | |
| 13 | 1 | – | |
| 14 | 1 | 1 | <bé pues> |
| 15 | 1 | 2 | |
| 16 | 4 | – | |
| 17 | 1 | 1 | <bueno total> |
| 18 | 1 | 8 | <bueno pues> |
| 19 | 2 | 9 | <bueno doncs en fi> <bueno clar> |
| 20 | – | 15 | <bueno clar> |
| Total | 27 | 93 | |
| | 22.5% | 77.5% | |

times that a narrator uses either one or both units during the telling of his/her story. Notice that, whereas there are seven informants who only use *bueno*, there are just two who only use *bé*. Next to the two variants, I include the *compound pragmatic markers* (CPM) whose first member is one of the two variants under analysis; these instances will be discussed in depth in following sections, when Catalan CPM are tackled.

The importance of Table 23 does not only lie in the striking quantitative difference between the number of times that a narrator uses *bé* and/or *bueno* (22.5% versus 77.5%) but on the distinct pragmatic functions that both markers carry out in the narrative structure. I provide that information in Tables 24 and 25, where we can see the functional distribution into narrative segments.

Table 24. Distribution of pragmatic functions of *bé* in Catalan narrative (N and %).

| | | BÉ | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|-------------|-------|
| <i>coherence relations</i> | <i>functions</i> | ABSTR. | ORIENT. | ACTION | I.EVAL. | E.EVAL. | RESULT CODA | total |
| Ideational Structure | CON | | | | | | | |
| | REF | | 1 | 1 | | | | 2 |
| | SEQ | | | | | | | |
| Rhetorical Structure | ADD | | | | | | | |
| | CLA | | | | | | | |
| | CLU | | | 2 | 2 | | 1 | 5 |
| | COM | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| | DEL | | 1 | 1 | | | | 2 |
| | EMP | | | | | | | |
| | EVA | | | | 2 | | | 2 |
| | EVI | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| REC | | | 3 | | | | 3 | |
| Sequential Structure | TOP | | | | | | | |
| | DSP | | | 3 | | | | 3 |
| | FRA | | 4 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 13 |
| | FRC | | | | 1 | | 1 | 2 |
| Inferential Component | INI | | 1 | 2 | | | | 3 |
| | CTX | | | | | | | |
| | JUS | | | | | | | |
| | MIT | | | | | | | |
| | PRE | | | | | | | |
| | PRO | | | | | | | |
| SIT | | 9 | 6 | | | 1 | 16 | |
| total | N | | 16 | 25 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 53 |
| | % | | 30.2% | 47.2% | 11.3% | 3.8% | 7.5% | |
| | | | | | 15.1% | | | |

Key to pragmatic functions coding: see Appendix 2.

Table 25. Distribution of pragmatic functions of *bueno* in Catalan narrative (N and %).

| | | BUENO | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|-------------|-------|-------|
| <i>coherence relations</i> | <i>functions</i> | ABSTR. | ORIENT. | ACTION | I.EVAL. | E.EVAL. | RESULT CODA | total | |
| Ideational Structure | CON | | | | | | | | |
| | REF | | 8 | 12 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 25 | |
| | SEQ | | | | | | | | |
| Rhetorical Structure | ADD | | 3 | 4 | | | 1 | 8 | |
| | CLA | | | 3 | | 1 | | 4 | |
| | CLU | | 2 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 19 |
| | COM | | | | 1 | 6 | | | 7 |
| | DEL | | 2 | 8 | 1 | 2 | | | 13 |
| | EMP | | | 2 | 1 | 1 | | | 4 |
| | EVA | | | 1 | 10 | | | | 11 |
| | EVI | | | 4 | | 1 | | | 5 |
| | REC | | | 7 | | 1 | 3 | | 11 |
| | TOP | | | 2 | | | 1 | | 3 |
| Sequential Structure | DSP | | | 2 | 1 | | | | 3 |
| | FRA | 1 | 2 | 9 | 7 | 4 | 4 | | 27 |
| | FRC | | | | 2 | | 1 | | 3 |
| | INI | | | 2 | | | | | 2 |
| Inferential Component | CTX | | | | | | | | |
| | JUS | | | | | | | | |
| | MIT | | | | | | | | |
| | PRE | | | | | | | | |
| | PRO | | | | | | | | |
| | SIT | 1 | 4 | 6 | | | 1 | | 12 |
| total | N | 2 | 21 | 69 | 28 | 20 | 15 | 2 | 157 |
| | % | 1.3% | 13.4% | 43.9% | 17.8% | 12.7% | 9.6% | 1.3% | 30.5% |

Key to pragmatic functions coding: see Appendix 2.

Three points stand out from the above findings:

- bueno* is present all through the narrative segments, including abstract and coda; *bé* is present all through, except in abstract and coda.
- bueno* has a key role in evaluation units (30.5% versus 15.1% of *bé*); *bé* has a key-role in orientation segments (30.2% versus 13.4% of *bueno*).
- bueno* exceeds *bé*, qualitatively and quantitatively, in pragmatic functions in all narrative segments.

Let us concentrate first on the segments. There is only one narrative where *bueno*

appears at the beginning and end of the story, in abstract and coda. It is one of the narratives where this marker is the only variant used. The opening and closing up of a narrative by means of *bueno* is not the commonest, so this instance can be presented as a real exception to the rule. See it exemplified in (107).

(107)

@Begin

@Participants: NAR7 Montse Narrator

@Age of NAR: 29;

@Sex of NAR: female

@Bg: a

*NAR: <bueno\> # jo la situació # la vegada que he passat més por\
<bueno\> # I the situation # I was really scared\
<bueno\> # I the situation # I was really scared\
<bueno\> # I the situation # I was really scared\

*NAR: és # jo munto\
és # I do horse riding\
és # I do horse riding\
és # I do horse riding\

*NAR: vaig a muntar a cavall\
I usually ride\
I usually ride\
I usually ride\
I usually ride\

%dia: \$ab

%pra: \$FRA \$SIT

%syn: \$d:IN MN

*NAR: i # quan començava a muntar.
and # when I started riding
and # when I started riding
and # when I started riding\

*NAR: que no en tenia ni idea.
when I had no idea of riding
when I had no idea of riding
when I had no idea of riding\

*NAR: <pues_> vaig començar muntant un cavall.
<pues_> I started riding a horse
<pues_> I started riding a horse
<pues_> I started riding a horse\

*NAR: que era bastant nerviós\
that was quite nervous\
that was quite nervous\
that was quite nervous\

%dia: \$ab

%pra: \$REC

%syn: \$d:IN MN

*NAR: i la primera vegada que vaig sortir a la muntanya a muntar.
and the first time I went horseback riding in the countryside
and the first time I went horseback riding in the countryside
and the first time I went horseback riding in the countryside\

*NAR: se'm va desbocar.
the horse ran away
the horse ran away
the horse ran away\

@Eg: a

.....

@Bg: c

*NAR:<doncs_> sí sí # i ja està\
<doncs_> yeah yeah # and that's it\
<doncs_> yeah yeah # and that's it\
<doncs_> yeah yeah # and that's it\

%dia: \$co

%pra: \$FRC \$CLU

%syn: \$d:IN MN

*NAR: <bueno_> # i vam arribar quatre_
<bueno_> # i vam arribar quatre_
<bueno_> # i vam arribar quatre_
<bueno_> # i vam arribar quatre_\

<*bueno*> # *and only four of us arrived*_

*NAR: i ja està.
 and that's it

%dia: \$co

%pra: \$ADD \$CLU

%syn: \$d:IN MN

@Eg: c

@End

(NAR7 *Montse*)

As we will see in the following pages, it is usually *bé* that carries out this text-opening function. *Bé* stands out for having a core structural and text-world anchoring role, whereas *bueno* has it for segment-framing and for instrumenting the illocutionary intentions of the speaker. In fact, segment framing and conclusion are, next to reformulation, the two most common functions carried out by *bueno* (see Table 25).

The opening and closing up of a discourse unit, i.e. framing function, by means of *bueno* has been pointed out by different authors. Saint-Pierre and Vadnais (1992) refer to French *bon* as both modalisateur and conversational structuring marker. As such, they point out its repeated use within and across discourse units (understood as conversational turn-taking and within a monologued sequence), and as introductory and closing discourse unit marker (p.246–250).¹⁶⁹ On similar lines, Briz (1993b) stresses the relevant role of *bueno* as a metadiscourse marker that performs a range of discourse functions. My findings agree with those of Briz: narrative demarcating role, staller, reformulator, and summing-up closing marker (pp.43–48). Certainly, as Briz points out (p.46), the discourse value of *bueno* does not allow us to see it as a mere filler (“*expletivo*”),¹⁷⁰ a perspective taken by some authors who overstress its core phatic function (Vigara 1990b: 77, Cortés 1991: 106, and to a lesser extent Fuentes 1993a: 213).

In (b) above I referred to the key role of *bueno* in evaluation segments versus *bé* in orientation ones. According to findings shown in Tables (24) and (25), *bé* is systematically used by the narrator to start and anchor the listener in the narrative world from the very beginning. In narrative structure, orientation is, very often, the segment that opens up a story; the narrator introduces place, time, and characters right away, with no inclusion of preceding abstract. In order to do that, s/he often needs an introductory marker, a lexical unit that carries out both a text-delimiting and a cognitive role, framing and at the same time mentally anchoring the listener — from the very start — in the narrative world that is about to be constructed. See it in excerpts (108) and (109):

%dia: \$or:PO
 %pra: \$INI \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: otpc/da

.....
 (NAR17 Xavier)

The claim that *bé* is often used by the speaker to mentally anchor the listener in his/her narrative world can be also illustrated by those orientation segments that do not open up the narrative but are found later on. See it in (110) and (111). David and Anna, the two narrators, first respond to the interviewer's question about having ever been in a situation of danger; when they start the actual telling of the narrative, they signal it by means of the marker:

(110)
 @Begin
 @Participants: NAR2 David Narrator
 @Age of NAR: 33;
 @Sex of NAR: male
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: sí # el què explicaré és la primera.
yes # what I'm going to explain is the first
 *NAR: que m'ha vingut al cap.
that has come to my mind
 *NAR: que no necessàriament és la més perillosa #
which is not necessarily the most dangerous one #
 *NAR: ni la sensació que # ni la sensació que realment sigui més perillosa.
nor the feeling that # nor the feeling that it is really more dangerous
 *NAR: però és la que jo recordo ara.
but is the one that I remember now
 @Eg: ee
 @Bg: ots
 *NAR: <bé\> # això va passar fa # deu fer uns dos # tres anys # a l'estiu # a
 Tailàndia\.
 <bé\> # this happened about # about two # three years ago # in the summer # in
 Thailand
 %dia: \$or:SO
 %pra: \$FRA \$SIT
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: ots

 (NAR2 David)

(111)
 @Begin
 @Participants: NAR4 Anna Narrator
 @Age of NAR: 29;
 @Sex of NAR: female
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: sí # <bueno\># es que # mmm# situació de perill es aixó <no/> una situació de vulnerabilitat\
 yes # <bueno\># the thing is # mmm# a situation of danger is that <no/> a situation of vulnerability\
 @Eg: ei
 @Bg: osc
 *NAR: era durant un # un viatge que vam fer a Mèxic # el meu home i jo.
 it was during a # a journey that my husband and I went on to Mexico
 *NAR: hi vam anar pel nostre compte.
 we went on our own
 *NAR: i # <bé\># vam arribar <doncs_\> a # a Mèrida # al Yucatán/
 and # <bé\># we arrived at <doncs_\> at # at Merida # in the Yucatan/
 %dia: \$or:SO
 %pra: \$SIT 2DEL
 %syn: \$d:IN MN 2MD MN
 @Eg: osc

 (NAR4 Anna)

The use of *bueno* with both framing and anchoring functions is much less frequent, as Table 25 showed. In fact, as it will be seen in the final results, *bueno* exceeds *bé* in the number and sort of illocutionary functions (that is, in the rhetorical narrative structure) it undertakes, whereas *bé* exceeds *bueno* in text-structural ones (that is, in the sequential narrative structure). Such finding coincides with the aforementioned use of French *bon* as modalisateur and conversational structuring marker (Saint-Pierre and Vadnais 1992): if we were to find a Catalan — and probably Spanish — translation of the term for both uses, *bueno* would correspond to the *bon*-modalisateur, and *bé* to the *bon*-structuring marker.

A similar pragmatic distinction between both units has been also underlined by Fuentes (1993a), who typifies Spanish *bien* as a closing recapitulating marker that conveys an assertive value to the proposition that follows, attaching a ‘psychological’ value to it (what I have described as mental anchoring in the text-world), and *bueno* as a phatic concessive element frequently used by the speaker as propositional linker, so as not to lose the argumentative thread, and as face-threat mitigator (p. 213–14). Again, although such a distinction hints at the respective structural and illocutionary roles, the way *bueno* is described denotes a negative or rather worthless discourse value that reminds us of the aforementioned empty use (Cortés 1991).

So far we have seen the framing and anchoring core roles of *bé* in orientation segments. However, it has a sound presence in complicating action units as well. Sometimes *bé* is used as complicating action initiator, again with a clear text-structuring role. Results in Table (24) tell us that those functions related to speaker's intentions are much less commonly undertaken by this marker, contrary to what occurs with *bueno*, a pragmatic marker that has a wide range of different illocutionary functions (see Table 25). This finding responds to expectations, fully explained at the beginning of this section, that *bueno* would be used by the speaker much more frequently than *bé* for expressive purposes, with a much higher overinvolvement of the self and the other than *bé*.

Hence, results show that in action and evaluation units mainly, the narrator makes use of *bueno* to add relevant information, to evaluate the events, to introduce a final summing-up concluding remark, to play for time to think, to shift topic, to regain the argumentative thread, and to clarify and/or emphasize a previous proposition. Some of these functions — like addition, clarification, emphasis, and topic shifting — are not found in *bé*. In addition, those illocutionary-related functions shared by both markers are, in frequency terms, much less significant in *bé* than in *bueno* (compare final results of Tables 24 and 25 above). This coincides with other studies done on the two markers in Spanish. Llorente (1996) and Martín Zorraquino (1994b: 410) stress the low incidence of *bien* compared to that of *bueno* in their corpus of analysis. Thus, Llorente points out that whereas she has found only two functions linked to *bien*, there is a considerable range related to the use of *bueno* (p. 229).

There is only one ideationally-related function present and shared by both markers, although distant in quantitative terms: reformulation. According to the above findings, *bueno* is an outstanding reformulator, used mainly in orientation and action units. *Bé*, on the other hand, barely appears as such. (112) illustrates this and other commented functions linked to *bueno*. All pieces belong to the same narrative. Rosa is explaining her summer travelling experience in Jordania with a friend and the sometimes hard times they had to go through. The following piece explains their efforts trying to climb to the top of a temple.

(112)

.....
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: vam arribar fins a dalt de tot.
 we went up to the top
 *NAR: <aleshores_> vam # ens vam fer les fotos/.
 <aleshores_> *we # we took the pictures/*
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ee

- *NAR: que # <bueno\> # és lo normal\
which # <bueno\> # is normal
- %dia: \$ev:EX
- %pra: \$FRA \$COM \$CLU
- %syn: \$d:IN SB
- @Eg: ee
- @Bg: da
- *NAR: ah # encara algú va donar la volta a la cúpula\
ah # some people still went round the dome
- *NAR: que # però tampoc no hi ha barana\
that # but there wasn't a handrail either/
- *NAR: <vull dir_\> jo no vaig ser capaç\
 <vull dir_\> I was not able\
 hi va haver gent així en plan_ #.
there were people like_#
- @Eg: da
-
- @Bg: ei
- *NAR: tampoc no era molt perillós.
it wasn't too dangerous either
- *NAR: si no tenies mm # això # un # no sé # un mareig o alguna cosa així.
if you didn't feel # don't know # dizzy or something like that
- @Eg: ei
- @Bg: da
- *NAR: però <bueno\> # la gent es va fer la foto a la cúpula\
but <bueno\> # people took a picture of themselves at the dome
- %dia: \$da
- %pra: \$FRA \$REC
- %syn: \$d:IN MN
- *NAR: i jo me la vaig fer no acostant-me gaire a la vora\
*and I had my picture taken not too close to the border\
 and <llavorens_\> # a l'hora de baixar #.*
- *NAR: i <llavorens_\> # a l'hora de baixar #.
and <llavorens_\> # when it was time to go down\#
- @Eg: da
-
- @Bg: da
- *NAR: però tot d'una # no m'havia passat mai.
but all of a sudden # it had never occurred to me before
- *NAR: vaig agafar com una mena de cosa.
I started feeling strange
- *NAR: el cor em va començar a bategar fort.
my heart started beating heavily
- *NAR: vaig començar a pensar.
I started to think

- *NAR: ai que caic.
I'm going to fall
- *NAR: ai que caic.
I'm going to fall
- *NAR: i vaig # <bueno_> # em vaig posar una mica_ #.
and I started getting # <bueno_> # a bit nervous_#
- *NAR: no vaig arribar a histerisme però una mica nerviosa_.
I wasn't hysterical but I was a bit nervous_
- %dia: \$da
- %pra: \$REF \$CLU
- %syn: \$d:IN MN
- *NAR: i sort que encara vaig tindre la sang freda_.
and luckily I still kept calm_
- *NAR: i vaig dir\
and said
- *NAR: ei # que algú vingui.
ei # I need for someone to come
- *NAR: que no sé què em passa.
I don't know what's going on
- *NAR: m'estic com marejant.
I'm feeling dizzy

.....
(NAR12 Rosa)

The above functions related to *bueno* are mostly found in the rhetorical narrative structure — comment-making, conclusion, and resumption — although there is also one belonging to the sequential — segment framing — and one to the ideational — reformulation. (112) exemplifies the most representative functions that *bueno* systematically performs, not only in oral narrative, but in oral speech in general.¹⁷¹

The first occurrence of the marker in (112) is found in an external evaluation, breaking the flow of the action. By means of it, Rosa introduces an external comment about the fact of taking pictures when travelling (“*bueno, és lo normal*”). It is, as many others, a polyfunctional *bueno* that serves to: (a) open up a new segment, (b) introduce extra information, and (c) make a concluding remark. The second occurrence that is found belongs to an action segment. Since there is an evaluation segment preceding it, Rosa uses the marker to regain the telling of the events; again, *bueno* is used to: (a) start a new segment, and (b) recover the broken train of thought. Finally, the third instance illustrates a concluding-reformulative *bueno*, two core functions of the marker that often appear intertwined.

Although most authors treat this marker in conversational genre, which implies different ritual constraints from those of a monologued discourse (for instance, turn-taking), it can be asserted that reformulation is a core pragmatic

function of *bueno*.¹⁷² Briz, for instance, treats reformulative *bueno* from different angles but always as a marker that helps the discourse progress, giving it continuity and making the negotiation process explicit (p.46); in his view, only a very special, or even forced, intonation would provide the utterance with such a particular meaning:

Vi a tus amigos en el bar / *bueno* me parecieron ellos.
I saw your friends at the pub / bueno I think it was them
 (?Vi a tus amigos en el bar me parecieron ellos)
 (?I saw your friends at the pub I think it was them)
 (Briz 1993a: 8)

Hence, according to Briz (1993b) reformulative *bueno* explains, attenuates, corrects, introduces a shift in topic or regains it after an interruption; if followed by adversative *pero*, it becomes a marker that initiates a concessive movement within the utterance. Sometimes, it acts as marker that paraphrases the preceding proposition (p. 46–47). As we see, some of the features that Briz attributes to *bueno* are found, in the approach that I propose, in between the rhetorical and ideational discourse structures. In fact, from Briz's proposal, I have only considered reformulative the units that paraphrase or correct the preceding proposition, in the ideational plane, considering the rest of functions illocutionary and therefore connected to the speaker's intentions.

But it is certainly true that reformulation is one of the most complex argumentative mechanisms, which presents serious difficulties when one tries to narrow it down.¹⁷³ The reason probably lies in the fact that the lexical units that facilitate this discourse operation have very distinct functional categories: reformulation is usually carried out by logico-semantic argumentative connectors with full referential meaning as, for instance, Catalan *és a dir*, but it can also be conducted by a pragmatic marker that has lost all its referential meaning to become a procedural facilitator of the speaker's intentions and thoughts, as is the case of the marker under analysis, *bueno*. Excerpt (113) illustrates a case of reformulation but also of evaluation, a pragmatic function linked, almost exclusively, to *bueno*, not to *bé*. Raimón, the narrator, has been explaining a journey to Birmania. After a long action segment comes his evaluation on the experience, followed by a closing-up coda. Note that it is framed by a concluding compound marker, a linguistic structure that will be commented on later in the chapter.

(113)

.....
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: va ser # una cosa molt_#.
it was # it was very_#

- *NAR: <bueno\> # va ser una una experiència molt forta <no/>. <bueno\> # it was a very serious experience <no/>.
- %dia: \$ev:IN
- %pra: \$REF \$EVA 2PRO 2CTX
- %syn: \$d:IN MN 2FN MN
- *NAR: primer perquè # perquè veus realment.
first of all because # because you realize
- *NAR: lo malament que estan allà.
their terrible situation
- *NAR: i després perquè després tú # a part de que et sens # molt estrany.
and then because then you # besides feeling # very strange
- *NAR: perquè vens d'un món ben diferent.
because you come from a very different world
- *NAR: i # a més # la meva dona que era metge i tot.
and # besides # my wife being a doctor and all
- *NAR: era una cosa # una situació bastant # bastant forta <no/>.
it was something # a situation that was quite # quite serious <no/>.
- @Eg: ei
- @Bg: c
- *NAR: i <bueno\ # pues_> això va ser una mica la història\.
and <bueno\ # pues_> that was pretty much the story
- %dia: \$co
- %pra: \$FRC \$CLU
- %syn: \$d:IN MN
- @Eg: c
- @End
- (NAR18 Raimón)

The use of *bueno* as a marker used by the speaker to introduce a personal remark or evaluation of a particular event within the storyworld has not been particularly stressed in the literature. In fact, it is one of the most important roles of the marker. Probably owing to the conversational text-genre traditionally used as corpus of analysis, many occurrences found in monologued narrative pieces have been analyzed simply as markers of 'continuity' (Cortés 1991: 105, Marsà 1992: 206) or 'fillers' (*expletivos*) (Cortés 1991: 112) when their real underlying function could be narrowed down if the structural traits of the text-genre in which they operate were taken into account. Let us see it, for example, in (114):

(114)

o sea / mis padres / antes de venir a vivir aquí / vivíamos en la calle del Besugo / que es esta otra que està aquí / como si fuera convergente con esta nuestra porque viene aquí // **bueno** / pues allí era donde mis padres hicieron la casa / que fue cuando mi padre se casó hace cuarenta y tres años/// (M-B-65) Cortés (1991: 105)
that is / my parents / before coming to live here / we lived on Besugo Street / which is

that other one over there / as if it ran into ours because it reaches here // bueno / so that was the place where my parents built the house / that was when my father got married forty-three years ago ///

According to Cortés, the above *bueno* is ‘continuative’ and appears after a speaker’s aside. But in narrative structural terms there is, I consider, a better explanation provided by the segmentation pattern (Labov 1972b) and linked to the key role that pragmatic markers have as segment-framing devices and shifters from one to another contextual realm or discourse structure. Consider, now, the above piece under this perspective:

> orientation (space, place, characters):

o sea / mis padres / antes de venir a vivir aquí / vivíamos en la calle del Besugo / que es esta otra que està aquí / como si fuera convergente con esta nuestra porque viene aquí //
that is / my parents / before coming to live here / we lived on Besugo Street / which is that other one over there / as if it ran into ours because it reaches here //

> complicating action:

bueno / pues allí era donde mis padres hicieron la casa / que fue cuando mi padre se casó hace cuarenta y tres años ///

bueno / so that was the place where my parents built the house / that was when my father got married forty-three years ago ///

pragmatic roles of *bueno*:

a. structural (in sequential discourse structure):

framing / opening up a new narrative segment (action)

b. illocutionary (in rhetorical discourse structure):

recovering the argumentative thread broken up by preceding orientation segment.

See now (115), an instance of *bueno* ‘*expletivo*’:

(115) *sí sí // y lo pasaba muy mal // pero bueno / las cosas son así y tú no puedes cambiarlas /*
// (H-A-25) Cortés (1991: 112)
yes yes // and he had a hard time // but bueno / things are like this and you cannot change them ///

Again, in narrative structural terms, this *bueno* gains significance and stops being a mere filler:

> complicating action:

sí sí // y lo pasaba muy mal //
yes yes // and he had a hard time

> external evaluation (the narrator provides extra information, external to the events).

pero **bueno** / las cosas son así y tú no puedes cambiarlas//
but bueno / things are like this and you cannot change them

pragmatic roles of *bueno*:

- a. structural (in sequential discourse structure):
 framing / opening up a new narrative segment (external evaluation).
- a. illocutionary (in rhetorical discourse structure):
 introducing a general comment that is considered relevant by the narrator.

The issue of co-text is important when trying to illustrate the performance of a pragmatic marker. In fact, although it is true that most studies on logico-semantic connectors use simple or complex sentences as examples, in the particular case of discourse markers there is a special need not only for wider co-text but also for text-genre specification. This is because of the intrinsic nature of these linguistic devices, operators that pop or push a previous or new constituent of the co-text (Polanyi 1988) and are intrinsically procedural in meaning. Hence, working with adjacency pairs which imply verbal answers from the interlocutor or, on the other hand, working with monologues whose listener is physically present but verbally patient implies that the researcher takes into account different ritual constraints and points of departure for the analysis. In conversational genre, factors such as agreements, disagreements, non-compliances, dispreferred responses, or the eagerness to hold the floor, for instance, will have to be considered. In contrast, in a monologued genre such as a narrative, textual factors such as structural traits, chunking or segmentation, and speaker's intentions will play a major role. I provided plausible explanations to texts (114) and (115) above, assuming that they were pieces of a longer narrative text.¹⁷⁴ As a means to summarize and compare findings discussed so far, I present Tables (26) and (27), where we can see the ruling functions of both markers and their major incidence in the narrative discourse structures.

Table 26. Incidence of *bé* in narrative discourse structure (N and %).

(*) reformulative (*\$ref*).

| IDEATIONAL STRUCTURE | PRAGMATIC STRUCTURE | | |
|------------------------------|---|---|--|
| | RHETORICAL STRUCTURE Illocutionary intentions | SEQUENTIAL STRUCTURE Structuring device | INFERENTIAL COMPONENT Inference facilitator/ restrictor |
| logico-semantic relations | | | |
| *3.8 % | 26.4% | 39.6% | 30.2% |
| 2 | 14 | 21 | 16 |

source: data taken from Table 24.

Table 27. Incidence of *bueno* in narrative discourse structure (N and %).
 (*) reformulative (*\$ref*).

| IDEATIONAL STRUCTURE | PRAGMATIC STRUCTURE | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| logico-semantic relations | RHETORICAL STRUCTURE | SEQUENTIAL STRUCTURE | INFERENTIAL COMPONENT |
| | Illocutionary intentions | Structuring device | Inference facilitator/ restrictor |
| *16.0% | 54.1 % | 22.3% | 7.6% |
| 25 | 85 | 35 | 12 |

source: data taken from Table 25.

The two tables above highlight the striking differences between the two Catalan markers reinforcing the evidence that, although variants of the same variable, they cannot be analyzed as one single marker.¹⁷⁵ Thus, figures show that *bueno* has a preponderant reformulative role, being used by the speaker much more often than *bé* when paraphrasing a previous proposition (16.0% versus 3.8%). Similarly, of the two markers, *bueno* is the one most often used to transmit intentions and thoughts (54.1% versus 26.4%). In contrast, *bé* has a core text-structuring function (39.6% versus 22.3%), being often used by the narrator to open a new narrative segment and initiate the complicating action stages. In addition, whenever the narrator has to anchor the interlocutor in the narrative world, in orientation segments mainly, *bé* is more profusely used than *bueno* (30.2% versus 7.6%).

These findings respond to the general expectations and more specific hypothesis that these two pragmatic markers are not interchangeable, but, rather, are used by the speaker with specific aims at specific parts of the narrative structure. Tables (24) and (25) above show that the use of *bueno* doubles the use of *bé* in evaluation units, whereas *bé* doubles the use of *bueno* in orientation segments. This is materialized through the rhetorical structure in the case of *bueno* (Table 27), and in the inferential component in the case of *bé* (Table 26).

The pragmatic meaning distinctiveness of *bé* and *bueno* we have seen so far is reinforced by prosodic and clause-distributional features that particularly affect this latter marker. Analysis of data showed that *bé* has a regular rise-fall intonation contour all through the narratives and that the twenty-seven occurrences are found, with the exception of three,¹⁷⁶ always at initial-main clause position. There is no evidence, therefore, of any particular marked intonation linked to a specific meaning since the falling contour and initial-clause position seems to be the norm. We can therefore affirm that *bé* is a *lefthand discourse bracket* that, because of its

falling nuclear tone, conveys assertiveness and completeness, a trait which becomes specially relevant if *bé* is compared to *bueno*.

Contrary to the systematicity of *bé*, the prosodic and distributional features of *bueno* prove that this marker has a marked prosody and clausal distribution that, on some occasions, affect its pragmatic meaning. Of the ninety three occurrences found in the narratives, 66.67% have a rise-fall nuclear tone, 31.18% are flat and only 2.15% have fall-rising contour. Whereas falling occurrences of *bueno* are polyfunctional and, similarly to *bé*, do not present any systematic trait, flat occurrences of *bueno* show certain particularities: more than half of the units are used to reformulate previous discourse and the majority of them are found in mid-clause position, be it main or subordinate.

See (116), for instance. It is the opening up of a story about a journey. The three occurrences of the marker found in this excerpt are used to reformulate previous discourse, in-between two clause fragments, in the first two cases, and in mid-main clause position, in the third.

(116)

-
- @Bg: otcS
- *NAR: recordo que fa uns quatre anys.
I remember about four years ago
- *NAR: vàrem anar dos amics meus que són reporters de televisió # <bueno_>
aquestes coses\ # a Marroc # a un viatge d'aquests amb furgoneta i que # i
que # <bueno_> # amb furgoneta_.
*I went with two friends of mine that are TV reporters # <bueno_>
that sort of thing\# to Morocco # to the sort of journey you do by van
and that # and that # <bueno_> # by van*
- %dia: \$or:TO CO SO
- %pra: \$REF 2DEL 2REF
- %syn: \$d:MD FM 2MD FM
- *NAR: i ells havien de fer una ruta.
and they had an itinerary
- *NAR: que # evidentment # era l'alternativa.
that was # obviously # alternative
- *NAR: perquè havien de gravar no sé què.
because they had to record I don't know what
- *NAR: per fer uns reportatges.
to do some programs
- *NAR: i van volguer fer algunes de les pistes que van a l'Atlas # <bueno_> unes
cascades i unes zones interiors de # de l'Atlas de de Marroc/.
*and they decided to take some of the roads that lead to the Atlas # <bueno_>
some waterfalls and interior zones of # of the Moroccan Atlas/*
- %dia: \$or:SO

| | |
|----------------|--|
| %pra: | \$REF |
| %syn: | \$d:MD MN |
| *NAR: | i vàrem triar una de les eh # possibles vies d'accés a un dels llacs. <i>and we chose one of the eh # possible routes to one of the lakes</i> |
| *NAR: | que eh # era la menys transitada # diguem-ho així. <i>that eh # was the least busy # let's say</i> |
| *NAR: | ah # érem dos nois i jo. <i>ah # there were two guys and I</i> |
| @Eg: | otcs |
| | |
| (NAR6 lourdes) | |

The analysis of data resulted into 76% of *bueno* that are clause-initial and polyfunctional, but (116) is a token of the remaining 24%, with a monofunctional and a distributional regularity that is worth taking into consideration. Moreover, although the norm seems to be main clause position, contrary to what occurs with *bé*, *bueno* is often found in subordinate clauses too. A plausible interpretation of the prosodic and clause-distributional variation of *bueno* can be its intrinsic pragmatic richness in both illocutionary and structural terms. We have seen that *bé* is used by the narrator much less often and for very specific purposes: Table (26) showed that the functions that *bé* carries out most often are grouped in the sequential narrative structure (39.6%) and in the inferential component (30.2%); *bueno*, on the other hand, appears to be polyhedral in meaning: as Table (27) shows, more than half of its uses (54.1%) are related to speaker's intentional state. It can therefore be concluded that there is a functional specialization in both markers.

In sum, *bé* and *bueno* are two Catalan markers that have a key role in narrative structure. *Bé* conforms to the standard norm of the language; *bueno* is a Spanish borrowing widely spread among Catalan speakers. They are two variants of the same variable but with very differentiated discourse uses. In the narrative, *bé* is mainly used at the beginning of the story, in orientation segments, when introducing characters, place, time, and setting, to cognitively anchor the interlocutor in the world of the narrative. It is also frequently used afterwards, during the telling of events, in the sequential structure, to open a new discourse segment or quoted material. Finally, its role as transmitter of the narrator's intentions, ideas, and thoughts is barely significant. The parcelling out of discourse tasks in the narrative is completed by *bueno*, a marker that has proved to have a preponderant role in the stories of personal experiences, where the teller has to convey the point of the story and fully convince his/her interlocutor that it is worth listening to. Contrary to what occurs with *bé*, *bueno* is often used by the narrator to reformulate an idea, to add, clarify, or introduce a concluding remark to the previous proposition. It is equally useful when there is a need for emphasis or evidence, or when the narrator tries to

regain the argumentative thread broken up by a previous segment. Finally, it is a rich evaluative device profusely present in internal evaluation segments, the subjective peak of the narrative, where there is maximum exposure of the inner-self. The findings partly confirm the hypothesis about *bé* and *bueno*, the former being used for more objective and text-structural purposes, and the latter for more illocutionary related and subjective aims. There is, however, an unexpected finding about *bueno* that was not hypothesized, related to a structural matter: the narrator often makes use of it to frame a narrative segment, a task which was believed to be exclusively undertaken by *bé*. As for prosodic and distributional features, *bé* is practically always found at clause-initial position, as *lefthand discourse bracket*, uttered with a rise-fall nuclear tone. It does not show any marked prosody or syntactic distribution linked to a specific pragmatic meaning. Such regularity does not occur with *bueno*, a marker that appears at initial, mid and final position in the clause, in main and, to a lesser extent, subordinate clauses. This distribution becomes relevant in relation to prosody: although the norm seems to be rise-fall intonation contour, there is a significant portion of *bueno* that are uttered flat. The majority of these are found in clause-internal position and are used to reformulate previous discourse. There is therefore a relationship between prosody, syntactic distribution, and pragmatic meaning that is worth taking into consideration.

6.1.2 *Clar*: evidence, evaluation and inference

We know that speakers make a widespread use of pragmatic markers in oral discourse. However, as suggested in previous pages, this use is not random, that is, free in terms of distribution within the text, but constrained by genre and context structural traits. In the particular case of oral narratives of personal experience, there is a marked tendency towards the use of one or other pragmatic marker depending on the stage of the narrative. In this respect, the semantics of the unit which acts as marker undoubtedly plays a major role in this distribution since the speaker tends to use the marker that best transmits his/her intentions in a given discourse segment. This is particularly true in the case of *clar*, a discourse marker that, because of its semantic value, is expected to be mostly found in evaluation units, a part of the narrative where the narrator's point is more overtly shown and where s/he tries to keep close to the listener.

Clar is an adjective that means clear, light and bright (like in 'The clear white morning light...'),¹⁷⁷ the opposite of dull or obscure. When it is applied to spontaneous oral speech, the figurative meaning it carries along is, therefore, that what has been, or is about to be, uttered is clear and evident to the speaker and, what is more relevant, to the interlocutor. In a monologued discourse, as is the case with an oral narrative, the speaker makes use of it to: a) emphasize the clarity of his/her words

and/or b) to convey the idea that what is being said is easy to understand and follow. This refers not only to the straightforward overt meaning but also to the possible implicit content in the message. Fuentes (1993b) also stresses the evaluative value of *clar* and points at its role as support marker of an assertion (p.105). See an example of it in (117). Pepa, the narrator, is telling about a girlfriend's experience with a group of guys that she encountered one night that she went out to a pub. She left the place with them and found herself in a difficult situation.

- (117)
- *NAR: i # i ella va marxar.
and # and she left
- *NAR: va marxar amb ells sola # aquesta noia amb set o vuit nois.
she left with them all by herself # that girl and seven or eight guys
- *NAR: gitanos eren.
gypsies they were
- *NAR: i <llavors_> ah # es veu que per l'autovia/
and <llavors_> ah # apparently on the motorway/
- *NAR: que va de Barcelona a Castelldefels/ # mmm.
that goes from Barcelona to Castelldefels/ # mmm
- *NAR: la cosa es va començar a desmadrar una mica <no/>.
the whole thing started getting out of control a bit <no/>.
- %dia: \$or:PO
- %pra: \$SEQ \$EVI 2PRO 2CTX
- %syn: \$d:IN MN 2FN MN
- *NAR: i # es veu que anava un.
and # apparently there was one
- *NAR: que era # fadrí.
that was a # bachelor
- *NAR: no estava casat.
he wasn't married
- *NAR: i es veu que volien.
and it seems that they wanted
- *NAR: que s'enrotllés # <bueno_> # que s'enrotllés amb ell <no/>.
her to have an affair # <bueno_> # to have an affair with him <no/>.
- %dia: \$da
- %pra: \$CLA 2PRO 2CTX
- %syn: \$d:MD SB 2FN SB
- @Eg: da/opt
- @Bg: ei
- *NAR: <clar/> # la cosa es va començar a posar tensa/
<clar/> # the whole thing started getting tense
- %dia: \$ev:IN
- %pra: \$FRA \$EVA \$PRE
- %syn: \$d:IN MN

- @Eg: ei
 @Bg: da/op
 *NAR: em sembla que em va explicar.
 I think she explained to me
 *NAR: que un li va pegar una galtada.
 that one of them hit her on the face
 *NAR: ella es va posar a xillar.
 she started screaming
 *NAR: i al final la van deixar tirada allà a l'autovia.
 and they finally left her abandoned on the motorway
 @Eg: da/op

 (NAR10 Pepa)

When telling the story, Pepa takes it for granted that her interlocutor knows the possible consequences of her girlfriend's behaviour, leaving a pub and getting into a car with a group of boys that she has just met. Thus, Pepa assumes that her interlocutor knows why 'the situation was tense', since she has just provided all the necessary elements to make it evident. The marker does not only reinforce the assertion¹⁷⁸ but also facilitates the accessibility to all possible inferences of the message. Fuentes (1993b) highlights the expressive and presuppositional nature of *claro*. By using it, the speaker assumes that what has been said — or is about to be said — is something logical and normal to anyone (p.99) and that there is no doubt about the truthfulness of the message; there is, behind it, an 'evident' shared knowledge that the speaker takes for granted.

In no part of the oral narrative is there so much implied content as in the evaluation units and, of all the markers analyzed, *clar* is the one most often used by the narrator to transmit it. Table (21) showed that 60.7% of all occurrences of *clar* are found in evaluation (35.7% in internal and 25.0% in external). An evident process of grammaticalization has made it possible for a lexical unit that originally had the category of adjective to work, in spontaneous oral speech, as a *modalisateur d'enonciation* (Fuentes 1993b) or sentence adverb that, with a free syntactic distribution within the clause, allows the speaker to express a personal attitude (Cuenca 2002: 3224; Martín Zorraquino 1993: 471).¹⁷⁹ Out of the 28 occurrences of *clar* found in the narratives analyzed, 10 present the form <és clar>. The results of the analysis showed that, functionally speaking, both forms (*clar* and *és clar*) have the same value. In Table (28) we can see the distribution of pragmatic functions of *clar*. Notice that the weight falls mostly on internal evaluation, followed by external and action units.

