Gender, Politeness and Pragmatic Particles in French
Gender, Politeness and Pragmatic Particles in French
by Kate Beeching
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This study\textsuperscript{1} sets out to test Lakoff’s (1975) hypothesis that women’s speech is more polite or tentative than men’s through a detailed analysis of the usage, in a sample of contemporary spoken French, of the pragmatic particles (PPs) \textit{c’est-à-dire}, \textit{enfin}, \textit{hein} and \textit{quoi}. Though the interpretation of the function of so-called discourse markers and pragmatic particles continues to be a subject of much debate, the study puts forward the case that PPs serve both the repair requirements and the social interactional ‘face-work’ which are characteristic of spontaneous speech and, as such, may be used as a meter by which to gauge the relative tentativeness of men’s and women’s speech.

Chapters 1–3 of the study survey the literature to do with language and gender, politeness theory and PPs, and describe the manner in which the data were collected and transcribed. Qualitative and quantitative analyses of the use of PPs in the corpus are provided in Chapters 4 and 5–8, respectively. The qualitative analysis aimed to evaluate the contextual factors which may motivate the use of PPs. The quantitative analysis, by contrast, set out to measure the distributional frequencies of their usage according to the sex, age and educational background of the speakers. Whilst the detailed exploration of contingent factors such as the social roles adopted by the speakers demonstrates the value of a qualitative account, the fact that it is possible to make generalisable or falsifiable pronouncements on the basis of results found to be statistically significant in the data legitimises the adoption of a quantitative account. Both qualitative and quantitative analyses presume a prior sub-categorisation of the pragmatic usages of the linguistic item under investigation.

The results of the study suggest that, if men’s and women’s usage of PPs differs in the corpus, the asymmetry lies not in the degree of tentativeness displayed but rather in the use made of such expressions to introduce explanatory ramification and to mediate repair, both of which are favoured to a greater extent by the male speakers in our corpus. If the female speakers display greater politeness, it lies in their more adroit usage of the PPs to structure discourse and to maintain contact with their interlocutor.
In the Conclusion in Chapter 9, we attempt to evaluate the contribution made to the field of language and gender in contemporary French and to suggest fruitful avenues for future research.

I wish to express my gratitude principally to Carol Sanders for her encouragement and painstaking supervision of the thesis on which the study is based and which evolved gradually over a seven year period. Warm thanks, too, to Françoise Gadet who agreed to co-supervise the thesis as part of the “co-tutelle” system at a somewhat later stage and whose interest, advice and detailed comments have been invaluable. Thanks, also, to the following colleagues who made stimulating and apt comments on sections of the thesis: Maj-Britt Mosegaard Hansen (on discourse markers), Anthony Lodge (on the description of *enfin*), Cécile Bauvois, Marielle Bruyninckx, Nigel Armstrong and Jean-Marc Dewaele; to Farooq Chudry who oversaw the statistical parts of the study, to Mark Jarvis for his input in the notation-system describing echo/self-mimic *enfin* and to Robin Price for stimulating discussion, enduring support and specific help with ornithological terms which appear in the corpus. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to the three anonymous readers from Benjamins, who made detailed and constructive remarks on the original thesis. These informed the substantial revisions made to the manuscript as I prepared it for publication. Finally, I should like to thank the ninety-five interviewees, the transcriptions of whose words make up the corpus of spoken French on which the investigation is based — without their contribution, the study could not have been written.

**Note**

1. The study is a substantially revised and abridged version of my doctoral thesis completed at the University of Surrey and the Université de Paris X — Nanterre in 2001 and entitled “The speech of men and women in contemporary French: the function of parenthetical remarks and the pragmatic particles *c’est-à-dire, enfin, hein* and *quoi.*”
List of abbreviations

Note: Where a 2 is included after some of these abbreviations, this denotes the fact that the numerical values alluded to have been corrected for the disproportionate quantities of speech produced by speakers with differing word-counts in order to allow meaningful comparisons to be made: the raw values were divided by the word count in each case and multiplied by 10,000 to generate manageable figures.

ANOVA Analysis of Variance  
CAD C’est-à-dire  
CD (Compact Disk/) Contradictory  
CT Complaint  
D Social Distance  
DISCOURS Discoursal “hein”  
DM Discourse Marker  
EM Epistemic Modality  
Emph. Emphatic  
FEA Face-Enhancing Act, see Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 1997.  
FTA Face-Threatening Act, see Brown & Levinson, 1987.  
H Hearer  
HYPE(R) Hyperbolic “hein”  
I Imposition  
I of E Inadequacy of Expression  
Misc. Miscellaneous  
MRP Marqueur de Reformulation Paraphrastique, see Fernandez, 1994.  
O/E Claim Over-exaggerated claim  
P Power  
PC Phatic Connective, see Bazzanella, 1990.  
PE Pragmatic Expression, see Erman, 1992.  
PP Pragmatic Particle  
R Ranking of the imposition  
S Speaker
CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.0 Introduction

Women’s language has been said to reflect their conservatism, prestige consciousness, upward mobility, insecurity, deference, nurture, emotional expressivity, connectedness, sensitivity to others, solidarity. And men’s language is heard as evincing their toughness, lack of affect, competitiveness, independence, competence, hierarchy, control.


Amongst the stereotyped views of the differences between men’s and women’s speech reflected in Eckert & McConnell’s words above, it has been claimed that women’s speech is more tentative or polite, more attentive to the face needs of others than men’s speech. It is this thread of enquiry which we shall be following throughout this study addressing the link between language and gender with particular reference to the use of pragmatic particles in contemporary French.

In her seminal work Language and Woman’s Place, Lakoff (1975) noted ten ways in which the speech of American women differed from that of men, including a larger number of hedges and mechanisms whereby utterances could be made to sound more tentative. Lakoff argues that, in a number of ways, women seek corroboration or approbation. They avoid swear words, use hypercorrect grammar and superpolite forms. They favour the use of tag-questions, rising intonation and hedges of various kinds such as “well”, “y’know”, “kinda” and intensive “so” to mitigate a possibly too strong (masculine sounding) assertion. These sentence types provide a means whereby speakers can avoid committing themselves, and thereby avoid coming into conflict with the addressee. By doing so, claims Robin Lakoff, speakers may also give the impression of not being sure of themselves, of looking to the addressee for confirmation, even of having no views of their own. Lakoff describes women’s speech as more polite than men’s. One aspect of this politeness is illustrated by the use of rising intonation to accompany a declarative utterance. In leaving a decision open, a woman avoids imposing her mind,
or views or claims on anyone else. Politeness involves an absence of strong statement and women’s speech is devised to prevent the expression of strong statements. Lakoff did not submit her hypotheses, based on her observations of friends and acquaintances, to empirical investigation. A number of research studies have attempted to do so, with contradictory results (e.g. Dubois & Crouch, 1975; Zimmerman & West, 1975; Brown, 1979; Holmes, 1986, 1995; Preisler, 1986; Erman, 1992, Wouk, 1999). More recent studies, such as Holmes’ (1995) *Women, men and politeness* have drawn on the concepts of face developed by Goffman (1967) and Brown and Levinson’s (1987) theories of positive and negative politeness in evaluating the extent to which women’s language might be considered to be more polite than that of men.

Very few studies into the relationship between language and gender have been conducted with specific reference to French. Apart from Beeching (2001) and Dewaele (2001), those studies which do exist (Houdebine, 1979a, 1979b; Yaguello, 1978, 1989; Aebischer & Forel (eds.), 1983; Pillon, 1987; Singy (ed.), 1998; other chapters in Armstrong, Bauvois & Beeching (eds.), 2001) have taken a philosophical approach, have focused on phonological variation, or on issues related to the representation of women and the creation of non-sexist terms. None have investigated the usage of particles in relation to gender. Though Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1992) writes persuasively and with considerable insight concerning the manner in which Levinson’s politeness theory might be applied to French, her examples arise from intuition or are from literary sources, and do not derive from an empirical study of a body of contemporary spoken French. Her work raises the issue of hedging expressions in English (1992, 222) but offers no equivalents in French. Our study, then, breaks new ground, both in investigating the pragmatic function of particles as mechanisms whereby speakers may hedge their speech and thereby render utterances more tentative and less face-threatening and in charting their sociolinguistic stratification, with particular reference to gender, in contemporary spoken French.

**Why particles?**

Brown’s (1979) work on the use of particles (particularly “boosters” and “softeners”) in the speech of men and women in a Mayan community in Mexico seemed to confirm that, in a situation in which women are in a subordinate position in society, they tend to use forms which show deference. The particles she studied occurred more frequently in women’s than in men’s speech (though correction had to be made for the semantic context and Brown
did not subject her results to statistical analysis). Brown argues that women are more sensitive to face-threatening acts and their speech strategies, including their use of particles, reflect this. Brown (1998, 97) problematises the relationship between communicative strategies and a speaker’s position in society and suggests that an analysis of such strategies allows us to predict universals in linguistic usage based on universals in the position of women cross-culturally; to the extent that women occupy similar structural loci with similar social-structural constraints on behaviour, women will behave similarly at the strategic level.

She claims that we would not expect linguistic similarities between West African women or high-caste Indian women and Tenejapan women, the former having apparently much more structural power. Brown proposes two hypotheses which may be tested in further cross-cultural research, the first is that deference (and, in general, negative politeness) prevails if and where people are in a position of vulnerability or inferiority in a society. Hence, women in a position inferior to men will be likely to adopt more negatively polite strategies. Linguistic realisations of negative politeness strategies in Tzeltal include performative hedges; indirect speech acts; pessimistic formulations of requests and offers; minimisation of impositions; deference; and depersonalising and deresponsibilising mechanisms which imply that the speaker is not taking responsibility for the force of this particular speech act.

Positive politeness prevails if and when social networks involve multiplex relationships with each person with whom a speaker interacts regularly, so that each relationship involves the whole person, or a large part of his/her person. Conventionalised linguistic resources for positive politeness in Tzeltal would include: the emphatic particles; exaggerated and emphatic intonation and prosodic patterns; negative questions (won’t you eat now?) as offers which presuppose an affirmative reply; repeats and other ways of stressing interest and agreement; irony and rhetorical questions as way of stressing shared point of view; use of directly quoted conversations; diminutives and in-group address-forms; expressions like “you know” and “you see” which claim shared knowledge; joking (which also presupposes shared knowledge and values); and Tzeltal inclusive-we used to mean “I” or “you”, pretending that the speech act is for the common weal.

Other studies, which have looked at tentativeness and the use of particles, have presented a complex picture of their functions and interpretation. Preisler (1986) suggests that where men adopt a social role which demands it, they, too,
employ linguistic strategies involving tentativeness. He gives the example of
senior managers who hedge criticisms or suggestions made to more junior sta-

Erman’s (1992) study of the pragmatic expressions you know, you see and I
mean, in female and male British English speakers reports that the men used the
expressions about 25% more often than the women and in some contexts about
twice as much and that the women tended to use pragmatic expressions between
complete propositions to connect consecutive arguments whereas the men
preferred to use them as attention-drawing devices or to signal repair work.

Wouk’s (1999) paper on gender and the use of pragmatic particles in
Indonesian, on the other hand, suggests that on the whole Indonesian usage by
both genders is facilitative and that this might be seen as a reflection of
Indonesian cultural values, which place a premium on maintaining the ap-
pearance of co-operative behaviour.

Why these particles?

Although particles present decided difficulties of interpretation and are fre-
quently multi-functional, they appear to contribute, through their hedging
qualities, to the mediation of social interaction and politeness. For this reason,
they are of keen interest in investigating the hypothesis that women’s speech is
more tentative or polite than men’s. The four particles c’est-à-dire (que), enfin,
hein and quoi were selected for detailed scrutiny as they occur very frequently in
spontaneous spoken French, fulfilling both referential-repair and face-saving
roles. C’est-à-dire (que) and enfin flag an upcoming repair or gloss and appear
utterance-medially as a general rule. Hein and quoi generally appear utterance-
finally and would seem to be more easily integrated into a theory involving
hedging and face-saving social interactional qualities. The four particles thus
form a balanced mechanism for evaluating two major defining constituents of
spoken language, one of which comprises its spontaneous, on-line qualities (a
spring-board for repair strategies), whilst the other lies in its social interactional
nature (a spring-board for hedging and face-saving strategies).

The manner in which the group of particles are used and their distribu-
tional frequency in the speech of men and women may serve, thus, to test
hypotheses concerning gender-asymmetrical language usage. Tannen’s (e.g.
1990) work, which stresses the factual (Report) tenor of male speech versus the
relational (Rapport) focus of women’s speech and the difficulties which this
causes in mixed-sex conversation, has struck a chord (albeit in somewhat
anecdotal fashion) with many readers. It may be that any gender-asymmetry
which we may find in the distributional frequencies of particles is attributable to a similar preoccupation with facts in men’s speech versus relationship in women’s speech. In other words we might hypothesize that the referential/repair function is likely to predominate over the social or interactional role in men’s speech, while social or interactional functions predominate over ideational ones in women’s speech. On the basis of the functions attributed to the linguistic items in question, we can move to a quantitative comparison of the manner in which PPs are used in men’s and women’s speech in the corpus. Our approach resembles, broadly speaking, that adopted by Holmes (e.g. 1995) but differs in including a consideration of the age and educational background of the speakers.

Since Lakoff’s (1975) work *Language and Woman’s Place* and the development of the variationist model in Labov’s (1972) *Sociolinguistic Patterns*, studies of the relationship between language and gender have formed a rich seam in a burgeoning literature covering phonological, syntactic, lexical and discourse levels of comparison. More recent studies include a focus on discourse analysis and the structure of turn-taking. Whilst many of the early studies concentrated on American English, some seminal projects, like Brown’s (1979) thesis concerning language, interaction and sex roles in a Mayan community, looked at different speech communities and attempted to posit universal strategic reflexes which would depend on the position of men and women in different socio-structural contexts.

This chapter attempts to provide a succinct overview of the large and growing literature in the field of language and gender and to draw out the areas which are of particular interest in relation to this study which include both the intersection of sex and social class in the variationist model and the concepts of tentativeness, politeness and ‘face-work’ which have developed out of the work by Goffman (1967) and which form a central plank in Brown & Levinson’s (1987) theory of politeness. The review of the literature starts with a brief evaluation of the nature/nurture debate with regard to gender-asymmetry (in 1.1). An attempt is made to give an account of and synthesize theories of politeness (1.2) before more detailed linguistic studies are highlighted which focus on the expression of tentativeness (1.3). The relation between expressions of tentativeness and power or status in society is explored in 1.4 with a discussion of the research conducted with relation to French in the later paragraphs. The chapter concludes on a note of caution concerning methodological approaches to the study of language and gender.
1.1 Sex or gender: the debate about biology and culture

Most studies investigating the link between language and gender have correlated biological sex with particular phonological, grammatical or other features of language. More recently, it has been suggested that a polarised approach is unhelpful and that a more valid, less deterministic approach is, on the one hand, to refer to *gender-preferential* rather than *gender-exclusive* differences (Coates (ed), 1998: 7) and, on the other hand, to propose a non-unitary model of gender, recognising that femininity and masculinity vary, are context-dependent and co-exist in the same person (Connell, 1993, 170 ff.). The physical contrast between male and female is a biological given in most societies, although Foley (1997, 286) cites authors — Errington (1990), Foucault (1984), Moore (1988, 1994) and Yanagisako & Collier (1987) — who cast doubts on this perhaps bald Eurocentric view, suggesting that even the “biological given” may be a cultural construction. Even amongst those who accept that biological differences exist, however, it is generally held that the significance and cultural accretions adhering to this physical difference are far from given. If sex is a biological, gender is a cultural construction.

Whilst investigations of pitch have revealed that there is a great deal of overlap in the pitch range of men and women and that pitch selection is culturally induced (men selecting lower pitch as a symbol of masculinity, women higher pitch to signal their femininity) (Ohara, 1992), it cannot be denied that there are physical differences, related to the length of the larynx and other factors which yield differential pitch possibilities at the top and the bottom of the range. There is also experimental evidence which suggests that there are differences in the organisation of the brain in men and in women. Women show better equivalence between the two sides of the brain than men in experiments where a stimulus is presented to either the left or right ear or eye but not both, leading to its processing in one hemisphere or the other. Women’s brains appear to be more globally organised for specific functions whereas men’s brains are more highly lateralised with verbal functions in the left hemisphere and spatial functions in the right (see Sherman 1978: 108–34 for an overview). Linguistic functions are thus more diffusely spread over the brain in women than in men. In an investigation of the relationship between brain damage and aphasia, it was found that men were afflicted after damage to almost any part of the left hemisphere whereas women were usually spared unless the damage was extensive in the anterior region. Gender asymmetry in the organisation of the brain, then, appears to explain why men are more often
affected by aphasia than women. It would also seem, argues Chambers (1995: 135), that this would explain women’s greater verbal abilities and linguistic wellbeing. On the other hand, the differences in brain organisation also provide an explanation for male superiority in spatial ability. As a woman’s spatial skills are controlled by both sides of the brain, there is an overlap with areas of the brain that control other activities and the spatial abilities suffer. Witelson (1978, 1985a, 1985b) studied men’s and women’s response to emotional information fed to the right hemisphere and then the left hemisphere. She made use of the fact that visual images restricted to the right-hand field of view are transmitted to the left side of the brain, and those restricted to the left-hand field are transmitted to the right side of the brain. The visual images she used were emotionally charged. She found women recognised the emotional content whichever side of the brain the image was transmitted to. Men only recognised the emotional content when the image was transmitted to the right-hand side of the brain. The difference in brain organisation relates to the corpus callosum, the bundle of fibres that link the left and right sides of the brain. These nerve fibres allow for the exchange of information between the two halves of the brain. In blind tests on fourteen brains, it was found that in women an important area of the corpus callosum was thicker and more bulbous than in men and the two sides of the brain have a larger number of connections in women. It has been suggested that the difference in emotional response in men and women can be explained by differences in the structure and organisation of the brain. Because emotions and speech are kept in different compartments in men, they have difficulties in expressing their feelings in speech. Witelson invokes what she calls the “preferred cognitive strategy” to explain why men and women select different strategies and professions. Each sex plays to the strengths with which their brain organisation has provided them. As far as verbal ability goes, Chambers (1995: 132) is one of very few researchers who suggest that, rather than compensating for shortcomings by using more standard language than men, women are displaying innately superior linguistic powers:

Women possess superior linguistic powers and, in particular, have a clear advantage over men in terms of their sociolinguistic competence.

Women show a wider range of linguistic variants and in various tests over many years have demonstrated an advantage over men in fluency, speaking, listening comprehension of written material and of spoken material, vocabulary and spelling (see Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974: 75–85; Denno, 1982; Halpern,
1986). Maccoby & Jacklin stress that the difference is narrow (1974: 75):

It is true that whenever a sex difference is found, it is usually girls and women who obtain higher scores but the two sexes perform very similarly on a number of tasks in a number of sample populations.

However slight the advantage, the scores reveal that women have greater verbal ability than men. Men are more likely to stutter and have reading disabilities. Kimura (1983) suggests that men are more likely to suffer aphasic speech disorders after brain damage and men are four times more likely to suffer infantile autism and dyslexia than are women (Taylor & Ounsted, 1972: 224). It is possible that girls have greater innate language skills than boys and that this verbal precocity is then capitalised upon and further encouraged through socialisation. As Sherman, 1978: 40 says:

The early female advantage bends the twig toward female preference for verbal approaches to problem solution. This bent is then increased by the verbal emphasis of the educational system and by aspects of sex roles that do not encourage girls’ development of visual-spatial skills.

Concerning verbal abilities, Chambers concludes that (1995: 136):

The neuropsychological verbal advantage of females results in sociolinguistic discrepancies such that women use a larger repertoire of variants and command a wider range of styles than men of the same social groups even though gender roles are similar or identical.

Kimura (1999) reviews neurological research which suggests that differences in men’s and women’s speech may derive from differences in cognitive functioning to do with the lateralisation of skills in the left and right hemispheres of the brain. It may be that repair mechanisms are employed in a gender-asymmetrical manner for this reason. Once again, we are confronted with a problem of interpretation: are such mechanisms the reflection of cognitive functioning in serving repair needs or a manifestation of social stratification in expressing deference and attention to face needs? It might be suggested, in addition, that there may be some connection between such biological phenomena and women’s greater attentiveness to others’ needs and the expression of these in language.
1.2 Politeness

Márquez (2000), following Fraser (1990a), outlines four clearly different views of politeness: the ‘social norm’ view (explicit rules, such as those enshrined in etiquette manuals), the ‘conversational-maxim’ view (deriving from Grice’s co-operative principles combined with a politeness principle, and developed for example by Lakoff, 1975 and Leech, 1983), the ‘face-saving’ view (Brown & Levinson, 1987) and Fraser’s own ‘conversational-contract’ view which converges in many ways with the ‘face-saving’ view. To these, we add Kerbrat-Orecchioni’s revisions to Brown and Levinson’s model, a consideration of Arndt and Janney’s framework (e.g. 1985a, 1985b, 1991) and Eelen’s (2001) *modus operandi* versus *opus operatum* view of politeness. In this section, then, we review the literature which might suggest that women’s speech is more polite with reference to each of those views and assess the usefulness of these models of politeness with regard to the analysis of pragmatic particles in French.

The ‘social norm’ view

Firstly then, there is substantial evidence in the literature to suggest that from the point of view of the ‘social norm’ (our everyday notion of what constitutes politeness), women’s speech is universally more polite than men’s, both in avoiding swearing and stigmatised expressions and in following more closely conventions to do with managing the conversational floor. Jesperson (1922: 245) claims that women, in addition to finding euphemistic ways of describing ‘certain parts of the human body and certain natural functions’ avoiding the ‘direct and rude denominations which men, and especially young men, prefer when among themselves’, also object to anything which smacks of swearing. Lakoff (1975) also cites the use of swearing as being one of the characteristics which distinguishes male from female speech. More recent investigations confirm this belief (Adler, 1978; Burgoon & Stewart, 1975; Flexner and Wentworth, 1975; Mulac et al., 1980, 1985). De Klerk (1997), investigating the usage of English-speaking South African adolescents, found that the differences were indeed large and (1997: 152) “reveal a strikingly consistent trend whereby males generally used words which scored higher in terms of shock value”. In addition both males and females had a greater tolerance for expletives in males than in females. De Klerk goes so far as to claim (1997: 154):
These linguistic views emerged as remarkably crisp and clear-cut, almost rule-governed phenomena, indicative of strong stereotyped beliefs: nice girls don’t swear but nice boys can (and ought to?).

De Klerk, however, concludes (1997: 156–157) that conventions appear to be changing and that the gap between the two gender groups is closing. As gender roles have been challenged, the social and linguistic practices which symbolised such roles are also being challenged.

There is a widely attested tendency for women to adopt standard forms to a greater extent than their male counterparts. One of the key findings of the variationist studies of Labov and Trudgill has been the correlation of prestige variants with female speakers. Labov’s mould-breaking and elegant experiments in Martha’s Vineyard and New York reported in *Sociolinguistic Patterns* (1972) focused first and foremost on aspects of class and on the manner in which sociolinguistic factors motivate linguistic change. One of the main conclusions which may be drawn from his research on Martha’s Vineyard is that language selections reflect social affiliations or aspirations, affirming a speaker’s sense of his or her social identity. The degree of centralisation of the sound /aw/ correlates strikingly with the degree of affiliation speakers sense towards Martha’s Vineyard (Labov, 1972: 39). The question of hypercorrection, too, is a key concept in establishing that it is group identification (or projection), which, along with the prestige attributed to a particular linguistic variable, contributes to linguistic change. Gender differences and women’s linguistic practices play a key role in this evolution. Labov’s classic experiment in New York department stores demonstrates that r-fulness in casual speech in everyday life functions as a prestige-marker of the highest ranking status group. The amount of r pronunciation of the lower middle class is negligible as it is indeed for the working class and lower class. However, having elicited data from informants over a number of speech styles (Casual (A), Careful (B), Reading (C), Word Lists (D) and Minimal Pairs (D’)), Labov observes that speakers’ behaviour changes:

> But as one follows the progression toward more formal styles, the lower middle class shows a rapid increase in the values of (r), until at Styles D and D’, it surpasses the usage of the upper middle class.

Labov, 1972: 124

Labov calls this crossover pattern hypercorrection, extending the usual use of this term to indicate an irregular misapplication of an imperfectly learned rule, and discovers a similar hypercorrect pattern for socially significant (oh). In addition, subjects were asked to choose which of four alternative pronuncia-
tions were closest to the way they usually pronounced a word themselves. Subjects did not have an accurate perception of their own production. “On the contrary, the respondents identified their own speech with those subjective norms which governed the direction of stylistic variation.” (Labov, 1972: 131).

Most respondents reported that they were using variants of (eh) and (oh) which were lower than their own speech production, even in the most formal style. The lower middle classes showed the greatest insecurity in their hyper-sensitivity to stigmatised features and inaccurate perception of their own speech. Labov argues that it is lower middle class hypercorrection which is a motor driving the tempo of linguistic change and, although providing no differential data for men and women in Sociolinguistic Patterns suggests that it is as children are brought up that the shift occurs, a situation in which women play a significant part.

Hypercorrection is certainly strongest amongst women — and it may be that the lower-middle-class mother, and the grade-school teacher are prime agents in the acceleration of this type of linguistic change.
Labov, 1972: 141.

Labov (1966: 288) shows that in careful speech women use fewer stigmatised forms than men and are more sensitive than men to the prestige pattern. This is revealed in a sharper slope of style shifting especially at the more formal end of the spectrum. Labov (1972: 243) quotes a number of studies which confirm this finding: Fischer (1958), Shuy and Fasold’s work in Detroit and Anshen’s study of Hillsboro. Labov points out the pattern is particularly marked in lower-middle-class women, who show the most extreme form of this behaviour. He goes on to cite Trudgill’s study of -ing in Norwich and highlights the paradox that women, especially lower-middle-class women, use the highest percentage of an advancing sociolinguistic variable in their casual speech, they correct more sharply than men in formal contexts. ‘It is clear’, he concludes (1972: 243), ‘that women are more sensitive than men to overt sociolinguistic values’. Indeed, Labov claims (1972: 301) ‘women are almost a whole generation further along in the raising of (eh) than the men’. Pondering the reasons why women show more differentiation in their adoption of sounds at different levels of formality, Labov concludes that ‘the rate of advance and direction of a linguistic change owes a great deal to the special sensitivity of women to the whole process’ (1972: 303) and highlights the fact that women have a more direct influence on young children than men especially during the years when children are forming linguistic rules. It is, however, not always the case that
women are in the vanguard of linguistic change. The centralisation of /ay/ and /aw/ on Martha’s Vineyard was found primarily in men’s speech:

The correct generalisation then is not that women lead in linguistic change, but rather that the sexual differentiation of speech often plays a major role in the mechanism of linguistic evolution.

Turning to Trudgill’s (1983) work in Norwich, we find a marked gender asymmetry in the over-reporting by women of their usage of the standard form /ɪə/ as opposed to local form /ɪ/ for ear. Trudgill attributed the greater adherence and acceptance of local forms to covert prestige. Local forms carry connotations of toughness and masculinity which appeal to men (but not women).

The finding that women’s scores were closer to the standard than those of men of the same status was recorded in a number of communities including: rural New England (Fischer, 1958); North Carolina (Levine & Crockett, 1966; Anshen, 1969); New York City (Labov, 1966); Detroit (Shuy, Wolfram & Riley, 1967); Norwich (Trudgill, 1974); Glasgow (Macaulay, 1977) and Edinburgh (Romaine, 1978).

An explanation for gender-asymmetry with regard to prestige variants may lie in the concept of networks evolved by James and Lesley Milroy (1980, 1987). Networks can be characterised by two parameters: density and multiplexity. Density relates to the number of people participating in a network and the number of relationships of a person to other members of this network. Multiplexity is an index for the multifunctional aspect of relations within a network: a work colleague can also be a friend. In Milroy’s 1987 study of Ballymacarrett she found that men had a large network of social connections within the neighbourhood, lived their lives within this network and used the local linguistic features to signal this affiliation. This preference for low status linguistic items, was termed ‘covert prestige’. Women either stay in the home or work outside the neighbourhood. In the wider world, prestige standard features are more valued and women therefore tend to adopt those forms. This approach would also explain why the women in Gal’s (1978) study prefer to speak German in order to gain greater access to jobs outside the Hungarian-speaking peasant community where the men remain on the soil and continue to speak Hungarian. Nichols (1980, 1983, 1998) came to similar conclusions concerning black women’s use of Gullah and standard American English on a small island in the United States. As the women took up service jobs on the nearby mainland, they needed English whereas the men, working on construction sites, did not. The women, therefore, are adopting the standard variety
more quickly than the men. All of these studies indicate that it is essential to chart the social context of a particular language phenomenon in order to explain why it is there.

Deuchar (1989) offers a number of explanations for women’s so-called greater adoption of standard forms. She calls into question the argument that women are more status-conscious by pointing out that women’s class is generally equated with that of their husband or father. Hence, if women are categorised as working-class whereas they are in fact middle-class, the data themselves are open to question. As far as the solidarity argument goes (that male solidarity is affirmed through use of the vernacular), Deuchar argues that most of the criteria for multiplexity are oriented towards a typical male life-style, assuming participation in paid employment and a clear separation between work and leisure. The higher network scores may be an artefact of the methodology and are at odds with suggestions by others (Brown, 1980, Nichols, 1984, Thomas, 1989) that women working at home tend to participate in denser and more multiplex networks than those working outside the home.

In his contribution to Singy’s (1998) collection of chapters on women and linguistic insecurity, Trudgill revises his initial views about women and prestige and suggests alternative interpretations of the well-attested fact that women’s language is often “more correct” than men’s, including Gordon’s (1997) interesting hypothesis concerning the link drawn, in girls’ speech, between socially less prestigious forms and sexual promiscuity. Whilst it is inappropriate in most societies for girls to parade their sexuality, this is not the case for boys. Trudgill concludes (1998: 56) that women are expected to behave “better” than men and this includes their linguistic behaviour.

Social norms in many cultures suggest that it is impolite to interrupt when someone is talking. A number of studies appear to show that men dominate conversation and that men interrupt women more than women interrupt men. In McConnell-Ginet’s (1988: 98) words, conversation turns out not to be an “equal-opportunity activity”. Women are generally stereotyped as being the talkative sex and yet quantitative studies show that, both in single-sex groups (Swacker, 1975) and in mixed-sex groups (Edelsky, 1981), men talk proportionately more than women. (It is, however, perhaps significant that the more formal the topic, the greater the difference and the more talk is allocated to men). Men not only talk more but they do not follow up thematically from the previous speaker and they interrupt more than women. Interruption has been the focus of a number of studies. Zimmerman & West (1975) demonstrate that
men are far more likely to usurp women’s rights than the other way round. Even in situations where the woman is of higher status, men will dominate the conversation. Woods (1989) discovered that people of higher status were more likely to interrupt successfully but lower status men could interrupt a higher status woman. More recently, the question of what constitutes an interruption and what is a supportive contribution to a conversation which is being developed mutually has been raised by a number of researchers (James & Clarke, 1993; James & Drakich, 1993; Tannen, 1989, 1990). The function of overlaps and interruptions may be difficult to interpret and at times interruptions may, far from reflecting a desire to dominate the conversation, be a gesture of solidarity and encouragement to the speaker. Indeed, refusal to speak at all can be a claim to dominance. Fishman’s (1983) study of husband/wife conversation reveals that a man’s minimal responses to his wife’s attempts at initiating conversation often dictated the topics finally adopted and discussed.

A number of research studies have focused on gossip and the role which it plays in establishing a sense of in-group solidarity. Gossip is generally considered to be, at best, trivial, at worst, malicious and is contra-indicated in manuals of social etiquette. Contrary to popular opinion, women do not have the monopoly on gossip. However, there appear to be clear strategic differences in the way such gossip is conducted. Coates (e.g. 1998) demonstrates the co-operative and polyphonic nature of language in all-female groups. Drawing on conversational data involving five 21 year-old American male university students, Cameron (1997) argues that men, too, talk co-operatively using simultaneous speech, latching (turn transition without pause or overlap) and repetition to create or affirm a consensus of views between speakers. Cameron (1997: 57) however, questions whether “this male conversation has the other important hallmark of women’s gossip, namely an egalitarian or non-hierarchical organisation of the floor.” Men’s gossip thus shares some of the purposes of women’s gossip (to create a sense of solidarity between speakers) but the strategies used to arrive at this end are different. In the conversations she studies, although there is a competitive, sparring quality to the talk, it is solidary in the sense that the men are engaged in ‘the joint production of discourse’. Thus, although gossip might be labelled ‘impolite’ from the point of view of the social norm, it serves an important purpose for both men and women in making sense of their lives and in establishing identity and group solidarity.

Polite communication consists above all in putting forward other people’s interests before one’s own. Women are stereotypically better at this than men.
However, Cameron, interestingly, suggests that there may be a disingenuous side to women’s solicitous attention to others in that they thus not only attend to others’ face but attend to their own. She concludes (1997: 59):

A woman may gain status by displaying the correct degree of concern for others, and lose status by displaying too little concern for others and too much for herself. Arguably, it is gender-stereotyping that causes us to miss or minimise the status-seeking element in women friends’ talk, and the connection-making dimension of men’s.

Coates (1997), however, found that the overlapping which is characteristic of women’s talk (Coates, 1996; Coates and Jordan, in press; Scheibman, 1995) was absent from the 17½ hours of British men’s conversation which she analysed. Although, as Coates points out, polyphonic talk has been found in mixed groups (Bublitz, 1988; Edelsky, 1981) and in male-female pairs (Chafe, 1995; Falk, 1980; Johnson, 1990, 1996), she found that the British men she studied respected Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson’s (1974) one-at-a-time turn-taking model. Coates suggests (1997: 120) that linguistic choices are topic-related and may be influenced by a factor which she names ‘expertism’. The male speech studied by Coates (1997) is characterised by a series of monologues in which the speaker ‘plays the expert’ gaining the floor for an extended period to talk on his area of expertise whether this is home-made beer-making, hi-fi equipment or film projectors.

This message is confirmed in most of the papers collected in Johnson & Meinhof (1997). This is the first publication to look at men’s, rather than women’s, language. It appears that, whilst the linguistic capabilities are available to both men and women e.g. men can and do gossip or overlap with each other in speech, they tend not to, whereas women display a tendency to indulge in these features.

Pilkington (Coates (ed.), 1998: 254–269) sums up the main differences between male and female gossip as follows (p.266):

Males do not provide minimal feedback and often do not respond in any way to others’ comments. They disagree very directly and bluntly with others’ statements. They abuse each other and criticise each other very directly. And they appear to feel no need to provide topic support or to develop others’ topics. They appear to switch topics abruptly and without regard for the previous speaker’s topic.

Johnson & Aries (Coates (ed.) 1998: 215–225), in a similar vein, suggest (p.217) that:
male friendships involve more communication about matters peripheral to self; they engage more in sociability than in intimacy (Pleck, 1975). Female friendships encompass personal identities, intimacy, and the immediacy of daily life.

They suggest that this may well be a universal gender asymmetry. It seems that social norms more readily allow a man than a woman to break both ‘other-oriented’ and ‘self-oriented’ rules of politeness (among which we might include, for instance, Leech’s ‘Modesty Maxim’).

In assessing why it is that there is gender-asymmetry in the usage of the French particles which form the object of this study, we cannot neglect a consideration of conventional social norms and what are generally considered stigmatised forms by certain sectors of the population. One of the reasons why women adopt what might be considered more tentative forms and shun those which are socially stigmatised may lie in their closer adherence to social norms which are deemed desirable in women — but are not insisted upon for men.

The ‘conversational-maxim’ view

We turn, now, from the ‘social norm’ view of politeness to one derived from the Co-operative Principle of Grice. Grice’s assumption that the main purpose of conversation is the effective exchange of information finds a corrective in Lakoff’s (1975) rules of politeness which introduce a means of combining the apparently conflicting dictates of ‘be clear’ and ‘be polite’. Whilst Lakoff’s analysis has been criticised for being insufficiently explicit with regard to the way that aloofness, deference and camaraderie work in a particular society, her rules have been applied to valuable research in this area — Márquez quotes Smith-Hefner, 1981; Tannen, 1981 and Pan, 1995—and we return to a fuller description of her rules in Chapter 4. Suffice it to say for the moment that, where indirectness and camaraderie are required to mediate politeness, we would expect to find pragmatic particles, both in introducing hedges (hence indirectness and a deferent mode of address) and because they tend to be colloquial or even stigmatised forms (see comments from Brinton, 1996, quoted in Chapter 2) and would thus create an egalitarian floor. Eelen (2001: 3) remarks that Distance (or aloofness) has been characterised as a strategy of impersonality, Deference as hesitancy and Camaraderie as informality. Roughly, European cultures tend to emphasize Distancing strategies, Asian cultures tend to be Deferential, and modern American culture tends towards Camaraderie. As we shall see, with reference to French culture, Di-
tancing strategies are far from being ubiquitous in Europe, educational background being a strong predictor of the strategy employed.

Leech (1983), reviewed in the context of politeness theory in Fraser (1990a), Márquez (2000) and Eelen (2001), develops the conversational-maxim view and indicates the contradictions which may exist in the negotiation of the CP and the PP. Briefly, he suggests six interpersonal Maxims: Tact, Meta (‘Do not put others in a position in which they have to break the Tact Maxim’), Generosity, Approval, Modesty, Agreement and Sympathy. Each Maxim has a set of scales including cost-benefit, optionality, indirectness, authority and social distance. Leech also invokes an Irony Principle. The Irony Principle can override considerations included in the scales: an extremely formal and elaborate formulation may be used, ironically, to make a request of an intimate, with whom one might usually expect more direct formulations to be used (e.g. ‘I wonder if it would be too much to ask if you could possibly bring yourself to remove your bike from the kitchen’ addressed to an adolescent boy). Leech’s Principles, Maxims and Scales capture the complexity of the manner in which politeness is performed in everyday acts of communication with humour, tact, modesty and generosity, and, in the detailed analysis of particular speech acts in our corpus, we recognise an enactment of his Maxims. Leech, himself, however, concedes that it would be very difficult to test the validity of his assertions.

The ‘face-saving’ view

The theory of politeness developed by Brown & Levinson (1987) derives from Goffman’s (1967) concepts to do with ‘face’. Goffman describes the manner in which, in all face-to-face social encounters, speakers act out what is sometimes called a line, that is “a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which he expresses his view of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, especially himself.” (Goffman, 1967, reproduced in Jaworski & Coupland, eds., 1999: 306). The term face is used, consonant with the folk notion of ‘loss of face’, to refer to the positive social image which speakers construct for themselves when taking a particular line. Speakers engage in ‘face-work’ in order to protect their self-image from attack and such face-work may involve them in pre-empting criticism by, for example, apologising before asking a favour or expressing an unpopular point of view (which would involve an imposition or threat to their co-locutor’s face). In addition, speakers cooperate in protecting each other’s face and where offence is caused, allocation of
blame is not at issue. When a face has been threatened, face-work must be done but whether this is initiated and carried out by the person whose face is threatened or by the offender or a mere witness is often of secondary importance. Terms such as tact or diplomacy bear witness to the manner in which the language of innuendo, ambiguities, well-placed pauses, carefully worded jokes and so on can save face. Goffman argues that, whilst there may be slight variations in the rules to do with face across different societies, face needs and the projection of self, through a *line* which is pursued with pride, honour, dignity, tact and a certain amount of poise, are universal human characteristics which develop in societies where members are mobilised as self-regulating participants in social encounters.

Brown & Levinson (1987) develop Goffman’s theory of face to include the notions of negative and positive face with their concomitants negative and positive politeness. Negative face is defined as the want of ‘every competent adult member’ that his action be unimpeded by others. Positive face is defined as the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others. Positive politeness is orientated towards the positive face of H (the hearer). It ‘anoints’ the face of the addressee by indicating that in some respects S (the speaker) wants H’s wants (e.g. by treating him as a member of an in-group, a friend, a person whose wants and personality traits are known and liked). Negative politeness is orientated mainly towards partially satisfying (redressing) H’s negative face, his basic want to maintain claims of territory and self-determination. Negative politeness involves self-effacement, formality or restraint. Face-threatening acts (such as asking favours or criticisms) are redressed with apologies, hedges on the illocutionary force of the act, impersonalising mechanisms (such as passives) and so on.

Females, according to Brown & Levinson’s model, stereotypically attend more closely to their positive face (their desire to be approved of) than to their negative face (their desire to be unimpeded in their actions). This is consonant with the notion that the relational is more important to women than dominance and agency (the stereotypical preserve of males). Strategies of positive politeness have been associated (e.g. by Holmes, 1995: 20) with an informal mode of speech which is more typical of men and negative politeness with a formal mode of speech which may be more typical of women. Indeed, in Brown’s work in a Mayan community, the women’s Tzeltal speech is normally a paradigm of negative politeness, revealing perhaps their deference and subordinate position in society.
According to Brown and Levinson’s account, the amount and kind of politeness that is applied to a certain speech act is determined by the ‘weightiness’ of the latter, which is calculated by speakers from three social variables: P (the perceived Power differential between hearer and speaker), D (the perceived social distance between them) and R (the cultural ranking of the speech act — how ‘threatening’ or ‘dangerous’ it is perceived to be within a particular culture). This calculation is explicated in the following formula, where \( x \) denotes a speech act, S the speaker and H the hearer:

\[
W_x = D(S < H) + P(H, S) + R_x
\]

On the basis of the outcome of the calculation, speakers select a specific strategy, according to which they structure their communicative contribution. Brown and Levinson (1987: 32) suggest that, with respect to gender and the large number of studies which have been conducted, “the various possible contributory factors (P, D, R, sex of speaker vs. hearer etc.) have not been carefully enough controlled for this research to be used to test our research in the way that we might have hoped.” Politeness theory claims to be universal and a number of criticisms have been levelled at such a claim. These are summed up by Jaworski and Coupland (1999: 296). It has been suggested that, despite the fact that Brown and Levinson’s data came from three different (genetically unrelated) languages, their theories may not apply in situations where notions of face are dissimilar and where perceptions of the face-threatening nature of speech acts may not be the same. Requests in one culture, for example, are not considered so face-threatening as in another. Clearly, much work requires to be done to further refine the culture-specific and context-specific manifestation of politeness but, as Jaworski and Coupland, conclude (1999: 297):

Despite these criticisms, politeness theory provides an excellent theoretical basis for continuing work on how individuals achieve sociability in face-to-face interaction.