Table 28. Distribution of pragmatic functions of *clar* in Catalan narrative (N and %).

| | | CLAR | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|--------|------|-------|
| <i>coherence relations</i> | <i>functions</i> | ABSTR. | ORIENT. | ACTION | I.EVAL. | E.EVAL. | RESULT | CODA | total |
| Ideational Structure | CON | | | | | | | | |
| | REF | | | | | | | | |
| | SEQ | | | | | | | | |
| Rhetorical Structure | ADD | | | | | | | | |
| | CLA | | | | | | | | |
| | CLU | | | | | | | | |
| | COM | | | | 1 | 2 | | | 3 |
| | DEL | | | | | | | | |
| | EMP | | | 1 | 1 | | | | 2 |
| | EVA | | | | 9 | 1 | | | 10 |
| | EVI | | 1 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | | 19 |
| REC | | | | | | | | | |
| TOP | | | | | | | | | |
| Sequential Structure | DSP | | | | | | | | |
| | FRA | | | | 4 | 6 | | | 10 |
| | FRC | | | | | | | | |
| | INI | | | | | | | | |
| Inferential Component | CTX | | | 1 | 1 | | | | 2 |
| | JUS | | | | 4 | 2 | | | 6 |
| | MIT | | | | | | | | |
| | PRE | | 1 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 2 | | 19 |
| | PRO | | | | | | | | |
| | SIT | | | | | | | | |
| total | N | | | | | | | | |
| | % | | 2 | 13 | 31 | 20 | 5 | | 71 |
| | | 2.8% | 18.3% | 43.7% | 28.2% | 7.0% | | | |
| | | | | | 71.9% | | | | |

Key to pragmatic functions coding: see Appendix 2.

The above findings stress the core evaluative role of the marker and show that the narrator uses it frequently to both highlight the illocutionary force of the utterance (works as evidential), and introduce what is assumed to be common ground shared with the listener. An interesting point to consider is the coincidence of both functions — evidential (EVI) and presuppositional (PRE) — within the same marker. This is illustrated in (118). Eva is giving an account of a tense situation that she went through when two boys robbed her and her girlfriend in the middle of the street. After a long complicating action segment where she tells the events, she stops

%dia: \$re
 %pra: \$FRA \$CTX \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN

.....

(NAR9 Eva)

When Eva says that the boy got very nervous and then, by means of *clar*, claims that she got even more nervous than him, she is in fact saying: (a) “*of course*, I got even more nervous than him,” (b) “you can imagine what a situation like this is, so *it is normal* that I got even more nervous than him” and (c) “*due to his nervousness*, I got even more nervous than him.” Hence, in (a) Eva is evidencing a fact; in (b) Eva assumes or presupposes that her interlocutor knows what a situation like that must be like; and in (c) she establishes a sort of cause-consequence relationship between the two propositions, a function that has been pointed out by Fuentes (1993b: 114) and Cortés (1991: 66) for Spanish *claro*, though in this particular case I would not talk about a logico-semantic relationship but a function that is closely linked to the presuppositional value of the marker (b and c closely related): “if you know what a situation like this is like — and I assume that you do — you will understand that I got more nervous than him” (afraid of being attacked suddenly, due to his nervousness).

Fuentes’s (1993b) position about this point is illustrated in the example that she provides (p.115): “pagas por adelantado y entonces, *claro*, pues te obliga a ir” (you pay in advance and then, *claro*, you’re obliged to go”). As she points out, the cause-consequence relationship is set up by *entonces* (then); if we omit it, the relationship is not as clear (“pagas por adelantado; te obliga a ir” — “you pay in advance; you’re obliged to go”). But, according to Fuentes, *claro* introduces “a logical sequence” where the causative relation is established because of the evidential function of the marker (p.115). Although this might be true in some cases, the rule does not always apply. See, for instance, the following sentence, in Spanish: “Después de cenar fuimos a la discoteca. *Claro*, ellos son jóvenes pero yo hubiese preferido irme a casa” (“After dinner we went to the discotheque. *Claro*, they are young but I’d rather have gone home”). In this sentence, the relationship set up by *claro* is not logical since there is not a direct cause-consequence relation between the preceding and following propositions, but rather a speaker’s invitation to the listener to open up a range of possible inferences (it is shared knowledge that, in general, young people like going to discos, whereas adults prefer a more quiet life; young people are more energetic than adults; young people like disco music, etc.). The conclusion I would draw is that, whenever there is a cause-consequence relation, as in Fuentes’s example (“pagas por adelantado. *Claro*, te obliga a ir”), it cannot be taken as logico-semantic but rather as one that stems from the underlying inferential meaning of the marker. In fact, Fuentes seems to share this view when she claims:

“El caso más abundante es el de la conexión causativa, ya sea en la dirección de la causa o la consecuencia. Esa conexión se establece entre los contenidos de los dos enunciados, podría objetársele. Pero *claro* la muestra, debido al valor presuposicional que lleva en su contenido. Este elemento (...) convoca los presupuestos de la comunidad lingüística ya que lo dicho por él corresponde a una conexión lógica y normal para todo hablante de esa lengua. De ahí que al apoyar dos enunciados con *claro* se refuerza la conexión causativa entre ellos.” (1993b: 114)

“The commonest case is that of a causal connection, be it in the direction of the cause or of the consequence. This connection is established between the contents of the two utterances, one could object. But, it is *claro* which demonstrates it, due to its presuppositional value. [*claro*] (...) calls upon the presuppositions of the linguistic community since what it conveys to a speaker of that language corresponds to a normal and logical connection. That is why the use of *claro* to connect two utterances results in the reinforcement of the causal connection between them.”

There is still another significant function of *clar* that has to do with a text structural feature which has been rather overlooked in the bibliography. I am referring to the segment-opening framing function, quite significant in frequency terms (see Table 28). Although Cortés (1991) and Fuentes (1993b) treat segment-boundary occurrences, they do it without taking into consideration text-genre and structure, concentrating, only, on their rhetorical pragmatic function(s). See (119), excerpt taken from the corpus of narratives. Jordi, the narrator, is telling his brother's experience on a train, in France; he was robbed and did not have any personal identification or money with him, so he had problems crossing the border.

(119)

.....

*NAR: <bueno_> # va pujar un # el seu amic fins a la frontera/.
<bueno_> # a friend of his got on the train to the border/

%dia: \$re

%pra: \$REF

%syn: \$d:IN MN

*NAR: i # ara no recordo_.
and # now I don't remember_

*NAR: si ell va aconseguir baixar amb auto-stop fins a la frontera/.
if he managed to go down hitchhiking to the border

@Eg: r

@Bg: ee/i

*NAR: perquè # <clar\> # no podia travessar sense el DNI ni res <no/>.
because # <clar\> # he couldn't cross without at least his
identification card <no/>.

%dia: \$ev:EX

- %pra: \$FRA \$EVI \$PRE 2PRO 2CTX
 %syn: \$d:IN SB 2FN SB
 *NAR: i # <bueno\> # el que passa és que no recordo massa bé els detalls <no/>.
 and # <bueno\> # the point is that I don't quite remember the details <no/>.
- %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$COM 2PRO 2CTX
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: ee/i
 @Bg: r
 *NAR: però el cas és.
 but the thing is
 *NAR: que # <bueno\> # ho van resoldre d'aquesta manera <no/>.
 that # <bueno\> # they solved it this way <no/>.
- %dia: \$re
 %pra: \$FRA \$REC 2PRO 2CTX
 %syn: \$d:IN SB 2FN SB

 (NAR20 Jordi)

The excerpt belongs to the end of the narrative. Jordi is telling the result of the experience when he suddenly interrupts it to introduce an external and internal evaluation; then, he goes on. There are three functions attached to the *clar* that opens up this segment, one structural (FRA: framing), one rhetorical (EVI: evidential) and one inferential (PRE: presupposition). Cortés (1991: 70) refers to these instances as 'supportive', especially when being preceded by a causal *because*. He illustrates it with the following example:

- (120) *y pienso que muy bien / porque claro / ehhh / los farmacéuticos no ganamos bastante para no tener pluriempleo//*
and I think: very well / porque claro / ehhh/ we, the chemists, don't make enough money with just one job//
 (Cortés 1991: 71)

although it is true that, by means of the marker, the speaker reinforces and supports the previous proposition, there is a factor that is specially relevant in (120). It is the fact that the occurrence is found in a monologued discourse,¹⁸⁰ an oral narrative to be more exact. Although there should be a larger linguistic contextualization of the marker, it is quite clear that the excerpt belongs to a personal account that, following the narrative's pattern, can be segmented into two parts:

- a. an internal evaluation segment related to the events taking place:
y pienso que muy bien
and I think: very well

- b. an external evaluation segment that adds extra information (i.e. not directly related to the events being told) considered relevant by the speaker:

porque claro / ehhh / los farmacéuticos no ganamos bastante para no tener pluriempleo.

porque claro / ehhh/ *we, the chemists, don't make enough money with just one job*

The segment-boundary role undertaken by the marker is clear in (119) and (120), the only difference being that in the latter case there should be more contextualization. Fuentes (1993b) goes a step further when she suggests that the role of *claro* after a connector (be it consecutive, like *porque*, or adversative, like *pero*) is not only that of supporting the propositional value of the preceding unit; there is also the speaker's willingness to stop and reflect about what has been said (p.113). In fact, my findings agree with Fuentes's remark on the segment delimiting function of this marker: a change of narrative segment involves the narrator's cognitive shift to a different contextual realm and this is only possible through the use of a lexical unit that facilitates such a procedural task. Moreover, going back to the use of *clar* in consecutive constructions, the analysis of data showed that such shifting is often signalled by the use of the marker preceded by a conjunction (usually *perquè*, but also *però* and *i*), which makes us reflect on the possibility of considering *clar* a parenthetical connector: it is a grammaticalized form that usually follows a conjunction, it has an appositive character and, going through a semanticopragmatic change, has evolved from a referential to a more procedural meaning (cf. Cuenca 2000a and 2002). Although Cortés (1991) also provides a description of this grammatical construction (*claro* preceded by *porque*, *pues* and *y*), he does not attach any specific pragmatic value to it and refers to such occurrences as *expletivos* (p.71).

Contrary to what is suggested by some authors about the 'empty' use of *clar* (Cortés 1991: 71, Fuentes 1993b: 119), after the data analysis I can conclude that there is always a pragmatic function attached to the marker directly related to the rhetorical and/or sequential discourse structure, and/or to the inferential component. The results of such findings are shown in Table (29):

Table 29. Incidence of *clar* in narrative discourse structur (N and %).

| IDEATIONAL STRUCTURE | PRAGMATIC STRUCTURE | | |
|------------------------------|---|---|--|
| | RHETORICAL STRUCTURE Illocutionary intentions | SEQUENTIAL STRUCTURE Structuring device | INFERENTIAL COMPONENT Inference facilitator/ restrictor |
| logico-semantic relations | | | |
| – | 47.9 % 34 | 14.1% 10 | 38.0% 27 |

source: data taken from Table 28.

More than any pragmatic marker analyzed so far, *clar* has a key role as a marker that facilitates and restricts the possible inferences made by the listener. Thus the narrator often makes use of it to justify, constrain or introduce presuppositions that are necessary for the full understanding of the account. At the same time that the narrator does so, there is also an aim to emphasize or evaluate a fact, both of which are functions that are to be found in the rhetorical structure of the narrative.

The only structural function of *clar* is the framing of a new segment. Although data in Table (29) reveal that this latter function is the lowest in terms of frequency, it is, qualitatively speaking, highly significant because it often provides the answer to the aforementioned cases of ‘empty’ instances (i.e. *expletivos*). See it in the following excerpt (121) taken from Fuentes (1993b: 119). Similarly to what occurred with Cortés’s example (120), there is a plausible explanation that can be found in the structural organization of the text. Fuentes considers the marker a *filler* and a mere support used by the speaker to continue the discourse:

(121)

“Pero en las Carmelitas, como éramos mellizas y nos parecíamos una barbaridad, con nuestro cuellecito blanco almidonado, nuestra corbatita, pues, éramos las mismas, iguales. Y yo era muy mala estudiante, desde luego, y Pepi valía un poco más, valía, vamos. Y, **claro**, como yo... no sé si aquel día, o tenía malas notas o estaba más revoltosa o lo que sea, que me castigaron a mí, pero al ir ...íbamos en fila e iban señalando a las que estaban castigadas, que teníamos una hora más de estudio, y en vez de cogermé a mí, que era la que hice la falta, pues, cogió a Pepi” (M2H3, 286–7). (Fuentes 1993b: 119)

“But in the Carmelitas, because we were twins and we were very much alike, with our small white starched collars, our small ties, we were the same, identical. And I should say that I was a very bad student, and Pepi was a bit better, she was better, really. And, claro, because I I don’t know if that day, I either had bad grades or I was more mischievous or I don’t know what, I was punished, but when we went we went in single file and they were pointing at those that were punished and thus had one more hour of studying to do, instead of pointing at me, who was the mischievous one, they pointed at Pepi”

Again, we are dealing with a monologued oral narrative that presents different parts. The narrator is telling her personal experience at school, that she attended together with her twin-sister. In the middle of the account (complicating action), she uses *claro* to regain the argumentative thread that has been broken up by an in-between external evaluation. So the possible segments to be made are:

a. complicating action (includes description):

“Pero en las Carmelitas, como éramos mellizas y nos parecíamos una barbaridad, con nuestro cuellecito blanco almidonado, nuestra corbatita, pues, éramos las mismas, iguales. *“But in the Carmelitas, because we were twins and we were very much alike, with our small white starched collars, our small ties, we were the same, identical.*

b. external evaluation (adds information that she considers important):

Y yo era muy mala estudiante, desde luego, y Pepi valía un poco más, valía, vamos.

And I should say that I was a very bad student, and Pepi was a bit better, she was better, really.

c. complicating action (regains argumentative thread):

Y, **claro**, como yo... no sé si aquel día, o tenía malas notas o estaba más revoltosa o lo que sea, que me castigaron a mí, pero al ir ...íbamos en fila e iban señalando a las que estaban castigadas, que teníamos una hora más de estudio, y en vez de cogermé a mí, que era la que hice la falta, pues, cogió a Pepi."

And, claro, because I I don't know if that day, I either had bad grades or I was more mischievous or I don't know what, I was punished, but when we went we went in single file and they were pointing at those that were punished and thus had one more hour of studying to do, instead of pointing at me, who was the mischievous one, they pointed at Pepi"

Certainly, the narrator does not only use *claro* to regain the thread of the account. She takes it for granted (that is, she presupposes) that the listener knows that twin-sisters are very much alike and that it is normal that her sister was caught instead of her. So the aim is not only that of structuring her discourse but also to share with the interlocutor the same cognitive realm. A similar case occurs in (122):

(122)

"Se lleva algunas veces la comida para allá, otras veces se la prepara allí. **Claro**, como tiene la cocina, es un piso amueblado, vamos, que lo han alquilado entero, **claro**, pues, tiene todas las cosas, los utensilios y todo" (M1H4, 100). (Fuentes 1993: 119)

"they sometimes take lunch home, other times they make it there. Claro, since it has a kitchen, it is a furnished apartment, they've rented it furnished, claro, it has everything, all the kitchen utensils and everything"

Besides pointing at the 'continuative' role of both occurrences of *claro*, in (122) Fuentes focuses on the second marker and suggests that its role is referential in relation to the former (p.119). My proposal is that whereas the former occurrence of *claro* has a clear segment-boundary function, opening an external evaluation, the second is highly inferential since it shares with the interlocutor a common ground: we all know that a furnished apartment has everything in it. Thus the segmentation would be as follows:

a. complicating action:

"Se lleva algunas veces la comida para allá, otras veces se la prepara allí.

"they sometimes take lunch home, other times they make it there

b. external evaluation:

Claro, como tiene la cocina, es un piso amueblado, vamos, que lo han alquilado entero, **claro**, pues, tiene todas las cosas, los utensilios y todo"

Claro, since it has a kitchen, it is a furnished apartment, they've rented it furnished, claro, it has everything, all the kitchen utensils and everything"

first *claro*: framing function (segment-boundary)

second *claro*: presuppositional function (shared knowledge)

The texts above tell us about the necessity to provide enough co-text to be able to identify the pragmatic function(s) (inferential, rhetorical and/or structural) of a marker. This is essential not only when dealing with discourse segments but also with larger pieces of texts. In the particular case of *clar*, it was observed that its frequency of appearance was higher in mid-narrative segments when, after having started the telling of events, the narrator evaluates or stresses a particular fact or event. Having a broad picture of the skeleton of the text allows us to see not only the clausal but also segmental distribution of a given marker. See, for instance, (123), Anna's telling of a journey to Mexico. After several uses of *bé*, a marker that, as we have seen, helps the narrator anchor the listener in the narrative world and build up the text, comes a repeated use of *<és clar>*, in action and evaluation segments; both occur at the climax of the story, when the illocutionary force is at its peak.

(123)

.....
 @Bg: da/ocs
 *NAR: i el camió de davant nostre va frenar.
and the lorry in front of us stopped
 *NAR: va passar el bum aquell.
it went over that bump
 *NAR: i # el # a veure # va passar les rodes de davant.
and # the # let's see # the front wheels crossed it
 *NAR: i quan estava a punt ja de de passar tot el camió.
and when the lorry had almost gone over
 *NAR: i ja només li quedava la part del darrera.
and there was only the back part left
 *NAR: en lloc de tirar endavant # va recular.
instead of driving forward # it went backwards
 *NAR: <és clar\> # nosaltres estàvem al cotxe # a darrera/.
 <és clar\> # we were in the car # behind it/
 %dia: \$or:SO CO
 %pra: \$EVI \$PRE
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: i # de cop i volta # el veiem que comença a recular.
and # all of a sudden # we see it move backwards
 *NAR: i # <és clar/># allò que has de buscar el el # la bocina.
and # <és clar/># the thing is that you have to look for the the # horn

- *NAR: a veure com pitaràs <no/>. *see how you manage to sound the horn*
- *NAR: per atura'l d'alguna manera. *to stop it some way or another*
- %dia: \$da
- %pra: \$PRE 2PRO 2CTX
- %syn: \$d:IN MN 2FN SB
- *NAR: i el tio no ens va veure. *and the guy didn't see us*
- *NAR: i # ens va picar <no/>. *and # he hit us <no/>.*
- %dia: \$da
- %pra: \$PRO \$CTX
- %syn: \$d:FN MN
- @Eg: da/ocs
- @Bg: ee
- *NAR: i <clar\ # o sigui_> # la situació de perill era aquesta <no/>. *and <clar\ # o sigui_> # that was the situation of danger <no/>.*
- %dia: \$ev:EX
- %pra: \$FRA \$EVI \$CTX \$COM 2PRO 2CTX
- %syn: \$d:IN MN 2FN MN
- *NAR: que et veus allà assegut. *that you see yourself sitting there*
- *NAR: i és com en els # els mals sons aquells de pel·lícula <no/>. *and it's like those # those nightmares in films <no/>.*
- %dia: \$ev:EX
- %pra: \$PRO \$CTX
- %syn: \$d:FN MN
- *NAR: que veus el camió que recula cap a tu. *that you see the lorry moving backwards towards you*
- *NAR: i # a més # es inexplicable que recules <no/>. *and # besides # it's inexplicable that it went backwards <no/>.*
- %dia: \$ev:EX
- %pra: \$PRO \$CTX
- %syn: \$d:FN MN
- @Eg: ee

.....

(NAR4 Anna)

The reason for finding a higher number of occurrences in mid-story segments that correspond to the climax probably lies in the core evaluative and highly subjective meaning of the marker. As Fuentes suggests, “Claro aporta su contenido evaluativo y de pedir la colaboración del oyente, su complicidad, el que comparta sus mismas ideas, y se mueva en el mismo universo nocional, cognitivo, del discurso.”

(1993b: 117). (“*Claro* conveys its evaluative content, and that of asking people for collaboration, their complicity, calling upon them to share the speakers’s ideas, and that the interlocutor moves in the same notional and cognitive discourse universe.”) What we have is therefore a highly marked affective marker that, more than any other pragmatic marker analyzed, facilitates the transmission of the speaker’s cognitive and emotional state. This is shown by the concentration of occurrences and functions in evaluative segments (see Table 21 and Table 28).

The free mobility of the marker within the clause responds to its disjunctive or appositional character (Fuentes 1993b: 122, Cuenca 2002: 3224), although the norm in the narratives analyzed is at initial-clause position (dependent and independent) followed by a pause. Present data indicate that *clar* is, therefore, a *lefthand discourse bracket* that the narrator uses to introduce an evaluation, a shared universe of beliefs, an evidence or a presupposition.

The prosody of the marker presents interesting variations: 10.7% of occurrences have a flat intonation contour, 67.9% a fall-rise, and 21.4% a rise-fall. However, no special correlation between intonation contour and semantico-pragmatic meaning was observed, or between intonation and the presence of certain connectors (adversative, consecutive, and coordinating conjunctions) preceding *clar*. There is a plausible reason that may help explain the higher number of fall-rise *clar* based on the pragmatic use that the narrator makes of it. Since it is a basic evaluative and evidencing marker used at the peak of the telling of events, the speaker utters it with a rising intonation trying to transmit all the illocutionary force (i.e. emotion, subjectivity, danger, in this particular case of oral narrative) that the story requires.

In sum, we have seen that *clar* in narratives is used as a pragmatic marker embedded within the narrator’s discourse in action and, to a larger extent, evaluation segments. The descriptive value of *clar* makes it a perfect linguistic tool for the speaker who wants to convey assertion and make a fact evident. At the same time, its core evaluative and highly subjective character facilitates the sharing of common ground and knowledge. This means that *clar* is a useful resource often used by the speaker to help the listener process presuppositions. Such findings respond to the expectations about *clar*, with a straightforward influence of its descriptive content on its pragmatic value. Besides working in the rhetorical and inferential discourse levels, *clar* has a significant role in the sequential narrative structure as segment-boundary frame, opening up internal and external evaluation segments mainly, where it is profusely found. This may help explain certain uses of the marker that have often been labelled as ‘continuative’ or ‘empty’ (i.e. fillers); we have seen that, in oral narratives, this function is rarely the case and that there is always a structural, illocutionary or cognitive aim behind it. In addition, the structural role of *clar* becomes more evident when the narrative is viewed as a whole since the marker is

mainly found in mid-narrative segments, when the story is at its peak or climax. An analysis of the syntactic distribution of the marker shows that *clar* behaves, almost exclusively, as a *lefthand discourse bracket*, that is, at clause-initial position. Although there is a tendency to utter the marker with a fall-rise intonation contour, there is prosodic variation, with instances of falling and flat nuclear tones; however, there is not a direct relationship between a given tone and a pragmatic meaning. A plausible reason for the generalized rising tone is the speaker's purpose when using the marker: to highlight, evidence, and share common ground with the interlocutor.

6.1.3 *Doncs* and *pues*: conclusion, resumption, and segment frame

Speakers do not always adjust their speech to the standard norms of the language. This is particularly true in language contact situations, as is the case of Catalan and Spanish. In previous sections we have seen that the Catalan colloquial register has a variety of foreign linguistic elements that come from the closest language with which it is in contact, that is, Spanish (Payrató 1988: 151). The use of *pues* in colloquial Catalan responds therefore to a language contact phenomenon. Hence, similarly to what occurred with *bé* and *bueno*, discussed in previous sections, the Catalan standard accepted form, *doncs*, is used together with the linguistic borrowing or transfer from Spanish, *pues*. Sometimes, the two forms are used indistinctly within the same narrative; in other cases, there is only one use, yet they can be considered as two variants of the same variable. In contrast with Spanish *bueno*, the transferring of *pues* does not adapt to the Catalan morphophonetic system (Payrató 1988: 152, Espuny 1998: 280) since the two lexical units are phonetically distant. As we will see later on, the borrowing is basically semantic-pragmatic.

Some sociolinguistic studies have shown that the use of *pues* is especially significant in Spanish-Catalan language contact situations and when the speaker has not had any formal instruction in Catalan language arts; there is also a tendency to use the non-standard form when the speech situation is informal and relaxed,¹⁸¹ which coincides with narrative elicitation (in the sociolinguistic interview, after a while, no attention to speech is paid). Note that, on similar argumentative lines, Vila's (1998) and Espuny's (1998) empirical analysis concluded that, whenever there is a lexical transfer, this is not necessarily related to functional variation (in terms of field, mode, tenor and tone) but to an aim to use it with a specific purpose that is dependent on the context of use and on the users. This is especially true in the pairing *doncs* and *pues* since, according to present findings, whereas *doncs* is mostly present in action units, *pues* is significant in evaluative units.

In the following pages it will be seen that the difference between the use of the standard versus the non-standard form lies, almost exclusively, in the speaker's purpose — whether the narrator is presenting the development of the events or is

making a personal comment on them — and that function distinctiveness between the two forms is barely significant. In addition, there is a quantitative factor to be taken into account when drawing conclusions. In the narratives analyzed there is a widespread use of *doncs*, the standard form, in front of a much lower presence of the Spanish form, *pues* (77.4% versus 22.6%), just the opposite of the pair of markers *bé* and *bueno* (see Table 30), where the use of the non-standard form (*bueno*) widely exceeded the standard (*bé*). Table (30) shows the cooccurrence of *doncs* and *pues* in the narratives analyzed.

Table 30. Cooccurrence of *doncs* and *pues* in Catalan oral narratives. Distribution of compound pragmatic markers (CPM) in narratives.

| <i>narratives</i> | DONCS | PUES | [CPM] |
|-------------------|--------------|-------------|-------------------|
| 1 | 3 | – | |
| 2 | 8 | – | |
| 3 | 1 | – | |
| 4 | 10 | – | <doncs bé> |
| 5 | 2 | – | |
| 6 | 1 | – | |
| 7 | 1 | 1 | |
| 8 | 1 | – | <doncs res> |
| 9 | 1 | – | |
| 10 | 1 | – | |
| 11 | – | 2 | |
| 12 | 2 | – | |
| 13 | 1 | – | |
| 14 | – | 3 | |
| 15 | 4 | – | |
| 16 | 3 | – | <doncs res doncs> |
| 17 | 1 | – | |
| 18 | 2 | 2 | |
| 19 | 4 | 6 | <pues és clar> |
| 20 | 2 | – | <doncs mira> |
| Total | 48 | 14 | |
| | 77.4% | 22.6% | |

According to the above data, there are only five narratives where *pues* is used and, of these, in only three there is linguistic variation, that is, the speaker uses both forms within the same piece of speech. The following excerpt (124) illustrates the above argumentation about the lack of function distinctiveness between *doncs* and *pues*. The two units bear a core concluding role that comes from their full lexical meaning. Joan, the narrator, does not make any distinction in their use. He is explaining one of his first driving experiences with a friend little after he had got his driving license. The two forms are found in a long complicating action section.

(124)

@Bg: da

*NAR: i # eh # <bueno\> # el # la finestra de la dreta # que és la finestra del
acompanyant per tant # se li va obrir\
*and # eh # <bueno\> # the # the window on the right # that is the window of
the passenger's side # opened*

%dia: \$da

%pra: \$FRA \$INI

%syn: \$d:IN MN

*NAR: ah # perquè era d'aquestes correderes\
ah # because it was a sliding one

*NAR: no baixava_
it didn't go down_

*NAR: sinó que corria cap a un lateral\
it only slided sideways

*NAR: i <doncs_> no # <bueno\> # no la sabia tancar\
and <doncs_> she didn't # <bueno\> # she didn't know how to shut it

%dia: \$da

%pra: \$CLU 2DEL

%syn: \$d:IN MN 2MD MN

*NAR: <llavors_> vaig intentar d'ajudar-la/
<llavors_> I tried to help her/

*NAR: ah # mentre el cotxe anava per una recta ah # bastant llarga_
ah # while the car went along a straight road ah # quite long_

*NAR: que hi havia <no/>.
that there was <no/>.

%dia: \$da

%pra: \$SEQ \$CON 2PRO 2CTX

%syn: \$d:IN MN 2FN SB

*NAR: <llavors_doncs_ ah # bueno\> mmm # recordo_
<llavors_doncs_ ah # bueno\> mmm # I recall_

*NAR: que intentar <doncs_> tirar-me cap a un lateral per sobre d'ella/
that I tried <doncs_> to lean sideways over her shoulder/

*NAR: per ah # tancar aquella finestra\
to ah # shut that window

%dia: \$da

%pra: \$SEQ \$SIT 2CLU

%syn: \$d:IN MN 2MD SB

*NAR: i ah # <bueno\> # mentre mentre jo feia això\
and ah # <bueno\> # while while I was doing so

*NAR: vaig perdre de vista la carretera_
I lost sight of the road_

- *NAR: com a novell que era\
because I was an inexperienced driver
- %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$SIT
 %syn: \$d:IN SB
- *NAR: i # i el cotxe <pues_> no sabia conduir sol\
and # and the car <pues_> couldn't drive on its own
- %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$CLU \$PRE
 %syn: \$d:MD MN
- *NAR: i # com que la direcció no era gaire bona\
and # because the steering wasn't very good
- *NAR: <pues_> va anar ah # decantant cap a cap al lateral # afortunadament el de
 la cuneta i no l'altre\
*<pues_> it slowly went ah # sideways # fortunately the ditch side and not the
 other*
- %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$CON
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
- *NAR: ah # quan vaig aixecar el cap\
ah # when I raised my head
- *NAR: ah # ja era ah # ja era fora de la carretera <no/>.
ah # it was ah # already off the road <no/>.
- %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$PRO \$CTX
 %syn: \$d:FN MN
- @Eg: da
-
 (NAR19 Joan)

Except for the last *pues*, the other three markers signal the introduction of a concluding remark from the speaker. The analysis of data shows that conclusion is the most repeated function undertaken by both *doncs* and *pues*. Badia i Margarit (1994) signals the intrinsic illative meaning of *doncs* and points out that it is its consecutive semantic value which, through an inferential process, results in conclusion (p.315). Portolés (1989: 130) and Fuentes (1990a: 141) point out the causal, adversative, and consecutive logico-semantic value of *pues* and, based on the illative properties of the unit, suggest a further pragmatic use that call 'continuative'. They exemplify it by means of dialogic and monologic discourse.

However, calling a pragmatic marker 'continuative' does not take us too far. All discourse markers set up a sequential relationship between the previous and the following utterance so, in a way, all are continuative. It is not a distinctive trait. What I suggest is analyzing this generic use in text-rhetorical and structural terms.

I have found that in fragments belonging to a monologue, ‘continuative’ often implies conclusive since the speaker makes use of the marker to introduce a final remark that closes up or rounds off the utterance. It often occurs in mid-clause position, after the subject (see, for instance, 121 above: “i el cotxe *pues* no sabia conduir sol” [“and the car *pues* couldn’t drive on its own”). As we will see, in dialogues ‘continuative’ implies question-answer and direct speech delimiting function. From a different frame, Marsà (1992) suggests a similar approach when, within the generic ‘continuative’, she includes the concluding and resumptive functions of the marker. In her conversational study, she also signals the text-structuring properties of *pues* (pp. 240–255).

The conclusive function attached to *pues* and *doncs* is the most systematic, quantitatively speaking. Similarly to what occurred with the pragmatic marker *clar*, analyzed and discussed in the previous section, the grammatical and semantic properties of these two markers are essential in the understanding of their discourse use. *Doncs* and *pues* are two conjunctions used to bridge cause and consequence.¹⁸² Their present use can only be seen as result of a grammaticalization process that gains special significance in oral discourse. The core illative meaning of these two markers comes, therefore, from their conjunctive value; the rhetorical conclusive meaning, from their logico-semantic value.

Although some authors have interpreted the present discourse use as purely ‘phatic’, I propose, as suggested above, a more insightful analysis framed by a discourse model. Thus the following assertion and example by Martínez García (1990) could be interpreted differently were these two premises taken into consideration:

“Distinto es hoy el *pues* de tipo ‘fático’, frecuentísimo en las oraciones de estilo directo, como por ejemplo: — ¿*Quienes vendrán a la fiesta?* — *Pues no lo sé muy bien*. A diferencia del anterior [causal], este último carece de todo significado y función y sólo se utiliza como una especie de “muletilla” en un intento de explicar una ‘causa’ que en realidad no se conoce. (Martínez García 1990: 600)

“The phatic *pues*, very frequent in direct speech, is a different case, as illustrated by the following example: — ¿*who is coming to the party?* — *pues I don’t know very well*. Unlike the previous one [causal], this one is meaningless and doesn’t have a function; it is only used as a kind of “filler”, trying to explain a ‘cause’ that is in fact unknown.”

The example presented by Martínez García to illustrate the ‘phatic’ empty use of *pues* finds a more accurate explanation when viewed in discourse structural and grammaticalization terms. As Briz (1993b) points out, this *pues* is demarcating — or framing, in terms used in this book — since it works as a sort of punctuation signal that separates two distinct speech units (p.43). In this particular example,

this is still more obvious because of the question-answer adjacency pairing. In addition, the loss of descriptive — causal — content has resulted in a procedural — pragmatic — meaning (clearly reflected in structural traits); thus, it is not really true that the unit has neither meaning nor function because it does; the difference in meaning is just qualitative, from a former argumentative to a procedural one. See the findings on the two markers in Tables (31) and (32).

Table 31. Distribution of pragmatic functions of *doncs* in Catalan narrative (N and %).

| | | DONCS | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|--------|------|-------|
| <i>coherence relations</i> | <i>functions</i> | ABSTR. | ORIENT. | ACTION | I.EVAL. | E.EVAL. | RESULT | CODA | total |
| Ideational Structure | CON | | | 1 | 1 | | | | 2 |
| | REF | | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| | SEQ | | | | | | | | |
| Rhetorical Structure | ADD | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| | CLA | | | | | | | | |
| | CLU | 2 | | 8 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 18 |
| | COM | | | | | | | | |
| | DEL | 2 | | 3 | | 2 | 2 | | 9 |
| | EMP | | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| | EVA | | | | 3 | | | | 3 |
| | EVI | | | 2 | | | | | 2 |
| Sequential Structure | REC | 2 | | 4 | | | | | 6 |
| | TOP | 1 | | 2 | | | | | 3 |
| | DSP | | | 3 | | | | | 3 |
| | FRA | 6 | | 2 | 1 | | | | 9 |
| Inferential Component | FRC | | | | | | | 2 | 2 |
| | INI | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| | CTX | | | | | | | | |
| | JUS | | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| Inferential Component | MIT | | | | | | | | |
| | PRE | | | | | | | | |
| | PRO | | | | | | | | |
| total | SIT | 5 | | | | | | | 5 |
| | N | 18 | 27 | 8 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 67 | |
| | % | 26.8% | 40.3% | 12% | 8.9% | 6% | 6% | | |
| | | | | 20.9% | | | | | |

Key to pragmatic functions coding: see Appendix 2.

Table 32. Distribution of pragmatic functions of *pues* in Catalan narrative (N and %).

| | | PUES | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|--------|------|-------|
| <i>coherence relations</i> | <i>functions</i> | ABSTR. | ORIENT. | ACTION | I.EVAL. | E.EVAL. | RESULT | CODA | total |
| Ideational Structure | CON | | | 2 | 1 | | | | 3 |
| | REF | | | | | | | | |
| | SEQ | | | | | | | | |
| Rhetorical Structure | ADD | | | | | | | | |
| | CLA | | | | | | | | |
| | CLU | | | 4 | 1 | 1 | | | 6 |
| | COM | | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| | DEL | | | | | | | | |
| | EMP | | | | | | | | |
| | EVA | | | | 3 | 1 | | | 4 |
| | EVI | | | | | | | | |
| REC | 1 | | | | | | | 1 | |
| TOP | | | | | | | | | |
| Sequential Structure | DSP | | | | | | | | |
| | FRA | | 2 | | 1 | 1 | | | 4 |
| | FRC | | | | | | | | |
| | INI | | | | | | | | |
| Inferential Component | CTX | | | | | | | | |
| | JUS | | | | | | | | |
| | MIT | | | | | | | | |
| | PRE | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| | PRO | | | | | | | | |
| SIT | | 2 | | | | | | 2 | |
| total | N | 1 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 4 | | | 22 |
| | % | 4.5% | 18.2% | 31.8% | 27.3% | 18.2% | | | 45.5% |

Key to pragmatic functions coding: see Appendix 2.

The framing — or demarcating — role of *doncs* and *pues* is, next to the conclusive, the most common one found in narratives. According to findings, these two units are often used at the beginning of the account, in orientation units. It is also in that part of the story where the narrator systematically uses the two forms with an inferential purpose, anchoring the listener in the narrative's world from the very beginning. The polyfunctionality of *doncs* and *pues* concentrates, mostly, on the rhetorical narrative structure. However, the significant text-structuring role of these two markers tells us that they are key pieces in the sequential structure, too.

The above findings support what was expected about *doncs*, that is, that it is found in action units, basically. It works as a piece that helps the speaker progress on the telling of a piece of information, in this particular case on the telling of the events. This can be explained by its capacity to introduce conclusive remarks but also to regain the argumentative thread broken up by a previous segment — resumptive function — (Marsà 1992: 242; Briz 1993b: 44; Fuentes 1990a: 142; Vigarà 1990b: 71). It is in this respect that Llorente (1996: 212) refers to *pues* as a marker that sets up a ‘local sequentiality’ (as opposed to the chronological sequentiality of *entonces*), and I suggest that such claim could be transferred to the use of *doncs* found in action segments.

Next to the conclusive and framing functions, there is still a third significant function performed by *doncs* which is the stalling function, that is, when the marker is used by the speaker with a delaying function, playing for time to think. This property has generally been attributed to all discourse markers but, as we have seen throughout the analysis, it has seldom proved to be the case. Contrary to what occurs with conversational discourse, stalling *doncs* in monologues is used by the speaker at mid-utterance position, not opening it. See, for instance, (125) and (126). In the first excerpt Elisabet uses de marker before a repetition, with a clear intention to find the right word; in the second excerpt, David uses the marker in the middle of a fragment, preceding two other markers that introduce comment (*bueno*) and contextual effects (*no*):

(125)

```
.....
@Begin
@Participants:      NAR15 Elisabet Narrator
@Age of NAR: 30;
@Sex of NAR: female
@Bg:   opc
*NAR:   <a veure\> # mmmm # <bé\> # va ser una # una festa d'aniversari/.
        <a veure\> # mmmm # <bé\> # it was a # a birthday party/
*NAR:   que ens reuníem tota una colla_.
        and a group of friends met_
*NAR:   per celebrar l'aniversari <doncs_> d'un # d'un amic\.
        to celebrate the birthday <doncs_> of a # a friend\

%dia:   $or:CO
%pra:   $DEL
%syn:   $d:MD SB
@Eg:   opc
.....
(NAR15 Elisabet)
```

- (126)
- @Bg: ee
-
- *NAR: i també <doncs_> allà al mig <bueno> # hauria sigut un número <no/>. *and also <doncs_> there in the middle of <bueno> # it would have been quite something <no/>.*
- %dia: \$ev:EX
- %pra: \$DEL 2COM 3PRO 3CTX
- %syn: \$d:MD FM 2IN MN 3FN MN
- @Eg: ee
-
- (NAR2 David)

Going back to the text-structuring properties of *doncs*, it should be pointed out that they do not only apply to segment-boundary framing. In Table (31) we saw that this lexical unit is sometimes found opening up quoted material. Although it is true that this can be interpreted as a sign of its illative meaning, just adding a further piece of information (Cuenca 2002), *doncs* is also a textual hinge used by the speaker to open up a new enunciative unit, thus it has a structural purpose behind it. Such a property has also been signalled by Marsà (1992: 251) in conversational discourse. See it in (127). Josep, the narrator, is explaining a swimming experience he had together with a friend.