Brown and Levinson (1987: 69) suggest possible strategies for doing face-threatening acts, as follows:

- 1. without redressive action, boldly
- 2. positive politeness
- 3. negative politeness
- 4. off record
- 5. Don’t do the FTA
If women are more sensitive to the face-threatening nature of what they are saying than are men, according to Brown and Levinson’s theory, we might expect them to adopt strategies to off-set such FTAs, either by avoiding FTAs or by employing redressive action in the form of positive or negative politeness. As our study focuses on the hedging potential of pragmatic particles, we shall not be considering strategies 1., 4. and 5., but only occasions where a potentially unpopular view is expressed, it is on record and redressive action is employed.

Kerbrat-Orecchioni: Face-Enhancing Acts

Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1997: 11–17) makes some highly apposite remarks concerning the limitations of Brown and Levinson’s schema. She declares that, to become even more effective, their model must undergo some revisions, the main impediment to the correct working of it lying in “the extreme fuzziness that surrounds the negative/positive notions”. According to Kerbrat-Orecchioni, Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory focuses on negative face and their model gives a very negative and pessimistic view of politeness. Interactors are presented as being individuals under permanent threat of all kinds of FTAs and spending their time mounting guard over their territories and their faces. She suggests that the term negative face has been coined to ‘fit in’ with negative and positive politeness. Negative face has to do with Goffman’s notions of territory and negative politeness with redressive action addressed to the addressee’s negative face. In other words, negative politeness relates to such speech acts as requests or orders which pose a threat or imposition on the addressee’s freedom of action and thus require to be carefully framed by the addressor. Kerbrat-Orecchioni suggests that there are a greater range of options, some of which present a more optimistic notion of politeness. She sums these up (1997: 13) as:

- negative politeness — towards the addressee’s negative face (e.g. the softening of an order)
- positive politeness — towards his/her negative face (e.g. a gift)
- negative politeness — towards his/her positive face (e.g. softening a criticism or disagreement)
- positive politeness — towards his/her positive face (e.g. a compliment, expression of agreement etc.)
Kerbrat-Orecchioni goes further in inventing a new term — FEAs — face-enhancing acts which are not FTAs (e.g. compliments which are primarily flattering), claiming that negative politeness is abstentionist or compensatory whilst positive politeness has a productionist character. In the context of the use made of pragmatic particles accompanying remarks which hedge the potentially over-assertive expression of opinion, such as we find them in the corpus under investigation in my study, the closest fit that we can find in Kerbrat-Orecchioni’s adaptation of Brown and Levinson’s theoretical frame is in negative politeness — towards his/her positive face. However, there is no overt criticism or expression of disagreement which requires softening. Hedges down-tone a remark which might offend the interlocutor, are thus apologetic or compensatory. They simultaneously, however, protect the perpetrator from criticism and thus speakers protect their own positive face (desire to be approved of). If, as Goffman says, speakers engage in ‘face-work’ in order to protect their self-image from attack, tentativeness may be seen as a redressive act with reference to the speaker’s own face. Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1997: 15) distinguishes between other-oriented and self-oriented principles and claims that, among the principles belonging to the second type, some are favourable to the self but only in the defensive form and some are even unfavourable:

...if one is allowed during interaction to protect one’s faces, it is not recommended to enhance them in an ostensive way; furthermore, it may be recommended in certain circumstances to deprecate them (to damage one’s own territory, or to belittle oneself by any criticism).

Applying Brown and Levinson’s and Kerbrat-Orecchioni’s models to the hedging devices on declarative assertions which form the focus of this study, the inclusion of a hedge might be characterised as being both redressive and face-enhancing. Though hedging a remark damages the addressee’s negative face by deprecating his opinion, it minimises the risk of a potential FTA for the addressee. In addition, because hedges form part of polite communication, they constitute a FEA for both parties: the addressee is treated with consideration, the addressee is improving his chances of being considered likeable. Hedges are, thus, both negative and positive politeness-markers which simultaneously serve the positive face of both the addressor and the addressee.

Table 1.1 summarises the somewhat complex mechanics involved in hedging a potentially over-assertive declarative remark.
Table 1.1. The effect of hedging a potentially face-threatening act on the negative and positive face of ‘self’ and ‘other’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech Act</th>
<th>Negative face</th>
<th>Positive face</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>self</td>
<td>other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declarative remark (bald)</td>
<td>FEA²</td>
<td>FTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declarative remark (hedged)</td>
<td>FTA redressed</td>
<td>FEA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If remarks are made without redress (e.g. in the form of a hedge), they promote the speaker’s negative face (assertion of his right to express his opinion freely) and constitute a FTA to the negative face of the addressee (the imposition of the opinion of the addressee is unredressed). Moreover, because they are bald, unhedged remarks constitute a potentially FTA to the positive face of both parties. If remarks are hedged, on the other hand, the speaker’s own negative face is threatened (he is downplaying his territorial right to assert his views unimpeded). At the same time, however, the FTA is redressed as far as the negative face of his addressee is concerned and, since hedging proceeds from a concern for politeness, the hedged remark is a FEA for the positive faces of both the addressee and addressee.

The difficulties encountered in the inclusion of (hedged) declarative assertions as an aspect of politeness may be resolved through the adoption of Sell’s (1992) model. Sell accepts Brown and Levinson’s notions of positive and negative face but rejects their view that politeness comes into operation only when a face-threat is imminent. Rather politeness is seen as a constant behavioural consideration which is involved in all social interaction at all times, so that it is perfectly possible to perform a non-threatening act impolitely. Although, like Brown and Levinson, Sell regards politeness as strategic, he acknowledges that speakers may achieve their interactional goals through impoliteness as well as politeness. As in most other frameworks (im)politeness is defined in terms of society’s conventions. According to Sell’s model, a speaker might hedge a declarative not as a means of redress (because the assertions did not necessarily constitute a FTA) but in order to comply with society’s expectations of polite behaviour. In this respect we might invoke both Arndt and Janney’s notion of confidence (emotive considerations — see below) and Leech’s Maxim of Modesty. To hedge a remark implies a lack of self-confidence or a minimisation of one’s self-importance (self-praise). We may also raise issues relating to competence (see Eelen, 2001: 153ff.) — anecdotally, women (generously?) attribute men’s stereotypically unhedged modes (lecturing tone) to strategic incompetence. To what extent are bald on-record re-
marks strategically impolite or simply a symptom of incompetence?

Both formality and tentativeness might be included in an attempt to implement politeness. Tentativeness is achieved through a range of linguistic devices, such as epistemic modal expressions, but may involve hedging expressions such as those which sometimes accompany the pragmatic particles which are the object of this study. A survey of the usage of such particles may thus indicate the extent to which there is gender-asymmetry in the achievement of sociability. We review the literature to do with tentativeness and hedging in 1.3 below.

The ‘conversational contract view’

Fraser and Nolen (Fraser, 1980, 1990a; Fraser & Nolen, 1981) present what they label the ‘conversational contract’ view of politeness. They state that participants bring a set of rights and obligations to each communicative encounter which determine what the participants can expect from each other. This interpersonal contract is not static but can be revised in the course of time or because of a change in the context. Rights and obligations are established on various dimensions: conventional (e.g. turn-taking rules), institutional (e.g. silence — or, at most, whispered conversations — in church), situational (speakers’ relative roles e.g. a parent has a right not to be interrupted by a child) and historical (previous interactions).

Politeness is a matter of remaining within the then-current terms and conditions of the conversational contract (CC) while impoliteness consists of violating them. Politeness is the norm. People only notice when someone is impolite. Politeness is therefore not involved with any form of strategic interaction or making the hearer feel good but simply involves getting on with the task in hand in the light of the terms and conditions of the CC. Neither is politeness seen as an intrinsic characteristic of certain linguistic forms, “Sentences are not ipso facto polite, nor are languages more or less polite. It is only speakers who are polite.” (Fraser, 1990a: 233). Finally, it is stressed that politeness is totally in the hands of the hearer. No matter how (im)polite a speaker may attempt to be, whether or not he or she will be heard as being (im)polite ultimately depends on the hearer’s judgement. This notion of evaluation is a key plank in the arguments of Eelen (2001), whose very useful and enlightening critique of politeness theories we shall consider below.
Arndt & Janney’s emotive communication

Arndt & Janney (e.g. 1985a, 1985b, 1991) take an approach which considers politeness within the broader spectrum of emotive communication. Through their verbal, vocal and kinetic choices speakers signal information about their confidence in what they say, about their affect towards the speaker and about their emotional involvement. High confidence can be signalled for example by verbal directness, while low confidence is signalled by verbal indirectness, a questioning intonation and an averted bodily posture. Politeness, it is claimed, refers to that part of emotive communication where the speaker behaves in an interpersonally supportive way. ‘A supportive speaker smoothes over uncomfortable situations, or keeps situations from becoming interpersonally uncomfortable, by constantly acknowledging his partner’s intrinsic worth as a person’ (Arndt & Janney, 1985a: 294).

In later work, Arndt & Janney elaborate their theory and distinguish between social politeness and interpersonal politeness (tact). Social politeness comprises highly conventionalised rules and language uses and refers to standardised strategies for getting gracefully into, and back out of, recurring social situations.

Despite Arndt and Janney’s clear distinction between the emotive elements of tact with its ‘conciliative’ function and the ‘regulative’ nature of social politeness, it seems that, in the context of tentativeness or hedging as a means of playing out social interactions, there are insights to be gained from their writings on emotive communication. Speakers are social but also individual with psychological reactions deriving in part from factors of personality but also from their perceived role in society and with reference to their interlocutor. Tentativeness of speech or a (possibly conventionalised) display of lack of confidence flags a deferent position vis-à-vis one’s interlocutor. On the contrary, a confident attitude may suggest directness and camaraderie — and supportiveness — or, on the other hand, a sense of superiority of status (directness + formality) vis-à-vis one’s interlocutor.

Eelen’s ‘modus operandi’ view of politeness

Eelen (2001) takes traditional theories of politeness to task firstly because they fail to take into account everyday notions of politeness (politeness1 — an ‘emic’ entity, as opposed to politeness2, the scientific view or ‘etic’ entity) and secondly because they appear to project a static view — social conventions of
politeness exist and people adhere to them — rather than a dynamic view — people create society and social norms through social interaction.

Basing his arguments on Bourdieu’s (1977a: 72) distinction between ‘the opus operatum and the modus operandi’, Eelen insists that politeness should be regarded as a modus operandi and should be studied as a social practice rather than as a mere execution of the opus operatum. Eelen’s approach, though as yet unelaborated in its finer detail as he himself is quick to recognise, has great appeal in capturing the reality of the interrelationship between the individual and the social, the complexity and variability of politeness phenomena and the empirical data collected to investigate them, and in taking an optimistic view of empowered individuals and (Eelen, 2001: 258) “a vision of discourse as the dynamic, living realm of social life where human beings can determine their proper destinations and enjoy the full richness of human ‘being’.”

We fully subscribe to Eelen’s fundamental understanding of sociability, and, in adopting what might be considered a prescriptive view correlating linguistic politeness markers with social strata in a hierarchical manner in our study, use such a methodology to provide a snap-shot of an opus operatum which forms part of a much more complex and dynamic modus operandi. In short, Eelen’s approach, which we do not have space to do full justice to here, provides a much-needed corrective to more static visions of social interaction but does not (as yet) offer a methodology for the study of linguistic realisations of either politeness1 or politeness2 (except in his general references to the need for corpora of real language data as the basis for empirical research). His emphasis is (2001: ii) “largely on the social… and linguistic aspects will be considered for their contribution to the social worldview”.

As Eelen (2001: 21) points out, Kasper’s (1990) overview of politeness theorizing distinguishes between two main trends in the conceptualisation of politeness: politeness as strategic conflict-avoidance and politeness as social-indexing. Most theories combine both aspects, Brown and Levinson’s dealing in depth with conflict-avoidance but including P and D factors — what is considered polite is perceived as such if it is appropriate in the context of the respective social positions of the speakers. Our own study aims to combine these two areas of concern, regarding PPs as a means of smoothing social relations but also as an overt flag of social status. Eelen’s distinction between politeness1 (everyday notions about politeness) and politeness 2 (scientific theories which attempt to provide a model of universal principles of sociability) is helpful when we consider a fundamental paradox to do with the relative stigmatisation of enfin
(= I mean), hein and quoi. Our study hopes to contribute to politeness2 by investigating the role of those pragmatic particles in the mediation of politeness in contemporary French. In doing so, it cannot, however, ignore the fact that, by politeness1 standards, these terms are not polite. They are used, and are useful, in maintaining sociability but they are not consciously recognised as doing so by most speakers who might indeed claim that they were contra-indicated as markers of politeness(1). Eelen’s approach is to be welcomed for attempting to integrate politeness1 within politeness2. He directly challenges Fraser’s (1990a: 234) assertion that “a viable theory of politeness cannot rest upon a set of rules based on social, normative behaviour…The normative perspective must be rejected”. Fraser argues forcibly that “what we view as polite or impolite behaviour in normal interaction is subject to immediate and unique contextually-negotiated factors and, as such, cannot be codified in any interesting way.” We concur with this but agree with Eelen that considerations of politeness1 cannot be excluded in a theory of politeness2, not, that is, if it is to consider questions of social indexing as well as strategies of conflict avoidance. Our study is empirical: it consumes theories. Yet theories cannot exist in a vacuum: however elegant and parsimonious they are, they are required to be predictive. There may be “no clear way of testing the[ir] validity” (Leech, 1983: 4) yet the presupposition is that it is desirable that such testing might take place. An empirical study of the distributional frequencies of these stigmatised items must take into account the conflicting pressures on speakers to achieve sociability both in terms of strategic conflict avoidance (which could include the use of hedging particles) and according to social indexing (heavy recourse to such particles might be labelled as ‘sloppy’ or uneducated speech). Not only do we find that the CP and the PP come into conflict but that the linguistic items employed may involve conflicting interpretations depending upon whether we are considering them in the light of politeness1 or politeness2, with a necessary concomitant effect on politeness2 regarding its two main objects of concern: conflict avoidance and social indexing.

In conclusion, our understanding of “politeness” in this study might be defined as the manner in which human beings attempt, with varying degrees of competence and according to different strategic Rules of Politeness, to achieve sociability in everyday interactions (which include FEA as well as FTAs and much else in between). Our understanding of politeness does not exclude a consideration of social norms (politeness1). The study is, moreover, concerned with social indexing, with the manner in which the Rules of Politeness, enacted through particular linguistic selections, correlate with social group-
ings, placing individuals in hierarchies of social distance and status. Finally, the study hopes to contribute to the development of scientific theories concerning universal principles of sociability (politeness2).

1.3 Tentativeness

Tentativeness has been associated with a Deferent speech style whereby speakers modestly and/or conventionally signal respect for the opinion of the interlocutor and downtone their own opinion. As we have seen, tentativeness can be seen as a FTA with regard to a S’s own negative face, can redress the FTA with regard to the negative face of H and can constitute a FEA with regard to the positive faces of both the S and the H. Tentativeness in speech may be implemented through the use of hedging mechanisms of various linguistic types including expressions of epistemic modality (modal verbs and modalising adverbials) as well as question forms (including rising intonation) and (phrases including) the pragmatic particles which form the object of our study. Hedging itself is a term which has not yet been fully defined by linguists (see Markkanen and Schröder (eds.), 1997) but hedges have been usefully sub-categorised by Prince, Bosk and Frader (1982) into two sorts: approximators and shields, the former relating to “fuzziness” within the propositional content of the utterance (His feet were sort of blue), the latter to do with fuzziness in the relationship between the propositional content and the speaker, that is the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the proposition conveyed. (I think his feet were blue). Such a distinction echoes that made by Leech (1983) between a speaker’s illocutionary goal and a speaker’s social goal. Leech develops a pragmatic framework consisting of two parts: a textual rhetoric and an interpersonal rhetoric: politeness is treated within the domain of interpersonal rhetoric. In cases where particles are used as a hedge or to introduce a hedge (either an approximator or a shield), how are we to interpret this? Should we consider both, as Coates (1997: 120) terms it, as a bid to avoid expertism and thus increase the likeability or friendliness of the speaker, to qualify and tone down utterances in order to reduce the riskiness of what one says, to mitigate what may otherwise seem statements which are too forceful and show politeness or respect to strangers and superiors (interpersonal rhetoric), or as a bid to provide the interviewer with correct information, by hedging what might be factually inaccurate statements (textual rhetoric)? A similar point is made by Caffi (1999: 904) when she says, in the context of doctor-patient interaction in...
Italian, “Is the doctor’s uncertainty real or strategic, is it related to instrumental aspects or relational aspects…is the doctor cautious because s/he really doesn’t know or because s/he actually knows but doesn’t want to say?”

The multi-functionality and difficulties of interpretation associated with such forms will be illustrated below from existing studies on particle-usage in English in the sections devoted, respectively, to epistemic modality, (tag) questions and you know.

Epistemic modality

Coates (in Coates (ed.) (1998: 226–253) provides evidence of the use of epistemic modality (lexical items such Perhaps, I think, sort of, probably as well as certain prosodic and paralinguistic features) in all-female talk to hedge assertions in order to protect both their own and their addressee’s face. Her impression, based on a small corpus of data, is that women exploit these more than men. Like Johnson & Aries, Coates (1998: 245) relates this usage to the topics under discussion. Holmes (1997) also provides evidence from English (New Zealand English) that topics crucially differ between men and women. Studying the manner in which men and women tell stories she finds that for both sexes the topics reflect the importance of everyday experience. However, (1997: 286):

…they also reflect the different preoccupations of the daily lives of women and men. The women focus on relationships and people, affirm the importance of their family roles, family connections and friendships. The men focus on work and sport, events, activities and things, and affirm the importance of being in control, even when they don’t achieve it. These different preoccupations contribute to and reinforce the gender identities women and men construct through their talk.

Meinhof’s (1997) study of male and female narratives appears to provide confirmatory evidence of the influence of topic on linguistic practice and of the fact that differential topic selection in male and female speech may dictate differential selection of linguistic items. She claims (1997: 227–228) both that “the avoidance of an intensely personal question in the academic men’s texts produced elegant and suggestive writing” and that the academic women’s more full-hearted acceptance of the difficulties and ambivalences of everyday existence was not shared by the men who experienced greater difficulty with the fragmentation of self and its dissolution into multiple identities — something which, Meinhof claims, women have learned to embrace with confidence.
An important corollary of Coates’ (1997) findings is that, if sociocultural presuppositions are a key factor in explaining how speakers make sense of a conversation, given that the sociocultural differences between men and women in Western culture are apparently so marked, mixed interaction may give rise to communication problems. Coates (1997: 249) draws out the fact that hedges (words such as *maybe, sort of, I mean*) have multiple functions:

> They can express shades of doubt and confidence; they allow us to be sensitive to others’ feelings; they help us in the search for the right words to express what we mean; they help us to avoid playing the expert.

She goes on to explain that the first function — expressing doubt and confidence — is basic but not so significant in terms of women’s friendships. The other three functions — attention to the face needs of others and downtoning one’s remarks so as not to set oneself above others — have an important role in the maintenance of friendship. In her earlier (1987) paper, Coates puts a slightly different emphasis on the manner in which women use epistemic modals. She claims it is related to three features of the all-woman conversation which she analyses:

(i) sensitive topics — participants had to be very careful to consider their addressees and avoid offence; (ii) self-disclosure — speakers had to protect their own face when revealing their feelings to others; (iii) co-operative style — it is a well known finding of research on women’s language that women deploy a co-operative rather than a competitive style in interaction; such a style lays heavy stress on the importance of not disagreeing with others, and thus on qualifying assertions. Coates (1987: 129).

Previous studies, thus, seem to suggest that the topic of conversation and degree of solidarity demonstrated between speakers affect the function of epistemic modals in conversation and that, to the extent that topic-choice and interaction mode may be asymmetric, men and women will employ them differently.

**Tag questions**

Tag questions, which Lakoff (1975) suggested were predominantly used by women and which placed them in a submissive, reactive and subordinate position, have been the subject of a number of studies, most of which contradict her findings (see Dubois and Crouch, 1975). Holmes has been the researcher most active in exploring men’s and women’s speech (in New Zealand)
(1985, 1988a; 1989a) and aspects of politeness (1984b, 1988b, 1989b, 1990a, 1990b, 1993, 1995, 1998a, 1998b). In her 1984b paper she argues that tag questions serve two main functions: modal tags, which request information or ask the addressee to confirm the truth of the statement (Luke and Bill went to the party, didn’t they?) and affective tags which display the speaker’s concern for the addressee (You didn’t go there, did you?). Affective tags are of two types: softeners which mitigate a request or criticism (negative politeness) (Wash the car for me, would you?) and facilitative, which demonstrate the speaker’s desire to continue the conversation (positive politeness) (Still at the same old job, are you?). Holmes found that a large majority of male speakers’ tag questions are modal (61%), but most of women’s tag questions are affective (65%), especially facilitative (59%). This shows that men typically use tag questions to gain or confirm information, while women use them to develop and encourage conversation. Foley (1997: 305) argues that if this is interpreted in a “two cultures” framework, it may be taken to mean that men use tag questions to get information that may be valuable in relative status competitions, while women use them to establish solidarity. Without studying the examples themselves it would be difficult to decide whether the men’s use of facts is a bid for status. It is difficult to see how the example given (Luke and Bill went to the party, didn’t they?) could be used in a competitive or status-asserting way. Foley also thinks the jury is still out on this matter, reminding us of the Javanese example (see page 35). It might well be, for example, that women are competing to be “more polite than thou” and thus claiming one-upmanship in this manner.