- (127)
-
- @Bg: da
- *NAR: però no hi havia manera de tornar. *but there was no way to go back*
- *NAR: jo anava nedant # nedant # nedant. *I kept swimming # swimming # swimming*
- *NAR: cada vegada era més lluny. *it was further and further*
- *NAR: ell al costat m'anava mirant. *he by my side kept looking at me*
- *NAR: i jo ah # <bé\># hi va haver un moment_. *and I ah # <bé\># there was a moment_*
- *NAR: <doncs_> que vaig pensar\ *<doncs_> I thought*
- %dia: \$da
- %pra: \$EVI 2DSP
- %syn: \$d:MD MN 2IN SB
- *NAR: <doncs_res\ # doncs_> ja s'ha acabat\ *<doncs_res\ # doncs_> that's it*
- *NAR: em deixo anar_. *I let myself go_*

Table 33. Incidence of *doncs* in narrative discourse structure (N and %).
 (*) consecutive (*\$con*) and reformulative (*\$ref*).

| IDEATIONAL STRUCTURE | PRAGMATIC STRUCTURE | | |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|
| | RHETORICAL STRUCTURE Illocutionary intentions | SEQUENTIAL STRUCTURE Structuring device | INFERENTIAL COMPONENT Inference facilitator/restrictor |
| logico-semantic relations | | | |
| *4.5 % 3 | 64.2% 43 | 22.4% 15 | 8.9% 6 |

source: data taken from Table 31.

Table 34. Incidence of *pues* in narrative discourse structure (N and %).
 (*) consecutive (*\$con*).

| IDEATIONAL STRUCTURE | PRAGMATIC STRUCTURE | | |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|
| | RHETORICAL STRUCTURE Illocutionary intentions | SEQUENTIAL STRUCTURE Structuring device | INFERENTIAL COMPONENT Inference facilitator/restrictor |
| logico-semantic relations | | | |
| *13.6 % 3 | 54.6 % 12 | 18.2% 4 | 13.6% 3 |

source: data taken from Table 32.

However, there is a third component, the inferential, that deserves further attention. As markers that facilitate the interlocutor's anchoring in the narrative world from the very start, *doncs* and *pues* are often found in orientation segments, opening up the story. In this context, this component adds onto the structural. Excerpt (128) illustrates such point.

(128)
 @Begin
 @Participants: NAR10 Pepa Narrator
 @Age of NAR: 30;
 @Sex of NAR: female
 @Bg: octp
 *NAR: <doncs> aquesta és la història_
 <doncs> this is the story_
 *NAR: que em va explicar la Mercè # una amiga meva # ah# estudiant de
 filologia anglesa/.

that Mercè # a friend of mine # told me # ah # she's an English philology student

*NAR: i que sortíem molt sovint per la nit <no/>.
and we used to go out a lot at night <no/>

%dia: \$or:CO TO

%pra: \$FRA \$SIT 2PRO 2CTX

%syn: \$d:IN MN 2FN SB

*NAR: i <llavors_> hi havia un lloc aquí al carrer Escudellers/
and <llavors_> there was a place here on Escudellers street/

*NAR: que es diu La Macarena/
that is called La Macarena/

*NAR: que és de flamenc # flamenc\
that has flamenco dancing

%dia: \$or:PO

%pra: \$SIT

%syn: \$d:IN MN

@Eg: octp

.....
(NAR10 Pepa)

It is true that *doncs* can be interpreted as a marker whose main function is opening up a new speech turn since, in the narrative, it follows the question ‘*Have you ever been in a situation of danger?*’. So, in this sense, it behaves as in a question-answer adjacency pair, in a dialogic exchange. But to my understanding it does not only ‘continue’ the thread opened by the question; this function, as we saw above, is structural since the marker is used to open a segment. The second use I am referring to is related to the attentional state of the listener. Thus, by means of the marker the narrator attracts the listener to his/her field and alerts the interlocutor to the fact that something important is about to be said. When this occurs in mid-segment position, it works as a cognitive halt that warns of a new state within the narrative. See it in (129). It is found in a combined orientation-complicating action segment. Cristina, the narrator, is telling the dangerous rafting experience she and a group of friend had on a day out.

(129)

.....
@Bg: op/da

*NAR: i l'últim de tots # quan se suposava que ja entràvem a la part més ampla del riu.
and the last one # when we thought we were entering the widest part of the river

*NAR: que hi ha arribant pràcticament al pont de la carretera nacional.
that there is close to the expressway bridge

- *NAR: el pont on en teoria hi havia els cotxes.
que no hi eren.
*the bridge where the cars should theoretically have been
but they weren't*
- *NAR: <doncs_> allà hi havia un salt més gran_.
<doncs_> *there there was an even higher waterfall_*
- %dia: \$or:PO
- %pra: \$REC \$SIT
- %syn: \$d:IN MN
- *NAR: i a baix hi havia un remolí.
and at the bottom there was a whirlpool
- *NAR: i a mi em van avisar.
they warned me
- *NAR: em van dir.
they told me
- *NAR: quan saltis # tira't a la dreta # o l'esquerra.
when you jump # do it to the right # or to the left
- *NAR: no sé què.
I don't know what
- *NAR: però jo vaig anar a parar.
but I fell straight
- *NAR: però com una pedra.
just like a stone
- *NAR: i sort que un dels que anàvem.
and luckily one in the group
- *NAR: havia saltat abans que jo.
had jumped before I had
- *NAR: i em va agafar pels cabells.
and he grabbed me by my hair
- @Eg: op/da

.....
(NAR1 Cristina)

There is quite a long description preceding the marker. Cristina is specially orienting the interlocutor until she considers that she has provided enough information. At that point, she makes use of *doncs* to attract the other's attention on a given part of the message/segment, cognitively rooting or anchoring her interlocutor in the text.

It could be concluded that the polyfunctionality of *doncs* and *pues* can be explained from four angles: (a) ideational, with full lexical meaning, which would correspond to the causal and consecutive use; (b) sequential, which would correspond to the segment and direct speech framing use; (c) rhetorical, which would be the *doncs* that introduces conclusion, plays for time to think, evaluates, and regains the argumentative thread; and (d) the cognitive, which facilitates and narrows

down the possible inferences to be made. Trying to explain this polyfunctionality from just one angle, as some studies have tried to do,¹⁸⁶ seems to play down the richness of the marker.

All the excerpts included above illustrate the prosodic norm of *doncs* and *pues*: a flat intonation contour. A plausible explanation could lie in the intrinsic illative meaning of these two markers, discussed above. However, there is some variation in their syntactic distribution that offers points of interest. The two markers were found mostly at clause-initial position, carrying out a wide range of functions, but the instances which were uttered in mid position (35.4% of *doncs*, and 28.6% of *pues*) were often linked to concluding and delaying functions. While it can be asserted that *doncs* and *pues* behave, in general, as *lefthand discourse brackets*, there are exceptions to this rule that should be taken into account, since the exceptional cases — those found in mid position — have proved to bear a marked pragmatic meaning.

In sum, *doncs* and *pues* are two conjunctive units that are used in Catalan oral narrative as pragmatic markers. Whereas *doncs* conforms to the standard norm of the language, *pues* is a Spanish borrowing quite widespread among Catalan speakers. They are two variants of the same variable that, in a language contact situation, are often used indistinctly.¹⁸⁷ Although the frequency of appearance of *pues* is much lower than that of *doncs*, they both cover the same functional roles. Their distinctive trait is their distribution within the narrative: there is a greater use of *doncs* in complicating action segments and of *pues* in evaluative ones. The reason why the Catalan standard form is mostly used in the telling of the events has to do with its intrinsic illative meaning that leads to conclusive assertions. Although this semantic property is also attached to *pues*, no plausible reason has been found that can explain this distribution in variation terms. Besides carrying out a significant conclusive role, *doncs* in particular is used by the narrator to play for time to think, to stress the illocutionary force of the utterance, to evaluate, and to regain the argumentative thread. The two pragmatic markers do not only have a strong presence in the rhetorical narrative structure. They are also key pieces in the sequencing of events, framing new discourse segments and, in the case of *doncs*, quoted speech. They both offer enough contextual effects to facilitate the possible inferences of the message. In this respect, *doncs* is often found opening up the story, in orientation segments, anchoring the listener in the world of the events about to be told. The findings confirm the expectations that *doncs* would be mostly found in complicating action parts, where there is a local sequencing of assertions. Such expectation was based on the core descriptive content of the unit (illative) that influences its discourse use (conclusive). As for prosodic and distributional features, *doncs* and *pues* are always uttered flat, which makes sense if we take into account their illative condition. Although the two markers are mostly found at

clause-initial position, thus behaving as *lefthand discourse brackets*, there are instances of mid-position that are directly related to a conclusive and delaying use. Finally, no instances of clause-final position were found.

6.1.4 *Llavors* and *Aleshores*: succession of events and segment frame

In Catalan oral narrative, the internal sequencing of events and the narrator's display of ideas, thoughts and actions is mostly carried out by *llavors* and, to a much lesser extent, *aleshores*. They are two variants of the same variable that both adjust to Catalan standard norm. According to Badia i Margarit (1994), the difference between these two time adverbials lies in the degree of formality of the register used by the speaker:

“*aleshores* és un terme culte, l'ús del qual ha anat estenent-se gradualment i avui és força acceptat. El terme veritablement popular és *llavors*, com ho prova el seu polimorfisme: ultra les formes (*a*)*llavors* i (*a*)*llavors* (que semblen les més difoses), almenys existeixen: (*a*)*llavòs*, (*a*)*llavons*, (*a*)*llavonses*, (*a*)*llavontes*, (*a*)*llavòrens*, etc. Convé concentrar totes aquestes formes entorn de *llavors* (o, tot el més, de les dues que acabo de senyalar com a més difoses, després d'aquella).” (Badia i Margarit 1994: 711–712).

“*aleshores* is a formal term whose use has gradually expanded and is nowadays quite accepted. The really popular term is *llavors*, as its polymorphism proves: widely spread are the forms (*a*)*llavors* i (*a*)*llavors* (that seem the most common), but there exist at least (*a*)*llavòs*, (*a*)*llavons*, (*a*)*llavonses*, (*a*)*llavontes*, (*a*)*llavòrens*, etc It is convenient to concentrate all of these forms around the standard *llavors* (or, at the most, around the two most widespread forms I have just mentioned, after this one).”

As he points out, the most widespread form used in Catalan colloquial register is *llavors*.¹⁸⁸ In our corpus of analysis, this was confirmed not only by the different variants that were found,¹⁸⁹ but also by its high frequency of appearance, that doubled that of *aleshores* (see Table 20). However, there is a sound reason that justifies the inclusion of *aleshores* in the study of Catalan pragmatic markers: according to findings, *aleshores* has a relevant structural role in oral monologue. In the narratives, it is very often used by the speaker to open orientation and action segments, to initiate the telling of the events and to frame quoted material. *Llavors*, on the other hand, is the marker most often used by the speaker to sequentially organize the events all through, from orientation to result. Such organization is text-internal. It does not depend on situational parameters, so it is not time deictic as in the following example taken from Badia i Margarit:

- (130) “és una cançó que *llavors* (*aleshores*) estava de moda”
 “It is a song that *llavors* (*aleshores*) was fashionable”
 (Badia i Margarit 1994: 712)

In (130) the speaker’s utterance is in present time and it is by means of the time adverbial (both *llavors* or *aleshores*) that s/he can refer back to a past time. The role of this time referential *llavors/aleshores* is to set up a relationship between two different time periods. It is, in the view that I take on the issue, a temporal *connector* whose instances will be quantitatively considered (reflected in the ideational narrative structure) but which will not be discussed.

The *llavors* and *aleshores* pragmatic markers are anaphoric but not time deictic or referential (present vs past). As pointed above, the primary function of *llavors* in narratives is to organize the internal sequencing of events, following both an *event* and a *discourse time*. Let us recall that whereas event time indicates “the temporal relationship between propositions themselves”, discourse time refers to “the temporal relationship between utterances in the discourse, i.e. the order in which a speaker presents utterances in a discourse” (Schiffrin 1987a: 229). The two times do not necessarily coincide, specially in oral narrative, where spontaneous speech results in a continuous going back and forth of the speaker, who tries to explain an event and at the same time insert personal comments or extra information that is considered worth knowing. In (131) there is a clear time sequencing of two events where *llavors* is exclusively ruled by event time. It is an excerpt from a travelling experience. Rosa, the narrator, explains the coming down of a steep narrow staircase, outside a high tower.

(131)

.....

@Bg: da

- *NAR: però tot d’una # no m’ havia passat mai.
but all of a sudden # it had never occurred to me before
- *NAR: vaig agafar com una mena de cosa.
I started feeling strange
- *NAR: el cor em va començar a bategar fort.
my heart started beating heavily
- *NAR: vaig començar a pensar.
I started to think
- *NAR: ai que caic.
I’m going to fall
- *NAR: ai que caic.
I’m going to fall
- *NAR: i vaig # <bueno_> # em vaig posar una mica_ #.
and I started getting # <bueno_> # a bit nervous_ #

- *NAR: no vaig arribar a histerisme però una mica nerviosa_.
I wasn't hysterical but I was a bit nervous_
- %dia: \$da
- %pra: \$REF \$CLU
- %syn: \$d:IN MN
- *NAR: i sort que encara vaig tindre la sang freda_.
and luckily I still kept calm_
- *NAR: i vaig dir\
and said\<
- *NAR: ei # que algú vingui.
ei # I need for someone to come
- *NAR: que no sé què em passa.
I don't know what's going on
- *NAR: m'estic com marejant.
I'm feeling dizzy
- *NAR: i <llavors_> dos nois que anaven allà amb nosaltres_.
and <llavors_> two guys that were coming with us_
- *NAR: van anar allà\
went there\<
- *NAR: em van agafar\
they took me\<
- *NAR: em van dir\
and they told me\<
- %dia: \$da
- %pra: \$SEQ
- %syn: \$d:IN MN
- *NAR: tranquil·la # que t'agafem.
calm down # that we have you
- *NAR: que no passa res.
everything is fine

.....
 (NAR12 Rosa)

The way the events are presented shows that *llavors* is used by Rosa to go back to a previous performative act and indicates an internal sequencing of two coterminous acts (Schiffrin 1987a: 249) that are both presented in past time:

event 1: “i vaig dir: [quoted material]”
 “and I said”

event 2: “i *llavors* dos nois ... van anar allà, em van agafar, em van dir.”
 “and *llavors* two guys... went there, they took me, they told me.”

But besides clear-cut event time instances, there are *llavors* and *aleshores* that are often used in discourse sequences carrying out other functions which are not time related exclusively. The speaker then makes use of the two markers for a variety of

pragmatic purposes, from illocutionary to sequential. See, now, (132). It serves to illustrate one of the former. In it, Anna makes use of *llavors* to make a fact salient.

(132)

-
- @Bg: osc
- *NAR: era durant un # un viatge que vam fer a Mèxic # el meu home i jo.
it was during a # a journey that my husband and I went on to Mexico
- *NAR: hi vam anar pel nostre compte.
we went on our own
- *NAR: i # <bé\> # vam arribar <doncs_> a # a Mèrida # al Yucatán/.
and # <bé\> # we arrived at <doncs_> at # at Merida # in the Yucatan/.
- %dia: \$or:SO
- %pra: \$SIT 2DEL
- %syn: \$d:IN MN 2MD MN
- @Eg: osc
- @Bg: da
- *NAR: i vam llogar un cotxe.
and we rented a car
- @Eg: da
- @Bg: ee
- *NAR: i # <bé\># aquell país és # és molt diferent/.
and # <bé\># that country is # is very different/
- %dia: \$ev:EX
- %pra: \$FRA \$COM
- %syn: \$d:IN MN
- *NAR: i <llavors_> te n'adones que aquí estàs molt protegit per moltes coses
<no/>.
*and <llavors_> you realize that over here you're very protected by many things
<no/>.*
- %dia: \$ev:EX
- %pra: \$EVI 2PRO 2CTX
- %syn: \$d:IN MN 2FN MN
- *NAR: que els cotxes <doncs_> més o menys et pots fiar.
that the cars <doncs_> more or less you can trust
- *NAR: perquè tenen assegurances molta gent/.
because many people have insurance/
- %dia: \$ev:EX
- %pra: \$JUS
- %syn: \$d:MD SB
- *NAR: i que # i tu saps # més o menys # quin serà el comportament dels eh
dels nostres conductors.
*and that # and you know # more or less # what the behaviour of eh #
our drivers is going to be like*

*NAR: i # més o menys # les regles les saps.
and # more or less # the rules you know them

*NAR: però allà era una mica diferent.
but over there it was a bit different

@Eg: ee

.....
 (NAR4 Anna)

It is true that the above use of *llavors* could be rephrased as: “*at that point (in time)*, when you realize that the country is so different, ...” and, therefore, that there is a time anaphoric use of the marker,¹⁹⁰ but the aim of Anna when using it was not to directly establish or point out a time reference but rather to stress a fact (or performative act) that occurred at a given point in time. It works as evidential, what is defined by Oller (1998) as an emphatic use of the marker. The same occurs with (133), where the narrator uses *llavors* in between two speech units that are not time dependent. In this case, the aim is to mentally anchor the interlocutor in the narrative world, cognitively bridging character, time and place orientation.

(133)

@Begin

@Participants: NAR10 Pepa Narrator

@Age of NAR: 30;

@Sex of NAR: female

@Bg: octp

*NAR: <doncs_> aquesta és la història_
 <doncs_> *this is the story_*

*NAR: que em va explicar la Mercè # una amiga meva # ah# estudiant de
 filologia anglesa/.
*that Mercè # a friend of mine # told me # ah # she's an English
 philology student*

*NAR: i que sortiem molt sovint per la nit <no/>
and we used to go out a lot at night <no/>

%dia: \$or:CO TO

%pra: \$FRA \$SIT 2PRO 2CTX

%syn: \$d:IN MN 2FN SB

*NAR: i <llavors_> hi havia un lloc aquí al carrer Escudellers/.
and <llavors_> there was a place here on Escudellers street/

*NAR: que es diu La Macarena/.
that is called La Macarena/

*NAR: que és de flamenc # flamenc\
that has flamenco dancing

@Eg: octp

%dia: \$or:PO

%pra: \$SIT

%syn: \$d:IN MN
@Eg: octp

.....
(NAR10 Pepa)

According to Marie-Jeanne Gerecht (1987) there are three different uses of *alors* that can help us to explain these non-straightforward temporal instances of *llavors* and *aleshores*. She suggests: (a) *alors* time operator; (b) *alors* argumentative connector; and (c) *alors* discourse marker. The first one would correspond to the time-referential adverb discussed at the beginning of this section and illustrated in (130), in Badia i Margarit's example; its semantic value lies in situational parameters. The second type is the *llavors* or *aleshores* that has a consecutive value. It is an argumentative connector that I have classified under the ideational structure since its role is to make explicit a cause-consequence logico-semantic relationship between previous and following propositions. Gerecht illustrates it with this example: "Pierre arrive *alors* je pars" (1987: 69) ["Pierre is here *alors* I'm leaving"]. In the narratives, it would correspond to the use in (134):

(134)

.....
@Bg: da
*NAR: i # <bueno\># va va passar/
 and # <bueno\># he drove drove by/
%dia: \$da
%pra: \$FRA \$REC
%syn: \$d:IN MN
*NAR: i va rascar la porta/
 and he scratched the car door/
*NAR: i va fer una trompada/
 and he bumped against it/
*NAR: va rascar una mica la seva moto/
 his motorbike was a bit scratched/
*NAR: i la porta <llavors_> no s'encaixava bé al tancar-se\
 and the door <llavors_> didn't fit well when shut\
%dia: \$da
%pra: \$CON
%syn: \$d:MD MN
*NAR: i # <bueno\> # va baixar el taxista cridant/
 and # <bueno\> the taxi driver got out shouting/
%dia: \$da
%pra: \$CLU
%syn: \$d:IN MN

.....
(NAR11 Marc)

The third type that Gerecht suggests does not set up an argumentative relation between two propositions but rather links two “énonciations ou une situation de communication” (p.76) (“enunciations or a communicative situation”). It is this third type that particularly interests me. Similarly to what occurred with other Catalan pragmatic markers seen in previous pages — *clar* and *doncs* in particular — the semantic value of *llavors* and *aleshores* influences its pragmatic use. All these lexical units have become pragmatic markers after undergoing a grammaticalization process and therefore a progressive bleaching of their descriptive meaning. The intrinsic temporal meaning of *llavors* and *aleshores* helps explain the second consecutive use illustrated in (134), also pointed out by other authors in relation to the Spanish form, *entonces* (Marsà 1992: 288, Cortés 1991: 91), but it can also provide a plausible explanation for instances like that of (132) and (133), where the speaker makes use of the marker to place the listener on a given mental and enunciative space. Gerecht spells it out in this way:

“*Alors* est avant tout un anaphorique dont la propriété lui permet de constituer le contenu sémantique de p comme repère temporel et/ou argumentatif à partir duquel q peut être validé. Il fonctionne comme un outil indicateur d’ancrage entre p et q ou entre E(p) et E(q) ou bien encore entre S(p) et E(q) (...) *Alors* a la capacité de renvoyer à l’ensemble de l’espace énonciatif de p, de sélectionner les coordonnées temporelles ou argumentatives nécessaires à q et de les lui offrir.” (Gerecht 1987: 79)

“*Alors* is above all an anaphoric form whose characteristics allow it to convey the temporal and/or argumentative semantic content of p from which q can be validated. It works as an anchoring device between p and q or between E(p) and E(q) or even between S(p) and E(q) (...) *Alors* has the capacity to shift to the enunciative space of p, to select the necessary temporal or argumentative coordinates and offer them to q.”

What makes *llavors* and *aleshores* a particularly useful tool to narrate an event is, therefore, their temporal and argumentative ability to bridge the gap between two sequences or enunciative spaces. It is for this reason that, contrary to what has been asserted by some authors (Cortés 1991), we cannot simply refer to their frequent use in informal talk in terms of “pseudonarrative” cue that “liven up the narrative”, with a straightforward empty use (Cortés 1991: 92 and 96) but rather as a meaningful device used by the speaker with very concise functions. Tables (35) and (36) show the varied functions that *llavors* and *aleshores* undertake:

Table 35. Distribution of pragmatic functions of *llavors* in Catalan narrative (N and %).

| | | LLAVORS | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|---------|---------|--------|---------|---------|--------|-------|-------|
| <i>coherence relations</i> | <i>functions</i> | ABSTR. | ORIENT. | ACTION | I.EVAL. | E.EVAL. | RESULT | CODA | total |
| Ideational Structure | CON | | | 4 | | | 1 | | 5 |
| | REF | | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| | SEQ | | 4 | 18 | | 2 | | 4 | 28 |
| Rhetorical Structure | ADD | | 1 | | | | 1 | | 2 |
| | CLA | | | | | | | | |
| | CLU | | | | | | 2 | | 2 |
| | COM | | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| | DEL | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| | EMP | | | | | | | | |
| | EVA | | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| | EVI | | 1 | 4 | | 1 | 1 | | 7 |
| | REC | | 1 | 1 | | | | 2 | 4 |
| TOP | | 2 | | | | | | 2 | |
| Sequential Structure | DSP | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| | FRA | | 2 | 2 | | 1 | | 2 | 7 |
| | FRC | | | | | 1 | | 1 | 2 |
| | INI | | | | | | | | |
| Inferential Component | CTX | | | | | | | | |
| | JUS | | | | | | | | |
| | MIT | | | | | | | | |
| | PRE | | | | | | | | |
| | PRO | | | | | | | | |
| | SIT | | 1 | 1 | | | | | 2 |
| total | N | | 12 | 32 | | 7 | 4 | 11 | 66 |
| | % | | 18.2% | 48.5% | | 10.6% | 6% | 16.7% | |
| | | | | | | 16.6% | | | |

Key to pragmatic functions coding: see Appendix 2.

Table 36. Distribution of pragmatic functions of *aleshores* in Catalan narrative (N and %).

| | | ALESHORES | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|-----------|---------|--------|---------|---------|-------------|-------|
| <i>coherence relations</i> | <i>functions</i> | ABSTR. | ORIENT. | ACTION | I.EVAL. | E.EVAL. | RESULT CODA | total |
| Ideational Structure | CON | | | | | | | |
| | REF | | | | | | | |
| | SEQ | | | 9 | | | | 9 |
| Rhetorical Structure | ADD | | | | | | | |
| | CLA | | | | | | | |
| | CLU | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| | COM | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| | DEL | | | | | | | |
| | EMP | | | | | | | |
| | EVA | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| | EVI | | | | | | | |
| Sequential Structure | REC | | 2 | 1 | | | 1 | 4 |
| | TOP | | | 1 | | | 1 | 2 |
| | DSP | | | 2 | | | | 2 |
| | FRA | | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | | 10 |
| | FRC | | | | | | | |
| Inferential Component | INI | | 1 | 1 | | | | 2 |
| | CTX | | | | | | | |
| | JUS | | | | | | | |
| | MIT | | | | | | | |
| | PRE | | | | | | | |
| | PRO | | | | | | | |
| total | SIT | | 2 | | 1 | | | 3 |
| | N | | 8 | 18 | 4 | 5 | | 35 |
| | % | | 22.9% | 51.4% | 11.4% | 14.3% | | |
| | | | | | | | 25.7% | |

Key to pragmatic functions coding: see Appendix 2.

If we compare the final results of *llavors* and *aleshores* according to segments, we see that their distribution is quite balanced, with the only exception of *result*, where only *llavors* is present. At the end of the story the marker is mostly used with a rounding off concluding and bracketing function, closing the narrative. See it illustrated in (135):

(135)

.....
 @Bg: r
 *NAR: fins que # fins que # vam aconseguir.
 until # until # we managed
 *NAR: parar el cotxe.
 to stop the car
 *NAR: i <llavors_> tothom es va desfogar\
 and <llavors_> everybody let themselves go
 %dia: \$re
 %pra: \$FRC \$SEQ \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: però fins aquell moment # muts tots a la gàbia.
 but up to that point # everybody had kept quiet
 @Eg: r
 @Bg: c
 *NAR: i ja està.
 and that's it
 @Eg: c
 @End
 (NAR5 Maria)

But the most striking difference between the two markers can be observed in Tables (37) and (38), following, where their incidence in narrative structure is shown. Half of the functions of *llavors* (51.5%) are linked to the ideational component (consecutive, reformulative, and sequential argumentative functions) whereas a similar number of functions undertaken by *aleshores* are linked to the sequential one (40%). In addition, the role of *llavors* and *aleshores* as inference facilitators also shows an interesting feature: *aleshores* is more often used by the speaker for contextual effects than *llavors* (8.6% vs 3%), cognitively anchoring the listener to the text world. In this respect, notice the parallelism between these two lexical units and the previously discussed markers *bé* and *bueno* (see Tables 26 and 27). In both cases, there is a parcelling out of discourse tasks that is reflected on the narrative structure: *bé* and *aleshores* are mostly used for text-structuring and inferential purposes; *bueno* and *llavors* have a major role transmitting the narrator's intentions, thoughts and acts. Besides, we have seen that this division of tasks occurs within the same register, that is, colloquial.

According to results, *llavors* is mostly used by the narrator in the ideational and rhetorical narrative structure whereas *aleshores* is scarcely used for illocutionary purposes. As previously stated, the primary aim of the narrator when using *aleshores* is basically that of structuring the information, reflected on the sequential narrative component. See the results of the above absolute figures summarized in Tables (37) and (38):

Table 37. Incidence of *llavors* in narrative discourse structure (N and %).
 (*) consecutive (*\$con*), reformulative (*\$ref*), and temporal (*\$seq*).

| IDEATIONAL STRUCTURE | PRAGMATIC STRUCTURE | | |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|
| | RHETORICAL STRUCTURE Illocutionary intentions | SEQUENTIAL STRUCTURE Structuring device | INFERENCE COMPONENT Inference facilitator/restrictor |
| logico-semantic relations | | | |
| *51.5 % 34 | 30.3 % 20 | 15.2% 10 | 3.0% 2 |

source: data taken from Table 35.

Table 38. Incidence of *aleshores* in narrative discourse structure (N and %).
 (*) temporal (*\$seq*).

| IDEATIONAL STRUCTURE | PRAGMATIC STRUCTURE | | |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|
| | RHETORICAL STRUCTURE Illocutionary intentions | SEQUENTIAL STRUCTURE Structuring device | INFERENCE COMPONENT Inference facilitator/restrictor |
| logico-semantic relations | | | |
| *25.7 % 9 | 25.7 % 9 | 40.0% 14 | 8.6% 3 |

source: data taken from Table 36.

The register issue pointed out at the beginning of this section by Badia i Margarit (1994) has, however, an enormous influence on the choice between *llavors* or *aleshores*. Out of twenty, twelve narrators use *llavors* exclusively and only three use *aleshores*. Badia i Margarit claims that *llavors* is the widespread ‘popular’ form, whereas *aleshores* is the ‘cultivated’ form that has been recently adopted by speakers in informal talk (see quotation at the beginning of section). The language used in oral narratives is spontaneous colloquial speech. As pointed out by Badia i Margarit, although *aleshores* tends to be used in formal registers, it has become a widespread form that is often found next to *llavors*, in informal talk.

It is interesting to see the distribution of the two markers in the narratives analyzed. There are four instances that present cooccurrence of the two variants, without an apparent functional and segment distinctive trait that can serve to explain it. They are mostly found in complicating action segments to sequentially organize the events, with only four exceptions found in evaluation parts. Let us see the cooccurrence in Table (39), following.

Notice that most speakers use only one variable (in the case of *llavors*, with a number of variants that, as pointed out by Badia i Margarit, are evidence of its extended use), although there are instances, like that of narrative 12 above, that have both variables and several variants.¹⁹¹

Table 39. Cooccurrence of *llavors* and *aleshores* in Catalan oral narratives. Distribution of compound pragmatic markers (CPM) in narratives.

| <i>narratives</i> | LLAVORS | ALLESORES | [CPM] |
|-------------------|--|--------------------|--|
| 1 | 3 | – | |
| 2 | – | 5 | <aleshores doncs> |
| 3 | 1<allavòrens> | 2 | |
| 4 | 1 | – | <llavors bé> |
| 5 | 1 | – | |
| 6 | 1<llavòrens> | – | |
| 7 | 2 | – | |
| 8 | 2 | 1 | <aleshores bueno> |
| 9 | – | – | |
| 10 | 3 | – | |
| 11 | 4 | – | |
| 12 | 2 <llavors> 1 <llavòrens> 1 <allavons> | 4 | <aleshores bueno> <llavorens res> |
| 13 | 1 <llavors> 2 <llavòrens> | – | |
| 14 | 1<allavontes> | – | |
| 15 | – | – | |
| 16 | – | 1 | |
| 17 | 1 | – | |
| 18 | 6 | – | |
| 19 | 5 <llavors> 1 <allavòrens> 1 <llavòrens> | 2 | <aleshores bueno> <llavors bueno> <llavores doncs bueno> |
| 20 | – | 5 | |
| Total | 40 66.7% | 20 33.3% | |

A thorough analysis of narrative 12 indicates that the two variants of the standard form (*llavorens* and *allavons*) are used indistinctly, for sequencing the events, regaining the argumentative thread and framing new discourse units. The special

trait is only found at the end of the story where, as pointed above, only *llavors* is used. See the excerpt where the variants appear (136):

(136)

.....
 @Bg: r
 *NAR: i <llavorens_ # res\># va ser un moment\
 and <llavorens_ # res\># it was just a moment\
 %dia: \$re
 %pra: \$FRA \$SEQ \$CTX
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 @Eg: r
 @Bg: ei/e
 *NAR: però no m'havia passat mai.
 but it had never happened to me before
 *NAR: perquè normalment no tinc vertigen.
 because I don't usually get dizzy
 *NAR: i em va espantar una mica.
 I was a bit scared
 @Eg: ei/e
 @Bg: r
 *NAR: <allavons_> # per baixar fins a baix\
 <allavons_> # to come down\
 %dia: \$re
 %pra: \$FRA \$REC \$SEQ
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: <doncs_> # va anar bé\
 <doncs_> # it went well\
 %dia: \$re
 %pra: \$CLU
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: només que aquells dos nois estaven molt espantats.
 the only thing is that those two guys were really scared
 *NAR: m'anaven mirant.
 they kept looking at me
 *NAR: a veure.
 to see
 *NAR: que no tornés a passar #.
 that it would not repeat again
 @Eg: r

(NAR12 Rosa)

The first pragmatic marker that opens the resulting unit is *compound*. As we saw in previous sections, whenever this occurs it is usually because there is a frame shifting

— within the same lexical unit — to a different contextual realm (Maschler 1998), in this case from the sequential to the inferential components.¹⁹² Besides being a fragment that illustrates the use of *llavors* to conclude the telling of an account, (136) serves to show a recurrent function of *llavors* (and *aleshores*): the resumption of line of thought after the incursion of a comment (internal or external). Oller (1998) refers to the resumptive and conclusive functions of *llavors* as two core functions of the marker.¹⁹³ Marsà (1992) and Cortés (1991) also propose these two functions about Spanish *entonces*, although Cortés does not do it explicitly and suggests that it is used to ‘liven up’ an oral account (p.92). In fact, if we look at the example that he provides closely, we realize that the *entonces* to which he refers is used by the speaker to regain the line of thought, after an addition of extra information that s/he has considered relevant for the full understanding of the account:

- (137) “estos señores / los dueños de estas fincas / pues nos hacían para que no saliéramos / porque todo esto eran prados / **entonces** nos hacían unas zanjas /// (M-B-52)
 “these landlords / the owners of these lands / they did their best for us not to go out / because all this was meadows / **entonces** they dug some trenches///
 (Cortés 1991: 92)

If narrative structure is considered, (137) probably belongs to an action segment that has been interrupted by external evaluation (*“porque todo esto eran prados”* [*“because all this was meadows”*]); the speaker regains the argumentative thread by means of *entonces*. If more linguistic context was provided, most of the *entonces* that Cortés presents (1991: 95–96) could probably be explained along similar lines. This raises again the issue of the importance that text-genre has for the analysis of discourse units whose meaning is basically procedural. Contrary to what may occur with referential units with full descriptive content, words and phrases that cognitively help the listener process a given information require a large co-text (be it dialogued or monologued) within which the analyst can frame them, structurally and cognitively; otherwise, most of the pragmatic information that these lexical units are able to provide is lost and unfortunately become pure fillers, with no apparent *raison d’être* in the text.

As far as prosody and syntactic distribution is concerned, *llavors* and *aleshores* present a regular pattern. Both of them are uttered with a flat nuclear tone, probably due to the role they play as markers that are frequently used by the speaker to sequentially organize the events (*llavors* in particular, as we have seen), be it in the rhetorical or in the sequential structure. As for clause distribution, with the exception of 12% of *aleshores* that were found in mid-clause position (following the subject), the rest were found at the beginning of main and, very few times, subordinate clauses. No special functional or segmental distinctive trait was found for the

clause-internal *aleshores*. It can therefore be asserted that both *llavors* and *aleshores* behave as *lefthand discourse brackets*.

In sum, *llavors* and *aleshores* are two temporal adverbs that, besides being used by the speaker as time-referential signs, work in Catalan oral narrative as pragmatic markers that introduce the local succession of events, intentions and thoughts. The two units comply with the Catalan standard norm, although the more common form seems to be *llavors* and its numerous variants. The thesis that the distinctive trait between the two adverbial forms lies on the register (Badia i Margarit 1994), informal when using *llavors* and formal when using *aleshores*, does not totally adjust to the results obtained in narrative analysis. Hence, although it is true that there is a quantitative factor which was expected on account of the narrative register, the distinction between *llavors* and *aleshores* in this text-genre finds a better explanation in discourse ideational and sequential terms. Thus, the quantitative analysis of data showed that the occurrences of *llavors* doubled the number of *aleshores*, as was expected for a colloquial register but, qualitatively speaking, it also showed that the number of functions that the marker undertakes in the ideational structure — sequencing the events, reformulating previous proposition, and introducing consecutive sequences — doubles that of *aleshores* (51.5% vs 25.7%). *Aleshores*, on the other hand, has a primary role in the sequential structure, at segment boundaries, initiating the complicating action part and opening quoted material (40% vs 15.2%). As inference facilitator, *aleshores* plays also a more significant role than *llavors* (8.6% vs 3%). Finally, in the rhetorical structure, it is worth mentioning two outstanding functions: the recurrent use that the narrator makes of *llavors* to make a fact, idea or thought salient for the listener (evidential function), and the resumption of events that is equally undertaken by *llavors* and *aleshores*. It can therefore be concluded that these two variants of the same variable show different tendencies, to the point of having specialized in different functions in some pragmatic discourse structures (i.e. *llavors* in the ideational and *aleshores* in the sequential and inferential). As for prosodic features, the two markers have a regular pattern, which is flat nuclear tone. A plausible explanation for the lack of rising or falling intonation contours may lie in the fact that both are units which are basically uttered with no special illocutionary force. The aim of the speaker when using them is basically that of presenting a succession of events or ideas so, in this sense, it could be said that they share similar characteristics of illative units, like *doncs* and *pues* discussed in previous section. The syntactic distribution of *llavors* and *aleshores* demonstrates that they are basically *lefthand discourse brackets* since, with only a few exceptions in the case of *llavors*, they are uttered clause-initially.

6.1.5 *no?* and *eh?*: evidence and inference

The quantitative and qualitative characteristics of *no* and *eh* pragmatic markers are radically different from the others under discussion in this book. As for the first, *no* is the pragmatic marker that appears the most in the data: 28.6% (see Table 20).¹⁹⁴ Qualitatively speaking, *no* and *eh* exhibit the syntactic, intonational and pragmatic properties of tag-questions (Cuenca and Castellà 1993, 1995; Cuenca 1996, 1997) which involves an idiosyncratic pattern that is not shared by the other markers in the corpus. There is still a third element that makes *no* and *eh* (specially the first) worth being discussed: they have a primary role in evaluative segments. This is due to their special role as markers of evidentiality which, according to Norrick (1995), involves establishing a relationship between the knowledge that the hearer has and what the speaker knows (p.687).

Let us see, first of all, *no* and *eh* tag-questions features. As far as syntactic distribution is concerned, they are always found in clause-final position, thus behaving as *righthand discourse brackets* (when the majority of markers are *lefthand brackets*); intonationally, they are systematically uttered with a fall-rise intonation contour (as all interrogative units are) and, finally, their pragmatic values are restricted to just two or three functions, as it will be seen mostly linked to the inferential component. Take, for example, the following excerpt (138), with three *no* tag-questions uttered towards the end. They serve to illustrate these three characteristics.

(138)

.....
@Bg: ei

*NAR: <bueno\> # va ser també eh #.

<bueno\> # *it also was eh* #

*NAR: de de de les tres situacions que estic explicant\.

from the three situations I'm describing

*NAR: la de travessar pel pels abismes\.

that of going through cliffs

*NAR: la de caure\.

that of falling

*NAR: i la de baixar el riu\.

and that of going down the river

*NAR: aquesta era # on vaig tenir una sensació més llarga de # de perill\.

this was # where I had the most persistent feeling of # of danger

*NAR: perquè # <clar/> # això va durar ben bé #.

because # <clar/> # the whole thing took really #

*NAR: devia durar un(a) hora/.

it must have taken an hour/

- %dia: \$ev:IN
 %pra: \$JUS \$EMP \$EVA
 %syn: \$d:IN SB
 *NAR: i era # era un(a) hora.
and it was # it was an hour
- *NAR: que passa que passa ràpida.
that goes by that goes by quickly
- *NAR: i que passa lenta <no/>.
and that goes by slowly <no/>.
- *NAR: depèn dels moments <no/>.
it depends on the moment <no/>.
- *NAR: però que # que <bé\> # que va ser eh # fotuda <no/>.
but that # that <bé\> # that was eh # horrible <no/>.
- *NAR: després vam riure molt.
then we laughed a lot
- *NAR: i després tinc una foto.
and then I have a picture
- *NAR: en que estic jo tot ple de d'esgarrinxades.
where I appear full of scratches
- @End
 (NAR2 David)

David is at the end of his story. He has been explaining a journey to Thailand and ends it up with a final personal comment on the events. At this point, he has already established a close bond with the listener, an interlocutor who has not been interactively active but who has had to be convinced, all along, that what he has been listening to was a real personal experience (that is, not fiction) and that David himself, the story teller, went through really dangerous situations. The purpose of his repeated use of *no* with a rising nuclear tone at the end of the assertion (he does it very often all through the narrative) is a willingness to share with the listener not a mere past personal experience, but a world of thoughts and impressions that he had when the events took place. It is therefore not only a back-channel cue whose aim is just to maintain the listener alert, as some authors suggest (Fuentes 1990b: 183; Briz 1994: 385; Fernández and Vázquez 1995; Cuenca 1996: 404), but a 'contextualization cue' (Gumperz 1982a) that is used to maintain involvement and to show stance towards own and other's attitude, emotions, and affects.

In addition, when the speaker makes use of tag-question markers there is an underlying desire of acceptance of what is being told and an implicit closeness on the speaker's part. In (138), David assumes and presupposes that there is a shared knowledge about how time flows so slowly in situations of danger. By using *no* so often he probably feels that his interlocutor is in a way sharing, with him, his past experience. There is, therefore, a twofold purpose behind the use of the marker: (a)

to call the attention of the listener to a particular part of the message; and (b) to share with the listener a common ground. This translates into a quite restricted number of pragmatic functions, mostly related to the inferential component, if compared to the other markers that appear in narrative discourse. It is on this argumentative line that Norrick (1993) points out the presuppositional nature of tag-questions:

“... invariant tags typically signal a perception of concurrence or difference in knowledge or attitude between the speaker and another participant in the conversation. In particular, tags tend to mark an assumption: (1) that the speaker and hearer share a belief or attitude, (2) that the hearer knows better than the speaker does, or (3) that the speaker knows better than the hearer, and hence challenges the hearer’s incorrect belief. “(Norrick 1993: 1)

The pragmatic value of tag-questions such as those in (138) can be linked to the modality of the two different parts that form it: one assertive and the other (the tag) interrogative. Thus by means of *no* and *eh* the narrator “modalizes the utterance by introducing implicit information denoting her or his attitude about the communicative exchange” (Cuenca 1997: 10). Between assertion and interrogation, the marker is then used as a discourse strategy to share with the listener a world of beliefs, what would be Norrick’s first assumption above.¹⁹⁵

The invariant syntactic distribution of *no* and *eh* in the narratives — always at clause-final position — indicates that they have an emphatic purpose, too, since they take the listener to that part of the message to which the narrator considers that it is advisable or necessary to pay special attention. In conversational discourse, tag-questions work as focal elements that facilitate the new information brought in by the communicative exchange (Cuenca and Castellà 1995: 78), thus working attentionally. In this respect, in a monologued discourse such as oral narrative, I would rather suggest that they function as elements that highlight a specific fact, event, thought or action, that is, working as *evidentials* (cf. Cuenca 1997: 16). As for their intrinsic inferential role, they are mostly used by the narrator to bring in presuppositions and shared knowledge, facilitating the contextual effects that the interlocutor will use to cognitively process and fully understand the message. Contrary to what occurs with conversational discourse, in the narrative of personal experience the speaker does not expect a verbal response or reaction from the listener. If there is any reaction, this has to be the conviction that what is being told is true, thus any lexical unit that facilitates such truth-transmission has to work in that direction.

Cuenca and Castellà (1995) suggest that tag-questions (“preguntes confirmatòries”) are ‘modality evidentials’ that try to establish the truth-value of a proposition by requesting the interlocutor about such truthfulness (not logical but from a communicative point of view); the relation set up is therefore dialogic, they argue,

since the speaker expects the listener's verbal reaction: "això ens indica el valor perlocutiu (de funció conativa, en el sentit de Jakobson) dels marcats que ens ocupen: es tracta d'involucrar — de fer còmplice — el receptor en un procés argumentatiu" (p.76) ("this shows us the perlocutionary value (conative function, in Jakobson's terms) of the markers under analysis: the aim is to involve the receiver — making him accomplice — in an argumentative process"). Again, linking with the above argumentative line, I suggest that the reaction expected does not necessarily have to be verbal — as it is in a dialogue — but implicit or understood. It is, above all, the complicity factor that Cuenca and Castellà point out that makes *no* a particular useful tool in the telling of an event. In the specific case of narrative discourse, this claim is supported by a highly significant fact: *no* and *eh* are frequently used by the narrator in evaluative stages, in internal evaluations in particular. Take, for example, (139). Elisabet is talking about a birthday party. She was wearing a long scarf around her neck that caught fire when she got close to a candle. This evaluative segment belongs to the end of the narrative, when she reflects about the possible terrible consequences.

(139)

.....
@Bg: ei

*NAR: i la sensació aquesta de # de # <o sigui_res\> # l'espant\
de # del moment # però la sensació aquesta de pensar_
*and the feeling of # of # <o sigui_res\> the scare of # of the moment #
but the feeling when you think*

*NAR: si hagués dut el cabell llarg_
if I had had long hair_

*NAR: que que potser m'hauria pogut encendre tota jo <no/>.
I could have probably caught on fire <no/>.

%pra: \$REF \$EVA \$CTX 2PRO 2CTX

%syn: \$d:MD MN 2FN SB

*NAR: no sé.

I don't know

*NAR: no m'havia passat mai.
it had never occurred to me before

*NAR: i la veritat és que em vaig espantar.
and the truth is that I was frightened

*NAR: em vaig espantar una mica <no/>.
I was a bit frightened <no/>.

*NAR: i que no saps.
and you don't know

*NAR: com # com reaccionar <no/>.
how # how to react <no/>.

%pra: \$PRO \$CTX 2PRO 2CTX

- %syn: \$d:FN MN 2FN SB
 *NAR: d'alguna manera saps.
in a way you know
- *NAR: que et vols treure allò.
that you want to take that out
- *NAR: però que no # que no t'ho pots treure.
but that you can't # you cannot take it out
- *NAR: o no saps.
or you don't know how
- *NAR: com treure't-ho <no/>.
to take it out <no/>.
- %pra: \$PRO \$CTX
 %syn: \$d:FN SB
 *NAR: perquè # <clar/> # si # penses # si t'ho tires ah #.
because # <clar/> # if # you think # if you pull it ah #
- *NAR: t'ho passes pel cap/.
you take it over your head/
- *NAR: et pots fer mal a la cara/.
you can damage your face/
- *NAR: o # no sé # una situació com una mica # així estranya <no/>.
or # I don't know # a situation a bit # like strange <no/>.
- %pra: \$EVA \$EVI \$PRE 2PRO 2CTX
 %syn: \$d:IN SB 2FN MN
 @Eg: ei

.....
 (NAR15 Elisabet)

The fact that Elisabet uses *no* so often in a part of the narrative that is especially subjective, i.e. internal evaluation,¹⁹⁶ supports the aforementioned contextual effect role of this pragmatic marker. Notice that there is an increasing wonder and looking for an explanation about her reaction had she had long hair. By means of the marker, there is a sort of pragmatic crescendo at the intentional state caused by the same speaker, probably with an unconscious aim to transmit the anxiety of the moment to the listener. This links with the above discussion on the different role that tag questions have, as pragmatic markers, in dialogued and in monologued discourse. I suggest that the use of tag-questions in monologues cannot be restricted to a pure communicative truth-value request, as may occur in conversation, but goes a step further onto a wider search for contextual effects that the speaker supplies in an attempt to facilitate the sharing of common ground and presuppositions. See (140), taken from the above narrative. Note that the utterances modalised by *no* present different grammatical patterns: one conditional, two negatives, and one declarative.

- (140) si hagués dut el cabell llarg que que potser m'hauria pogut encendre tota jo <no/>.
if I had had long hair I could have probably caught on fire <no/>.

- i que no saps com # com reaccionar <no/>
and you don't know how # how to react <no/>
 o no saps com treure't-ho <no/>
or you don't know how to take it out <no/>
 o # no sé # una situació com una mica # així estranya <no/>
or # I don't know # a situation a bit # like strange <no/>

According to Cuenca and Castellà (1995: 70), the use of *no* in negative sentences is not grammatical¹⁹⁷ but this restriction does not seem to work in a corpus of naturally occurring data, where the discursive attitude and intentional state of the speaker have a ruling function. In this sense, Cuenca seems to be right in hypothesizing that pragmatic functions are more important than formal syntactic aspects when it comes down to defining and characterizing tag question markers (Cuenca 1996: 401).

The distribution of *no* and *eh* in the twenty narratives analyzed shows that there is a preponderant use of *no*, as was previously mentioned: out of 163 tag question occurrences, 149 are *no* and only 14 are *eh*. But distributional data also show another interesting feature, concerning pragmatic meaning: whenever the narrator uses the two forms, *eh* undertakes a higher evidential meaning than *no*. See distributional data in Table 40 and further examples.

Table 40. Cooccurrence of *no?* and *eh?* in Catalan oral narratives.

| <i>narratives</i> | NO? | EH? |
|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| 1 | 4 | 1 |
| 2 | 21 | 2 |
| 3 | 5 | 2 |
| 4 | 18 | – |
| 5 | – | 1 |
| 6 | 1 | 2 |
| 7 | 16 | – |
| 8 | 12 | – |
| 9 | 2 | – |
| 10 | 6 | – |
| 11 | 7 | – |
| 12 | – | – |
| 13 | 1 | – |
| 14 | 5 | – |
| 15 | 14 | 2 |
| 16 | – | – |
| 17 | 3 | – |
| 18 | 10 | 1 |
| 19 | 15 | – |
| 20 | 9 | 3 |
| Total | 149 91.4% | 14 8.6% |

Let us take, for example, narrative 3. The narrator makes use of *eh* twice, in action and result segments. See it in (141). The narrator is explaining an argument that he had, when he was a child, with a teacher in primary school.¹⁹⁸ The first excerpt belongs to a complicating action unit.

(141)

-
- *NAR: me va # me va # me va intentar agafar de l'orella.
he tried # he tried # he tried to take me by the ear
- *NAR: i estirar-me cap avall.
and pull me down
- *NAR: i # <aleshores_> # les les ulleres/.
and # <aleshores_> # the the glasses/
- *NAR: que jo portava ulleres ja en aquella epoca.
that I wore glasses at the time
- *NAR: me van saltar disparades/.
they flew away/
- *NAR: en tan mala pata que # patapam # se van trencar\.
*and unfortunately # crack # they broke *
- *NAR: i # ah # de l'enrabiada que vaig agafar en aquell moment.
and # ah # I was so angry that
- *NAR: me vaig girar cap al bon home.
I turned to the man
- *NAR: i li vaig dir.
and told him
- *NAR: estas gafas me las paga <eh/>.
this pair of glasses you pay for them <eh/>.
- *NAR: estas me las paga!
you pay for this pair!
-
- @Bg: r
- *NAR: i # després ma mare va anar a parlar amb el # amb el senyor Vilalta <eh/>.
and # afterwards my mother went to talk to # to mister Vilalta <eh/>.
- @Eg: r
(*NAR3 Quim*)

Notice the strong illocutionary force that there is behind the two markers. There is, in the first case, a threatening attitude towards the teacher. Note that it could not be replaced by *no* unless there was an enunciative change of participant (not addressing the teacher, as he is, but his interlocutor). It is found at the end of an exclamatory utterance that is part of a direct speech fragment. In the second utterance, there is a direct address to the listener. Since it is found at the final story segment, the narrator makes use of it to round it off, too, and come back to present time. As Cuenca (1996) points out, this use of the marker responds to a challenging deictic

attitude of the speaker towards the listener (p.404). This becomes particularly obvious in those cases where the narrator uses *no* all through the narrative until the very end, where s/he uses *eh*. See (142). Here, again, the narrator closes it up by going back to present time by means of *eh*, with a strong evidential character.

(142)

.....

@Bg: ei

*NAR: <bueno\> # una cosa bastant complicada\ #.
<bueno\> # quite a complicated issue\#

@Eg: ei

@Bg: c

*NAR: i ja està\
and that's it

@Eg: c

@Bg: ei

*NAR: s'ho va passar bastant malament <eh/>.
he had a hard time <eh/>.

@Eg: ei

@End

(NAR20 Jordi)

Perhaps the most obvious case is that which presents the two question tag forms in two correlative utterances, as in (143). The excerpt belongs to Elisabet story, above.

(143)

.....

@Bg: r

*NAR: se'n van adonar de seguida.
they realized it right away

*NAR: i me'l # me'l van apagar.
and they # they extinguished it

*NAR: i m'ho van treure tot pel cap.
and they took it off over my head

*NAR: bonament com van poguer <no/>.
as gently as they could <no/>.

*NAR: però # no em vaig fer res <eh/>.
but # I didn't hurt myself <eh/>.

*NAR: no em vaig cremar gens.
I didn't burn myself at all

*NAR: tot i que em va quedar tot el jersei foradat i fet malbé # i el mocador també
<clar/>.
although the pullover ended up full of holes and totally ruined # and the scarf
too <clar/>.

@Eg: r

.....
(NAR15 Elisabet)

If we try to switch the two forms (144), notice that the pragmatic meaning does not radically change but loses its purpose and force. In addition, there is a polyphonic distinctive trait worth taking into consideration.

(144)

i m'ho van treure tot pel cap
and they took it off over my head.

*NAR: ?? bonament com van poguer <eh />
?? *as gently as they could* <eh />

*NAR: ?? però # no em vaig fer res <no/>
?? *but I didn't hurt myself* <no/>.

Note that the telling of the two facts, that of taking off the scarf and sweater that caught fire, and that of not being damaged, are not really addressed to the same enunciative interlocutor. There is a polyphonic use of the two markers: whereas the first performative action is part of the development of the action, that is, of the events being told, the result of not being damaged is an information that the narrator shares directly with the person that is listening to the story.¹⁹⁹ Consequently, I would conclude that *no* and *eh* are two pragmatic markers with a core evidential and presuppositional meaning but which do not exactly share the same enunciative properties and illocutionary force: besides working at the attentional state, *no* facilitates the contextual effects that are necessary to fully understand the message but the use of *eh* carries along a stronger emphatic (deictic and illocutionary) purpose that translates into an overt willingness to address, sometimes even challenge, the interlocutor.²⁰⁰

Finally, let us see the two markers segment distribution in Table (41):

Table 41. Distribution of pragmatic functions of *no?* and *eh?* in Catalan narrative (N and %).

| | | NO? | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|--------|------|-------|
| <i>coherence relations</i> | <i>functions</i> | ABSTR. | ORIENT. | ACTION | I.EVAL. | E.EVAL. | RESULT | CODA | total |
| Rhetorical | EVI | – | 45 | 150 | 129 | 78 | 42 | – | 444 |
| and | CTX | | 10.0% | 33.9% | 28.9% | 17.8% | 9.4% | | |
| Inferential | PRO | | | | | 46.7% | | | |

| | | EH? | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------|--------|------------|-------------|------------|---------------------|------------|------|-------|
| <i>coherence relations</i> | <i>functions</i> | ABSTR. | ORIENT. | ACTION | I.EVAL. | E.EVAL. | RESULT | CODA | total |
| Rhetorical and Inferential | EVI CTX PRO | – | 6 14.3% | 12 28.6% | 9 21.4% | 6 14.3% 35.7% | 9 21.4% | – | 42 |

Key to pragmatic functions coding: see Appendix 2.

Two data stand out from the above figures. Firstly, the predominant role of *no* and, to a lesser extent, *eh* in evaluative segments (46.7% and 35.7% respectively). Secondly, the high presence of *eh* in the result (21.4%). The first finding supports what has been suggested in previous pages, namely that these two tag markers are used by the speaker with the purpose of sharing a common ground, evidencing intentions, thoughts and attitudes. As focal elements, they are found in those parts of the monologue that are bound to offer proximity or complicity to the listener, that is, in evaluative pieces that the narrator introduces to subjectively comment on a particular fact or event. As for the second finding, the fact that *eh* is found in the result in higher proportion than *no* proves also the aforementioned distinctive trait about this marker. At the end of the story, the speaker goes back to present time²⁰¹ and addresses the passive listener directly by means of *eh* (see 141 and 143 above). As was previously pointed out, there is a particular emphatic illocutionary force behind its use that translates into a challenging attitude of the speaker when using it. This straightforward address to the listener takes place at the end of the story, when the telling of events has finished, rather than meanwhile. In this sense, note that, contrary to what occurs with *no*, in the case of *eh*, figures in action and result segments are quite balanced (28.6% and 21.4% respectively).

In sum, *no?* and *eh?* are two pragmatic markers that exhibit the intonational, pragmatic and syntactic properties of tag questions. Due to their interrogative character, they are always uttered with a fall-rise nuclear tone. In the rhetorical structure, they work as *evidentials*, elements that modalise the utterance manifesting the speaker's attitude and intentions; in this sense, they have a communicative truth-value since they are used by the speaker to overtly show a personal belief, opinion or thought, all of it with a sense of closeness. Their syntactic distribution is directly related to their pragmatic meaning. The fact that they are always placed in clause-final position tells us that *no* and *eh* are *righthand discourse brackets* that work as focal elements that call the listener for special attention. By means of these two markers, the narrator alerts the listener to a piece of information that is worth paying special attention to, one to be taken into account. In addition, in the case of monologued discourse such as narrative, their use involves an overt willingness to

share a common ground with the passive interlocutor and a desire of acceptance of what is being told. In this respect, contrary to what has been suggested by some authors, their role goes beyond a pure 'back-channeling', used only to maintain the communicative line open. This latter point links with the most outstanding property of tag question markers, which is their inferential and presuppositional value. By means of a linguistic device of this sort, the speaker assumes and presupposes a shared knowledge with the listener of the story. It is, in this respect, a push marker that helps the story progress since, when used, there is a significant amount of information that is implicit or understood. This is specially true of *no*. In addition to this, in the case of *eh* the illocutionary force increases being often used to directly challenge or even threaten the interlocutor. There is then a straightforward address to the listener that, in monologued discourse, translates into an implicit desire to be believed and understood. When used together with *no*, there is a polyphonic use of *eh* that results into a change of enunciative interlocutor. In narrative structure, *no* and *eh* have a sound presence in evaluative segments, internal ones in particular. This supports the above mentioned subjective value of these two markers, used by the speaker to establish a close cognitive link with the listener and a sharing of common ground.

6.2 Catalan compound pragmatic markers

Data show that Catalan narrators use compound pragmatic markers (from now on CPM) profusely. In previous sections I defined CPMs as functional cooccurrences of two or more pragmatic markers whose combinatory functions result in a change of attentional state of the speaker, or shift in cognitive frame, and/or a remarkable emphasis on the illocutionary point of the segment. Take, for example, (145). It is the beginning of a story about a car accident. The three segments — abstract, orientation, and external evaluation — start with a CPM.

(145)

.....

@Begin

@Participants: NAR19 Joan Narrator

@Age of NAR: 26;

@Sex of NAR: male

@Bg: a

*NAR: <bueno\doncs_ # en fi\> # no ho sé\.

<bueno\doncs_ # en fi\> # I don't know\

%dia: \$ab

%pra: \$FRA \$DEL \$CLU

- %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: ah # mmm # he triat això.
ah # mmm # I've chosen this
 *NAR: com podia haver triar una altra cosa.
as I could have chosen something different
 *NAR: però és una cosa.
but this is something
 *NAR: que em va passar.
that occurred to me
 *NAR: i que em va quedar.
and that it stuck in my mind
 *NAR: a més és una cosa ben tonta.
and it is a very silly event
 *NAR: que és un petit accident de cotxe que vaig tenir.
it is a small car accident that I had
- @Eg: a
 @Bg: ocs
 *NAR: <aleshores_ah # bueno\> mmm # jo anava amb una # amb una noia\
 <aleshores_ah # bueno\> mmm # I was going with a # with a girl\
 %dia: \$or:CO
 %pra: \$FRA \$DEL \$SIT
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: i anàvem tot sovint de Llagostera.
and we used to go from Llagostera
 *NAR: que és on ella vivia.
which is where she lived
 *NAR: fins a Girona per agafar l'autobús.
to Girona to catch the bus
 *NAR: per venir aquí a l'Autònoma.
to come here to the Autònoma university
- @Eg: ocs
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: <llavors_bueno\> # jo feia poc_
 <llavors_bueno\> # I had recently_
 *NAR: que # que tenia el meu landrover i el meu carnet de conduir
 simultàniament\
*I had recently got my landrover and my driving license simultanously\
 %dia: \$ev:EX
 %pra: \$FRA \$ADD
 syn: \$d:IN MN

 (NAR19 Joan)*

The three multi-word forms in (145) carry out sequential, rhetorical and inferential discourse component functions. By means of the multi-word marker, there is a

speaker's frame shift onto different contextual realms. In Chapter 5 (5.2) I explained the theoretical framework that supported my proposal of CPM at length. As a way to summarize it, let us recall that Maschler (1998) investigates discourse markers as one of the main cues through which frame shifts become manifest. This involves not only speaker's alignments, but also text-world, linguistic structures, prior and shared knowledge, etc. According to Maschler, discourse markers can provoke a *narrational frame shift* working as referential, interpersonal, structural, and cognitive cues. A *discourse marker cluster* is the materialized form that indicates a shift from a number of contextual realms; each marker in the cluster indicates a different shift (pp. 24,32,48). I draw a possible parallelism between Maschler's contextual realms and the four discourse structure components (ideational, rhetorical, sequential and inferential) that I propose as framework for the study of pragmatic markers in narrative.

Note that this cognitive operation takes place just by using one linguistic form. Let us analyze the three markers in (145) in detail. First of all, the three markers have a clear structural role since they are all used to open up a new segment (framing function). The switch from the sequential onto the rhetorical component comes, in the first case, when Joan responds to the interviewer's question (*have you ever been in a situation of danger?*) doubting about the appropriateness of his answer (<bueno doncs en fi> *no ho sé* [<bueno doncs en fi> *I don't know*]). Such stalling is carried out by *doncs*, an illative marker that often leads to conclusive assertions and is sometimes used to play for time to think; finally, the use of *en fi* closes up the stalling process and facilitates the declarative utterance. In the second case, the shift of the speaker's cognitive frame — and therefore of focus of attention — comes with *bueno*. The narrator has introduced the orientation of characters and space by means of *aleshores*, a marker that has proved to have a primary role in the sequential structure, at segment boundaries in particular, and wants to anchor the listener in the text-world from the start. He makes a shift from a sequential to a cognitive contextual realm. The third compound marker introduces external information that Joan considers is relevant for what he is about to tell: (<llavors bueno> *jo feia poc que tenia el meu landrover i el meu carnet de conduir* [<llavors bueno> *I had recently got my landrover and my driving license*]). He does it by means of *llavors*, a marker that is basically used to introduce the succession of events, intentions, and thoughts. Here, the marker is used to introduce a piece of information that the narrator thinks is important for the listener; there is, within the same linguistic unit, a shift from sequential to rhetorical discourse structure components.

Notice that the three CPMs in (145) include *bueno*, a polyfunctional marker that has a strong presence in the rhetorical structure of the narratives (54.1%). But the most outstanding fact is that, in the three patterns, this marker is used, in cooccurrence with another, to facilitate a shift onto distinct contextual realms: in

the first, it is the structural; in the second, the cognitive; and in the third, the rhetorical. It is a proof of the pragmatic richness of discourse markers as procedural linguistic pieces that help the listener interpret and at the same time process the information given.

When there is a cooccurrence of two or more pragmatic functions, there is a change in the attentional state of the hearer but there can be a reinforcement of the illocutionary force of the segment, too. Such is the role that the CPM in (146) fulfils. Notice that there is a repetition of one marker — *doncs* — that makes it possible. Josep is explaining the hard time that he and his friend once had when trying to swim back to the sea shore.

(146)

.....

@Bg: da

*NAR: però no hi havia manera de tornar.
but there was no way to go back

*NAR: jo anava nedant # nedant # nedant.

I kept swimming # swimming # swimming

*NAR: cada vegada era més lluny.

it was further and further

*NAR: ell al costat m'anava mirant.

he by my side kept looking at me

*NAR: i jo ah # <bé\># hi va haver un moment_.

and I ah # <bé\># there was a moment_

*NAR: <doncs_> que vaig pensar\.

<doncs_> I thought

%dia: \$da

%pra: \$EVI 2DSP

%syn: \$d:MD MN 2IN SB

*NAR: <doncs_res\ # doncs_> ja s'ha acabat\.

<doncs_res\ # doncs_> that's it

*NAR: em deixo anar_.

I let myself go_

*NAR: perquè no puc més\.

because I can't stand it anymore\.

%dia: \$da

%pra: \$DSP \$CLU \$EMP

%syn: \$d:IN MN

*NAR: i # just quan ah # quan ja # allò que em deixava anar.

and # just when ah # when I already # let myself go

*NAR: em va venir una onada.

there came a wave

*NAR: ah # vaig tocar amb la punta dels dits dels peus ah # la sorra # el terra a sota mar.

ah # I touched with the tip of my toes ah #the sand # the sand # the sea bed

@Eg: da

.....
(NAR16 Josep)

The complicating action is reaching its peak. Josep is in the middle of his telling of the events and is providing it with a strong illocutionary force. The inclusion of pragmatic markers help him to do so. At this point, the introduction of a CPM facilitates the task. The three-membered unit materializes a shift from the sequential to the rhetorical realms. Josep makes use of the first *doncs* to frame his own quoted material. Afterwards, the addition of two markers that have an intrinsic conclusive role reinforces the assertiveness of the utterance: <*doncs res doncs ja s'acabat*> (<*doncs res doncs* that's it>). Note that the two last members of the compound unit are not used by the speaker to shift to a different contextual realm, as in (145), but to convey a stronger illocutionary force to the action.

The notable significance that CPMs have in the corpus of Catalan narratives can be accounted for in quantitative and in qualitative terms. The analysis of data shows that there are thirty different patterns built around eight markers. See the combinations found in Table (42) with number of occurrences.

Table 42. Catalan CPMs in oral narrative

| | | | |
|------------------------|-----|-------------------------|-----|
| 1. <bueno doncs> | (2) | 2. <bé bueno> | (1) |
| <bueno doncs en fi> | (1) | <bé doncs> | (3) |
| <bueno pues> | (2) | <bé pues> | (1) |
| <bueno clar> | (2) | <bé llavors/ llavorens> | (2) |
| <bueno llavors> | (1) | <bé llavors doncs> | (1) |
| <bueno aleshores> | (1) | <bé o sigui> | (1) |
| <bueno total> | (1) | | |
| <bueno és a dir> | (1) | | |
| <bueno vull dir> | (1) | | |
| 3. <llavors bueno> | (1) | 4. <aleshores bueno> | (5) |
| <llavors bé> | (1) | <aleshores doncs> | (2) |
| <llavors pues> | (1) | <aleshores clar> | (1) |
| <llavorens res> | (1) | | |
| <llavores doncs bueno> | (1) | | |
| 5. <doncs res> | (1) | 6. <clar o sigui> | (2) |
| <doncs mira> | (2) | 7. <pues és clar> | (1) |
| <doncs bé> | (1) | 8. <o sigui res> | (1) |
| <doncs res doncs> | (1) | | |

The total number of occurrences amounts to 43, which, although it is a very small quantity for quantitative analyses and conclusions, is a valuable figure in qualitative terms since it serves to show dominant tendencies shown by certain markers. Later on, we will see their distribution in narrative segments.

According to data in Table (42), the marker that presents the richest combination is *bueno* (9), followed by *bé* (6), *llavors* (5), *doncs* (4) and, finally, *aleshores* (3). There are then three isolated instances with *clar*, *pues*, and *o sigui*. Data on CPMs reflect the weight that each marker has when working individually. Hence, in previous sections we saw that *bueno* has proved to be an extremely useful linguistic tool that is often used by the speaker with a wide range of pragmatic functions, mainly centered on the rhetorical structure but also on the sequential. Most of the frame shifts carried out by *bueno*-CPM are from sequential to rhetorical contextual realms. In the case of *bé*-CPM, this also occurs but since this marker has a strong role as text-world anchoring device, the shift is also done from and to the inferential component. *Llavors* CPM departs either from the ideational or sequential structures and shifts onto rhetorical and inferential. *Aleshores* and *doncs* CPMs are also used to facilitate the shift from the sequential to the rhetorical structures. Let us see all this in detail in Figure (11).

Besides showing the structural shift undertaken by CPMs, Figure 11 also shows their functional distribution. Notice that rhetorical and sequential structures are, in this order, those that present the highest number of functions. Within these, framing, conclusion, resumption, text-world anchoring, and temporal sequencing of events are the most relevant roles carried out. Note that all of them involve an important movement within the text. The fact that this phenomenon occurs materialized in a two or three-membered linguistic unit tells us the strong potential of CPMs in oral discourse.

Working as real textual hinges, CPMs do not only facilitate the cognitive procedural task of the listener when decoding and interpreting a given piece of information, but also economize its processing cost. This is especially true of the colloquial oral register since, contrary to what occurs with written discourse, when the speaker is engaged in the flow of speech there is no time to stop and think about the coming utterance. The frame shift from and to a contextual realm, in Maschler's terms, is then much easier if a CPM is used.

| | Sequential | Rhetorical | Inferential | Ideational | <i>structural shift</i> |
|------------------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------------------|
| <bueno doncs> | fra | | | sit | (SEQ > INF) |
| <bueno doncs en fi> | fra | del | clu | | (SEQ > RHE>RHE) |
| < bueno pues> | dsp | clu | | | (SEQ > RHE) |
| | frc | clu | | | (SEQ > RHE) |
| <bueno clar> | | clu | evi | | (RHE > RHE) |
| <bueno llavors> | | evi | clu | con | (RHE > IDE > RHE) |
| <bueno aleshores> | | clu | | seq | (RHE > IDE) |
| <bueno total> | ini | clu | | | (SEQ > RHE) |
| <bueno és a dir> | fra | com | | | (SEQ > RHE) |
| <bueno vull dir> | fra | del | clu | | (SEQ > RHE > RHE) |
| <bé bueno> | fra | top | sit | | (SEQ > RHE > INF) |
| <bé doncs> | | rec | sit | | (RHE > INF) |
| | fra ini | clu | | | (SEQ > SEQ > RHE) |
| | fra | rec | sit | | (SEQ > RHE > INF) |
| <bé pues> | ini | clu | sit | | (SEQ > INF > RHE) |
| <bé llavors/llavorens> | | | sit | seq | (INF > IDE) |
| <bé llavors doncs> | fra | rec | evi | sit | (SEQ>RHE>RHE> INF) |
| <bé o sigui> | fra | eva | add | clu | (SEQ>RHE>RHE>RHE) |
| <llavors bueno> | fra | add | | | (SEQ > RHE) |
| <llavors bé> | fra | com | | | (SEQ > RHE) |
| <llavors pues> | | clu | | con | (IDE > RHE) |
| <llavorens res> | fra | | | ctx seq | (SEQ > IDE > INF) |
| <llavores doncs bueno> | | | | sit seq | (IDE > INF) |
| <aleshores bueno> | fra | del | sit | | (SEQ > RHE > INF) |
| | | rec | clu | seq | (RHE > IDE > RHE) |
| | fra | rec | sit | | (SEQ > RHE > INF) |
| | fra ini | rec | | | (SEQ > SEQ > RHE) |
| | | rec | sit | | (RHE > INF) |
| <aleshores doncs> | | rec | sit | | (RHE > INF) |
| | fra | rec | | | (SEQ > RHE) |
| <aleshores clar> | | evi | pre | seq | (IDE > RHE > INF) |
| <doncs res> | | del | ctx | | (RHE > INF) |
| <doncs mira> | fra | evi | sit | | (SEQ > RHE > INF) |
| | dsp | evi | clu | | (SEQ > RHE > RHE) |
| <doncs bé> | | del | clu | | (RHE > RHE) |
| <doncs res doncs> | dsp | clu | emp | | (SEQ > RHE > RHE) |
| <clar o sigui> | fra | evi | emp | | (SEQ > RHE > RHE) |
| | fra | evi | com | ctx | (SEQ > RHE > RHE> INF) |
| <pues és clar> | | evi | pre | con | (IDE > RHE > INF) |
| <o sigui res> | | eva | ctx | ref | (IDE > RHE > INF) |

Key to pragmatic functions coding: see Appendix 2.

Figure 11. Catalan CPMs structural shift²⁰²

See, now, their distribution into narrative segments in Table (43).²⁰³

Table 43. Distribution of Catalan CPMs in narrative segments

| | ABSTRACT | ORIENT. | ACTION | I. EVAL | EX.EVAL | RESULT | CODA | Total |
|------------------------|----------|---------|--------|---------|---------|--------|------|-------|
| <bueno doncs> | | | 1 | | | | | 2 |
| <bueno doncs en fi> | 1 | | | | | | | 1 |
| <bueno pues> | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 2 |
| <bueno clar> | | | 1 | 1 | | | | 2 |
| <bueno llavors> | | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| <bueno aleshores> | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| <bueno total> | | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| <bueno és a dir> | | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| <bueno vull dir> | | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| <bé bueno> | | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| <bé doncs> | | | 3 | | | | | 3 |
| <bé pues> | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| <bé llavors/llavorens> | | | 2 | | | | | 2 |
| <bé llavors doncs> | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| <bé o sigui> | | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| <llavors bueno> | | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| <llavors bé> | | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| <llavors pues> | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| <llavorens res> | | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| <llavores doncs bueno> | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| <aleshores bueno> | | 1 | 4 | | | | | 5 |
| <aleshores doncs> | | | 2 | | | | | 2 |
| <aleshores clar> | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| <doncs res> | | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| <doncs mira> | | 1 | 1 | | | | | 2 |
| <doncs bé> | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| <doncs res doncs> | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| <clar o sigui> | | | 1 | | 1 | | | 2 |
| <pues és clar> | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| <o sigui res> | | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| N | 1 | 6 | 25 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 43 |
| % | 2.3% | 14.0% | 58.1% | 7.0% | 9.3% | 7.0% | 2.3% | 100% |

The distribution of Catalan CPMs shown in Table (43) indicates that the narrator makes a widespread use of compound markers in all parts of the story, with a higher concentration in the development of the action and at the beginning, when characters, time, place, and geographical space are introduced. This phenomenon finds a plausible explanation if we take into account that it is in these parts of the narrative where the actual telling of events takes place. These segments are the backbone of the story, where the narrator has to clearly present and organize the information provided. Moreover, since s/he is in the middle of the telling, whatever contextual references or personal comments are introduced have to be done in such a way that

- *NAR: i <aleshores_ # bueno\> # havíem tornat de vint-i-set dies/
and <aleshores_ # bueno\> # we had come back from twenty seven days/
- *NAR: no havíem menjat carn_
we hadn't eaten meat_
- %dia: \$da
- %pra: \$FRA \$INI \$REC
- %syn: \$d:IN MN
- @Eg: da
- @Bg: ee
- *NAR: perquè la carn és carn de iak.
because the meat is yak meat
- *NAR: que són aquells bitxos peluts.
that is these hairy animals
- *NAR: aquelles vaques peludes.
these hairy cows

.....
(NAR8 Duran)

Before starting the actual telling of events, Duran has made a long introduction, by means of a long orientation and external evaluation segments, supplying all the additional information that he considered provided the background of the story he was about to tell. At this point, by means of the first CPM, <*bé bueno*>, he shifts onto something concrete, number of days spent there, and roots the listener in the coming discourse. The long digression before the real action begins makes him use another CPM. This enormously facilitates the task of stopping, recovering and initiating the actual telling of events. It is certainly true that these three steps can be equally done with a single pragmatic marker, even without any. We know that the propositional meaning of the message is not affected by its presence or absence. But the quick discourse operation becomes much easier if a unit of these characteristics is used: there is an unnoticed cognitive temporary halt, while all the pieces in the text adjust, that allows the speaker to have some time to think. I would conclude that its main contribution to the text is that it cuts procedural costs and economizes processing efforts to the listener. This can particularly be observed in those instances where there is a three-step-shift that involves the inferential component, as in (148). The narrator is explaining her coming down of a high tower.

(148)

-
- *NAR: tranquil·la # que t'agafem.
calm down # that we have you
- *NAR: que no passa res.
everything is fine
- *NAR: dic.

- I say
- *NAR: sí # no sé què passa.
yes # I don't know what's going on
- *NAR: ha sigut la sensació de que #.
it's been the feeling that #
- *NAR: de no tenir una paret.
not to have a wall
- *NAR: on tocar.
that I can touch
- *NAR: allò # estar així.
like # to be like
- @Eg: da
- @Bg: r
- *NAR: i <llavorens_# res># va ser un moment\
and <llavorens_# res># it was a moment
- %dia: \$re
- %pra: \$FRA \$SEQ \$CTX
- %syn: \$d:IN MN
- @Eg: r
- @Bg: ei/e
- *NAR: però no m'havia passat mai.
but it had never occurred to me before
- *NAR: perquè normalment no tinc vertigen.
because I don't usually feel dizzy

.....
(NAR12 Rosa)

The prosody of Catalan CPMs is not uniform. There is usually an addition of individual intonation contours so that each member maintains its prosodic features. Usually, there is a pause after the first member that works as shift barrier, be it with flat, falling or rising tone. See (149), for instance. The narrator makes use of two compound markers that have a wide range of functional shifts. The first member is uttered with a falling nuclear tone, followed by a pause; the following marker is uttered flat. This intonational pattern is quite representative of CPMs intonation contours.

(149)

-
- *NAR: i el tio no ens va veure.
and the guy didn't see us
- *NAR: i # ens va picar <no/>.
and # he hit us <no/>.
- %dia: \$da
- %pra: \$PRO \$CTX

- %syn: \$d:FN MN
 @Eg: da/ocs
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: i <clar\ # o sigui_> # la situació de perill era aquesta <no/>.
 and <clar\ # o sigui_> # that was the situation of danger <no/>.
- %dia: \$ev:EX
 %pra: \$FRA \$EVI \$CTX \$COM 2PRO 2CTX
 %syn: \$d:IN MN 2FN MN
 *NAR: que et veus allà assegut.
 that you see yourself sitting there
- *NAR: i és com en els # els mals sons aquells de pel·lícula <no/>.
 and it's like those # those nightmares in films <no/>.
- %dia: \$ev:EX
 %pra: \$PRO \$CTX
 %syn: \$d:FN MN
 *NAR: que veus el camió que recula cap a tu.
 that you see the lorry moving backwards towards you
- *NAR: i # a més # es inexplicable que recules <no/>.
 and # besides # it's inexplicable that it went backwards <no/>.
- %dia: \$ev:EX
 %pra: \$PRO \$CTX
 %syn: \$d:FN MN
 @Eg: ee
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: i <bé\ # llavors doncs_> baixa:\ #.
 and <bé\ # llavors doncs_> he got out:\ #.
- %dia: \$da
 %pra: \$FRA \$REC \$EVI \$SIT
 %syn: \$d:IN MN
 *NAR: i # evidentment <doncs_> el camioner <doncs_> no tenia assegurança.
 and # obviously <doncs_> the lorry driver <doncs_> had no insurance
- @Eg: da
 @Bg: ee
 *NAR: perquè m'imagino que molts camions no tenen assegurança.
 because I imagine that most lorries don't have insurance

.....
 (NAR4 Anna)

The above examples may serve to illustrate another characteristic feature of CPMs, related to syntactic distribution. All the forms found in the narratives are systematically placed at the beginning of the clause, so it could be concluded that Catalan CPMs work as *lefthand discourse brackets*. The distributional nature of the first pragmatic marker that co-occurs is probably what causes such regularity. Notice,

however, that contrary to what occurs with single forms, their mobility within the clause is restricted. In addition, a reversal is not possible. Let's take, for instance, the three compounds in (145) above.