Tag questions were also investigated in Cameron, McAlinden and O’Leary (1989). Their findings, based on a corpus of 9 texts of 5,000 words each from the Survey of English Usage, were tabulated alongside those of Holmes, 1984b. 96 tag questions were produced, 36 by women and 60 by men. Although women use a higher percentage of facilitative tags than men, the men use a much higher percentage of facilitative tags than the men in Holmes’ study. Cameron et al argue that the scores may have been skewed because three of the speakers (two of whom were men) knew that recording was taking place and may have taken on a facilitating role in order to generate as much talk as possible from participants. However, if the contribution of these speakers were discounted, the incidence of facilitative tags amongst men would only drop by 6% which is not enough to account for the considerable difference between their results and those of Holmes. One hypothesis which Cameron et al put forward is that (1989: 86) the use of facilitative tags correlates with conversational role, rather than with gender per se. Where men take on a facilitating role, they produce...
large numbers of facilitative tags. Cameron et al also introduce the concept of the ‘unequal encounter’. Discourse and conversational analysts put forward the idea that questioning is a powerful interactional move because it obliges the interlocutor to produce an answer. In situations in which the participant is institutionally invested with rights and obligation to control talk — in the doctor’s consulting room, in the courtroom and so on — large numbers of questions are employed. Furthermore, ‘powerless’ participants avoid questions. Tag questions might, according to this analysis, be described as highly assertive strategies for coercing agreement and not as an indication of tentativeness.

In a second investigation, Cameron et al (1989) studied nine hours of unscripted speech from three different broadcast settings: a medical phone-in, classroom interaction and a general TV discussion. The tag questions were isolated and analysed according to Holmes’ framework of functions. The results were then broken down by the two variables of gender (male vs. female) and power (powerful vs. powerless). The results support the findings of the previous study and those of Holmes in as much as the men score higher on modal tags and women on affective ones, especially facilitatives. Women use more tags overall but at 61 to 55, the difference is not particularly striking. What is striking is the difference between the powerless and powerful participants. No powerless person of either sex uses either facilitative or softening tags. However, in the modal category, it is powerless speakers who score higher by a proportion of two to one. Cameron et al suggest that the study supports the claims of discourse analysts like Harris that tag questions are associated with the rights and responsibilities of ‘powerful’ speakers — but only facilitative tags. The use of modal tags to gain information does not appear to be a ‘powerful’ move, indeed it might be said that the role of the powerful is to facilitate and the powerless to request reassurance especially here in the context of classroom and medical advice — settings in which reassurance is commonly sought.

Similar to Holmes’ (1984b) assertion that men use tag questions for referential purposes more often whilst women use them to establish solidarity are the findings of Freed and Greenwood concerning questions. Lakoff and subsequent researchers had suggested that women use questions more than men and that the reason for this was that women did more “shitwork” in order to keep the conversation going. In their investigation of differential gender usage of question forms, Freed and Greenwood (1996: 19) concur with the findings of other researchers that sex-typed linguistic features are of a relative nature — there are no sex-exclusive differences — but go on to propose, with relation to questions, however, that:
some subtle differences emerge...women ask a higher percentage of RELATIONAL questions than men, and men use more EXPRESSIVE STYLE questions than women. Of the total number of questions women asked 29% were RELATIONAL questions. For men, relational questions represented only 16% of the total questions used. By contrast, men use questions for EXPRESSIVE style 36% of the time, as compared to women’s 24%.

The studies on (tag) questions highlight three key points which must be taken into consideration when investigating the use of linguistic forms in social contexts:

1. The relation between linguistic form and communicative function is not a simple thing. Language forms are multi-functional — Lakoff isolated the affective, but not the modal tag. Questions may be expressive or relational.
2. The patterning of particular linguistic forms may be illuminated by a consideration of a number of variables, not just gender. These include the role taken by the participant, the topic of conversation, the objectives of interaction, participants’ relative status and so on.
3. The interpretation of the findings is problematic. More recent research suggests that tag questions should not be interpreted negatively (as Lakoff did) but positively as conversational support structures. Interruptions are not always pre-emptive acts but can constitute a supportive contribution to a collaboratively created discourse. The role of conversational facilitator may be considered a powerful role, a strategy used to control talk, or a powerless one, a burden shouldered by subordinate speakers, effecting ‘interactional shitwork’.

You know

Amongst a number of linguistic devices which might be said to downtone or mitigate the force of a text you know has been the object of a number of studies. Whilst the epistemic modals appear to be speaker-oriented (I think, I mean, I guess, sort of), the expression you know is addressee-oriented. As Holmes (1986: 7) points out, however, you know has a number of functions and some of them may be indicated in the intonation. Holmes found that two broad categories proved valuable, one expressing speaker confidence or certainty (category I), the other reflecting uncertainty of various kinds (category II). Within each of these categories, a number of subcategories can be established. … Within category I, there are instances where you know expresses the speaker’s certainty and confidence con-
cerning the addressee’s relevant background knowledge and experience, attitudes, and anticipated response. In this category, too, belong instances of you know where it serves to positively reassure the addressee of the validity of the proposition, where its function is emphatic; and again the speaker is confident and certain in the expression of the utterance. In Brown & Levinson’s terms, instances of you know in this category can be identified as expressions of “positive politeness”.

In category II, there are instances of you know expressing both addressee-oriented uncertainty and message-oriented uncertainty (cf. Brown, G. 1982). The first type expresses the speaker’s uncertainty or lack of confidence concerning the addressee’s attitudes and likely response in the interaction. The message-oriented instances of you know express the speaker’s uncertainty regarding the linguistic coding of the proposition, or signal the speaker’s awareness of some linguistic imprecision (cf. James 1983). To the extent that you know here expresses a mitigating, apologetic, and attenuating function, instances of you know in this category can be seen as realisation of “negative politeness” (Brown & Levinson 1978: 134).

Contrary to expectation, men used you know to express uncertainty rather than certainty, as Holmes (1986: 17) indicates:

While men used you know more frequently than women to signal the fact that the message was imprecisely or unsatisfactorily encoded, women used it more often for positive politeness functions, such as emphasis, and to confidently and generously attribute relevant background knowledge and experience to their addressee.

Erman (1992) reports similar findings for you know, you see and I mean where she claims that men use these expressions substantially more than women and use them to signal repair work.

Empirical studies on hedging devices such as the use of epistemic modality, tag questions and you know, you see and I mean appear to indicate that men are as tentative in their speech patterns as women but for different reasons. Women use hedges to establish solidarity with their interlocutors whilst men use them to flag inadequacy of expression or uncertainty at a referential level. Adopting Prince, Bosk and Frader’s terms, men tend to use hedges as ‘approximators’ while women appear to use them to a relatively greater extent as ‘shields’.

1.4 Power and status

If there is gender-asymmetry in the use of hedges, the question arises as to whether this reflects a difference in men’s and women’s status and power in society, and/or contributes to such a difference. Two models of interpretation have arisen with regard to the way in which speech-styles can be interpreted: an apolitical or a political model, either ‘difference’ or ‘dominance’. In sharp
contrast with the “dominance” model espoused by feminists, the “difference” model proposes that men’s and women’s speech differs but that this does not place women in a subordinate position in society. The explanation for the asymmetry between male and female speech suggested by Chodorow (1974) and picked up in the “two cultures” model in Maltz & Borker, 1982, and Tannen, 1990, is that, unlike girls, who have clear role models in the mother and the other women in the domestic sphere, boys have to learn how to be men and that men see conversations as status contests in which one can be one up or one down, while women see them as a means of forging interpersonal relations. The manner in which these differences in styles are developed in childhood during play is investigated in a number of studies (summarised in Wodak and Schultz, 1986, Günther and Kotthoff, 1991; Eckert, 1989a). In terms of Brown & Levinson’s (1987) theory, boys are more focused on their negative face, as status gives them the power to act as they want even coercing others to do so, whereas girls are more concerned with positive face, the positive evaluation they give each other through mutual closeness.

Goodwin’s (1980) study of play activities among black children in an urban district of Philadelphia is often quoted as substantiating Maltz & Borker’s “two cultures” model. The boys tend to use direct imperatives such as “Gimmee those pliers” whereas the girls use hortatives or modalized expressions, such as “Let’s go around Subs and Suds; Maybe we can slice them like that”. Tannen (1990) develops a full model of male and female conversational practice along the two culture lines proposed by Maltz & Borker. She argues that women emphasise connection and intimacy with others and use language to establish and maintain those connections. They use language to suggest actions and thus their language is more polite. Men use language to display their power and skills and defend themselves from the attacks others might make on their claims to power and status. This is summed up by Tannen as ‘Rapport’ versus ‘Report’ speech. If, for women, language is used to create intimacy and solidarity, for men it is the way to establish superiority and ultimately prestige and power.

In its endeavour to test whether women’s speech is more polite than men’s, our study investigates the extent to which speakers in particular social groupings indulge to a greater extent than others in hedging-strategies aimed at conflict avoidance. The primary focus is, however, social stratification and the manner in which this is maintained and reenacted through linguistic behaviour. The study, thus, explores questions of relative power and status in society and reopens the difference/dominance debate.
Anthropological studies

One universal trait across all cultures appears to be the prestige and status attributed to men and asymmetry is generally explained by the domestic child-rearing duties shouldered by women in contrast to the public role of men. Foley (1997: 291–293) investigates the roles of men and women and the language they use in Malagasy, Javanese and Kuna and concludes (page 293) that “the evidence from all three societies suggests that male dominance is expressed and constructed by language”. However, the way in which this dominance finds linguistic expression is quite different. Malagasy men indulge in a particular form of indirect and polite oratory, called kabary which confers very high status on those who employ it skilfully. Malagasy women are barred from such speech and, indeed, are encouraged to adopt more direct forms. Such direct speech thus confirms their secondary role in society and, although men often benefit directly from women’s ability to haggle in the market, their direct manner of doing so devalues them in society’s eyes. Javanese, too, has an extremely complex system of speech styles reflecting the relative status of the speaker and addressee in a highly stratified society. Although women have relatively high status in Javanese society, linguistically they use deferential terms to their husbands and men use the speech styles with more subtlety. High status Javanese men will use extremely polite forms to subordinates, thus indicating their ability to use the complex linguistic system with skill and hence demonstrate their superiority. In both of these societies, women are more engaged in the domestic sphere whilst men dominate the public sphere, using linguistic artistry to confirm their status. The Kuna, too, view men and women as having different, but equal, areas of activity. Men hunt and farm, women perform domestic chores. The women produce the economically prized appliquéd cloth blouses and thus have considerable economic independence. Women may use complex linguistic forms characteristic of the public sphere. Men, however, do not use the language women use in the domestic area. Although Kuna society is more egalitarian, because men do not use the domestic language, they remain dominant. It seems, then, on looking at very different societies across the world, that whatever speech style they use, women’s speech is associated with domestic activity and is thus devalued, whilst men’s speech is associated with the public sphere and is given higher status.

In rare cases, languages have been found which display gender deixis, that is to say, that there is a difference in grammatical forms depending on whether the speaker is male or female. This seems particularly true of the native lan-
Gender, politeness and pragmatic particles in French

languages of N. America (e.g. Bogoras 1922; Ekka 1972; Flannery 1946; Sapir 1949: 206–12; Taylor 1982). Much more common, if not universal, is a pattern of gender markers (McConnell-Ginet 1988) in which particular linguistic features are commonly, if not prototypically, associated with one or other of the sexes but this association is statistical, not mandatory. This is an important distinction as gender deictics are generally grammatical formatives and are found in fixed contexts i.e. the gender of the speaker or addressee. Speakers are thus aware of these forms which are amenable to explicit explanation. Gender markers do not presuppose such fixed contextual backgrounds and indeed are much less amenable to explicit awareness.

Brown (1980), (reprinted Coates (ed.) 1998) suggests that three factors are involved in deciding how polite to be (Coates (ed.) 1998: 84):

1. One tends to be more polite to people who are socially superior to oneself or socially important: the boss, the vicar, the doctor, the president.
2. One also tends to be more polite to people one doesn’t know, people who are somehow socially distant: strangers, persons from very different walks of life. In the first situation politeness tends to go one way upwards (the superior is not so polite to an inferior), while in the second situation politeness tends to be symmetrically exchanged by both parties.
3. A third factor is that kinds of acts in a society come ranked as more or less imposing, and hence more or less face-threatening, and the more face-threatening, the more polite one is likely to be.

If women are more polite than men (in that they use more hedges, express interest in the addressee, use in-group identity markers, seek agreement and avoid disagreement), Brown’s theory would suggest that women are either 1) generally speaking to superiors, 2) generally speaking to socially distant persons, or 3) involved in more face-threatening acts or have a higher assessment of what counts as impositions. Studying data of men’s and women’s speech in Tenejapa, Brown’s hypothesis that women use more particles (softening expressions such as Maybe, if I may, do you suppose) is supported. Overall the women used more particles and Brown concludes (Coates (ed.) 1998: 93) that “such quantitative comparisons are useful as a rough guide as to what is going on at the strategic level, although they will not replace the painstaking comparison of individual strategies employed in speech”. Brown suggests that their politeness reflects the women’s subordinate position in Tenejapan society (their role in decision-making is invisible) and predicts that we would not expect similarities between West African women or high-caste Indian women.
as the latter have much more structural power. This seems to be belied by data from American and New Zealand English where women can equally have structural power and yet appear to adopt strategies which are more polite than those adopted by most men.

The situation in Britain and the U. S.

Trudgill (1972) posits that women use more standard forms than men and over-report because of social insecurity:

> The social position of women in our society is less secure than that of men...It may be...that it is more necessary for women to secure and signal social status linguistically.

It is postulated that men are judged according to their work, whilst women are judged according to their appearance which includes language. Deuchar offers another explanation in terms of Brown & Levinson’s politeness theory and concludes (1989: 32):

> ...when women use standard speech, they are protecting their own faces, and are sometimes paying attention to the face of the addressee at the same time, but would rarely be threatening it... Assuming women have face wants to the same extent as men, and yet less relative power, the use of standard speech is a way of maintaining their own face without threatening that of the addressee.

Eckert (1989a: 249), accepts that the reason for women’s overt prestige orientation may, as hypothesized by Trudgill, reside in their inability to advance their status through action in society and that this explains their recourse to symbolic resources, including language. The argument runs that, as women lack moral authority in the public sphere, they must create an image of the whole self as worthy of authority and must accumulate symbolic capital. As Eckert (1989: 256) remarks:

> This is not to say that men are not also dependent on the accumulation of symbolic capital but that symbolic capital is the only kind that women can accumulate with impunity... that is why, in peasant communities as in working class neighbourhoods, the women who are considered local leaders typically project a strong personality and a strong, frequently humorous, image of knowing what is right and having things under control.

Preisler (1986), in his careful cross-class study of linguistic sex-roles in the expression of tentativeness in English, distinguishes between S- (socio-emotional) and T- (task-oriented) roles and concludes (Preisler, 1986: 284):
...a pattern of usage differences has emerged which, though complex and not without loose ends demonstrates beyond doubt that linguistic tentativeness signals are correlates of sex and/or interactional role. In other words, women and/or S-persons have been shown to be linguistically tentative, relatively speaking and on the whole, in comparison with men and/or T-persons.

Interestingly, in a comparison between clerical workers and managerial staff, the latter — both male and female — tended to use tentativeness features prevalent in the speech of lower status female clerical workers. He states (Preisler, 1986: 288):

...The managerial decision-makers tended to manifest their task-orientation through some of the very tentativeness signals otherwise prevailing among women and S-persons in the “lower” status strata…This would seem to leave us with only a short way to go (though over very speculative ground) before we reach the conclusion that decision-makers recognise the value of at least some of the communicative behavior otherwise characteristic of women/S-persons.

Eckert (1998: 66) invokes Bourdieu and Boltanski’s (1975) notion of the symbolic market which has been extended to the study of variation by Sankoff and Laberge (1978). In order to “fit in”, people have to wear the right clothes and the right language, as much in a peasant village as in the diplomatic corps. She proposes a number of reasons why women might use more conservative or polite language than men: women are often “front end” workers such as secretaries and receptionists, women’s place in society makes them more vulnerable to criticism, hence the need to remain “beyond reproach” by using standard language (see Deuchar, 1989). These suggestions, however, do not appear very convincing. Women also use the vernacular and, in opposition to Trudgill’s assertions that men use the vernacular to appear masculine, Eckert suggests that their use of the vernacular may have more to do with the fact that they are blue-collar workers than with being male. Eckert’s work with Jocks and Burnouts at Belten High comprehensive provides convincing evidence that girls produce more “Jock language” or “Burnout language” than the boys. The reason given for this is that boys assert their identity through action. Such action being denied to girls, they opt for ‘symbolic capital’ such as clothes, hairdos and language to express their identity. This would suggest that the linguistic means of attaining an identity is somehow inferior to the route via action. An alternative interpretation of the data might be that girls are better at language and more interested in it (along with clothes and hair-dos) than are boys. This remains a cultural construction but at least in this interpretation girls are different but equal. Eckert gives a negative interpretation of this,
claiming that (1998: 73) ‘to the extent that men control material capital, women are constrained to accumulate symbolic capital…focusing on how they are, while their male peers will be focusing on what they do.’ Eckert concludes that the girls at Belten High put phonological resources to greater use than the boys, that there is greater social polarisation between jock and burnout girls which emerges in greater linguistic polarisation as well. She concludes interestingly that, if this leads to a generalisation, it is:

not a generalisation that would yield a consistent male-female difference across the board that would allow statements such as “women are linguistically more conservative than men”. Rather, the generalization is likely to have more to do with women’s greater use of symbolic resources to establish membership and status. And since the communities of practice in which women are seeking status vary widely, the particular linguistic nature of these symbolic resources will vary as well.

Eckert (1989a: 257) points out that it is common to confuse masculinity and femininity with gender and that this is where the link between language and power is most apparent:

Femininity is a culturally defined form of mitigation or denial of power, whereas masculinity is the affirmation of power.

In other words, claiming power as a woman is unfeminine, hence women, in order to be perceived as feminine, do all they can to downplay their own power. In early quantitative studies, it was claimed that men used the ‘vernacular’ more than women — ‘males are the chief exemplars of the vernacular culture’ (Labov, Cohen, Robins & Lewis, 1968: 41). However, Coates and Cameron (eds.), 1989: 7–10, provide substantial evidence of female networks in which non-standard and vernacular forms are used by women (Milroy, 1980, Cheshire, 1982, Russell, 1982, Edwards, 1989, and Thomas, 1989). It seems, as Edwards says (1989: 47) that:

Purely quantitative approaches to the study of language in society can be extremely helpful in identifying trends in the data which might not otherwise be discernible. Statistical analysis has the added advantage of being able to demonstrate whether any observed effects are due to genuine effects or merely chance fluctuations of the data. However, when we focus on the overall picture in this way we risk losing sight of the individuals on whom the study is based.

The situation in France

By comparison with the Anglo-Saxon literature, the field is relatively underdeveloped for French, most authors of reviews on the subject relying heavily on
data drawn from English. To my knowledge, Houdebine’s study of the difference between men’s and women’s speech, presumably based on data collected for her 1979a thesis, is one of extremely few empirical investigations conducted by a French scholar from hexagonal France. Other French studies are introspective, anecdotal or philosophical/feminist in tenor.

Yaguello (1987: 10) writes (my underlining):

En France, bien qu’il n’y ait pas eu, jusqu’à présent, d’enquêtes systématiques, on peut constater chez les féministes une préoccupation très affirmée de la “parole de femme”.

(In France, although there have not been, up till now, any systematic investigations, one can observe amongst feminists a very strong preoccupation with “Women’s Language”).

Offord (1990: 70), too, applies conclusions drawn from studies of English to the French situation. When talking of linguistic sexual stereotypes, he claims (my underlining) that “most of the research in this area has been concentrated upon English but the results are probably equally applicable to French although this has not been experimentally established.”

Yaguello (1987) places studies of women’s language firmly in the political or ideological camp and makes an interesting distinction, possible in French, between puissance and pouvoir (Yaguello, 1987: 10):

Si parole = pouvoir, est-ce que prendre la parole, c’est prendre le pouvoir? ou bien la parole des femmes s’apparente-t-elle davantage à la puissance qu’au pouvoir?

(If speech = (political) power, does it mean that taking the floor is taking power? or is Women’s Language more akin to strength than to power?)

Yaguello argues that women’s “conservatism” is attributable to their restricted role in the home, citing the fact that the role of black women outside the home led them to have contacts with standard English as compared with their unemployed male counterparts, speaking black English in the ghettos. Works devoted to French, as opposed to (mainly) English language data, are mainly philosophical (Irigaray, e.g. 1977) and/or feminist/literary (Simone de Beauvoir, Marie Cardinal, Hélène Cixous, Annie Leclerc, Xavière Gathier).

The sentiment that the French language is created by men for men is frequent in these authors. Cardinal (quoted in Yaguello, 1987: 64) claims:

Je me sens sans arrêt à l’étroit dans le vocabulaire, soit parce qu’il me manque des mots, soit parce que les mots français sont tellement investis par les hommes qu’ils me trahissent quand c’est moi, une femme, qui les emploie. (Autrement dit, p.96)

(I constantly feel constrained by vocabulary, either because words fail me or
because French words are vested in to such an extent by men that they betray me
when it is I, a woman, who uses them).