- *NAR: <bueno\doncs_# en fi\> # no ho sé\
 *no ho sé <bueno\doncs_# en fi\
 <bueno\doncs_# en fi\> # I don't know\
 *I don't know <bueno\doncs_# en fi\>
- *NAR: <aleshores_ah # bueno\> mmm # jo anava amb una # amb una noia\
 *jo anava amb una # amb una noia\ <aleshores_ah # bueno\
 <aleshores_ah # bueno\> mmm # I was going with a # with a girl\
 *I was going with a # with a girl\ <aleshores_ah # bueno\>
- *NAR: <llavors_bueno\> # jo feia poc que # que tenia el meu landrover i el meu carnet de conduir simultàniament\
 * jo feia poc que # que tenia el meu landrover i el meu carnet de conduir simultàniament\ <llavors_bueno\
 <llavors_bueno\> # I had recently got my landrover and my driving license simultaneously\
 * I had recently got my landrover and my driving license simultaneously\
 <llavors_bueno\>

Note also that in the case of temporal adverbials like *aleshores* and *llavors* the reversal of the form results in a change in meaning, from pragmatic to referential (i.e. 'at the time'). The possibility of reversing the members sometimes exists but, again, there is a restriction when the units involved have ideational markers.²⁰⁴ The more grammaticalized the unit is, the higher its pragmatic value, so only with units where the referential meaning is totally lost is switching possible (*bé bueno* > *bueno bé*; *doncs bé* > *bé doncs*; *bueno clar* > *clar bueno*). But even in these cases there are exceptions since there is not always a form-function correlate when the members are switched (see Figure 11).

In sum, the cooccurrence of various pragmatic markers cannot be viewed in purely descriptive terms. It responds to the speaker's need to set his/her footprint in the different discourse levels, from referential to interpersonal, structural, and cognitive. Hence, by means of the compound marker the speaker moves from one of these contextual realms to another easily, segmenting and at the same time narrowing down and facilitating the possible inferences and presuppositions. Because of the intrinsic procedural meaning of pragmatic markers, these compound units reduce, to a large extent, the processing cost of information.

6.3 Recapitulation

Catalan narrators use pragmatic markers profusely when telling a past personal experience. They do it within and across narrative segments, to delimit the boundaries and to facilitate the transmission of ideas, thoughts and actions. These linguistic cues signal the narrator's intentions, help convey the required illocutionary force to the discourse, and focus the hearer's attention on a specific contextual space. In addition, they play a central role in our mental knowledge store since they facilitate the sharing of this knowledge and therefore of common ground. The incidence of pragmatic discourse markers in Catalan oral narrative structure is summarized in Table (44):

Table 44. Functional incidence of pragmatic markers in Catalan narrative discourse structure (%). (for absolute figures, see Table 22)

| | IDEATIONAL STRUCTURE | PRAGMATIC STRUCTURE | | |
|-----------|------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| | logico-semantic relations | RHETORICAL STRUCTURE | SEQUENTIAL STRUCTURE | inferential component |
| BÉ | 3.8 | 26.4 | 39.6 | 30.2 |
| BUENO | 16.0 | 54.1 | 22.3 | 7.6 |
| CLAR | – | 47.9 | 14.1 | 38.0 |
| DONCS | 4.5 | 64.2 | 22.4 | 8.9 |
| PUES | 13.6 | 54.6 | 18.2 | 13.6 |
| LLAVORS | 51.5 | 30.3 | 15.2 | 3.0 |
| ALESHORES | 25.7 | 25.7 | 40.0 | 8.6 |
| NO | – | 33.3 | – | 66.7 |
| EH | – | 33.3 | – | 66.7 |

Table (44) shows that most functions carried out by Catalan markers are related to the rhetorical component of the narrative, followed by the sequential, inferential, and ideational. The markers whose functions are more tied to the rhetorical structure are, in this order, *bueno*, *doncs*, *pues* and *clar*. In different parts of the story, these four markers have proved to have a preponderant role. *Bueno* is often used to reformulate an idea, to add, clarify, or introduce a concluding remark; it can also work as evidential, emphaser or resumptive cue. *Doncs* and *pues* have an intrinsic illative meaning that makes them suitable for the introduction of conclusion and summing up assertions. They are also used by the speaker to play for time to think, to stress the illocutionary force of the utterance, to evaluate, and to regain the argumentative thread. Finally, *clar* is generally used by the speaker to convey assertiveness and evidence to an utterance.

The markers whose primary roles are linked to the sequential structure are *bé* and *aleshores*. They are mostly found at segment boundaries, initiating the complicating action part and opening quoted material.

The role of markers as cues that facilitate the contextual effects and shared knowledge is exemplified, in Catalan narrative, by *no*, *eh*, *clar* and, *bé*. As such, they all facilitate the transmission of the illocutionary point of the text. *No* and *eh* are used by the speaker as focal elements that call the listener for special attention. Their use involves an overt willingness to share common ground as well as an assumption of complicity with the listener. In addition, there is a concealed desire of acceptance of what is being told that is stronger in the particular case of *eh*. It is then used to address the interlocutor directly, with an implicit desire to be believed or understood. *Clar* is a useful resource often used by the speaker to help the listener process presuppositions. There is a straightforward influence of its lexical meaning on its pragmatic value since its core evaluative and highly subjective character facilitates the sharing of experience. In the inferential discourse plane, *bé* is mainly used by the speaker to anchor the interlocutor in the text-world.

See, now, the results that show the connexion between pragmatic values and text-genre under analysis in Table (45).

Table 45. Results of the functional distribution of Catalan pragmatic markers in narrative segments. (N and %).

| | ABSTRACT | ORIENT. | ACTION | I. EVAL | EX.EVAL | RESULT | CODA | Total |
|------------------|----------|---------|--------|---------|---------|--------|------|-------|
| <i>bé</i> | – | 16 | 25 | 6 | 2 | 4 | – | 53 |
| <i>bueno</i> | 2 | 21 | 69 | 28 | 20 | 15 | 2 | 157 |
| <i>clar</i> | – | 2 | 13 | 31 | 20 | 5 | – | 71 |
| <i>doncs</i> | – | 18 | 27 | 8 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 67 |
| <i>pues</i> | 1 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 4 | – | – | 22 |
| <i>llavors</i> | – | 12 | 32 | 7 | 4 | 11 | – | 66 |
| <i>aleshores</i> | – | 8 | 18 | 4 | 5 | – | – | 35 |
| <i>no</i> | – | 45 | 150 | 129 | 78 | 42 | – | 444 |
| <i>eh</i> | – | 6 | 12 | 9 | 6 | 9 | – | 42 |
| total | 3 | 132 | 353 | 228 | 145 | 90 | 6 | 957 |
| | 0.3% | 13.8% | 36.9% | 23.8% | 15.2% | 9.4% | 0.6% | |

The functional distribution of Catalan markers shown in Table (45) suggests that their use is linked to specific narrative segments and that, to a certain extent, it is context-dependent. The use that the speaker makes of a specific marker is not arbitrary. It is linked to the speaker's intentions, to the way that a given piece of information is structured, and to the implicit content and subjectivity of the informant. According to results in Table (45), action and evaluation are the two parts of the narrative where Catalan markers have the strongest presence. Al-

though these two parts are, quantitatively speaking, quite balanced, the number of functions carried out in internal evaluation doubles that found in external evaluation. This fact can be explained if we take into account that it is precisely in these narrative segments where the voice of the speaker is more clearly shown: commenting on the events, and exposing thoughts and inner-feelings about them. In contrast, external evaluation is objective information added to the story to clarify, add, or precise a piece of information. The use of cues that transmit the intentional state of the discourse and the possible inferences to be drawn is, consequently, much less required.

No and *bueno* play a key role in the telling of events. We have seen that *bueno* is a pragmatically rich marker in the transmission of intentions and illocutionary force that has a strong presence in the rhetorical and sequential narrative structures. *No* is finally-uttered all through, but more in evaluative units. This can be explained by its primary role as a cue that facilitates the sharing of common ground and proximity with the listener. In action units, it basically works as evidential and focal element. *Llavors*, *doncs*, *bé* and *aleshores* are all characterized by their key role in the temporal organization of events and their ability to present facts objectively. In most cases, their referential meaning directly influences their pragmatic use. In addition, *bé* and *aleshores* are text-structuring markers that are very valuable in the action-evaluation-action recurrent pattern that conforms the body of the narrative.

If we focus on evaluation, we see that, after *no*, *clar* and *bueno* are the chief markers. The polyfunctionality of *bueno* can serve to explain why it is present all through, not only in evaluation but in all narrative segments. Note that *bueno* is the only marker that appears from abstract to coda. As far as *clar* is concerned, it is mostly found in evaluative segments that are closely intertwined with the development of action, namely at the peak of the story, when the narrator is totally involved in showing not only the events but the point of it. The pragmatic richness of *clar* as a tool used by the speaker to help the listener process presuppositions provides a plausible explanation for that finding. By means of markers such as *clar* and *no* the speaker does not only manifest an opinion or thought openly, but shows involvement of the self and of the listener, looks for understanding, complicity, and proximity. In other words, core evaluative markers such as these intend to bridge two voices, that of the speaker and that of the listener, working, to my understanding, as polyphonic elements.

The hypothesis that certain pragmatic markers are *markers of intensity* or *intensifiers*, that is, evaluative elements that the narrator uses to show her/his perspective and attitude (Labov 1972b: 378), is confirmed by the role of units such as *clar*, *bueno*, and *no*. All of them are cues used by the speaker to effect cooperation, sharing, or intimacy. By means of these markers, the speaker confirms shared

assumptions and checks or expresses understanding. The nature of these interpersonal functions makes them an extremely useful resort used by the speaker to openly show the inner-voice.

The above findings, summarized and quantified in Tables (44) and (45), support the hypothesis that pragmatic markers are linguistic units whose textual and interpersonal functions are closely linked to text-genre. This assumption takes me to conclude that they are not generically and arbitrarily used by the speaker, but strategically placed. This point, widely discussed in previous pages, is central to confirm that their role in discourse cannot be viewed — only — in purely phatic terms. Using the term *filler* for a pragmatic marker²⁰⁵ suggests that its function is just that of ‘filling’ an empty space and that is therefore a totally meaningless linguistic unit. Such view may be justified if argued in logico-semantic and syntactic terms, taking only the descriptive mode into consideration, but not if semantic-pragmatic and procedural meaning is considered. If such was the nature of pragmatic markers, *any* marker could appear in *any* part of the text without a particular reason for using one or another. There would then be an arbitrary choice on the speaker’s part, which, as has been seen, is not the case.

CHAPTER 7

Contrastive analysis of English and Catalan pragmatic markers

7.1 Oral narrative: English and Catalan structural differences

In order to prove that markers play a decisive role in the narrative ideational, rhetorical, sequential, and inferential components, and that certain markers are bound to occur at certain narrative segments, previous knowledge of the nature of all the parts that conform the narrative seems appropriate; otherwise, the segment-marker link would hardly be understood. It is therefore with this purpose that a brief account of English and Catalan structural patterns have been drawn and compared.

The analysis of English and Catalan narratives of personal experience undertaken has suggested some important considerations to be discussed and contrasted. First thing that should be pinpointed is that narratives in both languages present similar structural patterns, that is, both include, to a higher or lower degree, the six sequentially ordered parts proposed by Labov's model. Therefore, there are not, in this respect, striking differences. There are, nevertheless, distinctions as for length of narratives and specifics of each of their parts. Both items will be discussed in the following lines.

The length of the narratives has been calculated according to number of clauses and segments. English narratives are shorter than Catalan narratives in both respects, taking into account that the existence of more clauses does not imply more segments and vice versa.²⁰⁶ Data presented along support it:

English narratives

Table 46. Average number of clauses per segment

| | | |
|------------------------------|------|--------|
| Total <i>tiers</i> /clauses: | 1391 | = 5.20 |
| Total <i>dia</i> /segments: | 267 | |

Table 47. Average number of segments per narrative

| | | |
|-----------------------------|-----|--------|
| Total <i>dia</i> /segments: | 267 | = 13.3 |
| Total narratives: | 20 | |

Catalan narratives

Table 48. Average number of clauses per segment

| | | |
|------------------------------|------|--------|
| Total <i>tiers</i> /clauses: | 2012 | |
| | | = 6.85 |
| Total <i>dial</i> /segments: | 295 | |

Table 49. Average number of segments per narrative

| | | |
|------------------------------|-----|--------|
| Total <i>dial</i> /segments: | 295 | |
| | | = 14.7 |
| Total narratives: | 20 | |

Hence, the difference is patent in both total number of clauses (1391 English in front of 2021 Catalan) and total number of segments (267 English in front of 295 Catalan). The consequences are, nevertheless, not outstanding from the structural point of view, since both languages present, independently of length, a similar narrative pattern.

However, from the point of view of conversational cooperation, there could be some further implications. Thus, according to Grice's *cooperative principle* and the *maxim of quantity* in particular (be as informative as possible but not more than necessary), a plausible explanation could be that Catalan narrators tend to be more explicit than English narrators in their responses to a personal experience question. This would account not only for length of narratives in number of clauses but for discourse segmentation as well (i.e. more segments). Nonetheless, a concluding explanation should require a contrastive analysis of more languages to effectively prove that English narratives of personal experience are, broadly speaking, shorter than other languages' narratives and thus confirm the above hypothesis.

But when going down to specifics of *pure* versus *combined* segments,²⁰⁷ narratives do show some differences. Catalan narratives double the number of English narratives as for combined segments (21.8% in front of 10.0%). Furthermore, the highest number of Catalan combined segments is found in complicating action sequences (mostly paired with orientation), whereas the highest number of English combinatory pairings are found in evaluation sequences (paired with internal or external evaluation). So it seems that whereas Catalan narrators are mainly concerned about the telling of events and, at the same time, situating the listener in terms of participants, time and setting, English narrators' main concern lies on the extra information provided to the listener (external evaluation) together with personal manifestations on the lived experience (internal evaluation). Nevertheless, notice that this only applies to combined segments. In absolute terms — pure segments and total numbers — both English and Catalan narrators devote similar time to the different narrative parts. The data below show it:

Table 50. Contrastive analysis of pure vs. combined narrative segments.

| | <i>English</i> | | | <i>Catalan</i> | | |
|-------------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| | <i>Pure</i> | <i>Combined</i> | <i>Total</i> | <i>Pure</i> | <i>Combined</i> | <i>Total</i> |
| Abstract | 1.1% | – | 1.0% | 1.0% | – | 0.9% |
| Coda | 0.6% | – | 0.6% | 1.0% | – | 0.8% |
| Orientation | 10.7% | 25.0% | 12.1% | 9.8% | 27.1% | 13.6% |
| C. Action | 56.9% | 31.2% | 54.3% | 50.0% | 43.6% | 48.3% |
| Evaluation | 22.5% | 43.8% | 24.8% | 28.1% | 21.8% | 26.8% |
| Result | 8.2% | – | 7.2% | 10.1% | 7.5% | 9.6% |

In fact, the above data show that Catalan narratives' complicating action only exceeds English narratives' in combined segments; when it comes to pure segments, English surpasses Catalan (56.9% in front of 50.0%). The other marked difference is related to result segments: whereas Catalan presents combined result segments (the only combination being with internal evaluation in two narratives: *NAR4* and *NAR11*), English does not. A plausible explanation may be found in the difficulty that Catalan narrators may have in finishing the telling of a story without including any personal comment that, to their understanding, adds subjectivity and a sense of folksiness with the interlocutor. In this sense, it could be said that whereas English storytellers of personal experiences present a clear-cut ending of the past event, Catalan ones prefer to wrap it with a personal touch.

As far as evaluation sequences are concerned note that, although both languages are quite levelled as for total number of evaluative clauses (24.8% in English; 26.8% in Catalan), they do show marked differences when focusing on evaluation types. The following data prove it:

Table 51. Contrastive analysis of pure vs. combined external and internal evaluation segments

| | <i>English</i> | | | <i>Catalan</i> | | |
|-------------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| | <i>Pure</i> | <i>Combined</i> | <i>Total</i> | <i>Pure</i> | <i>Combined</i> | <i>Total</i> |
| External | | | | | | |
| Evaluation | 40.0% | 30.0% | 38.0% | 44.4% | 41.7% | 44.0% |
| Internal | | | | | | |
| Evaluation | 60.0% | 70.0% | 62.0% | 55.6% | 58.3% | 56.0% |

Thus, in relative terms both English and Catalan narratives present more internal than external evaluation, the difference being more outstanding in English accounts (62.0% internal in front of 38.0% external, for English; 56.0% internal in front of 44.0% external, for Catalan). But as for combined segments, English presents a much higher rate of internal evaluation than Catalan (70.0% of English in front of 58.3% of Catalan). The conclusion to be drawn is that both English and

Catalan narrators devote an important amount of time to subjectively evaluating the events. The difference is that, whereas English narrators embed their evaluation within the story (as shown by the high number of combined evaluation segments), Catalan narrators present it more often in separate evaluation chunks, which is coherent with the type of genre (narrative) under discussion.

Finally, abstract and coda are, in both languages, quite balanced in terms of pure segments and total number of clauses. But neither in English nor in Catalan have combined segments been found. Their lack of regular appearance, as well as their low frequency rate, proves that their role in the structure of the narratives cannot be compared to that of orientation, complicating action and evaluation segments. These three parts have a key role in the structuring of the narratives: orientation because it is a source of important information in cognitive terms, since it helps the listener contextualize the events along the coordinates time, space and participants; complicating action because it is the backbone of the narrative, what conforms it; and evaluation because it provides the reason why a person has a special interest in explaining a given story. In this respect, both English and Catalan narrative segments follow, on a frequency scale, the same order:

Table 52. Contrastive analysis of English and Catalan overall narrative structure (clausal)

| English narratives | | | Catalan narratives | | |
|---------------------|-----|-------|---------------------|-----|-------|
| Complicating Action | 755 | 54.3% | Complicating Action | 976 | 48.3% |
| Evaluation | 344 | 24.8% | Evaluation | 542 | 26.8% |
| Orientation | 169 | 12.1% | Orientation | 276 | 13.6% |
| Result | 101 | 7.2% | Result | 195 | 9.6% |
| Abstract | 14 | 1.0% | Abstract | 17 | 0.9% |
| Coda | 8 | 0.6% | Coda | 15 | 0.8% |

Data in Table (52) have been drawn from total number of clauses. Notice that, although in absolute terms Catalan narrative figures exceed those of English narratives, in relative terms they are quite close. This takes us to conclude that, except for specifics related to segments type — pure vs. combined — English and Catalan narratives of personal experience do not present important structural differences. Whether these findings can be considered universals or not will depend on parallel studies on other languages.

The following section compares the results of the study and draws possible parallelisms and differences between forms and functions of English and Catalan pragmatic markers. Plausible interpretations and conclusions will follow.

7.2 Function versus form

In order to establish similarities and differences between markers, tables and data included in previous pages will be used and compared. Following the distinction and classification that was proposed in previous chapters, I will discuss the findings according to the type of coherence relation set up, treating each structure separately. After this, results will be discussed.

A separate section will deal with the distribution of markers into narrative segments. There, whenever a correspondence between function and form of a marker has not been found, a discussion and examples will be provided of other lexical resources and/or linguistic mechanisms that are used in place of markers, to carry out their functional role.

According to global results, the widest range of pragmatic functions is offered by markers whose roles are linked to the rhetorical narrative structure, where the narrator's attitude, intentions, and thoughts are manifested (44.1% English and 39.6% Catalan).

In the case of English markers, rhetorical structure is followed by the sequential (25.7%), ideational (22.2%) and, finally, the inferential component (8%). In the case of Catalan markers, it is the inferential component that has a strong presence (41.1%) due to the high number of occurrences of *no*, a tag-marker whose functions are intrinsically presuppositional; sequential and ideational structures (11.4% and 7.9% respectively) follow it distantly. The following pages are devoted to see all these structures and components in detail.

7.2.1 Markers in the ideational structure

Three functions are linked to the narrative ideational component: (i) cause-consequence, (ii) reformulation, and (iii) temporal sequencing of the events. The function-form relationship in both languages is as follows.²⁰⁸

– Consecutive or resultative relations:

English: *so, then*

Catalan: *doncs, pues, llavors*

Consecutive relations are mostly carried out by *so* in English narratives and *doncs*, *pues* and *llavors* in Catalan narratives. However, it is worth noticing that, according to results (see Tables 3 and 22, Chapters 5 and 6), any of the three Catalan forms can be considered counterparts of *so* in frequency terms since the use of the English unit highly exceeds the Catalan. Such finding may find a plausible explanation in the different lexical forms that Catalan language uses to set up a cause-consequence

relationship between a preceding and a following proposition. The translations that the bilingual Catalan-English dictionary²⁰⁹ offers of resultative (a) and pragmatic (b) *so* are the following:

- a. when it is equivalent to adverbial *thus, in this way* and *so that*, it is translated as *així, d'aquesta manera*.
- b. when it is used in interrogative and exclamatory clauses, as conjunction, it is translated as *doncs*:

so you are not coming? > *doncs, no veniu?*

so there they are! > *aquí els tenim, doncs!, doncs, mira'ls!*

The adverbial Catalan forms *així* and *d'aquesta manera* are, according to the dictionary, the Catalan translation of resultative *so*, but these two forms are not considered discourse markers in the database since they set up logico-semantic coherence relations. Although it is true that *doncs*, *pues* and *llavors* sometimes play a consecutive or resultative role, it is not their dominant function: *doncs* and *pues* are two conjunctions used to bridge cause and consequence but, due to a gradual process of grammaticalization, their meaning in discourse has become highly pragmatized. According to data shown in Table 22 (Chapter 6), this lexicalization has resulted in a significant use of the two markers to introduce conclusion or summing-up remarks. Similarly, *llavors* is mostly used as a temporal adverbial, to introduce the sequencing of the events, actions and thoughts.

– Reformulation deserves close attention since, similarly to what occurs with *so*, there is not, in frequency terms, a single Catalan-English counterpart. The markers that have been found to carry out this function are the following:

English: *well, I mean, you know*

Catalan: *bé, bueno, doncs, llavors*

In English, *well, I mean*, and *you know* are used to reformulate previous discourse but none of these three markers stands out from the rest. In contrast, in Catalan narratives one marker has been found that is used to paraphrase previous discourse recurrently: *bueno*. This finding is remarkable for two reasons. First, because *bueno* is a non-standard Catalan form borrowed from Spanish, which is, nonetheless, widely used by Catalan speakers. Secondly, because although this marker carries the same paraphrasing function as typical Catalan reformulatives such as *és a dir, en fi, vull dir*, etc., no reference has been found in Catalan literature about its reformulative potential.²¹⁰ Note that, according to data in Table 22 (Chapter 6), there are four markers used for this purpose (*bé, bueno, doncs* and *llavors*) but, with the exception of *bueno*, none of them can be said to have a core reformulative function.

- Temporal relations:

English: *so, then*

Catalan: *llavors, aleshores*

In frequency terms, temporal relations find a correspondence with English *then* and Catalan *llavors*. Their discourse functions are strongly influenced by their lexical meaning as temporal adverbials, basically used to order the sequencing of the events in narratives. Notice that this function can also be fulfilled by *so* and *aleshores*, although to a much lesser extent.

As pointed out at the beginning of this section, the presence of English pragmatic markers in the ideational narrative structure represents a 22.2% of the total amount of functions. This data contrasts with markers in Catalan ideational structure, where it amounts to 7.9% of functions only. In fact, ideational structure is the one that has the weakest weight in Catalan narrative, as far as the presence of pragmatic markers is concerned; in English, ideational and sequential structures are balanced (22.2% and 25.7%, respectively). As it will be discussed on later, in the Recapitulation section (7.4), a plausible explanation to the greater presence of markers in the ideational structure might have to do with the descriptive content of the units, fuller in English and weaker or bleached in Catalan; these differences might be accounted for in terms of different grammaticalization processes through which these lexical pieces have gone in the two languages.

7.2.2 Markers in the rhetorical structure

There are ten functions that pragmatic markers can perform linked to the narrative rhetorical component: addition of information, clarification, introduction of conclusive remarks, comments that add relevant information to the story being told, stalling or playing for time to think, emphasis or reinforcement of the propositional value of the utterance, personal evaluation or comment from the narrator directly related to the events being told, evidencing or saliency of the illocutionary force of the utterance, resumption of line of thought, and topic shifting.

Pragmatic markers in the rhetorical structure of both English and Catalan narratives cover a wide range of functions. They represent 44.1% of the total amount in English, and 39.6% in Catalan, with significant parallelisms and contrasts. The first thing worth highlighting is the high concentration of a given function in Catalan pragmatic markers in contrast with an overall functional distribution in the case of English markers.²¹¹ A detailed list of functions and forms is now provided:

- Addition of information:

English: *well, so, I mean, you know*

Catalan: *bueno, doncs, llavors*

Among the English markers, *so* is the one most used to carry out such function; among the Catalan, *bueno* highly exceeds the rest.

- Clarification:

English: *well, I mean*

Catalan: *bueno*

The clarifying function has a low profile among markers. It could be said that the two English and the only Catalan form that have been found to carry out such function are quite balanced, although the use of *bueno* slightly surpasses *well* and *I mean*.

- Conclusive remarks:

English: *well, so, then, I mean, you know, anyway*

Catalan: *bé, bueno, doncs, pues, llavors, aleshores*

In Catalan, *bueno* and *doncs* rule this function, ahead of *bé, pues, llavors* and *aleshores*, which carry it out much less frequently. In English, the conclusive role can be fulfilled by the six markers analyzed but, contrary to what occurs with Catalan markers, none of them really stands out from the rest. *So* and *anyway* are the two English markers that have a possible correspondence with conclusive *bueno* and *doncs* but, according to findings shown in corresponding Tables (3, Chapter 5, and 22, Chapter 6), not in equal terms.

- Comments that bring up relevant information to the story:

English: *well, so, I mean, you know, anyway*

Catalan: *bé, bueno, clar, pues, llavors, aleshores*

Among the number of markers that are used by the speaker to introduce a comment, English *well* and Catalan *bueno* are the most common, so it could be said that they are counterparts.

- Delaying or playing for time to think:

English: *well, so, I mean*

Catalan: *bé, bueno, doncs, llavors*

The delaying function is mostly fulfilled by Catalan *bueno* and *doncs*, and, to a much lesser extent, English *well*. Contrary to expectations, stalling or playing for time to think is not a primary role of pragmatic markers. While it is true that the two Catalan

markers carry it out, it is not their core function; as for *well*, notice that it is also used for other functions which are much more significant in quantitative terms.

- Emphasis or reinforcement of the propositional value of the utterance:

English: *so, then, I mean*

Catalan: *bueno, clar, doncs*

In English, emphasis is mostly conveyed by *then* and *I mean*. In Catalan, it is mainly done by means of *bueno*, which clearly outstands from the rest.

- Personal evaluation or comment from the speaker:

English: *well, so, I mean, you know, anyway*

Catalan: *bé, bueno, clar, doncs, pues, llavors, aleshores*

Markers that introduce evaluation deserve close attention. Evaluation is essential in the text-genre under analysis since it involves the inclusion of a monitoring feature not found in other parts of the narrative. *So, I mean* and *well* are the three English markers that carry it out the most; in the case of Catalan narrative, it is *bueno* and *clar* that do it far ahead of the rest of markers. We observe that there is not a lexical correspondence or matching between the two language units, with the only exception of *well* and *bueno* that, in rhetorical terms, seem to be closer than the other units. But *clar* and *I mean* are highly subjective markers that are used by the speaker to involve self and others in the communicative act, so it could also be affirmed that they are functionally paired.

- Evidencing or saliency of the illocutionary force of the utterance:

English: *well, so, then, I mean, you know, anyway*

Catalan: *bé, bueno, clar, doncs, llavors, no, eh*

Evidentials are units used by the speaker to show their understanding, intentions and attitude towards the hearer. In Catalan narrative, this is mainly accomplished by *clar*, *no*, and *eh*. In English narrative, no marker has been found to have a predominant role as evidential: all six units analyzed are used by the speaker with this purpose, without a dominant presence of a specific marker. Clause-final *you know* is also considered an evidential tag-marker but very few instances of it have been found. Notice that evidentials have a strong inferential role, so the link between Catalan tags and *you know* can be made in these terms, when the inferential component is discussed.

- Resumption of line of thought:

English: *well, so, then, anyway*

Catalan: *bé, bueno, doncs, pues, llavors, aleshores*

Resumption of argumentative thread or line of thought is the last most outstanding rhetorical function. It is fulfilled by Catalan *bueno*, on a primary plane, and *doncs*, *llavors*, *aleshores* and *bé* on a secondary plane. In English, *so* is the unit that the speaker uses most often to regain the thread broken up by the inclusion of a segment, distantly followed by *anyway*, *then* and *well*. Note that *so* is a marker that still has a strong referential value (setting up cause-consequence relations), a fact which has a direct influence on its pragmatic behaviour: recovering line of thought and opening up new segments, mainly, working as a pop and push marker.

– Topic shifting:

English: *well*, *so*, *then*, *anyway*

Catalan: *bueno*, *doncs*, *llavors*, *aleshores*

Among the English markers that are used by the speaker to shift topic, *so* is the most recurrent. In Catalan, *bueno* and *doncs* are those that seem to be preponderant. However, contrary to what may occur in conversational discourse, topic shifting has not proved to be a ruling function in monologued text, probably due to two elements related to the text-genre under analysis: (a) the fact that there is just a single speaker telling the story, without any verbal interruptions from the interlocutor; (b) the willingness of the speaker to keep on the same argumentative line that leads him/her to the goal being set: explain a past personal experience trying to keep the hearer attentive as much and long as possible.

In the light of these results, I would conclude that the functional non-saliency of English markers contrasts with the functional prominence that some Catalan markers show. The strongest parallelism we can draw is between Catalan *bueno* and English *well*, as far as range of functions is concerned. Note that it is *bueno*, the non-standard form, that is more prominent, and not *bé*, the standard form. Significant enough, *bé* has a core structural role in the sequential component that finds a counterpart in *well*: in frequency terms, *bé* and *well* are mostly used by the speaker to open up a new discourse segment. Hence, it can be concluded that there is a correspondence between *well* and *bueno* in rhetorical structure functions and a correspondence between *well* and *bé* in those related to the sequential structure, to be seen in the coming section.

7.2.3 Markers in the sequential structure

Four functions are linked to the sequential structure: framing of quoted material, opening and closing of discourse segments, and initiation of development of action. From all of these, segment-boundary framing has proved to be the most recurrent structural function carried out by pragmatic markers. Notice that, al-

though low in number of functions, the sequential structure has a dominant presence: in Catalan narrative, from the total number of functions carried out by pragmatic markers, 11.4% are linked to this discourse component, ahead of the ideational one (7.9%); in English, they represent 25.7%, slightly ahead of the ideational (22.2%). See the form-function correspondence in Catalan and English language.

- Framing of quoted material:

English: *well, so, I mean, you know*

Catalan: *bé, bueno, doncs, llavors, aleshores*

Markers used to introduce direct speech embedded within the narrative are, mostly, English *well* and *you know*, and Catalan *bé, bueno, doncs*. Although the two English forms stand out from the rest (in the case of *you know*, only exceeded by the monitoring feature, linked to the inferential component), the five Catalan forms are quite balanced, in terms of frequency of use.

- Opening a discourse segment:

English: *well, so, then, I mean, you know, anyway*

Catalan: *bé, bueno, clar, doncs, pues, llavors, aleshores*

Catalan markers that play a primary structural role are *bueno*, in the first place, and *bé*, in the second place. Others that, to a lesser extent, carry it out are *clar, aleshores, doncs, llavors*, and *pues*. Considering the quantitative data (Tables 3 and 22, Chapters 5 and 6), notice that only *bueno* is overtly ahead the other markers; the rest (except for *pues*) are quantitatively closer. This Catalan marker finds its English correspondence in *so*, primarily, and then *well*. Although the six English units analyzed have this text-structuring property, *so* and *well* are the most recurrent units used by speakers.

There is still a further point to be considered. According to present findings, segment-delimiting is the primary role of *well* and the second one of *so*. It is also the predominant function of *bueno* and *aleshores*, and the second of *bé*. There is a possible *well-bé/bueno* lexical and functional pairing that seems less obvious, and therefore more remarkable, in the case of *so* and *aleshores*. These two markers maintain a strong descriptive content, in the ideational structure (resultative and temporal, respectively). They do not seem to have gone through a long grammaticalization process that accounts for a loss of referential meaning into pragmatic meaning. But data suggest that, besides their descriptive value, their procedural meaning has to be taken into consideration, specially in the case of *aleshores*, a unit seldom used by speakers with a core temporal role (in colloquial register, *llavors* is the chosen variant).

- Closing a discourse segment:

English: *well, so, you know, anyway*

Catalan: *bé, bueno, doncs, llavors*

Contrary to what occurs with markers used to open a discourse segment, the closing is seldom done by means of a marker. According to findings, English *so* and Catalan *bueno* barely stand out from the rest.

- Initiation of development of action:

English: *so, then*

Catalan: *bé, bueno, doncs, aleshores*

The most remarkable finding linked to this function is the preponderant role of *bé* as text-structuring device, in front of *bueno* that, according to findings, has proved to be the richest functional Catalan marker. English *so* is predominant. However, just as it occurs with closing of discourse segments, compared to other functions, the start of complicating action by means of a marker is not especially significant.

7.2.4 Markers in the inferential component

According to the results of the study, very few markers carry out functions that are related to the inferential component. However, those that do, have an outstanding presence in monologued discourse. I am referring to Catalan *clar, bé, bueno, no* and *eh*, and English *you know*. There are six functions linked to this constituent: constraining of contextual effects (narrowing down inferences), face threat mitigation, introduction of presuppositions, monitoring feature (showing proximity and complicity with interlocutor), and text-world anchoring. See them now in detail.

- Constraining of contextual effects:

English: –

Catalan: *clar, no, eh*

Among the Catalan forms, *no* has a predominant presence. As fully discussed in section (6.1.5.), the final question-tag marker *no* has been profusely used by Catalan speakers when narrating a past personal experience. This phenomenon contrasts with English narratives, where utterance-final tags that have a contextual constraining effect, such as *okay?*, *you know?* or *right?*, have barely been found. In fact, there were only two instances of *okay* found in the twenty narratives analyzed (this is the reason why it was excluded from the analysis, as explained at the beginning of Chapter 5) and none of *right*. In addition, the *okay* and *you know* forms found in the database were not utterance-final tags but utterance-initial markers. Although the

primary role of *you know* is also inferential, it is not related to the constraining of contextual effects but to a monitoring feature that has to do with showing proximity and complicity with the interlocutor, to be seen further on.

- Justification of previous or following proposition:

English: –

Catalan. *clar, doncs*

Similarly to what occurs with contextual constraining markers above, no English form has been found that carries out justification and could therefore be correlated with the Catalan forms *clar* and *doncs*. According to Catalan-English bilingual dictionaries, the translation of *clar/és clar* — interjection, not adjective form — into English would correspond to: *of course! obviously! naturally!* but these exclamatory forms have not been found in the database nor do they seem to adjust to the text-genre under analysis, but rather to a conversational discourse where turn-taking is involved.

- Face-threat mitigation:

English: *well*

Catalan: –

Mitigation is a function that has turned out to have a very low profile among English and Catalan markers. Moreover, the only English marker found that carries it out — *well* — does so only a couple of times, so mitigation cannot be said to be a ruling function of *well* in narrative. A plausible explanation probably lies in the sort of text-genre under analysis. Markers that carry out this function are mostly found in conversation, where the saving of face seems to be more important. This may also be the reason why there are no signs of mitigation markers in Catalan narrative, either.

- Introduction of a presupposition:

English: –

Catalan: *clar, pues*

There is a predominant presuppositional role in the Catalan marker *clar* that, as with justification above, does not have an English counterpart in the database. Besides, as previously pointed out, the English translations of the two Catalan forms do not have a functional pairing in English, a fact which raises the issue of the impossibility of looking for an equal form-function matching in two different languages. Rather, the equivalence should be set not in terms of referential/lexical translation but in functional terms.

- Monitoring feature used by the speaker to share mutual background knowledge, and look for proximity, complicity and understanding:

English: *you know*

Catalan: *no, eh*

An interesting result concerns the findings on the sort of markers that carry out a monitoring function: whereas Catalan *no* works as utterance-final tag marker exclusively and with a core monitoring value, English *you know* fulfils this function only in utterance-initial position (half of the occurrences were found in that position). As pointed out when dealing with *you know* (Chapter 5: 5.1.5), the distribution within the clause influences its pragmatic meaning, since, whereas utterance-initial *you know* expresses a sense of intimacy and folksiness that presumes, on the speaker's part, a mutual shared knowledge with the hearer, utterance-final *you know* aims at checking whether the point of the story has got across, working as confirmation check (around twenty three percent were found in that position). Therefore, it could probably be concluded that *no* and *you know* are counterparts in qualitative terms, since they share a common functional trait, but not in quantitative terms since the number of occurrences of *no* highly exceeds that of *you know*.

- Text-world anchoring:

English: *well, so, then*

Catalan: *bé, bueno, doncs, pues, llavors, aleshores*

The narrator's use of markers to anchor the hearer in the narrative world has proved to be very common among Catalan informants. In contrast, English speakers make use of markers for this purpose to a much lesser extent and without any outstanding special form to carry it out. Catalan narrators frequently use *bé*, and *bueno* in the second place, to make the interlocutor aware of the important points to bear in mind in the world that is being constructed. In fact, the anchoring function is the primary function of *bé*, followed by the framing of a segment.

According to present results, in English narratives only proximity and anchoring seem to be significant, as far as the cognitive task of markers is concerned. In Catalan, except for mitigation, all functions are widely represented, although text-world anchoring is the most repeated one. A correspondence between *no* and *eh* tags and *you know* could be set up but, as mentioned above, the English marker seldom appears clause-finally in monologued discourse.

Finally, my findings suggest that the significance of the narrative inferential component linked to the use of pragmatic markers is worth taking into account in Catalan (41.1% of the total amount of functions are related to it). In contrast, this

linguistic property does not seem to have a specific weight in the use of pragmatic markers in English narrative (only 8% of the total amount of functions were directly related to it).

7.2.5 Results

The contrastive analysis of pragmatic markers according to discourse structures tells us that form and function do not always find their correspondent lexical unit in another language. Thus, with the only exception of *well* and *bueno* (to a much lesser extent, *bé*), and of *then* and *llavors*, there is no lexical and referential correspondence²¹² between English and Catalan markers: concluding *anyway* and *so* can be said to have their functional match with concluding *bueno* and *doncs*; resumptive *so* have it with resumptive *bueno* and *doncs*, too. As can be observed, there is not, apparently, any lexical or referential proximity between conjunctive *so* and adverbial *bueno* but they do offer a functional pairing. *Clar* and *I mean* find their correspondence in functional terms too: the two units are often used by speakers to evaluate the events being told, and the same can be said about *no*, *eh* and *you know*, used by the narrator to share common ground and beliefs.