Simone de Beauvoir expresses a similar sentiment (quoted Yaguello, 1987: 65)
when she says “Je sais que le langage courant est plein de pièges. Prétendant à
l’universalité, il porte en fait la marque des mâles qui l’ont élaboré. Il reflète
leurs valeurs, leurs prétentions, leurs préjugés.” (“I know that everyday lan-
guage is full of traps. Although it looks universal, it in fact bears the mark of the
males who developed it. It reflects their values, their aspirations, their preju-
dices.”)

Much of Yaguello’s work dwells on morphological aspects of gender-
marking in French, such as words ending in -eur/-euse; -teur/-trice; -ier/-ière
and the negative connotations attributed to lexis applied to women which does
not pertain for men (compare femme savante/homme savant; honnête femme/
honnête homme). It is important to highlight the historical accretions which
attach to words. It appears, however, that this is not the whole story and that
recourse both to quantitative statistical studies and to discourse and interac-
tional analysis is required in order to discern the manner in which men and
women “do gender” on a daily basis in everyday life. Intervention at a lexical
level is necessary but possibly ineffective and certainly insufficient to ensure
equality between the sexes. As Yaguello remarks (1987: 191):

L’action volontariste a des limites car le mal qu’elle attaque a des causes psycho-
sociales qu’un bouleversement planifié ne saurait suffire à déraciner.
(Intervention has its limits because the evil that it is attacking has psycho-social
causes that a planned upheaval cannot be enough to uproot.)

Aebischer & Forel (eds.) (1983) collected a number of papers concerning Parlers
masculins, parlers féminins?, including contributions from Anglophone re-
searchers such as Trudgill and West. Houdebine’s and Aebischer’s papers
distinguish themselves by their insight into the profounder psychological mo-
tivations behind some of the statistical evidence and the clarity and elegance of
their expression. Houdebine in particular argues convincingly that the phono-
logical characteristics of speakers’ French shift according to the persona which
they are projecting or identification they are making with a particular social
group at any one time. This may vary throughout the day depending on their
interlocutor and indeed throughout their lifetime as their life history evolves.

Il s’agit d’un procès d’idéalisation, d’une projection d’idéal vers quoi le sujet tend,
en cherchant à s’en approprier les emblèmes, les indices, tout ce qui fait trace du
groupe ou du sujet en cause: une recherche consciente et inconsciente d’identité
est à l’œuvre, un procès d’identification.
(What is involved here is a process of idealisation, of a projection of an ideal towards which the subject tends, attempting to appropriate its symbols, its signs, everything which leaves a trace of the group or the subject in question: a conscious and unconscious search for identity is at work, a process of identification)

Houdebine’s (1983: 131) insistence on the tentative and non-exclusive nature of linguistic preferences, based on the shifting sands of identification, is particularly welcome:

…chaque sujet, engagé dans de tels procès d’identification, d’homogénéisation ou de singularisation linguistiques -…- privilégiant consciemment ou inconsciemment telle ou telle prononciation, la répète, la favorise, néglige l’autre et change ainsi la langue, dans la langue, intervenant du poids de sa parole dans la variation et l’évolution phonologiques et linguistiques.
(speakers, engaged in such processes of identification, homogenisation or individualisation, favouring consciously or unconsciously one pronunciation or another, repeat it, reinforce it and abandon the other and thus change the language, within the language, making their contribution to phonological and linguistic variation and change through the weight of their words.)

Houdebine also stresses that some speakers are more affected than others, more sensitive than others in the act of talking and of listening and this will depend on their own personal biography, their social position, their sex, their propensity to talk or not and the extent of their desire to integrate into a particular community by adopting their speech-styles. Houdebine’s data for French concerning hypercorrection and women’s supposed greater use of standard forms appear to echo the early findings of Labov and Trudgill. Her interpretation of the findings is at once more subtle, with less polarisation of the sexes into separate camps, and more profound, showing deeper insight into the way that language serves as an “emblème” or “indice” of identification within a social group.

Aebischer’s paper in the Aebischer & Forel (1983) collection is also to be welcomed for its distinction between the tendency for women to speak in a particular way and the creation of a genre dubbed “Women’s Language”:

le parler lié à des femmes devient le parler des femmes. Il devient une réalité présentée comme un fait accompli.
(Language which some women use becomes Women’s Language. It becomes a reality presented as a fait accompli.)
Following the spirit of the time (with an affirmation of women’s’ identity and a refutation of the supremacy of masculine ways of managing the world), Aebischer points up the positive side of “bavardage” (gossip) espoused by feminists as a new mode of communication “régi par la non-violence, l’harmonie, l’amour et par une absence de hiérarchie, de pouvoir et de leaders.” (“governed by non-violence, harmony, love and by an absence of hierarchy, power and leaders”).

Mainstream linguists in France appear dismissive both of variationist studies in general (see Gadet, 1996) and of research linking language and gender (Pillon, 1987). Gervais (1993) takes a lead from Yaguello (1987) in taking a morphological and lexical approach deriving from a political or ideological standpoint, taking up arms in (Gervais, 1993: 135) “the battle against the suppression of women through language”. Durand (1993: 267–270) usefully addresses the question of women’s contribution to linguistic change and concludes, like Labov, that, though in some situations women lead change in line with a statusful norm, this is not always the case. The data reported by Durand are phonological (rolled alveolar versus uvular /R/, see Walter, 1988: 215; ‘ne’ omission, see Ashby, 1991; absence or presence of liaison, see Booij and de Jong, 1987). Durand (1993: 267) remarks that it is ‘quite common in France for linguists interested in language and society to reject Labovian sociolinguistic studies on the grounds that they espouse a politically naive (consensual) view of society.’ He provides the following corrective, however:

…at the very least, it must be realised that well-constructed sociolinguistic work offers a testing-ground for the checking of various hypotheses concerning social stratification by opposition to speculation about language and society based on purely qualitative judgements.

Armstrong (e.g. 2001) has been active in conducting such sociolinguistic work in the phonological field. He demonstrates a strong correlation between e-caduc retention in the Languedoc and adherence to regional values. The higher the mobility score, the greater the likelihood that a speaker will drop e-caduc. Women appear to be more mobile in principle than men and to adapt their speech accordingly.

To my knowledge, no sociolinguistic studies have yet been conducted on the distributional frequency of pragmatic particles in contemporary French. Many of the chapters in Tidd and Gregory (eds.) (2000) appear to suggest that women continue to lack structural power in French society — salarial, social and domestic disparities and the very small representation of women in top managerial posts bear witness to this. We will be investigating whether such structural
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asymmetry is reflected in the language they use — and in particular, in their usage of particles — in the manner which Brown discerned in Tenejapa.

1.5 Conclusion

The literature appears overall to confirm Lakoff’s original assertions — at least, with respect to the ‘social norm’ (politeness1) view. Women appear to be more polite — they avoid swearing and, from a phonological point of view, indulge in prestige variants to a greater extent than men in a number of genetically unrelated languages and very different societies. They allow men to speak more in mixed-sex interactions. When they gossip, they do so to create a sense of solidarity and inclusion, not competition and exclusion. Women’s speech is more tentative and more attentive to the face needs of others: Holmes’ (1995) studies in New Zealand demonstrate that women apologise, compliment and use the hedging and boosting devices analysed as politeness strategies. The women in Tenejapa use more particles to soften potentially face-threatening assertions or requests. However, the number of contradictory findings deriving in part from problems of methodology (the early assumption that one form=one function; the presence of other dependent variables such as speaker role or extra-linguistic context) and the fact that very little work of this type has been conducted for French legitimise the investigation of the role of pragmatic particles in the mediation of politeness in French.

Approaches taken by researchers heretofore have been subjected to considerable scrutiny and, indeed, are open to criticism. Quantitative surveys have been brought to task because, although they capture gross differences, they do not capture contextual differences. Holmes (1984a: 156), using the example of tag questions, underlines the fact that these may be used for very different purposes and that hedges may be used referentially (to indicate a genuine doubt or uncertainty) or relationally (to downplay a remark about which there is no doubt or uncertainty). It is only by analysing the function in context that a quantitative survey can be conducted in a meaningful way and for this purpose small corpora are to be preferred:

The detailed knowledge of context and participants which is required in order to analyze for function is certainly incompatible with the use of large scale survey data with great quantities of spontaneous speech from large numbers of people.

Holmes claims that it is the roles women assume which lead to hedging,
facilitating remarks and to the downplaying of their expert status such as to maintain solidarity. She argues (Holmes, 1984a: 162):

The medium or channel of communication, the role and status of the speaker in relation to the addressee(s), the type of interaction and the degree of formality involved may all be relevant in accounting for the distribution of different forms.

Kiesling (1997), through a detailed analysis of the way in which power relations are acted out through language, demonstrates (page 83) that “it would be extremely difficult to draw specific conclusions on the types of linguistic structures (e.g. tag-questions, hedging etc.) used by men ‘as a group’ on the basis of my data since their usage is highly contextualised.” The interpretation of the function of particular linguistic features has been the focus of a number of researchers’ attention. Not all interruptions are aggressive and negative, some are supportive. Counting up tag questions without regard to the fact that there also exist other interrogative devices which may be used in their place does not constitute a valid assessment of degrees of male/female assertiveness. Frequency counts and statistical analyses must be based in sound interpretation of the function of the linguistic feature in context.

Cameron et al, in Coates and Cameron (eds.) (1989: 77), propose indeed that attributing only one function to any piece of real talk falsifies the picture:

It seems to us problematic to suggest that the communicative function of a syntactic form is either invariant or analytically transparent in all cases. Studies like our own, which deal with natural data, indicate the absolute necessity of considering forms in their linguistic and social context, not in general, and suggest that we should regard multifunctionality as the unmarked case — that is, in real talk most utterances do many things at once.

Freed and Greenwood (1996: 15) concur with reference to the attribution of communicative function to questions:

We believe that questions constitute another discourse phenomenon that has been incorrectly associated with gender, and has been inaccurately assumed to serve one invariant communicative function for a particular group of speakers.

When considering the significance of particular discourse features, their communicative function must be carefully examined and may be multi-layered or ambiguous.

Reviews of language and gender literature have outlined a number of drawbacks inherent in the studies conducted heretofore. Many researchers (particularly in earlier works), however, appear to think it is justifiable to extrapolate from one society to another or from one language to another. Very
few researchers have stressed the need for studies of languages other than English despite the fact that the Anglo-Saxon literature itself provides convincing intimations of differences which may exist between the Englishes which are spoken in Britain, the U. S., Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. It is essential to exercise caution in extrapolating from one social situation to another, nationally or internationally. Each communication situation must be analysed on its own merits, quantitatively and also qualitatively. It is only on this basis that parallels may be drawn. Within the context of the literature described above, it is expected that one of the functions of PPs (for, as we have seen, multifunctionality is the unmarked case) will prove to be an attenuating one and it may well be that in women’s speech the affective function will predominate, possibly because of the roles women tend to assume or the topics they select, by contrast with the referential function dominant in men’s speech. Interpretation of the function of each PP in context will be thorny — it is for this reason that Holmes’ advice concerning small corpora and careful analysis of language in context will be observed. Both Edwards (1989) and Durand (1993) point to the value of statistical analyses in identifying trends in data which may not be perceptible using purely qualitative approaches. The experimental work carried out as part of this study thus aims to combine qualitative and quantitative approaches in an attempt to explain the apparent differences in the usage of particular features of spoken French in men’s and women’s speech. It is to be hoped that this study will in no way “end up with formulations which just reinforce societal stereotypes about male/female orientations within the social space” as Durand (1993: 270) puts it, but rather will lead us to greater understanding and appreciation of linguistic usage across sex, class and age barriers.

Notes

1. Despite Márquez’ assertions, though Tannen (1981) and Pan (1995) outline Lakoff’s Rules in the introduction to their studies, neither seem to me to apply Lakoff’s Rules in any detail: their studies of ‘machine-gun fire’ talk and business meetings respectively do not evaluate the usefulness of Lakoff’s tripartite division, concentrating on conventions concerning amounts of talk in Tannen’s case and on the over-riding role of status in Chinese society in Pan’s.

2. My understanding of Kerbrat-Orecchioni leads me to believe that she would exclude enhancement of one’s negative face under the term FEA, reserving the latter for positive face and positive politeness. I take the liberty of using the term here in the absence of a specific term to use in this context — it is an example of what Kerbrat-Orechionni (1997: 15) terms ‘positive impoliteness’.
Chapter 2

Discourse markers and pragmatic particles

2.0 Introduction

Les locuteurs utilisent une grande partie du temps de la production à commenter ce qu’ils sont en train de dire: remarques sur la façon de dire, recherches de meilleures façons de dire, etc. Le ‘dire’ et le ‘dit’ sont étroitement imbriqués. (Blanche-Benveniste et al., 1991: 17)
(Speakers spend a large proportion of their speaking time commenting on what they are saying: making remarks on the way that they are saying things, attempting to find better ways of saying things, etc. What is said and how it is said are tightly intertwined.)

The rationale behind including an investigation of a range of pragmatic particles and their role in the speech of men and women is as follows:

1. Despite the variety of functions which are fulfilled by such particles, many appear to introduce or to provide, in themselves, the kind of comment-on-the-ongoing-text described above by Blanche-Benveniste et al. They may accompany stretches of speech which perform thus both a repair and a hedging function (c’est-à-dire, enfin, quoi) or play such a role themselves (hein, quoi).
2. The distributional frequency of such particles is very high which allows us to adduce robust statistical evidence.
3. Many, though not all, particles appear to be exclusive to the spoken language.
4. Such particles in French are beginning to attract the attention of researchers, though they are generally grouped under the general heading of “markers” or “discourse markers”. Such linguistic description as already exists may assist in determining their function(s). This is a necessary first step in ascertaining whether they are gender-asymmetric in usage.
5. The gender-asymmetric role of similar particles in English, such as you know, I think, sort of, of course has been investigated and indeed, one of the earliest studies, Brown (1979) investigated politeness and the use of particles in a Mayan community.
6. If it is indeed true that women adopt more “tentative” features in their speech than men in order to “do politeness”, this may be reflected in the functions for which such particles are pressed into service.

The hypothesis to be tested is, therefore, whether women’s speech is more polite or tentative than that of men, as made manifest in their usage of a range of pragmatic particles. First, however, we must address the as yet unresolved and thorny question of the terminology which is currently in use to describe the phenomena which we have grouped under the umbrella “pragmatic particles”. The attribution of the term “pragmatic particle” to particular morphemes (dubbed, variously “tics”, “fillers”, “phatic connectives” and so on) and a discussion of the appropriateness of such terms is not an arid exercise. As Nyan (1998: 41) says of her own decision to create the term “metalinguistic operator”:

Unless they are pure conventions, labels given to linguistic elements normally constitute a commitment to certain assumptions about their nature and function and, in some cases, to a certain methodological stance, as is the case here. In other words, what one is labelling is not just a morpheme or a sequence of morphemes but also the way one construes it.

The approach we have taken to the definition and analysis of such particles is, broadly speaking, that developed in the field of pragmatics and described in Levinson (1983), along with its younger francophone variant, the theories of énonciation of the Geneva School, the tenets of which are outlined in Roulet et al. (1987) and Moeschler (1985). However, whilst the Geneva School focuses on exchange structure in conversation, we shall be more concerned with the questions of ‘face’ raised by Goffman (1967) and developed more fully in Brown & Levinson (1987) and Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1997), as such a framework is more pertinent to the features of tentativeness and politeness which we wish to investigate. In 2.1.–2.5 below, we survey previous studies of discourse/pragmatic markers/particles and markers of paraphrastic reformulation and their potentially gender-asymmetric role in the mediation of politeness.

2.1 “Phatics”, “punctors”, discourse markers, pragmatic particles

Gadet (1989: 52) includes in her list of characteristics of the spoken language elements which she describes as “les phatiques et les ponctuants (en quelque sorte, si j’ose dire, disons…)” (“phatics and punctors (in some way, dare I say,
In a foot-note she attributes the terms to Vincent (1981 and 1986) who distinguishes between:

les *phatiques*, émis par le locuteur (ouverture ou fermeture de conversation, parenthétiques permettant de conserver la parole) ou allocutaire; et les *ponctuants*, qui soulignent une certaine structuration du discours, parmi lesquels elle distingue ponctuants de transition entre les parties, ponctuants de style et ponctuants sémantico-syntaxiques.

*(phatic*emitted by speakers (either in opening or closing the conversation, or in parentheticals which allow them to keep the floor) or listeners; and *punctors* which serve to emphasize discourse structure and which she sub-divides into those which mark a transition between parts of the discourse, those which serve a stylistic function, and semantico-syntactic punctors).

Gadet (1989: 52, footnote 41.)

Gadet (1989: 52) describes such elements as being those “qui ont la caractéristique de ne pas être intégrés à la structure syntaxique et, sur le plan phonique, d’avoir une faible intensité et aucune autonomie mélodique” (“which are characteristically not integrated into the syntactic structure and, from a phonetic point of view, are spoken quietly and without their own tone-group”).

According to this definition, the terms *phatiques* and *ponctuants*, whilst covering (some of?) the linguistic items which are the focus of the present study, evidently refer to them, at least primarily, in their discourse-marking role and not in their social or interactional one. The definition of “punctor” given in Vincent & Sanko (1992: 205) seems, however, to diverge from that given above. Here punctors are described as a “class of markers that have usually been classified as nervous tics, fillers or signs of hesitation”. They are characterised by manifesting “complete prosodic assimilation to the preceding phrase…show a high degree of phonological reduction…are to a large extent desemanticized [and]...are virtually absent from the written language.” The linguistic items which are included in their study are: là, tu sais, vous savez, n’est-ce pas, hein, je veux dire, moi, osti, vois-tu and il/elle dit, j’ai dit. Vincent & Sanko (1992: 214) claim that such punctors belong to a class of largely interchangeable words, that “only the choice of individual punctors seems to be conditioned by social class” and demonstrate that the distribution of punctors is conditioned by factors such as prosodic rupture, context and genre of discourse, their frequency increasing as a function of loquacity and speaker involvement in the discourse. They indicate that both discourse structuring and social interactional elements may motivate punctor-usage:
Punctors can help us understand the nature of the links between sentences and among constituents, as well as the degree of involvement of the speaker in the act of communication.


The debate concerning discourse markers and their definition is raised by Fraser (1999), who remarks that they have been studied ‘under various labels, including discourse markers, discourse connectives, discourse operators, pragmatic connectives, sentence connectives and cue phrases’ (Fraser, 1999: 931). The term “discourse marker” is perhaps best known from the work of Schiffrin (1987) who defines them (1987: 31) as “elements which bracket units of talk”. The items studied by Schiffrin (1987) include as Hansen (1998: 24) notes:

- a rather heterogeneous group, including coordinating and subordinating conjunctions such as and and because, parenthetical clauses such as you know and I mean, temporal and conjunctive adverbs such as now and so, and (not so easily categorised) particles like oh and well.

In her work on the function of discourse particles in spoken standard French, Hansen (1998) remarks that it is not clear that all of these would be considered discourse markers according to the definition in her work. Both Fraser (1999) and Wouk (1999) consider Schiffrin’s criteria for what counts as a discourse marker as very broad. Fraser (1999: 931) defines discourse markers as:

- signalling a relationship between the interpretation of the segment they introduce, S2, and the prior segment, S1. They have a core meaning which is procedural, not conceptual, and their more specific interpretation is ‘negotiated’ by the context, both linguistic and conceptual. There are two types: those that relate the explicit interpretation conveyed by S2 with some aspect associated with the segment, S1; and those that relate the topic of S2 to that of S1.

He gives, as examples of discourse markers, So, And, Furthermore, But, and After all and suggests that, according to the criteria he outlines, Schiffrin’s oh and y’know do not constitute discourse markers.

In the introduction to their collection of chapters on the subject, Jucker & Ziv (eds.) (1998) cite the variety of terms used to refer to the items under investigation. As well as discourse marker (e.g. Schiffrin, 1987), we find pragmatic marker (e.g. Fraser, 1996, Brinton, 1996), discourse particle (e.g. Schourup, 1985; Abraham, 1991; Kroon, 1995), pragmatic particle (e.g. Östman, 1981), pragmatic expression (e.g. Erman, 1987) or connective (Blakemore, 1987, 1988). Jucker and Ziv stress that the variety of names which have been adopted reflects the wide range of linguistic approaches which have
been employed for their study and the multiplicity of functions which these elements are said to fulfil. These functions include discourse connectors, turn-takers, confirmation-seekers, intimacy signals, topic-switchers, hesitation markers, boundary markers, fillers, prompters, repair markers, attitude markers and hedging devices.

Amongst those elements which are found in ordinary conversation and which are either not found or found with much less frequency in the written language, Wouk (1999) draws a distinction between discourse markers, which provide orientation to the coherence of the conversational structure in which they are found and another category of elements which are variously called pragmatic or phatic markers or connectives or expressions. Discourse markers, for Wouk (following Fraser, 1990b), signal how the speaker intends the basic message to relate to the prior discourse. For example, in English, the word *but* indicates that what follows is in some way in contrast to what preceded the word ‘but’ whilst *so* indicates that what follows is a consequence or result of what preceded the word ‘so’.