These observations support the thesis maintained all through this work in the sense that the study of discourse markers requires taking into consideration, from the start, the sort of coherence relation that the unit in question sets up with preceding and following utterances. Hence, trying to find referential and lexical equivalents of English and Catalan markers does not seem to be the most appropriate way to approach the issue, if the goal is to find functional counterparts. In the following section, when the distribution of English and Catalan markers is compared, the issue will be retaken.

Chapters 5 and 6 included the description and discussion of English and Catalan Compound Pragmatic Markers (CPM). But there were only six English CPM found, in front of thirty different Catalan forms (3.84% versus 7.70%). There was just one English CPM that appeared twice: <*so anyway*>, which carried out a resumptive and conclusive role in the development of the action. According to present findings, structural shifts facilitated by CPMs in English narratives were basically found within the rhetorical level, resumption being persistently present all through. None of the movements involved the inferential component.

Catalan structural shifts, on the other hand, were most of the times from sequential to rhetorical and inferential components so, in this respect, it could be claimed that the use of the compound units was not only higher in quantitative terms, but also qualitatively richer in this language. The Catalan marker that proved to be most significant in terms of combinatory possibilities was *bueno*, although *bé* and *aleshores* were able to perform a large number of structural shifts.

Finally, there is a datum worth taking into consideration since it may have theoretical repercussions. The length of Catalan narratives exceeds that of English ones: 14.168 words versus 9.792 words. 515 single and 43 compound markers have been found in Catalan (558 in total), in front of 175 single and 7 compound markers in English (182 in total), which means that, of the total number of words, there are 3.93% of markers in Catalan narratives and 1.85% of markers in English narratives. As we see, although it is true that Catalan stories are longer, speakers in this language use pragmatic markers three times more than English speakers.

This finding may find a plausible explanation in *Gricean* conversational maxims of quantity and relevance. We have seen that discourse markers are very useful linguistic cues that narrow down possible contextual effects and presuppositions made by the hearer, that help the speaker structure the information, and that facilitate the transmission of intentions. All this is related to relevance and to making the understanding of the message easier. A higher number of segments involves a higher number of structural shifts, so the number of framing markers (single and compound) will be superior in Catalan language. We have seen that this is especially true in Catalan CPMs, where there is a systematic movement from the sequential (where the framing function is found) to the rest of the structures. As Marsà (1992: 330) points out in relation to the cooccurrence of markers in Spanish and English (i.e.CPM), there has to be a plausible explanation that accounts for this construction although, up to now, linguists have not paid a special attention to it in the literature. As I mentioned above, to my understanding, the relevance of CPMs lies in the important role that they play in the processing of information provided by the speaker, facilitating it to the hearer. It has been shown that shifts from the sequential structure to the rest of structures seem to be the norm in both English and Catalan. This ordering of structural shifts might indicate that, when speakers make use of pragmatic cues to facilitate the transmission of information, the first aim — not overtly conscious — is to structure their information; afterwards, propositional meaning, intentions, and inferences follow it closely, in discourse terms through the ideational, rhetorical, and inferential components. In this respect, the relevance of pragmatic markers in the text becomes manifest, as with textual connectors that are used to organize chunks of information (for instance, the typical *firstly*, *secondly*, *lastly*, etc. used in written language).

Finally, the unequal number of markers in the two languages and the high concentration of a given function on one specific marker may lead to the following question: what linguistic resources does the other language use in place of a pragmatic marker, to carry out the function(s) it fulfils? Providing a plausible answer to this question is not an easy task. I would suggest that differences in terms of syntax, semantics, and rhetorics have probably a lot to do with it. We know that Romance languages have longer and more complex sentences than English, thus

using more linking signals of subordination and coordination (either argumentative connectors and/or discourse markers, depending on the register)²¹³. It is also well-known that the rhetorics of the two languages differ notably: whereas English uses short sentences to go 'straight to the point' (in the case of narratives going directly to the recounting of facts), Romance languages use longer sentences that, at the same time, make up longer paragraphs to give an account of the same fact. In addition, description is embedded within the complicating action parts and Catalan narratives have proved to be more descriptive than English ones. I would therefore suggest that such structural and rhetorical differences in the text also imply a different use of markers and linking signals, in general.

In the coming section, the differences and similarities in distribution of English and Catalan markers in narrative structure will be described and discussed. There, I will further elaborate on this issue when observations about segment shifting are made.

7.3 Distribution of markers in narrative structure

The distribution of pragmatic markers in English and Catalan narrative segments correlates, in both cases, with the weight that the segment has in the narrative. Hence, the results of the study show that complicating action and evaluation (internal, followed by external) are the parts of the account that present a more abundant number of markers. This makes sense if we take into account that: (a) development of action is the backbone of the narrative, where actual things 'happen'; (b) evaluation is where the narrator tries to convey the point of the story.

According to data shown in Tables 2 and 21 (Chapters 5 and 6), *well* and *bueno* are the only two markers that have a steady presence. This finding confirms the aforementioned richness of the two units, which operate on all discourse planes: ideational, sequential, rhetorical, and inferential, a fact that has been pointed out by Schiffrin (1987a) in relation to *well*. In these tables it can also be seen that, whereas some markers have a steady presence throughout, others show striking differences and accumulation of occurrences in a given part of the narrative. This finding responds to expectations and to the hypothesis that there is not an arbitrary use of pragmatic markers in any part of the text, but context and genre dependence. Hence, English *so* and *then*, and Catalan *llavors* and *aleshores* are primarily found in development of action parts, probably because they still bear a strong referential meaning (resultative *so*, temporal *then* and *llavors*) that makes them a perfect tool for organizing the sequencing of the events.

English *I mean* and *you know*, and Catalan *clar*, *no* and *eh* are systematically used in evaluation, internal evaluation in particular. These markers are all used to call the

hearer's attention and to establish a personal link with him/her. Considering that markers predicate changes in the speaker's cognition and attitudes, the use of these units in evaluative parts of the narrative has a strong cooperative effect. They facilitate intimacy and complicity between speaker and hearer and confirm shared assumptions. Because of their evidential properties, they are extremely valuable cues to check or express understanding. It should not be forgotten that internal evaluation is the means used by the narrator to make sure that not only the facts reach the interlocutor, but so does the emotional load they carry along. Note that, according to results shown in the aforementioned Tables, internal evaluation contains a much larger number of the markers under investigation than external evaluation.

Figure 12 presents English and Catalan lexical forms according to the narrative segments in which they are found.²¹⁴

Orientation segment markers deserve close attention. According to present findings, English *well* and *I mean*, and Catalan *bé*, *doncs* and *aleshores* are particularly used by speakers at the beginning of the account, where characters, place, time, and space coordinates are introduced. This choice finds a plausible explanation in their anchoring role, facilitating the hearer's cognitive placement in the text-world. In addition, they are also common at segment-boundaries, which means that they are often used not only at opening orientation segments but at intermediate ones as well.

Results also show that Catalan narrators use pragmatic markers twice more often in orientation and result segments than English narrators. In the result, in English, *then*, *anyway* and *you know* are the most recurrent; in Catalan, *eh*, *clar*, *llavors* and *bueno* are the most repeated. They all share common traits: *then* and *llavors* facilitate the final organization of the events, *anyway* and *bueno* introduce final conclusive remarks, *eh*, *clar* and *you know* help to go back to the hearer's real world, confirming, at the end of the account, shared assumptions and looking for understanding. Finally, data show that there are very few markers in abstract and coda segments. This finding is not surprising if we take into account that these two parts of the narrative are often missing; the narrator starts the story with an orientation and ends it up either with a result or a combined evaluation-result segment.

In the previous section I mentioned the difficulties involved in finding the corresponding linguistic mechanisms that a given language uses to convey all the meanings (ideational, illocutionary, structural, inferential) that a pragmatic marker supplies to a text. I made reference to differences in terms of syntax, semantics and rhetorics of the language. Investigating these linguistic fields would take me far from my aims, but a look at the way narratives develop in both languages suggests that the answer is probably to be sought in that direction. See, for instance, the two following excerpts. The first (150) belongs to an English story; the second (151) to a Catalan account. As for the English story, notice the way that Mike shifts from orientation to events and to personal comments. There is not a single marker

| ENGLISH | Narrative segments/parts | CATALAN |
|---|--------------------------|--|
| well | ABSTRACT | bueno pues |
| well so then I mean anyway | ORIENTATION | bé bueno clar doncs pues llavors aleshores no eh |
| well so then I mean you know anyway | ACTION | bé bueno clar doncs pues llavors aleshores no eh |
| well so I mean you know anyway | INTERNAL EVALUATION | bé bueno clar doncs pues llavors aleshores no eh |
| well so then I mean you know anyway | EXTERNAL EVALUATION | bé bueno clar doncs pues llavors aleshores no eh |
| well so then you know anyway | RESULT | bé bueno clar doncs llavors no eh |
| well so | CODA | bueno doncs |

Figure 12. Distribution of English and Catalan pragmatic markers according to narrative segments

involved. There is not much description, either. Sentences start with first person singular, are mostly in active voice, are short and include major information. There is no digression. In other words, the narrator concentrates on the facts and, besides coordinating/narrative *and* (and some *but*) that presents the sequencing of events, actions, and thoughts, there are not many linking signals involved (including argumentative connectors). In fact, the first marker does not appear until the third internal evaluation segment, which is introduced at the end of the excerpt. Although it is true that all narratives are different, this one can serve to illustrate what seems to be the norm in English.

(150)

@Begin

@Participants: NAR8 Mike Narrator

@Age of NAR: 30;

@Sex of NAR: male

@Bg: a

*NAR: I think er # situations of danger really.

*NAR: probably the most common one in my case would be being robbed.

*NAR: thankfully not in Spain but in England I've been robbed three or four times.

@Eg: a

@Bg: os

*NAR: I can remember one occasion.

*NAR: when I was living in Birmingham.

@Eg: os

@Bg: da

*NAR: I # I got off the bus.

*NAR: and I was aware of a group of youths.

*NAR: who were following me.

*NAR: and # I started walking a bit # a bit more quickly.

*NAR: but I didn't really # I didn't really do much about it.

*NAR: and suddenly two of them came around in front of me.

*NAR: started hitting me.

*NAR: and I felt.

*NAR: somebody hitting me from behind # as well.

@Eg: da

@Bg: oc

*NAR: I think.

*NAR: there were about seven of them altogether.

@Eg: oc

@Bg: da

*NAR: and # pretty soon I was on the ground.

*NAR: they were kicking me.

@Eg: da

@Bg: ee
 *NAR: and I think.
 *NAR: it was dangerous.
 @Eg: ee
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: because # um # they weren't hurting me very much.
 *NAR: I covered my face and everything.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: but um # what I was scared of # more than anything.
 *NAR: was they would drag me off into a a back street or something.
 *NAR: and stab me.
 *NAR: I was worried.
 *NAR: that they might have a knife or a gun or something.
 @Eg: ei
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: eventually they got tired.
 *NAR: and left me alone.
 *NAR: they left me there.
 *NAR: lying on the ground.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: it was a strange experience.
 @Eg: ei
 @Bg: da
 *NAR: because um # they stole.
 *NAR: um # they did # actually # steal something.
 *NAR: they stole my watch and a jacket.
 *NAR: that I was wearing.
 *NAR: but one of them # for some strange reason # handed back to me some credit
 cards and things.
 *NAR: that had fallen out of my pocket.
 @Eg: da
 @Bg: ei
 *NAR: <so_> # it was a bit absurd\
 *NAR: I didn't really understand\
 um #
 *NAR: what the motive of the attack was\

 (NAR8 Mike)

See now excerpt (151) from a Catalan narrative. The first thing one notices is the continuous digression, going back and forth from the main point, which aims at providing descriptive details and personal comments that the speaker considers are worth being introduced; in this respect note how, by means of markers, the

narrator returns to the argumentative thread on numerous occasions. The second thing worth highlighting is syntactic constructions: sentences are longer and more complex, linked by means of coordinating or subordinating conjunctions; in general, there is more subordination than in English narratives. Although it is a sample, it provides an example of what seems to be the norm in Catalan.

(151)

@Begin

@Participants: NAR4 Anna Narrator

@Age of NAR: 29;

@Sex of NAR: female

@Bg: ei

*NAR: sí # <bueno\># es que # mmm# situació de perill es aixó <no/> una situació de vulnerabilitat\
 yes # <bueno\># the thing is # mmm# a situation of danger is that <no/> a situation of vulnerability\
 @Eg: ei

@Bg: osc

*NAR: era durant un # un viatge que vam fer a Mèxic # el meu home i jo.
 it was during a # a journey that my husband and I went on to Mexico

*NAR: hi vam anar pel nostre compte.
 we went on our own

*NAR: i # <bé\> # vam arribar <doncs_> a # a Mèrida # al Yucatán/.
 and # <bé\> # we arrived at <doncs_> at # at Merida # in the Yucatan/.

@Eg: osc

@Bg: da

*NAR: i vam llogar un cotxe.
 and we rented a car

@Eg: da

@Bg: ee

*NAR: i # <bé\># aquell país és # és molt diferent/.
 and # <bé\># that country is # is very different/

*NAR: i <llavors_> te n'adones que aquí estàs molt protegit per moltes coses <no/>.
 and <llavors_> you realize that over here you're very protected by many things <no/>.

*NAR: que els cotxes <doncs_> més o menys et pots fiar.
 that the cars <doncs_> more or less you can trust

*NAR: perquè tenen assegurances molta gent/.
 because many people have insurance/

*NAR: i que # i tu saps # més o menys # quin serà el comportament dels eh # dels nostres conductors.
 and that # and you know # more or less # what the behaviour of eh # our drivers is going to be like

- *NAR: i # més o menys # les regles les saps.
and # more or less # the rules you know them
- *NAR: però allà era una mica diferent.
but over there it was a bit different
- @Eg: ee
- @Bg: da/os
- *NAR: i # <bé\> # vam llogar un cotxe/.
and # <bé\> # we rented a car/
- *NAR: el vam agafar/.
we took it/
- *NAR: i vam començar <doncs_> a fer una carretera cap a una ciutat\
and we started <doncs_> driving towards a city\<
- *NAR: que # em sembla que era cap a dos cents quilòmetres o així <no/>
that # I think was about two hundred kilometres away <no/>
per aquelles carreteres de # de Mèxic.
driving along those Mexican roads
- *NAR: i # i <bé\> # i anàvem # vam passar molts poblets/.
and # and <bé\> # and we went # we passed through many villages/
- *NAR: i les carreteres mexicanes # quan passen per dins un poble # .
and the Mexican roads # when they pass through a village #
- *NAR: <doncs_> són una travessia dins un poble_.
<doncs_> are like a thoroughfare through the village
- *NAR: ah # posen uns #.
ah # they place some #
- *NAR: saps com aquells bums.
you know like those bumps
- *NAR: que hi havia abans aquí també.
that you would find over here too
- *NAR: quan travessaves els pobles # de quitrà.
when you passed through villages # the tar ones
- *NAR: que tu has de frenar.
that you have to stop
- *NAR: perquè sinó <doncs_> fas un sotrac bastant fort_
otherwise <doncs_> you have quite a jolt
- *NAR: i # i <bé\ doncs_> nosaltres anàvem amb amb el cotxe # un volswagen
d'aquells escarabats_.
*and # and <bé\ doncs_> we were driving the the car # one of those Volkswagen
Beetles*
- *NAR: i davant portàvem un camió.
and there was a lorry in front of us
- *NAR: i # <bé\> # arribem al poble/.
and # <bé\> # we arrived at the village/
- @Eg: da/os
- @Bg: da/ocs

- *NAR: i el camió de davant nostre va frenar.
and the lorry in front of us stopped
- *NAR: va passar el bum aquell.
it went over that bump
- *NAR: i # el # a veure # va passar les rodes de davant.
and # the # let's see # the front wheels crossed it
- *NAR: i quan estava a punt ja de de passar tot el camió.
and when the lorry had almost gone over
- *NAR: i ja només li quedava la part del darrera.
and there was only the back part left
- *NAR: en lloc de tirar endavant # va recular.
instead of driving forward # it went backwards
- *NAR: <és clar\> # nosaltres estàvem al cotxe # a darrera/.
<és clar\> # we were in the car # behind it/
- *NAR: i # de cop i volta # el veiem que comença a recular.
and # all of a sudden # we see it move backwards
- *NAR: i # <és clar/># allò que has de buscar el el # la bocina.
and # <és clar/># the thing is that you have to look for the the # horn
- *NAR: a veure com pitaràs <no/>.
see how you manage to sound the horn
- *NAR: per atura'l d'alguna manera.
to stop it some way or another
- *NAR: i el tio no ens va veure.
and the guy didn't see us
- *NAR: i # ens va picar <no/>.
and # he hit us <no/>.
- @Eg: da/ocs
- @Bg: ee
- *NAR: i <clar\ # o sigui_> # la situació de perill era aquesta <no/>.
and <clar\ # o sigui_> # that was the situation of danger <no/>.

.....
(NAR4 Anna)

The observations made about the above excerpts do not intend to draw any definite conclusions and generalizations about the reasons why English speakers tend to use pragmatic markers much less frequently than Catalan narrators. As I mentioned, this would require a thorough syntactic, semantic and stylistic analysis of the database, which is far from my objective and would lead to a different research.

The following section recapitulates the main points of this chapter. It summarizes similarities and differences between English and Catalan in the use of markers in narrative structure, and confirms hypotheses.

7.4 Recapitulation

We have seen the importance of pragmatic markers in English and Catalan oral monologue. They are pragmatically rich lexical units that operate at various discourse levels. The analysis of data tells us that, contrary to what has generally been suggested in the literature, their functions go far beyond a mere filling of an empty space. Pragmatic markers are polyfunctional cues that predicate changes in the speaker's cognition, attitudes, and beliefs since they facilitate the transmission of illocutionary force and intentions.

The analysis and discussion that I have presented in this and previous chapters confirms the general hypothesis that these pragmatic cues *do* something in discourse — as do argumentative connectors — and that throwing them in one big basket does not seem to be the most enlightening approach. It also confirms the more specific hypothesis that pragmatic markers are not arbitrarily used in any part of the speech, but are, to a certain extent, context and genre-dependent. The study of their behaviour in English and Catalan narratives has served to prove that certain markers recurrently appear at certain narrative segments. In addition, although they are polyfunctional elements, most of them have proved to have a dominant role within the text structure.

Throughout the study, it has become apparent that there is a definite relationship between pragmatic function and text form or structure. This becomes especially relevant if we take into account that most research and empirical studies on pragmatic markers have been carried out on conversational discourse, where discourse markers have a key function in turn-taking, mitigation, holding of the floor, expression of deference, or saving of face. We have seen that their role in monologued discourse shows differences, in this respect. Contrary to what occurs in a dialogue, the interlocutor is in this case a participant that is not verbally active in the communicative exchange since s/he just listens to what the narrator explains. It is probably in this context where the use of pragmatic markers becomes even more remarkable and essential since there is no feed back from a conversational partner. Pragmatic markers are then used to shift from and to a new discourse plane or contextual space — rhetorical, sequential, cognitive, ideational — and to make the interlocutor feel that, although not verbally active, s/he is part of a communicative exchange.

The contrastive analysis of narratives has shown that there are qualitative and quantitative differences between Catalan and English pragmatic markers. Catalan narrators make use of pragmatic markers three times more than English narrators, although in both languages there is a high concentration of markers in action and evaluation segments. Similarly, according to data shown in Tables 18 and 44

(Chapters 5 and 6), the distribution of markers according to ideational and pragmatic structures shows that most functions carried out by Catalan markers are related to the rhetorical component, first, followed by the sequential, inferential and ideational. In the case of English narratives, most functions fulfilled by markers are found in the rhetorical structure as well, but followed by the sequential, ideational and, finally, the inferential. Finally, it has been observed that differences in terms of syntax, semantics and rhetorics of the language may help explain the unequal presence of markers in both languages and the impossibility of finding a one-to-one correspondence for all the units.

The following example is an English–Catalan translation of a script that might help illustrate this last point.²¹⁵ Notice the different Catalan forms that have been provided by the translator for the English marker *well*.

A bilingual transcription of *The Challenge* from the *Yes, Minister* series

The Challenge

Scene 1: The BBC Radio Interview

L.K. And the main news this Thursday p.m. is the big government reshuffle. And I have with me in the studio to discuss his new empire the Minister for Administrative Affairs, the Right Honourable James Hacker, MP. It has been said, Mr Hacker, that you are now Mr Town Hall as well as Mr Whitehall?

..... *i la notícia més important d'aquest dijous és la reorganització del govern. Aquí a l'estudi hi tenim per parlar de les seves noves atribucions el Ministre d'Administració Territorial, l'honorable James Hacker, diputat. S'ha dit, senyor Hacker, que ara dirigirà l'Administració Local i també l'Administració Central.*

J. H. Well, it's very flattering of you to put it that way...

Bé, dit així resulta molt afalagador...

L. K. It wasn't me who put it that way, Mr Hacker, it was the Daily Mirror. I just wanted to confirm that you are now this country's chief bureaucrat.

No sóc pas jo qui ho diu així, senyor Hacker, és el Daily Mirror. Però jo només volia confirmar si ara el cap de la burocràcia del país és vosté.

J. H. Well, of course, that's nonsense. This government believes in reducing bureaucracy.

Oh, no, no, no, això és absurd. Aquest govern és partidari de reduir la burocràcia.

L. K. Well, figures I have here say that your Department's staff has risen by ten per cent.

Doncs, les xifres que tinc aquí indiquen que el personal del seu Ministeri ha augmentat un 10%.

J. H. Certainly not.

No és pas veritat.

L. K. Well, what figure do you have?

Doncs, quin és el tant per cent?

J. H. I believe the figure was much more like 9.97%

Crec que aproximadament és un 9,97%

L. K. **You see**, it has been suggested, Mr Hacker, that your department is less interested in reducing bureaucracy than in increasing it.

Crec que tot sembla indicar, senyor Hacker, que el Ministeri que vostè dirigeix no tendeix a reduir la burocràcia sinó a augmentar-la.

J. H. Yes, but that's because we've had to take on staff to reduce staff.

Sí, però tingui present que per reduir personal hem hagut de contractar personal.

L. K. I beg your pardon?

Com es menja això?

J. H. It's common sense. You have to take on more doctors to cure more patients. You have to take on more firemen to extinguish more fires.

Sí, és de sentit comú. Per curar més malalts s'han de contractar més metges, per apagar més focs, més bombers, i...

L. K. (INTERRUPTION) And how do you propose to extinguish local government bureaucracy?

I què farà per apagar el foc de la burocràcia a l'administració local?

J. H. Well, it's a challenge, and I'm looking forward to it.

Doncs, és un repte i em fa molta il·lusió.

L. K. Would you agree that there is even more bureaucratic waste there than there is in Whitehall?

Però no creu que hi ha una dilapidació fins i tot més gran que en l'Administració Central?

J. H. Well, yes, that's what makes it a challenge.

Sí, és clar. D'aquí vé que sigui un repte.

.....

The above English text includes six *well* and one *you see*. Four different Catalan markers have been used to translate English *well*: *bé*, *oh*, *doncs*, and *és clar*. The marker *you see* has not been translated into Catalan.

To my understanding, the questions that follow are: what is the discourse criterion, if any, that the Catalan translator has followed to translate *well* by

different lexical units? Why *bé*, at the beginning, and then *oh*, *doncs*, and *és clar*? Are they possibly interchangeable (i.e. arbitrarily used) or does their order respond to a regular pattern or discourse rule? It is true that the text is conversational, so different ritual constraints from the monologued oral narrative have to be borne in mind. It has been seen that pragmatic markers in dialogues are generally used to introduce disagreement, mitigation, holding of the floor, saving of face, etc. with a core distinctive trait, which is a continuous negotiation between the interlocutors, in this particular case between L. K., the interviewer, and J. H., the interviewee. Although some of these functions are not found in the database used in the present study, I will try to find a plausible explanation for the diversity of markers that the English-Catalan translator has used for English *well*. I will do it bearing in mind the discourse coherence model proposed (i.e. ideational, rhetorical, sequential, and inferential components). Consequently, I will take into account both the whole text structure (conversational turns) and the pragmatic functions that I consider *well* performs in the text.

Well, it's very flattering of you to put it that way
> *Bé, dit així resulta molt afalagador...*

The use of *bé* right at the beginning of the interview responds to the need that J. H. has to frame his response. As it has been seen in previous pages, when *bé* was analyzed (6.1.1.), the second core function of this Catalan marker is segment-boundary framing. My proposal (see Chapter 3) classified it in the sequential structure. Let us recall that *bé* had a strong weight in the sequential structure (39.6%), as opposed to *bueno*, which had it in the rhetorical one (54.1%).

Most of the interventions that follow include a pragmatic marker.

.....

L. K. It wasn't me who put it that way, Mr Hacker, it was the Daily Mirror. I just wanted to confirm that you are now this country's chief bureaucrat.

No sóc pas jo qui ho diu així, senyor Hacker, és el Daily Mirror. Però jo només volia confirmar si ara el cap de la burocràcia del país és vosté.

J. H. Well, of course, that's nonsense. This government believes in reducing bureaucracy.
> *Oh, no, no, no, això és absurd. Aquest govern és partidari de reduir la burocràcia.*

L. K. Well, figures I have here say that your Department's staff has risen by ten per cent.
> *Doncs, les xifres que tinc aquí indiquen que el personal del seu Ministeri ha augmentat un 10%.*

J. H. Certainly not.
> *No és pas veritat.*

L. K. Well, what figure do you have?
> *Doncs, quin és el tant per cent?*

J. H. I believe the figure was much more like 9.97%

> *Crec que aproximadament és un 9,97%*

.....

L. K. has been ironic in his first question: *It has been said, Mr Hacker, that you are now Mr Town Hall as well as Mr Whitehall?*

J. H. frames his response by means of *well* and doesn't seem to realize the irony and the attack that there are behind L. K.'s words: *Well, it's very flattering of you to put it that way...*

L. K. informs J. H. that his assertion has not intended to be a personal compliment, but a piece of information published in the newspaper (Daily Mirror, considered *yellow press*).

J. H. doesn't really know how to answer. He needs a linguistic mechanism that verbalizes his mental state and feelings at the moment. He is a bit confused and, probably for the first time, he feels he is being verbally attacked. *Well* is, in this context, a perfect linguistic device to mitigate the negative answer and to introduce a conclusive assertion: *Well, of course, that's nonsense. This government believes in reducing bureaucracy* (meaning, it is not true what has been said about me). There is no surprise behind it, just disagreement with previous proposition and, at the same time, the need to verbalize what he thinks of it (*it's nonsense*); *well* introduces a conclusive answer. The Catalan marker *Oh* does not grasp, to my understanding, J. H.'s intentions. A better alternative would be *bueno*,²¹⁶ a rich rhetorical Catalan marker. When *bueno* was discussed in previous sections (6.1.1.), we saw that it had a core conclusive function. The translation that I suggest is: *Bueno, això és absurd*. This marker does not only carry out a conclusive role, but it is also highly evaluative (in narratives it is often used in internal evaluation, to introduce a personal comment such as this one). Notice that the translator has used a repetition of the negative adverb *no* three times to convey the disagreement and to introduce *això és absurd*. I suggest using *bueno* for a twofold purpose: (a) to narrow down J. H.'s intentions; and (b) to economize processing efforts to L. K.

L. K. responds to J. H. There is now a back and forth between the interviewer and the interviewee:

L. K. *Well*, figures I have here say that your Department's staff has risen by ten per cent.

> *Doncs, les xifres que tinc aquí indiquen que el personal del seu Ministeri ha augmentat un 10%.*

J. H. Certainly not.

> *No és pas veritat.*

L. K. *Well*, what figure do you have?

> *Doncs, quin és el tant per cent?*

J. H. I believe the figure was much more like 9.97%

> *Crec que aproximadament és un 9,97%*

The two times that L. K. makes use of *well* is with a saving of face and evidential function. He does not want to say: *no, what you are saying is not true*. So he uses the marker to introduce his disagreement and to express, at the same time, deference.²¹⁷ Note that the second *well* carries a stronger illocutionary force than the first one; in this case, it is used as evidential: *Well, what figure do you have?* The interview is reaching its climax. *Doncs* is a conjunction that has a core illative discourse function (6.1.3.). L. K. makes use of it twice to introduce his answer. He is being conclusive and is also threatening J. H. *Doncs* is an appropriate translation because the speaker's refutation is not overt, but notice how the verbal illocutionary force raises in the second exchange. The second *doncs* is, for this reason, not like the first. It has been seen that *doncs* is a useful conclusive device but it rarely works as evidential. In this second case, I suggest using an evidential *bueno* to convey a stronger force to the verbal exchange. Thus the translation that I propose would be: *Bueno, (i) quin és el tant per cent?!* The use of conjunctive *and (i)* reinforces the speaker's intentions, a function that is usually carried out by CPM (5.2. and 6.2.).

L. K. opens the following intervention with the marker *you see*.

L. K. **You see**, it has been suggested, Mr Hacker, that your department is less interested in reducing bureaucracy than in increasing it

> *Crec que tot sembla indicar, senyor Hacker, que el Ministeri que vosté dirigeix no tendeix a reduir la burocràcia sinó a augmentar-la.*

Similarly to *you know*, this pragmatic marker facilitates the sharing of common ground between speaker and hearer and the possible inferences that the hearer might have to make to interpret the message. It is like saying: *you and I know what we are talking about. There is more about it than what it is being said*. There is no Catalan counterpart to *you see* in the text. The translator has translated the whole proposition *You see, it has been suggested, Mr Hacker, that ...* by *Crec que tot sembla indicar, senyor Hacker, que...* To my understanding, the use of *crec* (*I think*) does not convey the aforementioned speaker's intentions in the same way as *you see*. *I think* presents a personal opinion and a one-sided belief that is totally opposite to what *you see* tries to convey, i.e. shared knowledge.

Finally, the last two *well* have been translated by *doncs* and *és clar*, respectively.

L. K. (INTERRUPTION) And how do you propose to extinguish local government bureaucracy?

> *I què farà per apagar el foc de la burocràcia a l'administració local?*

J. H. **Well**, it's a challenge, and I'm looking forward to it.

> *Doncs, és un repte i em fa molta il·lusió.*

L. K. Would you agree that there is even more bureaucratic waste there than there is in Whitehall?

> *Però no creu que hi ha una dilapidació fins i tot més gran que en l'Administració Central?*

J. H. Well, yes, that's what makes it a challenge.

> *Sí, és clar. D'aquí ve que sigui un repte.*

L. K. has blamed J. H.'s department for not being interested in reducing bureaucracy but rather increasing it. J. H. then tries to provide a satisfactory answer, although he has a hard time doing it. L. K. interrupts him with a question: *And how do you propose to extinguish local government bureaucracy?* J. H. introduces his answer by means of a conclusive *well* that has been translated by a conclusive *doncs*. The last question is answered by means of an opening *well* followed by the affirmative adverb *yes*. The Catalan translator has opted for *Sí, és clar*. We know that *clar* is a Catalan pragmatic marker that has a core function as evidential (6.1.2.). Evidentials are units used by the speaker to show understanding, intentions and attitude towards the hearer. In Catalan narrative, it has been seen that this is mainly accomplished by *clar*, *no* and *eh*. In English narrative, there are a variety of markers that can work as evidentials, among which there is *well*. There is not, in English, a definite tendency towards the use of a specific marker for this purpose (see contrastive analysis, in this chapter). In the above conversational text, *well* functions as an evidential of a fact mentioned in the previous proposition, reinforcing the assertiveness of *yes* which, in fact, should be *of course*, were it to have a more exact correspondence with the strong illocutionary force of *és clar*.

The example and following discussion above illustrates the application that the present study has in the field of English-Catalan translation. Although the text-genre was conversational, it has been seen that not *any* translation is possible for the same lexical unit. Discourse markers are mostly polyfunctional, but grasping the right pragmatic meaning is fundamental to provide a counterpart in the other language. To the questions that were posed when the example was introduced, I would suggest, on the translator's side, a deeper knowledge of these, apparently, empty lexical devices.

In second language acquisition, pragmatic markers have a significant role as well. Students of a second language have sometimes difficulties in using a pragmatic marker appropriately. They tend to include a marker when it is not strictly necessary, or they use it with the wrong meaning. See, for instance, the following excerpt. It is a fragment from a composition written by a student who is learning English as a second language.

(...) Last summer I went to Italy with a group of friends. We took the train and travelled along the coast for two weeks, stopping here and there. *Anyway*, it was a very tiring journey because we walked a lot and often slept in the train, while travelling at night. Italy is a very interesting country to go on holiday. We visited many museums and met very interesting people that showed us around . (...)

Notice the student's wrong use of *anyway*. It could have been omitted or replaced by an adversative *but*. Trying to find a possible translation might not be of great help to the student since the teacher's objective is for the student to grasp its functional meaning. It has been seen that *anyway* is a pragmatic marker that is often used to introduce a conclusive remark or to regain the argumentative thread broken by a previous discourse segment; in long texts, it is also found at segment boundaries. All this information is fundamental for the student of English to use the marker appropriately. In addition, the student might want to know that the syntactic distribution of *anyway* in the clause is relevant as well, since it conveys a different meaning depending on its clause position: when being a lefthand discourse bracket, it has a text structural (segment framing and/or topic shift) and cognitive text-delimiting role (recovering the train of thought), whereas its use as a righthand discourse bracket involves summing up and evidencing of a situation. Although in both cases *anyway* has a conclusive function, this is reinforced when used clause-initial. Same as the translator, the teacher of a second language should be aware of the relevance of pragmatic markers in the learning of a second language. Their abuse or omission in a text may lead to interpretive misunderstanding and/or unfelicitous communication.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusions

As pointed out by Karin Aijmer (1996: 203) in her study on conversational routines, discourse markers “have not a negligible role in the process of creating coherence and organizing discourse.” Not all that is conveyed in an utterance is overtly specified. The hearer often has to make inferences, presuppositions and draw plausible interpretations about what the speaker has intended to say. All this is possible because of the context in which the utterance is inserted and the contextual effects that the hearer may draw from it. Pragmatic markers are linguistic items that facilitate this task to a great extent. Being empty of referential function, these linguistic cues have a core metalinguistic and procedural function that helps the speaker display the way s/he intends the message to be understood, while at the same time indicating to the hearer how the message is to be segmented and processed.

In this concluding chapter, I will bring out the most important points found in the recapitulation sections, trying to provide satisfactory answers to the questions that took me to investigate the pragmatic domain of discourse markers. These points will be linked to general aims and hypotheses.

Several questions involving formal and functional issues motivated my interest in the variable that I have analyzed and discussed in previous pages. The first question that I considered required a straightforward answer was: what sort of linguistic elements are to be considered *discourse markers*? is it just *well* and *you know* or also *moreover* and *however*? is the answer positive or negative?, and why? do these lexical units share any syntactic, semantic or pragmatic feature that can account for a common definition or classification? According to the literature on the topic, there is not agreement on the matter: some authors use a unique term to include what I consider is differently conceptualized, and different terms are used for the same underlying concept. In relation to the above lexical units, at the beginning of my research my linguistic intuition told me that *well* and *you know* set up relationships between previous and following propositions or discourse segments that were of a different nature from those set up by *moreover* and *however*. To my understanding, *moreover* and *however* show additive and contrastive relations that are not linked to the illocutionary meaning of the sequence as *well* and *you know* are, but to the argumentative propositional one. Chapter 3 was

an attempt to clarify and respond to what I have, all along, considered to be the heart of the matter.

Since my interest has been the study of pragmatic discourse markers, Sander's notion of pragmatic versus semantic *source of coherence* offered me the foundation on which to construct a model that could account for the presence of pragmatic markers in a text. My definition of *pragmatic marker* is in accordance with the notion of *pragmatic source of coherence*. Studies have shown that linguistic elements of this nature are not essential for the propositional meaning of the text, but are highly valuable and necessary for the interpretation of the message that the speaker tries to convey. It has also been claimed that their absence may lead to interpretive misunderstanding and unfelicitous communication.

The structural role of pragmatic markers is equally significant. Not only do these lexical pieces organize the overall textual frame and development of ideas, thoughts and actions, but work as real discourse-segment hinges. It is in this capacity that they are a great help for the hearer in integrating, within a mental model, large amounts of information that, otherwise, might appear disconnected.

Bearing all the above in mind, based on Redeker's proposal for integrating discourse markers in a discourse coherence model (1990, 1991), in Chapter 3, I suggested that pragmatic markers operate in the pragmatic structure at three different planes: rhetorical, sequential and inferential. From these three planes, stem two broad macrofunctions: the structural (point 3.3.1), and the inferential (point 3.3.2). Redeker's ideational plane, which I have related to the logico-argumentative relations (i.e. concessive, causative, adversative, additive, reformulative, etc.) mainly set up by *argumentative connectors*, has only been brought up when strictly required by the polyfunctionality of the pragmatic marker under discussion.

The role of segment boundary markers has been particularly emphasized. A cognitive approach to narrative structure suggests that these linguistic cues help construct a mental model from a particular point of view (Segal et al. 1991). Their performance in the pragmatic discourse structure tells us that these linguistic elements are cues used by the speaker to signal his/her intentions, to convey illocutionary force to the discourse, to focus the hearer's attention on a specific contextual space, and to facilitate and restrict the hearer's possible inferences for interpreting the message.

In Chapter 3 I made the link between the function(s) of markers and the discourse coherence model proposed (point 3.4). The analysis of the markers under investigation yielded 23 different functions that were exemplified by means of units that generally are polyfunctional but show a dominant meaning that allows for their classification within a given discourse structure or component. The aim of this classification was to concentrate the variety of roles displayed by a marker under broad macrofunctions. The purpose was to provide them with a distinctive trait

that (a) could group them together under a common denominator, i.e. defining dominant feature, and (b) could avoid dispersion and listing of excessive descriptive detail.

The proposal presented in Chapter 3 consists in grouping the 23 functions of markers under the four aforementioned distinctive discourse components: (a) rhetorical, if the function is related to the speaker's intentions and attitudes, thoughts and actions; (b) sequential, if the function is related to segment-structural features; (c) ideational, if the function is related to the ideas described in the text-world; and (d) inferential, if the function is related to the cognitive context that is shared between speaker and hearer.

Once I concluded that pragmatic markers are elements that contribute pragmatic coherence to a text — as opposed to semantic coherence — and therefore that only certain lexical items are to be considered pragmatic markers (*well* and *I know* but not *moreover* and *however*), the next step was to find out their role in a specific text-genre. According to the literature, linguistic cues that lack referential meaning and are persistently used by speakers are mere *fillers* (*mot crossa* or *falca*, in Catalan; *muletilla* and *expletivo*, in Spanish) of empty spaces whose main role is allowing the speaker time to think about what to say next. The conclusion that follows from this claim is that, if it were true that these empty words are basically used to fill in spaces and work as delayers, then they could probably be used in any text-genre — dialogued and/or monologued — indistinctly and without any restrictions worth taking into consideration. If markers were mere fillers as they are presented in some of the literature, then there would not be any specific textual use and their performance could consequently be free and context-independent. In the second part of this book, that is, in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I tried to show that this is not the case and that pragmatic markers are polyfunctional elements that generally show a dominant tendency that allows for their classification under a given discourse structure or component: ideational, rhetorical, sequential, or/and inferential.