Whilst there is some debate in the literature, both over the exact definition of discourse marker and over the plethora of terms used to refer to such items, most researchers agree that they “bracket talk” (Schiffrin, 1987), that they “indicate, often in very complex ways, just how the utterance that contains them is a response to, or a continuation of, some portion of the prior discourse” (Levinson, 1983: 87–88), and that they “function as instructions from the speaker to the hearer on how to integrate the host unit into a coherent mental representation of the discourse” (Hansen, 1998: 75).

The pragmatic or phatic expressions, on the other hand, are of two sorts. Some, often referred to as hedges, perform evidential functions, expressing degrees of speaker certainty of or commitment to their message (*I mean, I think, sort of*). Some perform more affective or facilitative functions. *You know*, as we have seen from Holmes, 1986, can indicate emphasis or express solidarity. Hölker (1991: 78–79, cited and translated in Jucker, 1993 and in Jucker & Ziv, eds., 1998: 3) identifies four basic features of what he calls pragmatic markers:

1. they do not affect the truth conditions of an utterance;
2. they do not add anything to the propositional content of an utterance;
3. they are related to the speech situation and not the situation being talked about;
4. they have an emotive, expressive function rather than a referential, denotative, or cognitive one.
Brinton (1996: 33–35) provides a much longer list of features which Jucker & Ziv (1998: 3) abbreviate thus:

- Phonological and lexical features:
  a. Short and phonologically reduced
  b. They form a separate tone group
  c. They are marginal forms and hence difficult to place within a traditional word class.

- Syntactic features:
  d. They are restricted to sentence-initial position
  e. They occur outside the syntactic structure or only loosely attached to it
  f. They are optional.

- Semantic features:
  g. They have little or no propositional meaning

- Functional features:
  h. They are multi-functional, operating on several linguistic levels simultaneously.

- Sociolinguistic and stylistic features:
  i. They are a feature of oral rather than written discourse and are associated with informality
  j. They appear with high frequency
  k. They are stylistically stigmatised
  l. They are gender-specific and more typical of women’s speech.

This last comment is recognised by Brinton (1996: 35) as being “controversial”. There are thus several domains where “discourse markers” can be functional which include textual, attitudinal, cognitive and interactional parameters. Accordingly, discourse markers have been analysed as text-structuring (marking openings or closings of discourse units or transitions between them), as modality or attitudinal indicators, as markers of speaker-hearer intentions and relationships, and as instructions on how given utterances are to be processed.

Whilst work is being pursued for French by Nemo (e.g. 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2001 and forthcoming), it focuses on the interface between semantics and pragmatics and on the (necessary?) distinction between the conceptual and procedural/instructional function of such markers. Our own study focuses to a greater extent on the interactional and repair functions of these elements. We have thus elected, like Wouk (1999), to call such items pragmatic particles with the proviso that what we have called a pragmatic particle may serve
simultaneously as a type of discourse marker. The definition which we propose to employ to characterise the pragmatic particles under investigation combines insights from Blanche-Benveniste, Gadet, Vincent (and Sankoff), Wouk, Brinton and Hölker.

Pragmatic particles:

- serve to comment on language (*hein, quoi*) or to introduce a comment on language (*c’est-à-dire, enfin*);
- are multifunctional. In certain cases, comments introduced by such particles may be referential but the aspect investigated here will primarily be their social-interactional rather than their referential role;
- are a feature of oral rather than written discourse;
- are associated with informality and may be stylistically stigmatised;
- appear with high frequency;
- may occur in utterance-terminal or utterance-medial positions but not typically in utterance-initial positions;
- are often short and phonologically reduced and may be assimilated to a preceding or following tone-group;
- do not add to the propositional content and may be omitted with no loss to the semantic content;
- have an emotional, expressive and possibly face-saving function rather than a denotative or cognitive one.

Our definition of PPs coincides closely with Brinton’s definition of ‘pragmatic markers’. Her stipulation that pragmatic markers are restricted to sentence-initial position, however, does not apply. This is what distinguishes her pragmatic markers from our pragmatic particles.

Of the four particles selected for detailed scrutiny, *c’est-à-dire (que)* corresponds least well to these criteria. It forms a separate tone-group, is not short or phonologically reduced, is not so polysemous or multi-functional, is not stylistically stigmatised and may readily appear in written discourse. If we posit a left-right continuum with primarily discourse-marking (referential) considerations on the left and primarily pragmatic (interactional/politeness-oriented) considerations on the right, *c’est-à-dire (que)* takes up a position to the left of the continuum.

*Enfin*, too, when used as a corrective, has a discourse-marking role in indicating that the segment following it constitutes a ramification of the preceding text. This may be a correction of a purely referential type or it may be a hedge which downtones the preceding remark. We have decided to call the
items pragmatic particles because politeness or tentativeness may be expressed through hedging, in other words through the pragmatic or expressive function rather than the referential discourse-marking function that such items may also adopt in a communicative context.

The approach taken to the analysis of the meaning and function of the pragmatic particles is similar in this study to that taken by Hansen (1998), but differs from it in some important respects. It is similar in that the study is, like hers (1998: 76):

*semasiological and inductive, starting with individual expressions and trying to arrive at a description of their coded content, rather than onomasiological and deductive i.e. starting with an *a priori* definition of possible content categories and then attempting to discover how these categories are expressed in a given language (*in casu* French).*

The study differs in focusing on the pragmatic, rather than the discourse-marking aspects of particles. Hansen (1998) groups some particles whose function might be considered to be primarily pragmatic together with others whose primary role might be considered to be discourse-marking or connective. As we are concerned in this study with testing the gender-asymmetry hypothesis and specifically with investigating whether men and women use the resources in the language to attend to face needs and “do politeness” in different ways, using features such as the particles, the focus is on their pragmatic, rather than their cognitive or logical connective potential.

### 2.2 Minimalist and maximalist descriptions

Another important respect in which the approach in this study differs from that of Hansen (1998)¹ is in its tendency towards a maximalist description of each particle. A minimalist account attempts to bring all senses of a given expression under a particular umbrella and as such provides an elegant, parsimonious and intellectually-satisfying account. Minimalism has, however, been described by König (1991: 75) as “too abstract and general to be of significant practical value”. It is certainly the case here, where the different functions of the particles must be ascertained in relation to their asymmetrical usage by men and women. If we go too far along the maximalist road, however, particles might be described as having as many functions as the contexts in which they are to found and this would also be clearly unhelpful. Hansen’s response to this
dilemma in the case of DMs is to adopt a methodical minimalism whereby a common core meaning is assumed and “side effects” are included as implica-
tures inherent in the context. As Hansen provides no numerical data, one assumes that the core meanings are an abstract entity as opposed to a judge-
ment based on the relative frequency of an item in the spoken language. In
addition, whilst the diachronic evidence given is of interest, it is felt that in
some cases Hansen attempts to relate linguistic items to some putative forebear (e.g. *ben* to *bien*) which requires greater justification and that the historical perspective deflects from a proper consideration of current usage and forces a particular categorisation. The present study, then, focuses on “side effects”, the pragmatic functions of items in context and it is these which are taken as fundamental. Language is thus viewed as the servant of communicative intent.
A number of linguistic items or mechanisms may serve a particular communicative or discourse-managing interactional purpose. Our aim is to quantify the degree to which men and women employ language to mediate social relations (in adopting features of tentativeness, attenuators and so on). First, however, we must arrive at an adequate description of the feature employed and allocate each example on an instance-by-instance basis to a particular function group. Whilst a multi-functional account, whereby a certain degree of indeterminacy of meaning may be permitted, has great appeal in capturing the reality of the linguistic situation, such an approach is of little practical value in the context of the current study where an interpretation of the item must be made in order to arrive at the quantitative data required to make meaningful comparisons between the speech of men and women. An approach is thus adopted which might be described as a compromise between minimalist and maximalist approaches. On the one hand, we do not aim to provide a semantic analysis which includes all the senses of, for example, *enfin* under the same umbrella. There are occasions when *enfin* may be translated as ‘At last, finally’ and others where it may be translated ‘I mean’. The minimalist approach, in its most strict form, whereby a unifying concept, or ‘core meaning’ for a highly polysemous morpheme is sought, has little bearing in the analysis of a pragmatic particle, the distributional frequency of which may be loaded in very large measure towards usage which does not correspond to the canonical meaning of the particle in question or to any core meaning as such. Its function as an attenua-
tor or downplayer, as factual corrective or attitude marker is interpreted in its context-of-use. That is to say that, in the cases where *enfin* may be translated as ‘I mean’, we look to the ‘side effects’ inherent in the context to determine its function. In this respect, Traugott’s (1990) suggestion that the non-proposi-
tional uses of items are derived from the propositional ones through a process of increasing subjectification is of interest. The sentence fragment *si vous voulez* and the adverbial *quand même* have lost their propositional sense in the spoken language and become grammaticalised or indeed pragmatized as markers of attenuation with little relation to their “core” or canonical/propositional meaning. Though the items continue to be used in their core meaning (more frequently in the written/formal than in the spoken/informal mode), they are used with overwhelmingly greater frequency in the spoken language in a non-propositional manner, as face-saving devices.

2.3 Markers of paraphrastic reformulation

Reformulations are the focus of the work of both Fernandez (1994) and Rossari (1994). In her fascinating study of what she calls *particules énonciatives*, Fernandez (1994: 174 ff) reviews the role of pragmatic particles in introducing repair and reformulation. This particular sub-categorisation of particles — *marqueurs de reformulation paraphrastique* (MPR) — is of particular interest to us because of the emphasis on the potentially hedging or attitudinal/expressive nature of the paraphrase:

L’accent est mis sur l’*activité* du locuteur qui établit une relation paraphrastique plus que sur l’équivalence sémantique entre énoncés: c’est une prédication d’identité qui est en jeu.

(The emphasis is placed to a greater extent on the *activity* of the speaker who establishes a paraphrastic relation than on the semantic equivalence between utterances: it is the assertion that something is semantically equivalent which is at stake here.)

Fernandez (1994: 175)

Paraphrase in this sense is made up of three constituents: the source utterance (*l’énoncé-source*), the paraphrase (*l’énoncé-doublon*) and the paraphrastic reformulation marker (*marqueur de reformulation paraphrastique* — MRP).

Fernandez notes (1994: 176) that such paraphrastic markers may be positioned before the *énoncé-doublon*. Amongst these she includes complete propositions such as *je le répète* (I repeat) and *je vais vous le dire* (I’ll tell you) and stereotyped expressions such as *c’est que*, *(it’s that)*, *c’est-à-dire* *(que)*, *(that is to say (that))*), *autrement dit* *(in other words)* and *par exemple* *(for example)*. Others, which are generally adverbs, conjunctions or interjections, may be found:
1. before the paraphrase (ah, alors, bon, de toute façon, disons, donc, en fait, enfin, d’accord, oui, tu sais/vous savez) (ah, so, well, in any case, shall we say, so, in fact, I mean, agreed/of course, yes, you know);
2. integrated within the paraphrase (donc, précisément, vraiment) (so, precisely, really);
3. after the paraphrase (bon, évidemment, hein, oui, quoi, voilà) (right, obviously, you know? yes, as it were, that’s it)

The use of the paraphrase allows the speaker, by means of an equivalent expression, to guide the interpretation which a hearer may make of what is being said. At the same time, the paraphrastic mechanism allows speakers to edit their text, which is a fundamental requirement in the creation of spontaneous speech.

2.4 The role of pragmatic particles in mediating positive and negative politeness

In her study of men and women in Tenejapa, Brown (reproduced in Coates, ed., 1998: 81–99) describes the manner in which particles are used to modify the force of a speech act. There are some 20 particles in Tzeltal, which say in effect “I maybe, perhaps, tentatively, in some respects, assert/request/promise/declare…” or “I emphatically, sincerely, really assert/request/promise/declare…”. Brown argues that such strengtheners or weakeners of the force with which the speaker performs the speech act are prime candidates for formulating polite utterances. Hedging such acts is in general to be negatively polite, and emphasising them is positively polite (though, as Brown points out, this will depend on the semantics of the sentence in question. If a speaker emphasises a speech act of criticising or insulting the addressee, it is hardly positively polite). Brown also describes a society in which the sexes are segregated and in which women are highly deferent to men (walking behind them on the paths, stepping aside to let men through) but extremely warm and supportive to other women, stressing their closeness though rapport-emphasising expressions. The men treat people in a much more business-like manner, their trail greetings are short, even brusque, and their speech lacks many of the mechanisms of stressing deference as well as for stressing solidarity that abound in women’s speech. Brown predicts that:
1. Women use more strengthening particles when speaking to women.
2. Women use more weakening particles when speaking to men.
3. Women speaking to women use more particles overall than men to men.

Brown discovered that some crude correlations do appear, differentiating the speech of women and men but “only when the particle counts are corrected for the subtleties of the semantics”. By this, she refers to such things as the topic under discussion for both men and women use many more hedging particles when talking about something for which they do not have firsthand knowledge; similarly, they use many more emphatic particles when giving value judgements about what they think and feel. In same-sex dyads, women do use more particles of both the positive-politeness emphasising and negative-politeness hedging varieties. However, the hypotheses for cross-sex dyads are not confirmed. Brown suggests that, as natural conversation yields little of comparable semantics in the speech of the cross-sex dyads, the comparability of the samples is highly questionable. She concludes that despite the semantic/pragmatic difficulties in counting particles they appear to offer a possible quantitative index to politeness strategies, albeit a very crude one.

Wouk’s (1999) paper demonstrates that gender differentiation in the use of the particles kan and iya/ya in Indonesian (roughly equivalent to tag questions and “you know” in English) is much less sharp than that found in other studies. On the whole, Indonesian usage by both genders was facilitative. She argues that this is a reflection of Indonesian cultural values which emphasise solidarity. It is thus of great interest to test the hypothesis with another language which is not English (French) but which shares a common European culture. The qualitative analysis of the corpus in Chapter 4 allows broad consideration of a number of interacting variables with a focus on the use of pragmatic particles, paying particular attention to their role in the creation of a hedged or polite mode of discourse. More detailed analyses of the functions and the sociolinguistic stratification of the sub-set c’est-à-dire(que), enfin, hein and quoi form the subject of Chapters 5–8.

2.5 Pragmatic particles: Textual and interactional levels

In her study of female and male usage of you know, you see and I mean, Erman (1992) makes a similar distinction to that made above pitting the discourse-marking against the pragmatic function of such expressions which she names
the Textual and Interactional levels. Erman (1992: 221) posits a cline moving from lexical at the extreme end of the textual pole to pragmatic at the extreme end of the interactional pole. The Textual level is further broken down into information structure, discourse structure and conversation structure whilst the Interactional level is broken down into hesitation, repair and appeal. She reports that the men in her corpus used much larger numbers of such particles (especially *I mean*) and that women tended to use pragmatic expressions between complete propositions to connect consecutive arguments, whereas men preferred to use them as attention-drawing devices or to signal repair work.

In her study of phatic connectives in contemporary spoken Italian, Bazzanella (1990) provides an overview of a range of expressions in Italian which, in some cases, are parallel to the set selected for detailed study here in French. These are:

1. No?, non è vero?, vero?  
2. non so  
3. sai, come sai, sai com’è  
4. vedi  
5. senti, stammi a sentire, ascolta  
6. me segui?  
7. capisci?, puoi capire?, capito?, capirai

8. così  
9. niente  
10. diciamo, come dire?, come posso dire?, voglio dire, ti dirò, per meglio dire  
11. cioè  
12. be’, va be’  
13. insomma  
14. se vuoi  
15. allora, dunque  
16. scusa  
17. praticamente  
18. ecco  
19. appunto  
20. guarda
Bazzanella’s focus is wide-ranging and not specifically centred on potential gender asymmetries. She remarks, however, (Bazzanella, 1990: 644) that young people, from primary school to university, waver between praticamente, cioè, così, niente, diciamo in a ‘sea of uncertainties’. Interestingly, this ‘sea of uncertainties’ is not alleviated for university students who are more worried about their performance and the range of phatic connectives increases from primary school level to secondary school level to university. Bazzanella (1990: 644) recounts that, in answer to the question ‘Tell me what a phoneme is’, one student replies:

Praticamente il fonema niente è un’unità diciamo ((silence))

Practically a phoneme nothing/0 is a unit let’s say ((silence))

Bazzanella describes these expressions as having a ‘phatic’ function whereby the student, despite his ignorance, tries to hold the floor, attempting to find some way of answering. She does not make a more delicate distinction between the interactional and discourse-marking uses of phatic connectives and this would be of interest. Regarding sex and the choice of PCs, she points out that senti ‘listen’ is employed more by men whilst guarda ‘look’ and sai ‘you know’ are more often used by women. However, she does not propose to enter the male/female language debate, stressing that many other factors, regional preferences, social class, profession and so on must be taken into account.

The relevance of Bazzanella’s paper to the current study lies in the list of expressions which she includes as phatic expressions in spoken Italian. Many are semantically and some are syntactically equivalent to the expressions we have selected for study in French e.g. coiè/c’est-à-dire; be’, va be’/ben, bon ben; insomma/quand même; se vuoi/si vous voulez. As there is no formal rationale for inclusion of a particular expression within the set selected for study, we can only justify it on the grounds that such expressions appear to be common in spoken French, as is a similar set in spoken Italian. The limitations of Bazzanella’s study lie in the enormity of its scope and we make no apologies for restricting the focus of our study to a more limited range of expressions. Erman’s (1992) work adopts a similar methodology to that which we have decided upon: in order to provide meaningful analysis of the way that men and women employ such expressions, each instance of a PP (most play discourse-marking and interactional roles simultaneously) must be analysed in context and allocated to a semantico-pragmatic functional category. Such an interpretation may depend upon the adjacent paraphrastic element which is introduced or upon lexical or other contextual features.
2.6 Conclusion

The presence or distributional frequency of certain items in the spoken language is motivated by one of two main factors appertaining to naturally-occurring speech, one is its spontaneous, linear nature which gives rise to a substantial degree of repair and the other is its social and interactive nature, whereby potentially face-threatening acts are mitigated either through repair (if the potentially face-threatening act has already been performed) or pre-emption (to soften a potentially face-threatening act in the performing of it). PPs may be used to introduce repairs of a referential sort or of an interactional, face-saving kind. Some (such as *enfin*, *bon*, and *c’est-à-dire*) mediate the introduction of a repair, others (such as *ben*, *bon ben*, *quand même*, *si vous voulez*, *vous voyez*, *hein* and *quoi*) are pre-emptors with varying degrees of pre-emption depending on their position in the tone-group containing the potential FTA and, roughly speaking, on a cline from *ben* and *bon ben* (utterance-initial) to *hein* and *quoi* (utterance-final). The degree of pre-emption does not appear to diminish the softening effect of such particles, though their usage may be motivated by the scope of the reference on which they have bearing.

Note

1. Hansen (personal communication, November, 2000) makes an important distinction between ‘methodical minimalism’ (which she advocates) and ‘theoretical minimalism’. The former is a version of Occam’s razor, which holds that you should not multiply meanings beyond necessity i.e. if the interpretations of two utterances containing a given particle differ on some non-truth-conditional point which can be explained as resulting from some contextual factor other than the existence of the particle, then you do not have two senses of that particle. Hansen has absolutely no quarrel with the notion of polysemy but, like us, feels that the number of senses postulated should be kept within reasonable bounds.
Chapter 3

Establishing and investigating a corpus of spoken French

3.0 Introduction

This chapter highlights the value of drawing on a corpus of naturally-occurring spoken French for sociolinguistic investigations, describes the development of corpus linguistics as a field and attempts to survey existing corpora of spoken French. It prepares the terrain for the empirical work described in Chapters 4–8 by discussing the manner in which the data were collected for subsequent analysis and the problems relating to transcription. Transcription conventions are established which suit the aims of the research project and the prospective readership.

3.1 Corpus studies

The value of studying a corpus of real examples of language-in-context was recognised with reference to English-language usage in the mid 1980s and this has led to a considerable and growing literature in the field such as Sinclair, 1991, Stubbs, 1996, Thomas & Short (eds.) 1996, and Kennedy, 1998. The strand of British social linguistics originating with Firth shows how important it is to base linguistic descriptions on adequate attested data. Corpus analysis, in investigating naturally occurring texts, can reveal culturally significant patterns of language use.

Spoken and written corpora

It is surprising that, even in the British tradition, spoken language is relatively unrepresented, a fact highlighted by Sinclair (1991: 15–16) when he says

Most corpora keep well away from the problems of spoken language — with some honorable exceptions — and, for a corpus which in any way purports to reflect a ‘state of the language’, this is unfortunate.
Sinclair argues that there is no substitute for impromptu speech or natural conversation and suggests that the “quasi-speech” provided in film scripts and drama texts does not make up for the deficiency. However, the painstaking labour of transcription and difficulties in accounting for both the intonation qualities and the indeterminacy or multiplicity of meaning inherent in naturally-occurring speech have placed a considerable brake on developments in this area.

It is important when establishing a corpus to ensure that it is representative and balanced and that the corpus or subcorpus selected is appropriate to the task in hand. Studies of variation draw on subcorpora representing different regional varieties of the language, or different styles, registers, genres and subgenres as in the famous studies by Biber and his associates (e.g. 1988; 1994) where linguistic features are grouped together with text-types positioning themselves in a continuum along vertical and horizontal axes. Small spoken corpora with a closely targetted sample of language use are of particular interest in establishing syllabuses for students of Language for Specific Purposes (see Beeching, 1997), as well as in beginning to establish the distributional frequencies and functions of linguistic items used in the spoken language (see Beeching, 2001b).

The French tradition

French linguistics had until the 1980s tended to follow non-empirical lines of investigation, providing (mainly syntactic) descriptions based on intuitions gleaned from observation of naturally occurring data. These data have, however, not generally been routinely subjected to quantification in statistical terms. Moreover, where sociolinguistics is concerned, the variationist tradition has been resolutely shunned (see Gadet, 1996). Blanche-Benveniste & Jeanjean (1987: 49) provide a short bibliography of works in which an attempt has been made to correlate ‘faits de langue’ and ‘faits de société’ and claim that the linguistic features examined are generally considered to be marginal or deviations from the norm. They also (Blanche-Benveniste & Jeanjean 1987: 43) suggest that the theoretical frameworks within which French linguists are working have not been extended such as to cope adequately with the features which characterise spoken French:

Au total, les linguistes de ces années récentes n’ont pas proposé de cadre pour absorber le français parlé. Ils l’ont souvent vu comme un secteur marginal, qu’on
ne peut pas intégrer à une grammaire qui serait celle du français “commun, de base, de référence”…
(All in all, linguists over the past few years have not proposed a framework to fit the spoken language. They have often regarded it as a marginal area which cannot be integrated into a grammar of “standard, underlying, reference” French).

French pedagogical traditions have similarly rejected the spoken language as a valid basis for the development of norms or rules. ‘Oral’ has been equated both with ‘populaire’ (popular) and with ‘fautif’ (incorrect). Children in school have been instructed to “parler comme des livres” (speak like a book) (Barthélemy, 1985: 77). Culioli (1983: 295), who has worked hard to promote the spoken language as a variety in its own right and worthy of scholarly investigation, explains such an attitude by suggesting that the written form provides a stability and coherence which is threatened by the apparent chaos inherent in the spoken language:

La culture française est une culture puriste (…) La langue écrite y est outil de cohérence; elle nous fournit la sécurité des formes stables, fixées et normées; elle est un facteur d’unité (…)
(French culture is a purist culture (…) The written language plays an instrumental role in providing coherence; it provides us with the security of stable, fixed and standard forms; it has a unifying function).

If the written language represented the norm, the pinnacle of rational thought, the spoken language was considered to fall well short of these Cartesian ideals:

car le français parlé était une succession d’amorces avortées, de ratages, de phrases en suspens, qui paraissent défier l’analyse. En un mot, le français parlé était du français mal tourné, qui tournait mal.
(for spoken French was a succession of aborted beginnings, of backtracking, of phrases left hanging in the air, which appear to defy analysis. In a word, spoken French was badly turned and turning out badly).
(Culioli, 1983: 291)

French corpora

Whilst there is a wealth of information concerning English corpora, the British National Corpus is fairly easily accessible and there are a number of excellent surveys of the history of British Corpus Linguistics such as Biber, Conrad & Reppen’s (1998) Corpus Linguistics and Kennedy’s (1998) Introduction to Corpus Linguistics, such is not the case for French. The best overview of progress to date is in a special issue of the Revue française de linguistique appliquée
entitled *Corpus, de leur constitution à leur application* and published in December 1996. In a contribution to this volume entitled “De l’utilité du corpus linguistique” (on the usefulness of the linguistic corpus), Claire Blanche-Benveniste states unequivocally that France had not yet produced the vast and balanced corpora which had been established in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Portugal. The corpora assembled for the Trésor de la Langue Française were started early and are immense. But they are corpora of written language representing literary texts spread over a very long historical period. The section called FRANTEXT contains literary texts from the 19th. and 20th. centuries and these are computerised and may be consulted, for a fee (£200 per institution per year.) Several press corpora are available such as Le Monde and Le Monde Diplomatique. But for the moment there is not a large enough selection of such texts to allow for a comparison between different genres.

The spoken language presents the additional problem that it must be transcribed. For a long time, researchers of British English were uneasy with the proportion of written to spoken language in corpora, often as little as 10% of corpora was of transcribed spoken language and this did not seem to them to reflect usage, most of which in daily life is spoken usage. But since the Survey of English usage corpus was enlarged by Jan Svartvik and has now been included in the British National Corpus, this imbalance has been, to a certain extent, rectified. Another characteristic of English corpora which does not appear to be shared in France is that of easy accessibility. The very first electronic corpus, the Brown Corpus in the US, was set up with the intention that it should be accessible — free — to researchers who wished to consult it. This principle has held for subsequent corpora of English. Such appears not to be the case for French corpora, especially spoken corpora, which it is often possible to consult in their universities of origin but which, to my knowledge, are not accessible through a Web-site address and have not been brought together in the way that the British National Corpus has been. In order to consult French corpora, you must ask the permission of the director of the institute involved and, whilst I imagine that permission is rarely refused, this has, I think, militated against the growth of such research. And, in particular, it has slowed down lexicographic work which needs especially large corpora if words of a very low occurrence are to be studied.

One clear advantage of corpora in linguistic studies is that, as both Beryl Atkins, the lexicographic Editor of the Oxford Hachette dictionary, and Claire Blanche-Benveniste of the Groupe Aixois de Recherches en Syntaxe, point out, one is not restricted by one’s intuitions about the language but can survey what...
words are actually used by different speakers or writers with what frequency and in what linguistic contexts.

Although progress appears to be slow, spoken French has been the object of a number of studies in more recent years — see Ambrose (1996) for a useful bibliography — a number of spoken corpora have been and are being established and interest in the uses of corpora is growing (e.g. Habert, Nazarenko and Salem, 1997; Huot, 1998). The GARS (Groupe Aixois de Recherches en Syntaxe) has been most active in this respect. Blanche-Benveniste & Jeanjean (1987: 3) salute the efforts of Damourette and Pichon who, from 1911–1939, without the benefit of a tape-recorder, collected examples of the spoken language and thus created the 7 volumes of their *Essai de Grammaire de la Langue française*. They applaud the fact that Damourette and Pichon

connaissent la nécessité de s’appuyer sur des exemples attestés: on ne peut se permettre d’inventer des exemples de langue parlée en se fiant à l’intuition, qui est toujours trompeuse en ce domaine.

(are aware of the need to draw on attested examples: one cannot rely on one’s intuition to invent examples of spoken language as intuition is frequently misleading in this area).

The Corpus d’Orléans is perhaps the largest existing corpus of spoken French, amounting to 300 hours with 497 recordings and 4 500 000 words (Blanc & Biggs, 1971). The project was initiated in 1966 by Michael Hecht at Reading University with the aim of providing a basis for research and for teaching at university level. The corpus has the advantage of having sufficient information about the speakers and the situations to allow sociolinguistic research to be undertaken. This corpus has, until very recently, remained under-exploited by French researchers. It appears that the transcriptions made by researchers of spoken French in France such as the GARS are now in machine-readable form, such as to be readily analysed by computer.

Coveney (1996: 4–28) provides information about the 18 hours of interviews transcribed as the basis for his work on interrogation and negation.

Researchers of Canadian French are more fortunate in having an already established corpus — the Ottawa-Hull Corpus as well as the Boudreau-Dubois Corpus and the Peronnet Corpus of Accadian French. A list of French spoken corpora and how they may be consulted is included in the Appendix.

Although French spoken corpora are gradually becoming more accessible, it was decided, when work began on the study in 1993, that the most satisfactory approach was to draw on raw data fitting the sociolinguistic requirements of the project and to transcribe the data. It is to be hoped that similar small
Corpora of transcribed data may be coordinated and made accessible in electronic form such as to create a larger body of text for researchers to work upon.

3.2 Data collection for this study

Between 1980 and 1990, a number of interviews were recorded with native speakers of French in a wide range of locations in hexagonal France including Brittany, the Lot and the Minervois. The age, educational background and sex of the speaker were noted.

Of the ninety-five interviews, 45 were with men and 50 were with women with the following breakdown according to Education Level and Age (Educ 1 = no bac; Educ 2 = + bac; Educ 3 = +bac+ university degree (+); Age 1 = 0 – 20 years; Age 2 = 21 – 40 years; Age 3 = 41 + years). Classic variationist investigations, such as those developed by Labov (1972), correlate linguistic features with social class, divided into Upper Middle Class, Lower Middle Class, Upper Working Class and Lower Working Class. Subjects are indexed for class according to ratings on a number of features including educational background, occupation, father’s occupation, income, life-style, housing and locality of residence. Criticism (reviewed in Coates & Cameron, eds., 1989: 18) has been levelled at early research on Language and Gender, particularly for the anomaly inherent in its classification of women on the basis of the occupations of their husbands or fathers. It was decided therefore to use educational background as a means of testing for social stratification, particularly as Coates & Cameron (1989: 18) go on to point out that “two factors especially relevant to people’s speech patterns are their level of education and their social aspirations”. It has been impossible to index “social aspirations” numerically in a systematic way but these emerge from the conversations and can be taken into account in the qualitative account. The decision to divide subjects into the age-groups described above was taken on the basis of the numbers of subjects in each grouping and on the basis that after the age of twenty, many subjects are beginning to move into adult occupations, whilst post-40, they are fully established, less aspirant, members of society. This age-group includes retired and elderly members and it might be argued that the corpus could have been further subdivided. However, the number of subjects in this group is relatively restricted. Labov (1972) selects age-groupings of, variously 15–30; 35–50; 55–70 or 20–29; 30–39 and 40+. He suggests (1972: 58) that, if the age groups can be broken down
into three units, it is possible to detect any overall direction of change. Speakers were thus divided into young (up to 20), middle aged (21–40) and middle aged to elderly (41+). As no data exist for PP-usage in previous generations, we cannot, for the moment at least, chart real-time changes in linguistic usage. We may, however, posit possible changes in distributional frequencies based on apparent time distributions. Tables 3.1.-3.5 show the numbers of speakers in each demographic sub-group. As the amount of talk for each speaker is uneven, an attempt was made to select interviews which provided a balanced sample for men and women of different educational levels and ages.

Table 3.1  Numbers of male and female speakers in each Level of Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educ 1</th>
<th>Educ 2</th>
<th>Educ 3</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2  Numbers of male and female speakers in each age-group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age 1</th>
<th>Age 2</th>
<th>Age 3</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3  Numbers of 0–20 year-old male and female speakers at each education-level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age 1</th>
<th>Educ 1</th>
<th>Educ 2</th>
<th>Educ 3</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4  Numbers of 21–40 year-old male and female speakers at each education-level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age 2</th>
<th>Educ 1</th>
<th>Educ 2</th>
<th>Educ 3</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.5  Numbers of 41+ year-old male and female speakers at each education-level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age 3</th>
<th>Educ 1</th>
<th>Educ 2</th>
<th>Educ 3</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cross-reference to the corpus

The transcriptions themselves are available at the following web address: http://www.uwe.ac.uk/facults/les/staff/kb/corpus.pdf. Background Notes are included for each speaker at the beginning of this file where the sex of the interviewee, their age and educational background (0 = no bac, 2 = +bac, 3 = + university degree(s)) are noted, along with the length of the recording in minutes, the word count and, where appropriate, some indication of the subject matter and some short comments are included. Interviews are numbered 1–95 and each interview is then line-numbered, thus a citation from the corpus marked (1, 64) indicates interview 1 line 64. This system is pursued consistently in the belief that interpretations of interaction are possible only in a larger discourse context and readers may wish to satisfy themselves that a particular interpretation is just by reference to the larger context contained in the transcriptions. Speaker A is, in all cases, the interviewer, speaker B (+ C, D, E in the cases of interviews with more than one speaker) the interviewee(s).

The topics raised in the interviews are wide-ranging, from discussions of leisure activities and family relationships to racism and the computerisation of society. The setting was generally fairly informal, many interviews were recorded on campsites, where people generally have time to talk. Relatively few of the interviews were conducted in interviewees’ homes. None of the interviewees was well known by the interviewer and the interviewer — in the vast majority of occasions the researcher — posed a question and then allowed the speaker to take the floor. It could be argued that this is an unnatural form of conversation but, given that there is a clear understanding that the analysis is of interviews and not of conversation, the data are valid. Wolfson (1997) provides interesting discussion of the interview as a speech event, arguing that the interview is recognised as being a speech event marked by a question/answer format: one of the participants in the interview event has the unilateral right to ask questions and the other(s) have the obligation to answer them. Free conversation is not expected. Wolfson (1997: 117) suggests that:

The fact that the interview is a speech event in our society makes it legitimate to ask questions of a personal nature of total strangers, but at the same time severely limits the kind of interaction which may take place within it, and therefore the kind of data which one can expect to collect.

She gives an example of the type of narrative frequently elicited by sociolinguists in attempts to collect samples of “natural speech”. She demonstrates,
using an extract from Shuy, Wolfram & Riley (1968: 86) that the question which is intended to lead to a story is only one in a series of questions and there is a change of topic immediately following the subject’s response.

In the interviews which form the data for this study, the interviewer took a less “directive” role, suggesting topics by asking a question but then allowing speakers to develop the topic in whatever way they wished. She did not interrupt when speakers took the floor easily and intervened only when speech was flagging and interviewees clearly needed a prompt concerning what to say next. In general, topics raised by interviewees were picked up by the interviewer in the next question. In this way it was hoped that interviewees would feel that the interviewer was engaged with them and picked up on their interests. As Wolfson (1997: 119) says:

Changes in topic are usually motivated by something within the conversation. In contrast, the question/answer rule of the interview prevents the speaker from introducing topics of narratives which is, as we have seen, the way they occur in everyday conversation.

This renders the term “interview” perhaps less than ideal as a description of the speech events which took place as part of our data collection. Certainly, these were not fly-on-the-wall recordings of conversations between intimates. Neither were they, however, of the highly directed interview type in which the interviewer ignores topic cues and asks interviewees questions which do not relate to the linguistic or extra-linguistic context. Our approach approximates most closely to that which is recognised by sociolinguists as:

the so-called spontaneous interview in which the subject is asked a few questions and then encouraged to develop any topic which seems to interest him. The results of such interviews can be very interesting and have often been said to provide excellent material.

(Wolfson, 1997: 120).

Wolfson goes on to argue that, although the spontaneous interview may appear more “natural”, there is nothing artificial about the interview which has at least the merit of being a recognised speech event. The spontaneous interview is not a speech event, according to Wolfson, and it has no rules of speaking to guide the interviewee. She claims that people can feel very uncomfortable when placed in such a situation, they may feel suspicious and start asking questions like, ‘Just what are you trying to find out?’ This was not my experience with any of my interviewees. All seemed, apart from some of the adoles-
cents (of whom there are few in the data), able and willing to speak at length, to bring up their own topics and to pursue them, in some cases, volubly. A more substantive and fundamental point concerns the degree of solidarity between the interviewer and the interviewee. Wolfson argues that the closer the interviewer is to the interviewee in personal attributes such as age, sex, general attire, and dialect or speech variety, the greater are his chances of obtaining data approaching the subject’s intimate speech style. The degree of solidarity, then, between the participants will affect the verbal behaviour of the subject. Relative age and social status are key factors and the relationship between speaker and interviewer must be included as a factor in any statistical survey. As Wolfson remarks (1997: 123):

Studies which attempt to correlate particular speech forms with the age, sex and social background of stratified samples of speakers cannot make use of interviewing as a technique for data collecting without controlling for the relationship between speaker and interviewer.

This has important implications for the collection of corpus-material. As much information as possible must be appended to any interviews collected, including the sex, age and social status of the interviewer (and what they were wearing?) in order that the “solidarity” factor may be included in any analysis or conclusions drawn.

The results of the investigation of the data collected as part of this study must be interpreted in the knowledge that the corpus is small but all the same more representative of ordinary everyday speech than a similar corpus containing only written text or broadcast or scripted material which has been written-down to be read out. It is to be hoped that researchers will put together spoken subcorpora in order to create larger corpora thus gaining greater reliability and more robust statistical results.

In the end, is there such a thing as “natural” speech? It is only when norms of speaking are uncertain or violated that “unnatural” speech results. The data we collect in an interview situation reflect speech which is appropriate and natural in this situation. Provided that we do not attempt over-ambitious claims, extrapolating from one speech situation with a particular interviewer with speakers of particular ages and social backgrounds to all situations with any interviewer with speakers of those backgrounds, then useful and just conclusions can be drawn.
3.3 Transcription

As Gadet (1989: 44) suggests, there is not an ideal system of transcription. The intended readership and the objectives of the research will guide the transcriber in finding a middle way “entre les deux pôles de la fidélité et la lisibilité” (“between the two poles of faithfulness and readability”). Transcription is a time-consuming business but not something which can be undertaken by a secretary or assistant (Stubbs, 1983) as they would not necessarily “respect the authenticity of the recording”. Ochs (1979, reprinted in Jaworski & Coupland, eds., 1999: 167–182) comments on the fact that researchers rarely produce a transcript that does not reflect their research goals and the state of the field. Such selectivity should not be random and implicit.

As the present study is primarily of semantic and pragmatic features and not phonological ones, it is the problems associated with orthographic transcription which are of most interest to us. Although intonational features are of great importance in interpreting the pragmatic force of PPs such as hein we decided to follow the implicit advice indicated in Kennedy’s (1998: 32) comment that corpora containing large amounts of prosodic information are very difficult to work with at a lexical level. It was, for this reason, decided to keep the transcription as neutral as possible, including all audible words and some indication of pausing but not systematically including prosodic features. In cases where prosodic features were relevant, we took recourse once more to the original sound recordings.

Punctuation

An important distinction concerning the spoken language is that drawn between the sentence and the utterance. The spoken language does not always provide us with complete sentences and, from the transcriber’s point of view, imposing sentence breaks (full stops and capital letters) makes little sense. It has, indeed, become a well-established convention to avoid orthographic punctuation in transcribing the spoken language. The GARS transcribers for example do not include capitalisation, full stops or commas in transcriptions, preferring to employ oblique lines to indicate pauses, with one oblique indicating a short pause and two obliques indicating a long pause. The GARS avoid such orthographic conventions with the laudable aim of not wishing to pretend that the spoken language resembles the written langue. As Giovannoni and Savelli (1990: 32) remark:
Le français parlé ne saurait être, on le rappelle, appréhendé par le GARS comme une variante appauvrie du français écrit.
(Spoken French, let us not forget, was not to be perceived by the GARS as an impoverished version of written French).

The decision to include conventional orthographic punctuation in the transcription of our corpus requires thus some justification. As Ochs (1979, reprinted in Jaworski & Coupland, eds., 1999: 169) reminds us, the layout of the transcription on the page betrays certain assumptions concerning the relative importance of items or speakers. Gadet (1989: 46) points out that the spoken language has no “punctuation” as such, that the full stops and commas of the written form are generally considered to “echo” intonational features but that intonational features function in a quite different way:

Il n’y a naturellement pas de ponctuation à l’oral. Le supra-segmental, quelquefois donné comme son équivalent, repose sur un tout autre fonctionnement. Quel que soit le système de transcription adopté, il est donc évident qu’on ne doit pas l’accompagner de signes de ponctuation, ainsi libérés pour d’autres conventions…
(There is naturally no punctuation in the spoken language. Suprasegmental features, sometimes given as its equivalent, function in a completely different way. Whatever system of transcription is adopted, it is thus obvious that it should not be accompanied by punctuation marks which can then be freed up for use according to other conventions…)

Spoken language differs from written language but adheres, generally speaking, to an implicit sentence structure, the voice dropping at the end of a sense-group, rising when a question is being posed and so on. Not to employ full stops and capital letters, commas and question marks which capture the cluster of intonational features which mark utterance-closure, question-formulation, pausing and hesitating in a legible form seems to derive from a kind of dogma — an understandable one in the context of the downgraded role traditionally attributed to the spoken language — which seeks to demonstrate visibly on the page the nobility of the spoken language (for without these esoteric signs, the spoken language is too easily compared with the written language and suffers in the comparison). One might argue, as we have seen Gadet does above, that such notations are somewhat inexact representations of the supra-segmental facts. They do not, however, appear to be any more inexact than the orthographic transcription of phonetic phenomena which is widely accepted as being the most legible and economical way of portraying segmental features. Using traditional orthographic punctuation marks was found to be the most
pragmatic solution to the problem of rendering a transcribed spoken text legible for the general reader by Beeching & Page (1988: 5–6). The system adopted by clab (centre de linguistique Besançon), in which punctuation and full stops are abandoned and a single and double slash are used to indicate the end of the rhythmic group and a pause respectively, is contrasted with the system finally adopted in their work which retains written punctuation marks in the interests of legibility. Such an approach has the advantage of resolving some problems such as those of left and right detachment which are raised by Bilger et al (1997: 72). These authors cite the following example and the difficulty in attributing the adverb *immédiatement* to the verb positioned to its left or to that to its right:

```
je j’ai énormément de mal non pas à me réveiller je me réveille immédiatement je me lève et je me dis il faut que je me prépare
```

(I find it incredibly difficult not waking up I wake up and get up straight away/ I wake up straight away and get up and tell myself I have to get ready).