Chapter 5 includes the analysis and discussion of results about the English pragmatic markers found in the database: *well*, *so*, *then*, *I mean*, *you know*, and *anyway*. This is done under two perspectives: according to the four discourse components, and according to narrative segments, namely, *abstract*, *orientation*, *complicating action*, *evaluation*, *result* and *coda*. The purpose was to show that certain markers mostly appear at certain parts of the text, linked to their intrinsic referential and/or pragmatic meaning.

Results have shown that most functions carried out by English markers are found in the narrative rhetorical structure, followed by the sequential and ideational structures. Within the rhetorical structure, *anyway*, *I mean*, *well*, and *so* are the primary markers. In the sequential structure, *well*, *so*, *you know*, and *anyway* are the markers that have the most preponderant role. They all act, primarily, as segment

boundary frames, opening and closing narrative segments and quoted material. Among them, *well* and *so* stand out from the rest. The role of pragmatic markers as inference facilitators is exemplified by *you know*, a lexical unit that the narrator often uses to involve the hearer in the text-world and share with him/her mutual background knowledge and implications. In general, markers whose main role is inferential facilitate the transmission of the illocutionary point of the narrative.

But all the above findings are valuable inasmuch as they can be related to the text-genre in which the markers are found, and on the relationship between pragmatic function and narrative segment. Present findings confirm the hypothesis that the narrator's use of this sort of elements is not arbitrary and context-independent since their functions are linked to specific narrative segments. *So* and *then*, for instance, have an important presence in action units, which finds a plausible explanation in the fact that *so* has a primary role as marker of result and recoverer of train of thought, and *then* is a marker whose main role is that of introducing the succession of events and of the speaker's intentions. In both cases, it is obvious that their referential meaning directly influences their pragmatic use. *Well* is used by the narrator in action and evaluative units, basically. Its richness as illocutionary and text-structuring device can help to explain this, considering that the action-evaluation-action segment alternation is typical of oral narrative.

The narrator often looks for understanding and sharing of common ground when telling a narrative of personal experience. S/he also tries to help the hearer find out the hidden implications of the message, if there are any. The main role of *you know* is that of helping the speaker in such a task, in both action and evaluation units, although it is in evaluation units where it plays an essential role in conveying the point of the story. Similarly, the use of *I mean* in evaluation segments, internal evaluation mainly, also responds to its core function, that is, showing the hearer involvement of the self and the other.

According to present findings, it can therefore be concluded that, as was hypothesized in Chapter 4, there is not an arbitrary use of markers within a text. *I mean*, for instance, is used by the narrator in internal evaluation more often than in action segments. This does not respond to an arbitrary free choice, but to the intrinsic procedural and referential meaning of this lexical unit that makes it appropriate for such distribution within the text. Similarly, *so* and *then*, two markers whose core referential meaning strongly influences their pragmatic use, are mainly found in complicating action segments.

The hypothesis that certain pragmatic markers behave as *markers of intensity* or *intensifiers*, that is, as evaluative element that the narrator uses to show his/her perspective (Labov 1972b: 378), proves to be specially true of *well*, *I mean*, *you know* and *anyway*. To different degrees, they all 'intensify' some parts of the account by selecting a situation or event and highlighting its illocutionary force.

In Chapter 6, I carried out the analysis and discussion of pragmatic markers found in Catalan narratives: *bé*, *bueno*, *clar*, *doncs*, *pues*, *llavors*, *aleshores*, *no*, and *eh*. According to results, Catalan narrators use these linguistic cues profusely when telling a past personal experience. As with English markers, the study follows two argumentative lines: relationship between the functions of the markers and the narrative segment, and functional incidence of the marker in the four discourse structure components.

Findings suggest that most functions carried out by Catalan markers are related to the rhetorical component of the narrative, followed by the sequential, inferential and, finally, ideational component. *Bueno*, *doncs*, *pues* and *clar* are the markers whose functions are closely tied to the rhetorical structure.

Bé and *aleshores* are the markers whose primary roles are tied to the sequential structure. They are found at segment boundaries, at the initiation of the complicating action and at the opening of quoted material.

In the inferential discourse plane, *no*, *eh*, *clar* and *bé* have a preponderant role. They are all cues that facilitate the contextual effects and shared knowledge, helping the transmission of the illocutionary point of the text. *No* and *eh* in particular are used as focal elements that ask the hearer to focus his/her attention on a specific part of the utterance. Their use also involves an assumption of complicity with the hearer and an overt willingness to share common ground. In addition, in the use of these two tag-markers there is a concealed desire of acceptance of what is being told that is especially true in the case of *eh* when it is used by the speaker to address the interlocutor directly, with an implicit desire to be believed or understood. As for *clar*, there is a direct influence of its lexical meaning on its pragmatic use since its intrinsic evaluative and subjective character facilitates the sharing of experience. It is precisely for this reason that *clar* becomes a very useful resource used by the speaker to help the listener process presuppositions. Finally, in the inferential plane, *bé* is used by the speaker to anchor the interlocutor in the text-world, a fact which contrasts with the recurrent use of *bueno* as a rich illocutionary marker, in the rhetorical discourse plane.

The functional distribution of Catalan markers per narrative segments suggests that their use is linked to specific parts of the text and is context-dependent. Hence, the use that speakers make of markers in a particular segment is linked to intentions, to the implicit content and subjectivity of the informants, and to the way that the information they provide is structured. Results show that action and evaluation are the two parts of the narrative where Catalan markers have the strongest presence, with a strong concentration on internal evaluation units. This fact is easily understood if it is taken into consideration that it is in these parts of the story where the speaker's voice is most overtly shown, commenting on the events, providing an opinion about situations and actions, and expressing thoughts and inner feelings

about the event. Since external evaluation is of an objective nature that involves a distance from the speaker, the use of markers to transmit the intentional state of the discourse and the possible inferences and presuppositions to be drawn is inferior.

In action segments, *no* and *bueno* play a key role in the telling of events. *Bueno* is a pragmatically rich marker in the transmission of illocutionary force. This marker has a primary presence in the rhetorical structure and a secondary role in the sequential structure. *No* is a tag-marker that is used clause-finally throughout the narrative. Whereas in evaluative parts it is basically used as a cue that facilitates the sharing of common ground and works as a monitoring feature, in action segments it works as an evidential and focal device. *Llavors*, *doncs*, *bé* and *aleshores* are all characterized by their role in the temporal organization of events and their facilitating the telling of plain facts. Moreover, among these, *bé* and *aleshores* work as text structuring devices that are highly valuable in the action-evaluation-action alternation that conforms the body of the narrative.

As far as evaluation is concerned, *no*, *clar* and *bueno* are the three markers that are used most often by the speaker. The polyfunctionality of *bueno* provides a plausible explanation for its abundant presence throughout all narrative parts. In fact, *bueno* is the only marker that appears in all six narrative parts, from abstract to coda. The use of *clar* implies an involvement of the speaker in showing not only facts but, what is more important, the point of the narrative. It is for this reason that it is mostly found in evaluative segments — closely intertwined with action segments — at the peak of the story. The particular features of *clar* and *no* make them perfect linguistic elements for the speaker to use to help the listener process presuppositions and show involvement of self and other, looking for understanding, complicity, and proximity with the interlocutor. In this respect, it could be asserted that core evaluative markers such as *no* and *clar* work as polyphonic elements that bridge two voices, that of the speaker and that of the listener.

The role of units such as *clar*, *bueno* and *no* confirms the hypothesis that certain pragmatic markers work as *markers of intensity* or *intensifiers*, in Labovian terms (Labov 1972b: 378), that is, as evaluative devices used by the speaker to show his/her perspective or/and attitude. They are all used by the speaker to check or express understanding, to confirm shared assumptions, and to effect cooperation, sharing and intimacy. All these interpersonal functions that these markers are able to carry out make them extremely valuable elements for openly expressing the speaker's inner-voice in evaluative parts of the text.

The reflexion that follows from present findings is that textual and interpersonal functions of markers are closely linked to the text-genre in which they operate. Understanding this involves that units such as those analyzed cannot be viewed in purely phatic terms whose role is basically that of filling empty spaces in an utterance. Such a claim might only be justified if viewed from a logico-semantic and

syntactic frame, strictly taking the propositional and grammatical mode into account, but not if semantic-pragmatic and procedural aspects are considered. If such was the nature of pragmatic markers, then, as previously mentioned, *any* marker could appear in *any* part of the text at random, without a particular reason for using one or another and without any distributional restrictions. The study I have carried out has proved that this is not the case and that these linguistic cues have a preponderant role predicating changes in the speaker's cognition, attitudes and beliefs, facilitating the transmission of illocutionary force and speaker's intentions.

The study of the functioning of pragmatic markers in English and Catalan oral narratives served to prove: (a) that their regular appearance is not arbitrary but rather systematic as their distribution in discourse suggests, and (b) that most markers show a dominant role in the ideational, illocutionary, structural, and inferential discourse components.

The function versus text-genre relationship is certainly relevant, taking into account that most empirical research on markers has been done from a conversationalist approach, where turn-taking, adjacency pairs, mitigation, holding of the floor, expression of deference or saving of face are predominant functions. In this respect, it has been seen that the monologued text form shows interesting differences. In contrast with what occurs in a dialogue, the elicitor of a narrative is not a verbally active interlocutor. The use of pragmatic markers becomes, therefore, especially remarkable since there is not an overt verbal feedback from the conversational partner. The narrator then uses the linguistic cues to shift from one contextual space or discourse plane to another — ideational, rhetorical, sequential, inferential — sharing with the hearer the vividness of a real life experience. In this sense, it has been observed that *compound pragmatic markers* provide the speaker with a still more useful linguistic tool than single markers since the shifting from and to a new contextual realm is carried out at markers boundaries.

The contrastive study of English and Catalan narratives showed that, although there is a high concentration of markers in action and evaluation segments in the two languages, Catalan narrators use pragmatic markers three times more than English narrators. This may be accounted for by appealing to the syntactic, semantic and stylistic differences of the two languages, a fact which often makes the one-to-one correspondence among markers extremely difficult and sometimes even impossible. Functional counterparts become, in these cases, the only possibility since, in most cases, there is not lexical and/or referential proximity (for instance, conclusive *bueno* finds its counterpart in conclusive *anyway*; resumptive *bé* finds it in resumptive *so*).

The distribution of pragmatic markers according to ideational and pragmatic discourse structures also showed some differences between the two languages: whereas most functions carried out by Catalan markers belong to the rhetorical

structure, followed by the sequential, inferential, and ideational structures, those fulfilled by English markers are found in the rhetorical and sequential components, followed by the ideational and, in the end, inferential component. These results show that: (a) both English and Catalan pragmatic markers have a preponderant role in the rhetorical and sequential narrative structures; and (b) English markers are more attached to the ideational structure than Catalan markers, which have a primary role in the inferential component, ahead of the ideational component. In view of these findings, can it be concluded that more or less weight in the ideational structure means more or less referential meaning of the markers? and if so, is it possible that Catalan markers have gone through a longer grammaticalization process than English ones, Catalan markers being more semantically bleached than their English counterparts? I believe it to be a plausible explanation for present findings.

Notes

1. Due to lack of space, the whole corpus of English and Catalan narratives will not be included in the book. Those who are interested can consult it in www.upf.edu/df/publicacio/WEBcorpus.doc
2. Italics added.
3. The following classification is based on Schiffrin (1994a: 339–353). Besides Schiffrin's proposal, for an applied overall view of discourse analysis to formal and functional linguistic areas of study, see McCarthy (1993) and Hatch (1992).
4. For a full understanding of the functions of language, key reference is Halliday (1973, 1985a).
5. Gumperz (1982b and 1984) offers an insightful reflection on the theoretical consequences of such a perspective from the point of view of discourse coherence.
6. Hymes (1972) provides the acronym *SPEAKING* as a methodological tool to analyse language: *S* (*setting, scene*), *P* (*participants*), *E* (*ends*), *A* (*act sequence*), *K* (*key*), *I* (*instrumentalities*), *N* (*norms of interaction and interpretation*), and *G* (*genre*).
7. The bibliography on pragmatics is very extensive. Main references are Levinson (1983: Chapter 1) and Leech (1983). The former offers a thorough discussion of the term and its scope as an area of inquiry; from the latter, useful being the differentiation between semantics and pragmatics, the definition of general pragmatics and the subclassification between *sociopragmatics* and *pragmalinguistics* (pp. 5–12). Brown and Yule (1983: 27–35) offer a clarifying synthesis of the inferential interpretative context. Reyes (1990) provides a profitable description of the discipline and its relation to grammar. Espinal (1988) and Bonilla (1990) do it from *Relevance theory* and discourse strategies, respectively. For a more formal approach, consult van Dijk (1977: II, 1978: III), Horn (1984), Gazdar (1979) and Green (1989). Rigau (1981) and Cuenca (1988, 1990) offer an interesting grammatical perspective of the discipline. Prince (1988) presents the discipline under a generativist view, framing it within the 'pragmatic competence' of language. Moeschler (1992) and Vanderveken (1992) focus on theoretical pragmatics and discourse acts.
8. The *cooperative principle* is observed by both speaker and listener: "Make your conversation contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (Grice 1975: 45).
9. Schiffrin (1994a: 21–22) and Leech (1983: 46–48) provide an insightful explanation of both linguistic currents and their repercussion in the analysis of discourse.
10. Vallduví provides a thorough discussion of the scope of pragmatics and presents important arguments for the need to end up with the 'wastebasketness' of the discipline:

“Lumping together all elements of linguistic structure that involve contextual notions (Levinson 1983) or, similarly, all aspects of meaning that have no truth-conditional effects (Gazdar 1979) has been very useful in advancing our understanding of the nonpragmatic phenomena of language. The result of such a methodological approach, however, has been the enormous heterogeneity of pragmatics as an area of inquiry.” (1992: 9). For a full understanding of discourse analysis as part of linguistic competence, it is worth seeing Prince (1988) and other works by her referred in Vallduví (1992).

11. Italics added.

12. Such is the claim of Rigau (1981: Chapter 1), Bernárdez (1987: introduction), Espinal (1988: 91–100) or Marsà (1992: 20–21), *inter alia*.

13. Werlich (1982: 23) offers an illustrative example of such a formalist approach when defining *text*: “A *text* is an extended structure of syntactic units such as words, groups, and clauses and textual units that is marked by both *coherence* among the elements and *completion*”. Bernárdez (1982: Chapters I and II, 1987: introduction) provides an insightful explanation of the historical antecedents of *text linguistics* and present state of the art. More theoretical studies on the matter can be seen in Bernárdez (1995), Lozano *et al.* (1993) and Adam (1990). Rigau (1981) and Espinal (1988) deal with the issue from a generativist approach.

14. The functional paradigm emerges from the Prague School, with J. R. Firth followers and Halliday as his foremost representatives, and the Tagmemic School founded by Longacre.

15. It should be mentioned, though, that Halliday, as a functionalist grammarian, also points out the importance of the process-product dichotomy, but in this case to make a clear distinction between *process-oral language* and *product-written language* (1985a: xxiii, 1985b: 81–86). Similarly, from the point of view of text interpretation, Petöfi (1990) establishes a *static* vs. *dynamic* dichotomy; the former implies a structural interpretation whereas the latter implies a procedural one.

16. *Rhetorics*, as a discipline, connects linguistic and pragmatic contexts: “*en el hecho retórico la estructura pragmática contiene los elementos sintácticos y los elementos semánticos, que así quedan orientados hacia la relación entre el orador, el texto retórico y el destinatario, como eje pragmático del fenómeno retórico (...) El texto o discurso retórico es la construcción material-lingüística que produce la actividad comunicativa del orador. Como objeto lingüístico que es, consta de niveles y elementos constitutivos entre los cuales existen relaciones de índole estructural.*” (Albaladejo 1991: 51–52)

[“from a rhetorical point of view the pragmatic structure contains the syntactic as well as the semantic elements, such that they are aimed at the relationship between the addresser, the text and the addressee, as pragmatic axis of the rhetorical phenomenon (...) The text or rhetorical discourse is the material-linguistic construction produced by the communicative activity of the speaker. Being a linguistic object, it is formed by constitutive levels and elements among which there are relations of a structural kind.”]

17. Schiffrin (1994a: 362) argues that a message includes two types of information, semantic (propositional meaning linguistically codified) and contextual, related to that which is not of primary interest: “context cannot exist unless we are thinking of ‘something else’ (e.g. an image, a smell, a sound, a word, an utterance, a sequence of utterances) that is located

relative to it. The identity of that ‘something else’ (and what kind of sense we are trying to make of it) influences our decisions about what counts as context and about what ‘parts of context we find important.’”

18. See Brown and Yule (1983: 35–46) for a thorough discussion of the notion of situational context. The authors present the ethnographic studies of Firth (1957) and Hymes (1962) as pioneering works on the notion of socio-cultural context.

19. Most of the studies on *coherence* make reference to such terms. See Brown and Yule (1983: 236–256) or Beaugrande and Dressler (1981:V) for a full discussion of them.

20. Some authors refer to this context as co-text. For a synthesis, see Brown and Yule (1983: 46–50).

21. Being aware of the wide bibliography on the field of text typology (including text genres and text classes), this review focuses on the specific genre used in the present study to analyse pragmatic markers, i.e. oral narrative of personal experience (Labov and Waletzky 1967, Labov 1972b). However, information and thorough discussion on the field can be found in Van Dijk (1978), Isenberg (1987), Adam (1985, 1991, 1992), Biber (1988, 1989), Bronckart (1985), Roulet (1991b), Beaugrande and Dressler (1981), Virtanen (1992) and Werlich (1976), among the most representative works. Bernárdez (1982, 1987), Fernández-Villanueva (1990) and Castellà (1995) offer interesting discussions, as well. It should be pointed out that, just as in the rest of discourse disciplines, the authors who work in the area of inquiry of text typology also show a tendency towards a formalist or a functionalist approach. Thus, Van Dijk and Isenberg take a formalist approach, whereas Werlich, Adam, Roulet or Biber, for instance, take a functional one. Smith, Jr. (1985), from the Tagmemic school, offers the same perspective. For an applied work on rhetorical analysis and genres, consult Hatch (1992: Chapter 5); she presents two approaches to text structure, rhetorical genre analysis and rhetorical structure theory. From developmental psycholinguistics, children’s acquisition of narratives has produced a vast bibliography, too. Peterson and McCabe (1983), for instance, provide wide references.

22. For detailed bibliography on narrative within these fields, see Prince (1982), Polanyi (1989), Riessman (1993), and Schiffrin (1994a). For extended bibliography on narrative analysis, consult Riessman (1993: 71–78).

23. Since the purpose of the present study is not the formalization of narrative sequences, we will not get into such *system of subscripts* in detail. Nevertheless, we recommend its checking for those interested in temporality (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 22–24).

24. This notion implies that they cannot be interchanged without altering the temporal sequence and, thus, the semantic interpretation of the events: “Such a condition is met when the displacement range of a given clause does not extend past the actual location of some following clause, and conversely the displacement range of this following clause does not extend past the actual location of the given preceding clause. More concisely, their displacement sets do not include each other. Two such clauses are temporally ordered with respect to each other.” (...) The temporal juncture is semantically equivalent to the temporal conjunction then (1967: 25 and 30).

25. From now on, all the examples provided are from the corpus of narratives collected and

compiled to pursue this research. The author personally elicited, registered and transcribed the Catalan narratives. I am indebted to M. Teresa Turell, who provided me with the English narratives. They were elicited and registered by her graduate students from University of Barcelona during the academic year 1992–93. The author did the transcription of data in CHILDES, fully explained in Chapter 4.

26. From now on, this is going to be the question which was used to elicit the narratives.

27. Italics added.

28. Although a full account of all the symbols used in the transcription of data will be provided in Chapter 4 (4.4), those that are important to know at this point are advanced: *a*: abstract; *o*: orientation (*s*: space; *p*: place; *t*: time; *c*: characters or participants); *da*: development of the action; *e*: evaluation (*ee*: external evaluation; *ei*: internal evaluation); *r*: result; *c*: coda.

29. In the orientation section, we differentiate *space orientation* from *place orientation*. In the first case, we include geographical information; in the second case, location (for instance, those events which occur in the university, at home, in the street, etc.).

30. The author clarifies that these expressions are, in fact, feed-back or back-channel signals that facilitate communication, not expressions of surprise (note 6, p.245).

31. Besides, a narrative which is not credible flunks Grice's maxim of "be truthful" (rf. *Cooperative Principle*).

32. Labov establishes a tight link between narrative events or actions presented in the narrative, and speech acts (relationship action-speech). In Labov 1982, he analyzes the structure of three narratives to get at the conclusion that speech can lead to violence. However, it is not the linguistic structure *per se* that takes the author to such conclusion, but what lies behind it: "Though there are tying relations between sentences-anaphoric, elliptic — the coherence of discourse is not established at this level but at a more abstract level of representation. Ultimately, the cohesion of the three narratives that we are examining does not depend on the sequence of narrative clauses but on the sequences of speech acts and actions that the narrative presents." (1982: 233)

33. There has not been found any with these characteristics in the *corpus* of narratives under analysis.

34. This question is generally used by Labov for practical reasons since: "... death and danger of death are among the two or three major themes of human concern and interest for all of the cultures that we know. It is for this reason that these themes play an important role in our interviews." (Labov 1982: 228). Moreover, the account of a personal experience of such characteristics guarantees the holding of attention of the audience since it encapsulates at least one reportable event.

35. See, for instance, Catalan *NAR18 Raimon*, *NAR6 Lourdes*, *NAR8 Duran*, and English *NAR1 Sarah*, *NAR4 Totty*, *NAR7 Karen*, among others.

36. In fact, Labov (1972b: 371) mentions that for some narrators it is almost impossible to keep within the bounds of the narrative. Specially in therapeutic interviews, external evaluation becomes the main body of the narrative, this being only the instrument or framework within which evaluation is inserted.

37. All the examples presented in this section are taken from Labov 1972b (pp. 78–392). They are samples of narratives from Harlem adolescents and adults.
38. This reflexion arises in view of the presence of intensifying devices that do not fulfill the conventions of sentence grammar (see, for example, the use of *no* in 14b, p.48).
39. Labov mentions the fact that most adult narrators use complex linguistic devices to evaluate their experiences, to the point that many “can lose the point of their story entirely in an excess of external evaluation and syntactic elaboration.” Furthermore, “the reaction of listeners to these narratives seems to demonstrate that the most highly evaluated form of language is that which translates our personal experience into dramatic form.” (1972b: 396)
40. There are numerous studies on cohesion and coherence, ranging from formal to functional approaches. Charolles (1988) offers an insightful historical overview of both textual properties.
41. Halliday and Hasan (1976: 9). Italics added.
42. The example provided by the authors is the following: A: There’s the doorbell; B: I’m in the bath. In this respect, we totally agree with the authors that the presence of a verbal link is neither necessary nor essential to interpret a text.
43. Italics added.
44. But, as Brinton (1996) states, there is a “plethora of other terms used” (p.29). See Appendix 1 for sample of suggested definitions around the term *discourse marker*.
45. I have purposely omitted those definitions that involved lexical units which set up inter sentential connection. In text grammars, conjunction is treated as part of connexity and logics. Hasan’s early work on Grammatical Cohesion in Spoken and Written English (1968), Halliday and Hasan’s Cohesion in English (1976), Werlich’s Text Grammar of English (1976) and Petöfi and Sözer’s Micro and Macro Connexity of Texts (1983) are key references on the issue. More recent works are those from Sweetser (1990) and Martin (1992), inter alia, who discuss the subject integrating semantics and pragmatics. Cuenca (1990, 1999) and Pons (1998) offer a global integrative perspective of connexity as a cohesive mechanism at both sentential and textual levels. In equal terms, Rigau (1981, 1986), Artigas (1986) and Castellà (1991) suggest that connexity is, next to reference, a syntactic procedure used to make a text cohesive. However, it should be pointed out that the vast majority of the aforementioned authors use the term *connector* to refer to such cohesive mechanism, not *discourse marker* (I will come back to this issue in the following section, 3.2.)
46. I clarify the concept of pragmatic marker in the following chapter (3.3.1.2.), when Redeker’s model is reviewed.
47. Spooren (1997) has worked on the processing of underspecified coherence relations, based on Horn’s 1984 reformulation of the Gricean maxims, and has concluded that, from Horn’s principle of Speaker Economy, speakers and writers use the R-principle (“be relevant”) more than the Q-principle (maxim of quantity: be as informative as possible but not more than necessary), especially with causal relations (1997: 156). His conclusion thus links with the already established idea that discourse markers are not strictly “essential” for the interpretation of discourse.

48. Italics added.

49. In Grosz and Sidner's words, "Reichman (1981) discusses some words that function in this way and coined the term *clue words*. We will use the term *cue phrases* to generalize on her observation as well as many others because *each one of these devices cues the hearer to some change in the discourse structure.*" (1986: 178). Italics added.

50. Sanders' test (1997: 126) consists of two pairs of basic causal operations between two propositions that, by means of paraphrase formulations, show whether the relation is pragmatic or semantic. The first pair responds to a pragmatic relation; the second to a semantic one.

- (i) a. the fact that P causes S.'s claim/advice/conclusion that Q;
- b. the fact that Q causes S.'s claim/advice/conclusion that P
- (ii) a. the fact that P causes the fact that Q;
- b. the fact that Q causes the fact that P

Thus, in "I'm busy. You can take your own beer out of the fridge" or "Theo was exhausted, because he was gasping for breath", the relation is pragmatic because "one of the paraphrases (i) corresponds best to the coherent relation as it is originally expressed in the text": (i) The fact that I am busy *causes my advice* to take your own beer out of the fridge; (ii) ?The fact that I am busy *causes the fact* that you can take your own beer out of the fridge. In contrast, in "Theo was exhausted because he had run to the university", the relation is semantic because "one of the paraphrases (ii) corresponds best to the coherent relation expressed in the text": (i) ?The fact that Theo had been running *causes my claim* that he was exhausted; (ii) The fact that Theo had been running *causes the fact* that he was exhausted. (pp.126–127).

51. Sanders et al. (1993) claim that coherence "is not a property of the discourse itself but of the representation people have or make of it." Thus, what is coherent is not the discourse *per se* but the discourse *representation*. (p.94)

52. In fact, the boundary between semantics and pragmatics can be drawn in many various ways, and has given rise to a vivid theoretical dispute in the literature in the past two decades. For current research in the semantics/pragmatics interface, see, for instance, *Presuppositions and Discourse: Essays offered to Hans Kamp* (2003), edited by R. Bauerle, U. Reyle and T. E. Zimmerman. The book collects recent contributions to the semantic and pragmatics of presupposition, devoting the first section to foundational issues, that is, to Hans Kamp's Discourse Representation Theory (DRT). The second section is devoted to connections between information structure and presupposition, and the third to detailed case studies related to presuppositional phenomena.

53. Similarly, Abraham (1991: 9) refers to two types of particles: focus particles, which "have always found the interest of semanticists and logicians" and modal particles, with "socializing, contextualizing, presupposing, implicating, and illocutionizing effects." (pp.9 and 13). About the state of the art of particles and modality, consult Martín Zorraquino (1992).

54. Making a difference between the two commonest terms — *discourse marker* and *connector* — seems appropriate. I understand that whereas the term *discourse marker* conforms to discourse structure and communicative pragmatic rules, the term *connector*

conforms to grammatical and logico-semantic sentential and text rules (i.e. pragmatic versus semantic coherence relations). I make such distinction for methodological and theoretical implications.

55. In most studies on discourse markers, there is just a description of their occurrence in isolated utterances with barely any linguistic contextualization. We should not forget that an important number of authors refer to such lexical pieces as *fillers* or *particles* (Svartvik 1980: 168), *paddings* ('expletivos y muletillas') (Cortés 1991: 28–29) or just 'oral expressions that maintain the ongoing conversational flow' (Vigara 1990a: 1094), without providing any theoretical grounding that accounts for its systematic presence in the language or attaching any specific textual function to them.

56. I agree with Marsà (1992: 74) about the looseness and openness of the notion *unit of talk*, used by Schiffrin in the definition that she provides of discourse marker. However, Schiffrin mentions the deliberate use that she makes of such a term (1987a: 36) because she believes that it has a greater operational range than 'sentence', 'proposition', 'speech act' or 'tone unit'.

57. In the following section it is shown that this unit is treated by the Geneva School and the Argumentative Theory linguists as a *pragmatic connector* with highly relevant semantic and syntactic roles in the utterance. Again, in any case a unit of such characteristics should be analysed in the same terms as units such as *well* or *oh*, unless the operating discourse functions are clearly pragmatic, not semantic/adversative (to my understanding, either one or the other should be specified).

58. They propose a Linguistic Discourse Model (LDM) that explains the presence of such units. For a thorough discussion of the model, see Polanyi and Scha (1983) and Polanyi (1985b, 1988).

59. Redeker (1986): *Language use in informal narratives: effects of social distance and listener involvement*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of California, Berkeley.

60. Italics added.

61. About ideational structure Redeker refers to the relations identified in Mann and Thompson 1988, i.e. Rhetorical Structure Theory, to which I have referred when dealing with semantic coherence relations, in 3.2. In terms of theoretical framework, she also mentions how much she owes to, among others, the work of Grosz and Sidner 1986, fully discussed in the theoretical framework as well.

62. (i) "A paratactic sequential relation is a transition between issues or topics that either follows a preplanned list or is locally occasioned, as for instance in conversation" ; (ii) "Hypotactic sequential relations are those leading into or out of a commentary, correction, paraphrase, aside, digression, or interruption segment" (Redeker 1991: 1168).

63. As a matter of fact, what Redeker is making evident is a methodological issue that has to do with the inductive strategy used by Schiffrin, designing the model of discourse coherence *a posteriori* of her empirical analysis, that is, her proposal is an outcome, not an starting point (Redeker 1991: 1160).

64. Redeker also suggests a different term, *discourse operator*, to embrace the two relation types because she considers that the label *discourse marker* is more pragmatically biased

(1991: 1168). However, I will keep on using the latter.

65. Redeker's use of context is understood as "the current common ground" [rf. Clark and Carlson 1981], i.e. shared knowledge. The link between ideational, rhetorical and sequential relations and context is put in these terms: "the strongest, contextually most relevant relation is taken to be the basis of the coherence link" (1990: 372). Thus, once the coherence relation is established, the speaker will choose between an ideational or a pragmatic marking.

66. This classification comes out of a study of narratives (film description experiment) performed on twenty-four students of the University of California at Berkeley and eight non-student Berkeley residents. They were divided in two groups that had to explain the film to somebody else; one of the groups to friends, and the other one to someone they had never met before. Redeker's hypothesis was that the group 'of friends' would make use of more pragmatic structuring devices than the other, which would use more ideational marking (1990: 370–71). This is the reason why, in her classification, she often makes reference to the narrative genre.

67. The author refers to Schiffrin's article (1986): "Functions of *and* in discourse", in *Journal of Pragmatics* 10:41–66. There is, though, another possibility with these two coordinating conjunctions, which is their function from a logico-semantic perspective.

68. This type of ideational structure marker corresponds to those that specify a semantic coherence relation, usually linked to the term *connector*, discussed in the previous section (3.2.) when dealing with the two coherence relation types. The Geneva School and the Argumentative Theory linguists make use of a similar term — *pragmatic connector* — to refer to the units that operate argumentatively and as discourse inference guides. Both will be presented and discussed in the coming section.

69. *Recent Approaches to Bridging: Truth, Coherence, Relevance*. Lecture given by Deirdre Wilson at Universidad Complutense, I International Symposium on Discourse Analysis, Madrid, April 21 1998.

70. Context understood as the speaker's and hearer's *cognitive environment*, that is, the set of assumptions that are manifest to them (1986: 137).

71. Interesting enough, the concept of *contextual assumptions* could be closely related to the notion of *topoïs* or *univers de creences*, coined by Ducrot's French Argumentative school.

72. The case of *besides* deserves a further comment. Not only does it add evidence for an assumption derived from the preceding utterance, but it condenses the ultimate important point of the issue. That is, having or not having time to make pancakes is not the most relevant issue; the 'real' reason for not making them is that 'there's no milk'.

73. The difference between *modalisateur d'énoncé* and *modalisateur d'énonciation* lies in their operative scope. Thus, whereas the former contributes to the propositional content of the utterance (same role as an adjunct), the latter reflects an attitude of the speaker about the event (same role as a disjunct) (Ducrot 1980).

74. Highly significant is his remark on the term *connector*: "*Le problème réside en grande partie dans le fait qu'il n'y a pas de consensus quant à la définition du terme connecteur dans la linguistique contemporaine. Ce terme est devenu tellement à la mode qu'on peut souvent avoir l'impression qu'il désigne pour certains une catégorie fourre-tout. Tout élément qui a une*

fonction connective, et qui n'est pas défini autrement est un connecteur — un connecteur pragmatique si tant est qu'il n'est pas un connecteur logique." (Nolke 1990: 120–121) ["The problem lies, to a great extent, in the fact that there is no agreement as far as the definition of the term *connector* in contemporary linguistics is concerned. This term has become so fashionable that one may often have the impression that it is, for some people, an umbrella category. Any element that has a connecting function, and which is not defined otherwise, is a connector — a pragmatic connector if not a logical connector."].

75. The name comes from *Téorie de la Pertinence*, French name for Relevance Theory.
76. The only known work is that of Bach (1996, 2000), who has used the notion of continuum in terms of degree scale for the study of Catalan reformulative connectors.
77. Except for those authors who view these units as discourse structuring devices found at segment boundaries, i.e. those presented in Sections 3.2. and 3.3. above.
78. Bakhtine sustains that the object of linguistics is discourse, understood as verbal interaction. Poliphony implies, thus, that, within an utterance or discourse, there are different 'voices' that represent different points of view; besides the voice of the speaker, there may be other voices not identified with specific utterances.
79. This notion implies that certain linguistic elements of the utterance that carry propositional meaning are susceptible to lead towards specific conclusions that can be materialized differently, either linguistically or through illocutionary acts (Ducrot 1983: 7).
80. Roulet (1997: 132) makes reference to a large group of linguists and philosophers who have seen the importance of this module as well: Pike and Pike 1983, Polanyi and Scha 1983, Polanyi 1988, Reichman 1985, Mann and Thompson 1988, Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1991, Searle 1991, to mention some
81. I will not get into a thorough discussion of the rest of modules since they are not directly related to discourse marker functions. The enunciative module concerns discourse polyphony, that is, the different voices — openly or not openly — manifested in a text. The periodical module concerns the discourse segmentation in space or time. The informational module is related to information discourse progress. The compositional module contains information about the different types of monological and dialogical text sequences. The situational component refers to the production and interpretation of discourse. The referential module is concerned with the interactants' knowledge of the world. The interactional module comprehends those features related to interaction, i.e. mode, channel, interactional roles, place and face relations. Finally, the psychological module relates to information about psychological states of the individual (Roulet 1997: 131–2).
82. Roulet points out the importance of the relational dimension in the works of Ducrot et al. (1980), Anscombre and Ducrot (1983) and Blakemore (1987).
83. The interactive dimension of discourse refers to the relation between speaker and hearer. Roulet exemplifies it with the use of *tu sais* and *voions*: the first "tries to gain attention from the hearer and to make the argument more convincing by appealing to his discourse memory"; the second, "presents the argument as obvious to the hearer in order to eliminate an opposition stored in discourse memory against the intended conclusion." (1995: 11)

84. Markers of interactive functions are divided into four classes: (i) argument or conclusion markers (*parce que, donc*); (ii) counter-argument markers (*bien que, mais*); (iii) reformulation markers (*enfin, après tout*); (iv) thematic markers (*quant à*).

85. Among other examples, Roulet presents different uses of a single unit, *mais*, accounted for in the polyphonical and periodical dimensions, and of two units, *même* and *d'ailleurs*, both giving instructions in the enunciative dimension (1995: 8–10).

86. Other Geneva School members have analyzed these units from different linguistic perspectives. Rubattel (1982) has worked on their role from syntax: the distinction between *discourse markers* and *connectors* lies in their degree of syntactic complexity; *connectors* are clause constituents and cannot be considered isolated elements, as if they were independent utterances. Similarly, Charolles (1990), from a grammatical perspective, claims that *connectors* and *operators* reflect a grammatical function of coordination and subordination, respectively. Schelling (1983) has concentrated on the argumentative role of these units. Reboul (1989) and Berrendoner (1983) have worked out their relation with anaphora. Vincent (1990) has studied them from a variationist approach, taking into account the different forms and functions they can take.

87. See Martín Zorraquino and Montolío Durán (1998) for an overview of the topic. See Briz (1993) for a thorough discussion of *pragmatic connectors* and their argumentative, illocutionary and structuring roles in colloquial Spanish. Portolés (1993, 1995, 1998) offers an integrative approach of argumentative and inferential theoretical frameworks for his study on *discourse markers*. Casado Velarde (1993) and Cortés (1991) depart from a text grammatical perspective and incorporate elements from the argumentative and functional discourse traditions. However, their works sometimes present a lack of systematicity as for the distinction of the two broad discourse coherence relations, i.e. pragmatic vs semantic. Thus, in the classifications they propose, lexical units with a clear logico-semantic argumentative function (those that have been characterized as *connectors* in the present work) are found next to units which display a core pragmatic function (i.e. *discourse markers*); the descriptive-methodological approach dominates over the explanatory one.

88. See Redeker's evaluative comments (3.3.1.2).

89. In fact, Roulet suggests that a modular approach such as his is the solution to partial views on the issue, i.e. inductive anglosaxon studies which are eminently descriptive and are not theoretically grounded, on the one hand, and reductionist approaches based on general principles that do not account for the complexity of discourse phenomena (such as those based on Relevance Theory), on the other.

90. By this I am referring to the degree of grammaticalization: the more lexicalized — or grammaticalized — a unit is, the higher its pragmatic value. Traugott (1995a, 1995b, 1996) and Cuenca and Marin (1998a, 1998b) offer a thorough discussion on the process of semantic loss of lexical units that have progressively acquired a strong pragmatic value and, with it, a change of their discourse use and grammatical category (1998a: 383). See also Pavlidou (1991) and King (1992), who refer to 'the grammaticalization of particles' and the different types of meaning they can combine.

91. Other instances of this marker, where the ideational structure merges with the pragmatic one, will be considered in the analytical part, following.

92. Along this line, there is a long narrative tradition in how children construct narratives and acquire the linguistic tools and mechanisms to do it. As for the use of discourse markers in particular, see Hoyle 1994 and Sprott 1992. Hoyle suggests that the use of *well*, *now*, and *ok* help the children ‘create and signal the imaginary participation framework’, working as bracketing devices. Sprott studies children’s use of discourse markers (*because*, *so*, *and*, *but*, *well*) in disputes, concluding that, before the ideational level of discourse, they first index the exchange and action levels.
93. The list the author offers is exhaustive: pauses and hesitation markers, such as *fillers* or repetition — in spoken discourse — paragraph indentations — in written discourse — time change markers, place change markers, change of perspective markers, etcetera (Van Dijk 1982: 181).
94. According to Bestgen and Vonk (1995: 387), *segmentation markers* belong to the general class of discourse markers described by Redeker 1991 and Schiffrin 1987, and include *cue phrases* (such as *now* and *first*) described by Grosz, Pollack and Sidner 1987, and text-signaling devices such as headings, pointer words or typographical cues, as referred by Lorch 1989.
95. The results of the study show that: “*and* marks high continuity between the actions or events described in two sentences. *Then* marks discontinuity. The *anchorage marker* [an explicit reference that indicates time of the day when the action started] signals high discontinuity” (Bestgen and Vonk 1995: 386–87).
96. Segal et al. (1991: 31) clarify: “A mental model is a mental structure which has properties directly dependent upon the meaning of the text rather than its lexicon or its syntactic form. The deictic shift perspective adds to the concept of the mental model the notion that readers shift their frame of reference for interpreting the sentences being read from a conversational here-and-now situated center to a point or region within the world of the story at or near the events of the story. This region is called the *deictic center* (Rapaport et al., 1989).”
97. Segal et al. (1991: 32) present the definition of this principle, developed from the deictic shift theory, proposed by several authors (Bruder et al. 1986; Daniels 1986; Galbraith 1989, Rapaport et al. 1989, Segal, Bruder and Daniels 1984, Wiebe and Rapaport 1988): “A new sentence in the text is interpreted in terms of an ongoing construction of an integrated component of the narrative’s meaning. Unless specifically marked, the new meaning is incorporated into, and regarded as continuous with, the current ongoing construction.”
98. See it summarized in Figure 6.
99. Polanyi (1988) calls such operational move *pop* and *push*, so she refers to *push marker* if the unit signs the creation of a new constituent, and *pop marker* if it signs the recovery of a previous constituent. Thus, *well* would be a push marker because it has a significant segment opening function, whereas *so* would be a pop marker because one of its primary functions is the recovering of train of thought.
100. In my view, the reflection that follows from this finding is that a lexical unit can be both connector *and* discourse marker depending on the sort of coherence relation that it sets up with the surrounding discourse. For instance, *so* is a connector when it creates a logico-

semantic argumentative relation of result but a pragmatic marker when it signs the illocutionary intentions of the speaker, i.e. introducing a shift in topic or an evaluation of the events. In contrast, English *well* and Catalan *bueno* are pragmatic markers that can become connectors when they set up a reformulative relation. In the Romance languages, reformulation is traditionally approached from an argumentative framework (cf. Anscombe and Ducrot 1983). However, other readings are also possible. Cuenca (2002) uses a globalizing term — *textual connector* — to refer to units which may have both descriptive and procedural meaning. Under this term, she includes parenthetical connectives and conjunctions

101. For an insightful discussion and classification of Catalan reformulatives, see Bach (2001).

102. The back-channelling is done by means of face gestures and non-verbal expressions.

103. A preliminary study with two groups of informants — one with and the other without university studies — was carried out. Since there was no difference between the two groups in terms of use of pragmatic markers, it was finally chosen the group that had university studies.

104. The interviewers of the English informants were not native speakers of English. The issue of the informants' nativeness in front of the researcher's non-nativeness has been studied by Sutcliffe and Turell (1991). Whenever this is the case, as it is in the elicitation of English narratives in this study, the authors conclude that there is reduction in the length of the story, in an attempt to involve the researcher in decoding less information, although they also point at the fact that it does not affect the structure of the narrative. Moreover, there is simplification in terms of syntactic complexity, lexical use and idiomatic expressions (1991: 461).

105. Schiffrin points out that 'empirical' for sociolinguists implies offering an explanation based on observations about actual language use (produced by speakers in real social situations), that is, an explanation accountable to particular data (as opposed to theoretical linguistic models, whose aim with data is to test a set of predictions and, therefore, falsify them) (Schiffrin 1987b: 13).

106. Labov (1966): *The social stratification of English in New York City*. Washington, D. C.: Center for Applied Linguistics.

107. According to this principle, "any systematic observation of a speaker defines a formal context in which more than the minimum attention is paid to speech" (Labov 1972c: 113). Let us recall that vernacular language is spontaneous language style that occurs in spite of the formal context.

108. It has been used for the transcriptions of data from disordered learners, second language learners, adults aphasic disorders, bilingual data (see Turell and Forcadell 1997 and Forcadell and Turell et al. 2000), etc.

109. See 'The Form of Files' in MacWhinney 1995: 8–9.

110. The difficulties that the transcription of verbal data present are thoroughly discussed by Crystal (1980). He raises the problems that the identification of sentence structure may present when conversational data are transcribed, pointing at three major areas of difficulty: (a) indeterminate connectivity; (b) indeterminate ellipsis; and (c) intercalation of structures. He concludes that wanting to impose a descriptive model on the data which uses the

sentence as basic unit is the cause of the problems; conversational English, he suggests, should not be analyzed in terms of sentences but of clauses (1980: 155–159)

111. They are listed in alphabetical order.

112. I use boldface to highlight the most outstanding figures.

113. From now on, I will use boldface to highlight the most outstanding functions.

114. Watts's study investigates the perception that native speakers have of the use of discourse markers (such as *you know, right, well, like*) by other speakers. His study concludes that, in a family gathering, members evaluate outsiders negatively as discourse markers users. (1989: 203). Greasley investigates the use of *well* on television commentaries on a game of snooker, pointing at the oddity of studies on this marker in non-conversational discourse. He concludes that *well* signals non-acceptance of a previous dialogue move or situation and is basically used to introduce snooker commentaries (1994: 489–491).

115. Finell refers to Traugott's theory of grammaticalization (1982) to account for its shift in meaning from Middle English to Modern English (1989: 655).

116. As far as defining its function or word-class status, there is little agreement. As Svartvik (1980: 168) and Greasley (1994: 477) point out, a range of labels have been suggested to describe its role: 'interjection', 'filler', 'particle', 'initiator', 'hesitator', 'disjunction marker', 'correction phrase', 'softener', 'relevance hedge', 'fumble/starter' and 'downtoner' are among them. Besides, Schiffrin (1987a: 102) adds, "use of *well* is not based on semantic meaning or grammatical status. Although *well* sometimes is a noun, an adverb, or a degree word, its use in utterance initial position is difficult to characterize in terms based on any of these classes." On similar argumentative lines, Stubbs (1983: 68) concludes: "One type of item about which syntax and semantics have little to say is represented by *well*. Other such items include, especially when utterance-initial or complete utterances, *now, right, OK, anyway, you know, I see, hello, byebye.*"

117. Following Schiffrin's theoretical framework, Marsà's analysis of *well* in conversation also concludes that this marker is used as a structuring and self-repair device. She proposes four roles of *well*: structuring, thematic, interactive and expressive, with further subclassifications (1992: 142–143).

118. Svartvik (1980) distinguishes two major uses of *well* in conversational discourse: (1) qualifier, and (2) frame: "As a qualifier, *well* is closely connected with previous and/or following discursal context, serving as a link between the two" (showing agreement, positive reaction or attitude, reinforcement, surprise, etc.) "Unlike the qualifier, which is typically initial and linked to turn-taking, *well* in its framing function normally occurs non-initially, embedded in discourse" (it introduces shift of topic, explanations, clarifications, direct speech, self-correction, etc.) (pp. 173–175). Svartvik concludes that *well* is a 'sharing device' that has a primary social role in informal conversations (p.176).

119. For further uses of *well* as a comment marker, see Greasley (1994), pp. 481–489.

120. Finell concludes that both uses have their source meaning in Old English, when the speaker adopted it to express "a wish to be in good standing with a person" or when the speaker does not completely comply with the interlocutor, yet "is willing to admit that the interlocutor has got a point in his/her argument" (1989: 654–655).

121. According to Schourup (1985: 18), an evincive is “a linguistic item that indicates that at the moment at which it is said the speaker is engaged in, or has just then been engaged in, thinking: the evincive item indicates that this thinking is now occurring or has just now occurred but does not completely specify its content.” Schourup claims that interjections are “reflections of the private world” of the speaker and that their use as evincives responds to the speaker’s need to communicate unspoken thought (p. 17–19). The term he adopts for evincives such as *well*, *like*, *y’know*, *I mean* and *now* is *discourse particle* (ch. 2 and 6).

122. Their analysis of *well* is part of what they call *linking signals*. These are divided into seven subunits: ‘Making a new start’ (*well*, *now*), ‘Changing the subject’ (*by the way*, *incidentally*), ‘Listing and adding’ (*first(ly)*, *second(ly)*, *next*, *to begin with*, *in the second place*, etc.), ‘Reinforcement’ (*besides*, *in any case*, *anyway*, *furthermore*, *what is more*), ‘Summary and generalisation’ (*in a word*, *in short*, *to sum up*, *altogether*, etc.), ‘Explanation’ (*that is*, *namely*, *for example*, etc.), and ‘Reformulation’ (*in other words*, *rather*, *better*). Note that all such pragmatic functions are carried out by *well* (and other pragmatic markers) in the narratives analyzed, as data on Table 26 show.

123. The important role of *well* as introductory piece of direct speech — in the case of narratives, in action sequences — has been recognized by several authors: Schiffrin (1987a: 124), Marsà (1992: 142–143), and Jucker (1993: 438), among others.

124. Notice that I have marked intonation with a rise (/), fall (\) or flat (-) symbol next to the marker.

125. I have quoted from Murray (1979: 730).

126. According to Watts (1989: 211), there are certain markers that can only function as lefthand discourse markers: *well*, *now*, *I see* and *oh*, whereas others occur only as righthand discourse brackets: *though* and *like*. Other may function in both positions: *I mean*, *you know* and *anyway*.

127. According to Reichman, a *context space* is the basic discourse constituent. I suggest that this notion can serve to explain the partition of oral narrative into segments and the way the narrator shifts from one to another. Hence, Reichman maintains that “a discourse is partitioned into a set of hierarchically related constituents, which are only partly defined by the conversational moves they contain. Discourse participants ‘package’ pieces of discourse into these separate units and selectively bring these units in and out of the foreground of attention in the generation and interpretation of subsequent utterances. The fundamental unit of discourse processing — the constituent hierarchically related to other discourse constituents and brought in and out of focus in a discourse — we call a *context space*. The structure of a discourse can be specified by the identification of its context spaces and the relations between them” (1985: 24).

128. Let us recall that Schiffrin’s model proposes five planes of talk: Exchange structure, Action structure, Ideational structure, Participation framework and Informational state (1987a: 25–28). They were all presented and discussed in Chapter 3 (3.3.1.1).

129. For a thorough discussion on the pragmatic nature of causal connectives, see Oversteegen (1997: 51–85).

130. The first is the resultative logico-semantic, which belongs to Ideational structure.

131. From the six pragmatic functions linked to the inferential component that I propose (see Figure 9, Chapter 3), *so* only undertakes one: anchor the interlocutor in the events or narrative world, making her/him aware of what is going on in the world that is being constructed (coded as \$sit). However, Schiffrin treats conclusive or speaker's summing-up *so* as inferential, whereas I have treated it as illocutionary, connected to rhetorical structure (the same as Redeker 1990: 372, pragmatic uses of conjunctions).
132. Evaluation-development of action segment pairing systematically occurs all through the narratives, both in the English and Catalan database.
133. Cited through Murray (1979: 730)
134. Watts (1989) does not include *so* among the markers that function either as lefthand or righthand discourse markers, probably because of its grammatical and descriptive meaning, but I consider it a marker whenever it carries out illocutionary and text-structuring functions.
135. Orientation embedded in complicating action or result preceded by a coda, for instance.
136. Schiffrin tries to justify her dealing with *I mean* and *you know* together in her 1987 work on discourse markers. Among other reasons, she claims that she does it because both markers are "socially evaluated and negatively sanctioned." She presents the example of newspaper columnists, who lament about the tendencies of teenagers and football players ("two groups thought to be inarticulate") towards the use and abuse of *I mean* and *you know*.
137. It is true that such a climax could be reached without the presence of the markers — "there was nothing they could do. [I mean] We were there for half an hour and nobody said a word. [I mean] Nothing happened." — just by means of punctuation marks. But, by using *I mean*, the speaker involves himself, and the listener, in the narrative's world and, at the same time, ties her/him down to it. Let us recall that pragmatic markers — and discourse markers in general — do not add any truth value to the proposition (see Chapter 3 for discussion), but they make the discourse coherence relation explicit.
138. The <*but I mean*> pattern is found in narratives 2, 8, 14 (twice), and 16.
139. In fact, Schiffrin (1987a) deals with both in the same chapter because she considers that, besides having a literal meaning that influences their discourse use, both markers show functional complementation and social stigmatization: "use of *y'know* can be interpreted as overdependence on the hearer, and use of *I mean* can be interpreted as overinvolvement with the self. And it could be for these reasons that these markers are stigmatized" (p. 311). Jucker and Smith (1998) also put them together when pointing at the fact that *you know* and *I mean* are, with *like*, 'presentation markers' (as opposed to 'reception markers' such as *yeah*, *oh* and *okay*) since they "accompany and modify the speaker's own information" (p.174).
140. The free distribution of *you know*, *I mean* and *anyway* has been pointed out by Watts (1989: 211).
141. Schourup (1985) differentiates the two types of *you know* by using a question tag, as in "you know Alice is a sharp tennis player, don't you?". In this case, the verbal unit does not

function as a 'discourse particle' but as a clause constituent forming part of the syntactic structure (p.100).

142. In studying the functions of *you know* in women's and men's speech, Holmes (1986) distinguishes two subcategories of *you know*: one that reflects the speaker's confidence, and the other that reflects the speaker's uncertainty. Moreover, she argues that "with the appropriate emphatic intonation it can be used as an intensifier or booster, expressing the speaker's complete confidence in the proposition being asserted, and in some cases serving to reassure the addressee of its validity" (1986: 16). Most, if not all, occurrences found in the corpus of narratives reflect the speaker's confidence, as in this case.

143. Here Schourup (1985: 109) interprets utterance-initial use of *you know* as an 'intimacy ploy' (term coined by Schegloff 1968: 1078), and explains it in this way: "It is as if the speaker were saying, 'We trust each other; our sensibilities are so attuned that I can count on your appreciation of essentials of what I say even before I say it'. This peculiarity of initial YK no doubt explains why the item carries a sense of 'folksiness'."

144. 'Gambits' are conversational strategy signals ("semi-fixed expressions") used by speakers to structure the content and procedure of conversational discourse (Keller 1981: 93).

145. In fact, what Keller refers to is probably the delay or stalling pragmatic function of discourse markers (coded as \$DEL in the classification that I proposed). But my analysis of data proved that this function is rarely fulfilled by pragmatic markers: only six times did *well*, *so*, and *I mean* carry out the function of 'playing for time to think' (see Table 23, p. 133). Literature and empirical studies have proved that pragmatic markers, and discourse markers in general, are linguistically rich devices, in terms of procedure and structure.

146. I cite from Jucker and Smith (1998: 196).

147. The example they provide illustrates such point: "*You know*, it's two o'clock" . According to Jucker and Smith (1998: 173), it is not that A believes B knows that it is two o'clock but rather that A believes B knows its implications. Thus what becomes important is the fact that *you know* makes the implications salient and marks them as common ground: "... you know is designed to ensure that the inferences presumed to be commonly calculable are made salient not just as individual calculations but as jointly constructed implications."

148. Data from Table 15 coming.

149. In this respect, *anyway* resembles the connector *besides*: both lexical units serve to introduce, at the end of an argumentation, the most important point to bear in mind.

150. I have not observed any other systematic cooccurrences in evaluation segments.

151. Takahara (1998: 333) mentions Alterberg's (1986) classification of *anyway* into 'concession' and 'transition'. Concessive *anyway* is subclassified into unrestricted and restricted, whose scope is just some words and phrases. The unrestricted one is placed clause-finally, which coincides with my findings.

152. Although, because of the different nature of the coherence relations that the two units establish, I consider *anyway* a discourse marker (establishing a pragmatic coherence relation) and *besides* a connector (establishing a semantic coherence relation).

153. Chafe (1987: 16) also points out the relationship between placement and function: when *anyway* is used to signal a return to the main topic, after a digression, it is placed clause-initially, after a pause, and has falling intonation.
154. Term from Becker (1995). Taken from Maschler (1998: 24)
155. In fact, Maschler (1998) poses many questions for future research on the nature of clusters/CPM: “do markers indeed cluster such that there are no two markers from the same contextual realm [i.e. discourse structure]? If not, as some exceptions suggest (...) are there any constraints concerning which markers from the same realm may co-occur in a cluster? What about the order of markers within a cluster?” (1998: 48).
156. I cite from Maschler (1998: 23).
157. In Takahara’s study (1998) on *anyway*, he describes the use of three related patterns: <but anyway>, <so anyway>, and <well anyway>, referring to them as ‘duplicated uses of connectives’ (p.339–341).
158. The narratives where these CPMs were found are: <then well>: nar3; <okay anyhow>: nar17; <so anyway>: nar10 and 16; <so you know>: nar18; <well I mean>: nar 14; <well so>: nar 17.
159. The structural shift follows a certain order (shown in parenthesis), although in cognitive terms it is clear that all these planes overlap.
160. When Catalan CPMs are discussed, more plausible explanations and conclusions will be drawn since the amount of occurrences is qualitatively and quantitatively much higher.
161. I use boldface to highlight the most outstanding figures.
162. On the study of *bé* and *bueno* and their pragmatic similarities with English *well*, see González (1994, 1998).
163. The coincidences and differences between these two markers will be commented later on, when the contrastive analysis is done, in Chapter 7.
164. For Catalan colloquial register traits, see Payrató (1988 and 1994).
165. Catalan speakers pronounce *bueno* partially adapting to the phonetics of the language: / bwénu /, so that the word keeps traits from both Catalan and Spanish languages.
166. In González (1998), a contrastive study of *bé* and *bueno* with the English marker *well* was carried out on a Catalan oral corpus, taking into account the variables of functional variation (field, mode, tenor and tone). Results confirmed the author’s hypothesis that Catalan speakers use *bé* in informative formal discourse more often than in interactive informal discourse, where they tend to use *bueno*. In addition, whereas *bé* and *well* share similar pragmatic functions, *bueno* does not; it conveys an expressive trait not found in those utterances introduced by *bé*. On the other hand, Vila’s study (1998) on *lexical transcodic markers* on the same Catalan oral corpus concludes that, in terms of functional variation, the amount of lexical transcodic markers is not significant at all (p.266). On similar lines, Espuny’s study (1998) on the cooccurrence of four lexical Spanish and Catalan forms (*bueno* and *bé*, *después* and *després*, *menos* and *menys*, *tenir que* + infinitive and *haver de* + infinitive) concludes that all tend to cooccur indistinctively, although there is a slight tendency to use more lexical transferences in oral interactive informal texts (p.287).

However, note that the present study does not take into consideration functional variation since all the markers analyzed share the same field, mode, tenor and tone.

167. Vigara (1990b) refers to pragmatic markers as “*expresiones de relleno*” (fillers) claiming that: “*y son más abundantes también en gente poco instruida, quizá porque por su condicionamiento no está capacitada para eludirlos y sustituirlas, aun cuando lo deseara; o también porque le es más sencillo escudar en ellas — cómodos recursos — su falta de instrucción.*” (p.40) [“and they are also more abundant in uneducated people, perhaps because, due to their conditioning, they are not capable of omitting and substituting them, even if they wish to do so; or perhaps because it is easier for them to hide — as convenient resources — their lack of formal instruction.”].

168. As explained in Chapter 4, all the informants are graduate native speakers. There are four of them who have formal instruction in Catalan language arts and actually teach the language themselves (narrators 1, 2, 5 and 15); as Table (23) shows, their use of *bueno* exceeds that of *bé*.

169. They describe five different types of *bon MSC* (*marqueurs de structuration de la conversation*): *Le bon d’enchaînement linéaire*, *le bon d’enchaînement global*, *Le bon de transition*, *Le bon introducteur*, *Le bon de clôture* (Saint-Pierre and Vadnais 1992: 246–250).

170. I adopt the term ‘filler’ (in the sense of meaningless — empty — lexical unit) for the Spanish ‘*expletivo*’, term often used by Cortés and Vigara to name those uses that do not respond, according to them, to any clear argumentative or discourse purpose. I do not share their position. As I try to prove, to my understanding discourse (pragmatic) markers always fulfil a function in speech.

171. Confront also Fuentes (1990a: 149), Cortés (1991: 104–107), Marsà (1992: 199), Portolés (1993: 156, 1998: 144); Briz (1993a: 155, 1998: 46); Martín Zorraquino (1994b: 410–411); Llorente (1996: 232–240); Turell and Corcoll (1998).

172. From distinct perspectives, this has been systematically stressed throughout the literature. See, among others, Fuentes (1990a: 156), Cortés (1991: 104), Marsà (1992: 215), Briz (1993b: 46).

173. Cuenca (2003) presents a contrastive analysis of reformulation markers in English, Spanish and Catalan. Based on grammaticalization theory, the analysis shows coincidences in the sources of the markers and differences in the variety of forms expressing reformulation as well as in their frequency of use.

174. Cortés refers to (114) as ‘narration’: “*El grupo mayor, por su número de apariciones, es el que denominamos propiamente continuativo (...) Hemos hallado 33 ejemplos, la mayoría de los cuales se produjo tras un inciso del hablante, que lo apartó momentáneamente de la narración.*” (1991: 105) (bold characters not in original) [“The biggest group, because of its high frequency of appearance, is the one denominated *properly continuative* (...) We have found 33 examples, most of which took place after a pause by the speaker, which took him momentarily away from the narration.”].

175. According to Silva-Corvalán (1984) and Lavandera (1984), this is what usually occurs with syntactic and pragmatic variables.

176. Narrative 2 (mid-subordinate clause position); narrative 8 (initial-subordinate clause position); and narrative 16 (mid-main clause position).
177. Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary (see *clear*). Diccionari de la Llengua Catalana (see *clar*).
178. According to Martín Zorraquino (1994a), *claro* is, next to *evidentemente*, *naturalmente*, *por supuesto* and *desde luego*, a paradigm of “*palabra modal asertiva afirmativa, de polaridad “máximamente” positiva*” (p.567) [“an affirmative assertive modal word, of highly positive polarity.”].
179. Both in Catalan and in Spanish, when categorized as sentence adverb, the unit can be paraphrased by means of *be* followed by a conjunctive *que*: “és clar que sí” (Cuenca 2002: 3225); “Claro, a mí los chocolates me gustan muchísimo” (*está claro que* a mí los chocolates me gustan muchísimo) (Martín Zorraquino 1993: 468) [“Claro, I really do like chocolates” (*está claro que/it is clear that* I really do like chocolates)]. J. M. Blecia (1975: 708–711) and I. Bosque (1990), *Las categorías gramaticales*, Síntesis, Madrid (p.128–129), discuss the adjectival or/and adverbial nature of *claro* (Martín Zorraquino 1994a: 560). Cuenca (2002) refers to *clar* as an interjection (resulting from a process of grammaticalization) that has a modal value and a communicative phatic function. By means of it, the speaker tries to keep closely in touch with the listener (p.3224). The modal value of *claro* has also been pointed out in Fuentes, who considers it always an adjective and never an interjection (1993b: 109).
180. Cortés (1991) classifies these instances under the use of *claro* as ‘paragraphic or extrasentential connector’ (p.66).
181. Cristina Ferrà, Consol Pèrez, and M. Luz Rodríguez: *Estudio de la alternancia doncs/pues*. Dossier de Sociolingüística. Professor: M.Teresa Turell. Master course: Teacher Training of Spanish as a Foreign Language. Barcelona University, 1993.
182. Badia i Margarit (1994) points out an extended wrong use of *doncs* among Catalan speakers influenced by the propositional value of *pues*: “... per la via d’aquest castellanisme s’ha introduït en la llengua una falta greu de sintaxi: atès que el cast. “pues” és una partícula al mateix temps il·lativa i causal, l’adopció de la il·lativa **pues* en català hi ha arrossegat una construcció aberrant de la conjunció **doncs* equivalent a la causal *perquè* (**no va poder venir, doncs estava malalt*).” (pp.315, 317) [“... by means of this Spanish form a serious syntactic mistake has been introduced into the language: because Spanish “pues” is both an illative and a causative particle, the adoption of the illative **pues* in Catalan has brought with it a wrong use of the conjunction **doncs* equivalent to causative *because* (**he couldn’t come, doncs he was sick*).”]
183. As in: “Este médico es un tocón, un aprovechao; ¡*pues* no me ha hecho poner en viso!” (Ciudad, 58). (Vigara 1990b: 71) [“This doctor is a feeler. He likes to take advantage; ¡*pues* he made me dress down to my petticoat!”]
184. Variation is present in narratives 7, 18 and 19 (see Table 30).
185. Out of the twenty narratives, *pues* only appears in five (see Table 30).
186. Based on Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986), Miche (1994) proposes that the polyfunctionality of *pues* can be explained only by taking into consideration its core

descriptive meaning: “*je suis la suite de quelque chose*” [“I am the continuation of something”]. From that instruction, the listener must find the most relevant relationship between the preceding and following utterances (p.73).

187. More information would be possible if the findings were correlated with external variables/factors that might account for differences in behaviour and specialized uses. However, interesting as this issue is, I do not consider external factors and concentrate on internal behaviour of markers within the text.

188. For a thorough study on colloquial *llavors*, see Oller (1998).

189. These are: *llavòrens*, *allavontes*, *allavòrens*, *allavons*. However, for the aims of this work, I have adopted Badia i Margarit (1994) perspective on the study of the unit and have counted all the variants together with the variable *llavors*.

190. although, if time was particularly stressed, the speaker could have used a cleft construction: “It is then that you realize...”

191. The variants found are always of *llavors*.

192. Although *res* is not discussed in the present work, it has been observed that it has two main functions: one conclusive and another inferential. The speaker’s aim is to constrain the possible contextual effects that the proposition where it is found may have on the listener. Thus by using it, the speaker and listener share a common ground.

193. Oller’s study (1998) on the use of *llavors* in conversational discourse suggests four uses of the marker: resumptive, emphazier, conclusive, and delaying.

194. According to Cuenca (1997) there are four question-tags in Catalan that implement the same pragmatic function: the negative adverb *no?*, the interjections *eh?* and *oi?* (this one used only with a confirmation value), and the word *veritat?* (with its phonetic variants: *vritat*, *vitat*, *tat*). In the corpus of narratives, I have only found *no* and *eh*, the two generalized forms in standard Catalan. Since the amount of occurrences of *no* highly exceeds that of *eh* (28.6% in front of 2.7%), I will mostly concentrate on *no* occurrences although the two forms share the same pragmatic, intonational and syntactic properties. I will therefore present them together, under the same heading.

195. Most languages have invariant tags but certain languages such as English, Danish and Finnish use inflected tags as in: But your mom doesn’t even limp, *does she?* Although tags are commonly used to mark uncertainty, Norrick (1995: 688) claims that “more importantly they also imply that the hearer has more immediate or surer access to the knowledge in question, and hence they appeal to the hearer for confirmation.”

196. Throughout her account, Elisabet uses *no?* fourteen times; eight of these belong to internal evaluative segments.

197. They exemplify it in: ??“ No acabaràs la feina, *no?*” (??*You won’t finish work, no?*), although they bring in Hualde’s (1992: 5) opposite view on the matter by supplying his example: “No et vols menjar les patates, *no?*” (“*You don’t want to eat the potatoes, no?*”). (Cuenca and Castellà 1995: 70).

198. Let us recall that the narrators could choose between telling a situation of danger or a frustrating childhood experience at school.

199. Notice that the sentence is negative. As previously mentioned, the use of *no?* in this case is considered by some authors ungrammatical (Cuenca and Castellà 1995: 70). Although it could be argued that this feature could account for its awkwardness, in previous pages I argued that it was not a primary factor to be taken into consideration when dealing with the use of *no?* in monologues.
200. In fact, Cuenca and Castellà (1995) also hint at a distinctive trait between the two markers when they claim that *eh?* is used by the speaker with a subjective aim (p.82).
201. This function should be undertaken by the *coda*, but most narratives do not have this final part. Therefore, it is often an internal evaluation or a result segment the units that include the rounding off concluding function of the coda.
202. The structural shift follows a certain order (shown in parenthesis), although in cognitive terms it is clear that all these planes overlap.
203. See Appendix 3 for detailed distribution of CPMs in the corpus of Catalan narratives.
204. Cuenca (2002) refers to the free mobility of some of the members that I have found in Catalan CPMs. With the category of *parenthetical connectors*, some of these units (formally, prepositional phrases, verb phrases and adverbs) can appear at clause-initial, clause-internal, or clause-final position. However, there are some restrictions with units which only admit initial position (*és a dir, ara (bé), això és, o sigui, així*): *També cal dir que hi ha llamps i llamps. *Hi ha, és a dir, llamps potents i llamps menys potents. [It should also be said that there are different kinds of lightning. *There are, és a dir, strong and weak flashes of lightning.]* They are all reformulative markers that involve an argumentative movement within the text so that the order of the propositions affects the meaning of the message. I have found a similar case in *<bueno és a dir>*, where the second member cannot be switched by the first.
205. Or *muletilla* and *expletivo*, in Spanish, and *mot crossa, omplidor* or *falca*, in Catalan.
206. This point can be proved by comparing long narratives like English NAR17 and NAR18, with 110/25 clauses/segments and 139/22 clauses/segments respectively, with NAR4 or NAR16, for instances, which both consist of 71 clauses organized in just 13 and 7 segments respectively, or NAR3, with a proportion of 63/10 clauses per segment. What was found in all these cases is long *development of action* segments.
207. The structure of narratives is not always formed by well differentiated segments that belong to just one type of narrative sequence. There are texts that, within the same segment, mix clauses that, according to Labov's pattern, belong to different stages (*development of action-orientation, development of action-evaluation, internal evaluation-external evaluation, orientation-evaluation*, are some examples of such combinations). I have named those sequences that do not show combination *pure* and those that show combination *combined*.
208. From now on, boldface will be used to highlight the most recurrent forms
209. Diccionari Anglès-Català. Enciclopèdia Catalana. Barcelona, 1983.
210. In fact, since it is a non-standard form, it does not appear in any Catalan dictionary.
211. Contrast Table 3 (Chapter 5) with Table 22 (Chapter 6)
212. Marsà (1992: 329) reached a similar conclusion for English and Spanish discourse (transition) markers.

213. Cuenca (2000b) presents a thorough discussion of the issue, comparing Catalan, Spanish and English sentence structures, in stylistic terms.
214. I use boldface to mark those forms that have a dominant presence in the segment.
215. I am grateful to Patrick Zabalbeascoa for providing me with these examples. They are taken from his doctoral dissertation: *Developing translation studies to better account for audiovisual texts and other new forms of text production*. Lleida University, 1993.
216. Although I know that it is not a standard Catalan form and, consequently, translators may not be allowed to use it.
217. Numerous studies have shown the function that pragmatic markers have as politeness conversational routines (see, for instance, Aijmer 1996).

Appendixes

Appendix 1

Sample of suggested definitions around the term *discourse marker*

“Sequentially dependent elements which bracket units of talk (...) sometimes these units are sentences, but sometimes they are propositions, speech acts or tone units (...). Markers occur at the boundaries of units as different as tone groups, sentences, actions, verses, and so on (...). The analysis of discourse markers is part of the more general analysis of discourse coherence — how speakers and hearers jointly integrate forms, meanings, and actions to make overall sense out of what is said.” [*and, because, but, I mean, now, oh, or, so, then, well, y’know*] (Schiffrin 1987: 31, 49)

“Discourse markers are expressions such as *now, well, so, however, and then*, which signal a sequential relationship between the current basic message and the previous discourse.” (Fraser 1990: 383)

“Discourse connectives are expressions which impose constraints on relevance in virtue of the inferential connections they express.” [*and, after all, you see, but, moreover, furthermore, so*] (Blakemore 1987: 141)

“a linguistic item [particle] that indicates that at the moment at which it is said the speaker is engaged in or has just then been engaged in, thinking; the evincive item indicates that this thinking is now occurring or has just now occurred but does not completely specify its content.” [*like, well, y’know*] (Schourup 1985: 14)

“A discourse marker is a linguistic expression that is used to signal the relation of an utterance to the immediate context. *Context* in this definition can be thought of as the current common ground (Clark and Carlson 1981).” (Redeker 1990: 372)

“pop-markers pop the subordinate unit off the stack and make the main discourse available for continuation.” (Polanyi and Scha 1983)

“*Ce sont des éléments qui articulent des unités conversationnelles ou textuelles en posant entre elles une relation de subordination ou de coordination (...). Les connecteurs constituent une sous-classe des marqueurs d’interactivité (...). Ils posent des instructions argumentatives et ils sont intégrés dans le bâtiment de l’argumentation (...).*” (Rubattel 1982: 37)

[“They are elements that articulate conversational or textual units by setting up a relation of subordination or coordination between them (...) Connectors are a subcategory of markers of interaction (...) They provide argumentative instructions and they are integrated into the argumentative frame (...).”]

“*Les connecteurs peuvent enchaîner non sur énoncé, mais sur une information qui se trouve déjà dans la mémoire discursive, et qui est le reflet d’un énoncé, d’un acte, d’un événement ou d’un implicite.*” (Roulet, CLF 11, p.336)

["Connectors have the capacity to establish a link not with the utterance, but with the information which is found within the discourse memory, and which is the reflection of an utterance, an act, an event or an implicit."]

"Cue phrases are expressions such as *now*, *in the first place*, and *by the way*, which do not make a direct semantic contribution to an utterance, but instead convey information about the structure of the discourse containing the utterance." (Grosz, Pollack and Sidner 1989: 443)

"One type of item about which syntax and semantics have little to say is represented by *well*. Other such items include, especially when utterance-initial or complete utterances, *now*, *right*, *OK*, *anyway*, *you know*, *I see*, *hello*, *byebye*. Syntax has little to say about them, since they make no syntactic predictions. Most, if not all, have uses in which they are potentially complete utterances. Nor does semantics have much to say about such items, since when they are not used in their literal meanings, they have no property of thesis: that is, they have no propositional content." (Stubbs 1983: 68)

"*Los marcadores del discurso son unidades lingüísticas invariables, no ejercen una función sintáctica en el marco de la predicación oracional y poseen un cometido coincidente en el discurso: el de guiar, de acuerdo con sus distintas propiedades morfosintácticas, semánticas y pragmáticas, las inferencias que se realizan en la comunicación.*" (Portolés 1998: 25–26)

["Discourse markers are invariable linguistic units that have a null syntactic function in the sentence predicative frame and that have a common goal in discourse: that of guiding, in accordance with their distinct morphosyntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties, the inferences that take place in the communicative exchange."]

"*Proponemos el término marcadores del discurso para designar a todos aquellos elementos lingüísticos que indican las relaciones de contenido y de expresión entre enunciados o grupos de enunciados y cuyo efecto se refleja en la organización coherente del discurso.*" (Marsà 1992: 110)

["We propose the term discourse marker to refer to those linguistic elements that indicate content and expression relations between utterances or groups of utterances and whose effect is reflected in the coherent organization of the discourse."]

"*Los conectores pragmáticos constituyen en el texto verdaderos trazos de toda la actividad argumentativa y de la actividad comunicativa en general, a la vez que son instrucciones para el oyente de la orientación argumentativa de los enunciados que articulan (...); son controles de la situación de habla, bien del mensaje, bien del contacto. Se trata en este caso de la que hemos denominado función metadiscursiva del conector pragmático.*" (Briz 1994: 379–80)

["Pragmatic markers are, in the text, real traces of all the argumentative activity and of the communicative activity in general, as well as instructions for the listener of the argumentative orientation of the utterance they articulate (...); they are control signs of the speech situation, be it the message or the contact. It would be, in this case, what we have called metadiscourse function of the pragmatic connector."]

"*Els marcadors del discurs queden definits com a elements modalitzadors que actuen en el nivell textual i s'utilitzen metalingüísticament. Són remàtics i incideixen prioritàriament en el nivell pragmàtic del text, encara que alguns manifesten també una relació semàntica. Sovint apareixen entre pauses i poden presentar mobilitat posicional encara que solen tenir posició inicial.*" (Marín 1998: 217)

["Discourse markers are defined as modalising elements that operate at the textual level and

that are used metalinguistically. They are rhematic elements which mainly affect the pragmatic text level, although some of them express a semantic relation as well. They are often found between pauses and can have distributional mobility, although they are usually found in initial position.”].

Appendix 2. Key to pragmatic functions coding

Ideational structure:

- CON resultative marker. Introduces a consequence of previous proposition or act.
 REF reformulative marker. Reformulates previous proposition, usually by paraphrasing it.
 SEQ temporal marker that introduces a sequential order of events.

Rhetorical structure:

- ADD addition marker. Adds more detailed information that the narrator considers is relevant for the account. Expands, explains and/or supports previous proposition or information.
 CLA clarification marker. Clarifies previous discourse, sometimes by means of examples.
 CLU concluding marker. Introduces important fact to bear in mind or take into consideration. Works as rounding off tool.
 COM marker that introduces a personal comment or remark that is not directly related to the events but that is considered relevant by the narrator for the full understanding of the story. Usually found in external evaluation.
 DEL marker that delays, puts off information, playing for time to think (*staller*. Stenström 1994).
 EMP emphasizer. Reinforces propositional value of the utterance or previous pragmatic function.
 EVA evaluator. Introduces evaluation or comment from narrator directly related to the events taking place. Usually found in internal evaluation.
 EVI evidential. Marker that makes a fact or a situation salient. Highlights the illocutionary force of the utterance or discourse segment. Indicates that the information provided is highly relevant for the interpretation of the story.
 REC marker that recovers or regains argumentative thread or line of thought, usually interrupted by a narrative segment.
 TOP topic shifter.

Sequential structure:

- DSP marker that introduces direct speech. It can be found either in or out of quoted material.
 FRA opening ‘frame marking device’ (Jucker 1993) used to initiate a narrative segment.
 FRC closing ‘frame marking device’ used to close a narrative segment.
 INI development of action initiator.

Inferential component:

- CTX marker that constrains the contextual effects that the proposition may have on the listener. Stops, softens or narrows down the range of inferences and effects that the account may have on the listener.
 JUS marker that introduces justification of previous or following proposition.

- MIT 'face threat mitigator' (Jucker 1993).
 PRE marker that introduces a presupposition.
 PRO monitoring marker used by the speaker to share mutual background knowledge or ground. By using it, the narrator looks for proximity, complicity and understanding.
 SIT marker that anchors the interlocutor in the narrative's world. By means of it, the narrator makes the interlocutor aware of the events that are taking place or of the important point(s) to bear in mind in the world that is being constructed.

Appendix 3.

Distribution of Catalan compound pragmatic markers in the corpus of narratives

| | |
|---------------------|---|
| <i>narrative 1</i> | <bé doncs> 2 |
| <i>narrative 2</i> | <aleshores doncs> 2 |
| <i>narrative 3</i> | – |
| <i>narrative 4</i> | <bé doncs> <bé llavors doncs> <bé llavors/llavorens> < bé o sigui> <llavors bé> <doncs bé> <clar o sigui> 2 |
| <i>narrative 5</i> | – |
| <i>narrative 6</i> | <bueno és a dir> |
| <i>narrative 7</i> | <bueno llavors> |
| <i>narrative 8</i> | <aleshores bueno> 2 <bé bueno> <doncs res> |
| <i>narrative 9</i> | – |
| <i>narrative 10</i> | – |
| <i>narrative 11</i> | <bueno doncs> <bueno pues> <bueno vull dir> |
| <i>narrative 12</i> | <aleshores bueno> <llavorens res> |
| <i>narrative 13</i> | – |
| <i>narrative 14</i> | <bé pues> |
| <i>narrative 15</i> | <o sigui res> |
| <i>narrative 16</i> | <doncs res doncs> |
| <i>narrative 17</i> | <bueno total> |
| <i>narrative 18</i> | <llavors pues> <bueno pues> |
| <i>narrative 19</i> | <bueno doncs en fi> <aleshores bueno> <llavors bueno> |

narrative 20

<llavores doncs bueno>
<pues és clar>
<bueno clar>
<bueno aleshores>
<doncs mira> 2
<bueno doncs>
<bueno clar>
<aleshores clar>
<aleshores bueno>

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