The inclusion of a comma before or after *immédiatement* resolves such a dilemma and includes the necessary prosodic information in a simple, readily comprehensible conventional form. The text would thus read:

```
je me réveille immédiatement, je me lève
```

(I wake up immediately and I get up)

or

```
je me réveille, immédiatement je me lève
```

(I wake up and immediately I get up)

Such an approach responds, too, to the difficulties noted by researchers of lexico-syntactic or discourse features who stripped out the prosodic notation from the *LOB Corpus* in order to deal more directly with the orthographically transcribed data. In the present study, neither tagging, whereby words may be labelled with their word-class, nor parsing, whereby information concerning the function of each word or group of words in a phrase or sentence, were felt to be a useful adjunct to the corpus which could be more readily analysed using the Find facility on an ordinary computer or using a Concordancing programme such as Wordsmith.

If the Transcription Conventions listed at the beginning of Coates (ed.) (1998) are anything to go by, though capitalisation is generally (though not always) avoided in transcriptions of English, full stops are used to indicate pauses (and these often coincide with tone-group boundaries i.e. what might be
considered to be the end of a “sentence”) and question marks and exclamation marks are used “to mark intonation, not grammar”. Both Coates and Cameron make overlapping and latching a particular feature of their studies and they have developed a type of “musical stave” notation to indicate where overlappings and polyphonic phenomena occur. Whilst such an approach has great attractions, it was decided that, as most of the interviews in the present corpus featured only two or, occasionally, three speakers and that turn-taking was a somewhat sedate affair, not generating a great deal of overlapping (except in the case of the two boys who feature in interview 1 and the two men in interview 94) that a detailed transcription of this sort was not justified, especially as overlapping and latching are not a particular focus of the current research study. As such, our data contrast dramatically, too, with the child data described by Ochs, (1979, reprinted in Jaworski & Coupland, eds., 1999). Ochs argues that an inaccurate representation might be made of interactive situations in turn-by-turn linear presentations down the page, as young children frequently “tune out” the utterances of their partner. Our expectations (built up on the basis of reading, for example, plays) might lead us to believe that utterances “build” on the previous utterance and this is not the case with some child language.

The spoken language, however, possesses other features not shared by the written language and which cannot be neglected in transcription. A number of these are listed by Giovannoni and Savelli (1990: 33) as follows:

– les *euh* de remplissage (filler *ers*)
– les répétitions (repetitions)
– les corrections (approximations lexicales, hypercorrections) (lexical approximations, hypercorrections)
– les bribes (truncations)
– les hésitations (hesitations)
– les ruptures de constructions (breakdowns in the syntactic structure)
– les allongements vocaliques (vowel lengthening)
– les variantes non normatives (non-standard variants)
– les pauses (pauses)

The first six of these features are included in the transcription, vowel lengthening is not systematically signalled in the corpus and pauses which occur at those places where one would not expect a clause or sentence ending (normally marked through commas, full-stops and capitalisation) are marked [pause] or [pause longue]. Non-standard or collapsed variants, sometimes transcribed as *j’sais pas* (I dunno) (for *je sais pas* (I don’t know)) or *p’t-et* (*p’raps*) (for *peut-être*
(perhaps)), are not signalled in the transcription. *Ne* (not) omission alone is flagged in transcriptions such as *je sais pas* (I don’t know) and *il y a pas* (there isn’t/aren’t). This is justified given the overwhelming frequency of such forms — *ne* omission is the unmarked case — and the indication which is thus given concerning the register adopted by a speaker who includes *ne* (the marked case). It was felt to be a potentially relevant feature for future study, easily retrievable by calling up *pas, rien, personne, aucun* (not, nothing, no-one, not one) etc. in a Search investigating those occurrences where *ne* has been omitted/retained.

3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have hoped to provide both a justification for and exemplification of the use of corpus material in the study of spontaneous spoken French. The first hurdle to be crossed in the attempt to test intuitions against samples of “natural language” is to obtain a representative sample of such language. In 3.2, we discussed the collection of the data and the extent to which it might be considered to be “natural”. We drew particular attention to the influence which the degree of solidarity between the interviewer and the interviewee may exert on the language forms used. We can make no broader claims on the basis of the data collected than that the forms produced are those which the speakers employ when talking to a (native Anglophone) female teacher of French in her mid-30s. We would expect a more “intimate” speech-style to pertain in interviews with social equals, in other words, (female) teachers in the “mid” age-range.

In this chapter, too, we have discussed the problems relating to transcription and have attempted to justify the somewhat contentious decision to include orthographic punctuation marks in transcriptions in the interest of legibility, with a necessary loss in terms of faithfulness to some of the suprasegmental features. As it is impossible to predict the exact feature which will be of interest to researchers, prosodic information — even that which is as detailed as the Survey of English Usage Corpus and the London Lund Corpus — is always incomplete and it is suggested that reference should be made to the original sound recordings to further annotate the transcriptions if a more detailed account prove necessary. The transcriptions err, thus, on the side of legibility in adhering to very broad orthographic conventions. A corpus which is neutral in this way lends itself most easily to lexical investigations and to those exploring the distributional frequency of words and expressions.
Chapter 4

The qualitative analysis

4.0 Introduction

A quantitative approach is taken to the analysis of PP-usage according to age, sex and education in Chapters 5–8. Chapter 4, by contrast, takes a qualitative approach to assessing the role played by factors over and above the age, sex and education of the speaker in promoting the usage of PPs, with particular reference to the expression of politeness. In line with Holmes’ (1984a: 156) recommendations, described in the Conclusion to Chapter 1, that the kind of detailed analysis required can only be undertaken using a small corpus and also taking on board Edwards’ (1989: 47) caveat that in pursuing large-scale quantitative analyses ‘we risk losing sight of the individuals on whom the study is based’, this section aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the linguistic and extra-linguistic factors which pertain in each of the ninety-five interviews, amounting to 17½ hours of speech, with a total word-count of 155,480.

Analytical framework

The analytical framework adopted is that of Conversation Analysis rooted in the ethnomethodology of Garfinkel, 1972, and Turner, 1974. It espouses these researchers’ suspicion of ready-made analytical categories attempting to invoke in so far as possible the categories which the speakers themselves use in making sense of the interaction and “ad-hocing”, as Garfinkel terms it, depending upon the specific communication situation. This approach, as Levinson (1983: 295) points out “results in a strict and parsimonious structuralism and a theoretical asceticism — the emphasis is on the data and the patterns recurrently displayed therein.” Turner (1974) exemplifies an approach which includes the ‘total speech situation’, including social factors which are known to be relevant or norms by members of the society, of which the researcher is one. Turner (1974: 205) argues that the sociologist should ‘explicate the resources’ he shares with the participants in making sense of utterances in a stretch of talk. The sociologist will use his socialised compe-
tence throughout, continuing to make explicit what these resources are and how he employs them. Turner sees no alternative to these procedures. The sociologist requires to use his socialised knowledge as an indispensable aid and must pay explicit attention to what constitutes such socialised knowledge. He sums up (1974: 205) “In short, sociological discoveries are ineluctably discoveries from within the society.” Turner suggests that, in order to build up a core of methods and procedures by which the ‘programming’ whereby socialised members ‘produce’ social structure may be mapped, sociologists must recognise that they have no choice but to reflect upon and analyse the social order to which they themselves subscribe. Such a methodological approach concurs with that which Eelen (2001) suggests might be taken to politeness. Theories of politeness cannot disregard everyday notions of politeness, shared by participating members of a common social world.

Lakoff’s “Rules of Politeness”

Whilst Brown and Levinson’s theories concerning face-threatening acts and negative and positive politeness inform our study in a fundamental manner, it is to Lakoff (1975) that we turn in order to map out the way that PPs may be used differentially by members of French society to mediate politeness. Lakoff presents a tripartite view of politeness which has proved extremely useful in characterising the strategies adopted by the speakers in the corpus. Lakoff (1975: 64–5) suggests that Rules of Politeness “should be able to predict why in a particular culture, a particular act in a particular circumstance is polite or not polite.” She proposes three such rules:

1. Formality: keep aloof.
2. Deference: give options.

The first two rules tend to occur where inequality between speaker and hearer exists or may exist, the third implies egalitarianism. Rule 1 distances speakers both from the addressee (use of “vous” rather than “tu”, use of hypercorrect forms, avoidance of colloquialisms) and from what they are saying (using legal or medical terminology), implying that there is no emotive content to their utterances and thus the participants can remain aloof. A doctor can thus maintain both distance and superiority over his addressee. Rule 2 politeness conveys, whether really or conventionally, the superiority of the addressee over the speaker. Hesitancy, question intonation, tag questions and hedges “leave
the addressee the option of deciding how seriously to take what the speaker is saying”. Rule 3 is sometimes considered to constitute anything but polite behaviour but, in American society, Lakoff suggests, gestures of friendliness can certainly be considered in this category. The purpose of Rule 3 is to make the addressee feel that the speaker likes him and wants to be friendly with him. Rule 3 is, according to Lakoff, favoured by men, who opt for colloquialisms, swearing and backslapping as a means of bonding, whilst Rules 1 and 2 might be said to be more typical of women who will hold back on gestures of camaraderie until real feelings of sympathy are created between them. Rule 1 cannot be combined with Rule 3. But Rule 2 can be combined with Rule 1 or Rule 3. You can be aloof but deferential and friendly but deferential but you cannot be distant and friendly at the same time. Social distance will dictate in large measure which of these Rules of Politeness is adopted by each of our speakers. Sifianou (1992: 24) criticises Lakoff’s Rules of Politeness both for their lack of specificity and their lack of universality:

Without a thorough and in-depth examination of how the concept of politeness is perceived by a particular group, and without working definitions of what it is to be polite, aloof, formal, etc. we cannot make any claims for universality.

Each society — and sub-section of a society — will have its own conventions concerning what constitutes appropriate degrees of aloofness, deference and camaraderie within particular social contexts. It is this, which, in our view, gives Lakoff’s Rules the flexibility which permit them to aspire to universality. Despite their limitations and a certain degree of inexplicitness, Lakoff’s rules should not be condemned as ‘common sense platitudes’ (Arndt & Janney, 1985: 281). In order to apply her rules to contemporary French, we must arrive at working definitions of what it is to be ‘polite, aloof, formal etc.’ in the specific context of the data collected here. In this, we must have recourse to our own knowledge of the society of which we are a part and, as Turner puts it (1974: 205), ‘explicate the resources’ which we share with the participants in the interviews in the creation of socially appropriate intercourse. We might hypothesise that *hein* and *quoi* may be avoided by those who implement Rule 1 politeness (though there may be an admixture with Rule 2 politeness strategies). Speakers who attempt to keep aloof by adopting a formality of tone may adopt explanatory strategies, using *c’est-à-dire*. Speakers in the corpus who may feel they are unequal to the interviewer are either those who are of inferior status (and must keep their distance out of respect): younger speakers and working class speakers, or of superior status (who keep their distance out of a
sense of self-esteem or because they are speaking in their role as a professional): older speakers, highly educated speakers, (male speakers?). Rule 2 users will show deference to their addressee by using hedges and expressions of uncertainty. These might include *enfin*, *hein* and *quoi* but only to a limited degree and would certainly include epistemic modals and the somewhat more formal *quand même*, *si vous voulez* and *vous voyez*. Deferential speakers will include the younger speakers, less educated speakers but also more “traditionalist” (older) speakers who would find Rule 3 camaraderie inappropriate. The colloquial forms *ben*, *bon ben*, *enfin*, *hein* and *quoi* might tend to be adopted to a greater extent by Rule 3 users to increase a sense of camaraderie, simply by virtue of being colloquial forms. Rule 3 users, in their bid to create camaraderie as a form of politeness, may use explanations in tandem with colloquial forms. These users will either be on a par with the interviewer in terms of social status or staking a claim to be on a par with her, in other words if they are of lower status or higher status, they will be trying to gloss over this fact by using such terms and creating a fictive egalitarianism. Rule 3 users may use the entire gamut of PPs, though we might expect them to avoid expressions of attenuation. These working definitions of the manner in which the “Rules” might be articulated for French are schematised in Table 4.1. We have limited our inclusion of the PPs to the four which form the subject of the study:

Table 4.1 Lakoff’s Rules of Politeness: their sociolinguistic manifestation in French

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lakoff’s (1975) Rules of Politeness</th>
<th>Linguistic features in French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule 1: Formality</td>
<td>Avoidance of colloquialisms (<em>enfin</em>; <em>hein</em>; <em>quoi</em>). Use of <em>c’est-à-dire</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule 2: Deference</td>
<td>Hedged or tentative mode of speech; use of <em>enfin</em>, <em>hein</em>, <em>quoi</em>, use of epistemic modals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule 3: Camaraderie</td>
<td>Use of colloquialisms <em>enfin</em>, <em>hein</em> and including <em>quoi</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although we can draw up a schema of the Rules, these are not hard and fast. As Lakoff remarks (1975: 67):

> how many and which of the rules you apply in a given situation are determined by your subculture as well as by your personal psychological makeup.

The 95 interviews in the corpus were examined individually in great detail, and a written account produced of each, including comments on the distributional frequency of the particles, the strategy of politeness (in terms of Lakoff’s Rules of Politeness) adopted by the speaker and what, in the socio-situational context, might have given rise to that strategy. The pragmatic particles, where the
distinction proves useful, are divided into two broad types: Type 1 which have conceptual meaning and which comprise *bon, c’est-à-dire* and *quand même* and Type 2 which appear to have a relational or processing function and which comprise, *ben, bon ben, enfin, euh, hein, quoi, si vous voulez* and *vous voyez/voyez-vous*. The functions of the particles *c’est-à-dire, enfin, hein* and *quoi* are more fully discussed in Chapters 5–8, where, in addition, a quantitative analysis of PPs allows a statistical approach to be taken.

Below we attempt to synthesize the insights gained into the role of PPs which appear to play a part in the difference between the more formal speech situations or speakers (Rule 1) and the least formal speech situations and speakers (Rule 3). Whilst it is the distributional frequency of PPs and the role which they appear to play in the speech of the individuals in the corpus which form the main focus of the analysis, the approach allows for relevant factors to be discussed in a context-sensitive way. It combines a consideration of the whole communicative situation — in so far as it is known to the researcher¹ — with that of an intuitive perception of the personality projected by the speaker.

4.1 Rule 1: Formality

Rule 1 is adopted in a range of clearly defined situations or by easily distinguishable types of speakers:

- Loudspeaker announcements, instructions and non-discursive/transactional speech
- Professionals speaking in their role as experts
- Young people speaking to older speakers or those in authority
- Older “traditionalist” speakers
- Hypercorrect speakers.

Loudspeaker announcements, instructions and non-discursive/transactional speech

Fifty-seven of the total number of interviews could be described as non-discursive or short. It seems that the less scope there is for sensitive subject-matter, the less call is made on pragmatic particles. However, certain subjects apparently consider the most straight-forward information potentially face-threatening and adopt the deferential strategies described by Lakoff under Rule
2 and some speakers, even in very short interviews, introduce elements of camaraderie. For loudspeaker announcements, such as interviews 2 and 21, a formal tone is adopted, with a style close to scripted speech and an avoidance of PPs in the interest of intelligibility. Instructions, such as those provided for boules-playing, swimming and paddling a canoe (Interviews 27, 41, 70), similarly are delivered in a formal direct manner with little speaker involvement. Interview 17 (horse-riding instruction), exceptionally, might be allocated to the Rule 3 column because of the speaker’s use of *hein*. The passage, a paradigm of the language of instruction, relies heavily on both imperatives and insistent questioning, underscored by *hein* (17, 19–22):


(Pick up your reins. What are you going to do to stop your pony? What’s your name? What? So what would you do to stop your pony? Huh? So you can’t stop it, then! What do you stop your pony with?)

Léglise (1999) provides excellent exemplification of *hein* used in an instructional context in the work of the *Patrouille Maritime* (Marine Patrol) to underline commands and interrogatives. Such a function of *hein*, as we see in the example above, is not restricted to the men working for the Marine Patrol.

Professionals speaking in their role as “experts”/hypercorrect speakers

Rule 1 is used, almost exclusively, by people taking a specific role in which they are speaking as professionals and, for this reason, monitor their speech and adopt a formal tone. This interpretation is echoed in Goffman’s words concerning the social attributes of ‘face’ when he claims that face may be defined as an image of self — delineated in terms of approved social attributes — albeit an image that others may share, as when a person makes a good showing for his profession or religion by making a good showing for himself (my underlining).


Such is the case for M., who runs a language school, J., a doctor, and the employee at DASTUM, an organisation which promotes the Breton language and culture. Educated speakers in a role of authority in a fairly formal context adopt referentially-orientated, distance-creating speech styles which reinforce their authority. In such circumstances, speakers do not appear to feel the need to establish rapport with their interlocutors, considering that fact-purveyance
The qualitative analysis

is the task at hand and that this is not a role which engages them in non-objective and, in some cases, unscientific, acts of solidarity. Whilst the industrial designer turned wine grower, who features in interview 8 and M. J., the literacy teacher, who features in interview 29, are not responding in their official capacity, they also keep their distance from the interviewer with factual accounts, a low hedge rate and very low rates of PP usage. M. J., in particular, took a university degree late in life and might be considered to be an aspirant or hypercorrect speaker. It seems that male speakers may tend towards a referential mode of politeness, providing facts rather than rapport. This leads them to use linguistic items to mediate explanation and correction (c’est-à-dire, enfin) and fewer of those items which hedge or establish rapport (quand même, si vous voulez, disons, hein, vous voyez).

A mark of respect

A formal mode of address might be said to demonstrate respect to the co-locutor. Three groups of speakers fall into this category: the youngest, the oldest and the less educated speakers. The vast majority of the youngest speakers (aged under 16) in the corpus adopt Rule 1 — this may derive from the social distance perceived between themselves and the interviewer or from turn-length — most children provided only very short answers. This applies, too, to some older speakers who showed little confidence in their replies (the hotel-keeper, the dog-groomer, the girl in the clothes shop).

Two of the speakers who opt for Rule 1 usage are over 80 years old. They are both women. It may be that their speech reflects a more “correct” or formal usage which was felt to be appropriate for “ladies” or in the formal context of an interview. In interview 92, Mlle. M., an 88 year-old retired couturière, talks about her early years and uses a narrative, rather than a discursive, mode of speech which does not give rise to the use of epistemic modal expressions, though certain topics (for example abuse) could have led her to employ such terms. Her rate of speech is slow at 185 w.p.m. and there are only 4 occurrences of euh in 15 minutes speech. Her mode of speech is unhedged, and she uses few particles. We note that voyez-vous is used by elderly speakers and that a hedged manner of speech is rarely adopted by speakers with little formal education. When Mlle. M. uses hedging expressions, they are adopted because of her uncertainty about which term to use not because of the sensitivity of the subject matter or to protect face needs, as we can see in the following example (92, 183–184):
Bon, il y avait des jupes qui étaient comment dirais-je? plus étroites si vous voulez. (Well, there were skirts which were how shall I put it? narrower if you like.

*Si vous voulez* collocates with *comment dirais-je?* and both indicate her uncertainty concerning the term *étroites* to describe the skirts in vogue at the time.

The subjects of interviews 7, 28, 59 and 89, four women who have devoted themselves to their families and, in very different ways, to traditionalist modes of being, illustrate the way in which some less-educated women adopt a formal or distant (though far from unfriendly) mode of address in order to express politeness in what they deem a formal interview situation. Such speakers are aware that PPs (especially *quoi*) are not considered ‘correct’ and attempt to avoid them. Other, more confident, speakers with jobs outside the home (networks which are more multiplex?) have a more cavalier attitude to ‘correctness’ and make liberal use of PPs. Social norms, at least in terms of linguistic usage, differ from one section of French society to another. Speakers project a version of politeness which they deem will be acceptably polite by their co-locutor who evaluates them in their turn according to a system of norms based on social distance and status.

Of the less educated male speakers who adopt Rule 1, (Interviews 60, 54, 58, 68 and 85) interview 60 is short and this may explain the dearth of particles. The two volunteer fire-men in interviews 54 and 55 might be said to be “on duty” and hence adopting a formal manner of speech to match their responsible role in society. The 58 year-old restaurateur in interview 68 speaks slowly (134 w.p.m.), in a measured way and, like the speakers in interview 57 and 59, seems to be monitoring his speech such that it will be comprehensible to foreign listeners. This seems to confirm the earlier finding that speakers who monitor their speech and who speak in a slow and measured way employ far fewer particles. This may correspond to their conception of formal language as it resembles the written variety more closely.

Interview 85 is with two men aged 56 and 43, the interviewee (not the researcher) states at the beginning that she will call them “vous” which indicates that she is looking for a level of formality in their speech, despite the fact that one of the men is her father. The men use some particles, albeit fairly sparingly, and the particles and expressions of epistemic modality are distributed unequally between the two men. B., the younger of the two men, uses *Bon, je pense que, je crois que* and *peut-être* (Well, I think, I believe, perhaps) to a much greater extent than A., perhaps in deference to the opinions of the older man. Both men in their own ways observe certain conventions of politeness in particular
areas and hedge remarks which they consider sensitive in such a way as to mitigate what could be perceived as face-threatening acts, either because of the deference the younger man owes the older or that the older man owes to the opinions of his wife and daughter. Personality factors, the perceived sensitivity of particular topics and the extent to which the speech situation is perceived as formal may all act as variables in the usage of PPs as well as the demographic categories of social class, age and gender.

4.2 Rule 2: Deference

Rule 2 was defined as containing some particles but these were, in the main, restricted to Type 1 particles. Subjects who fell into this category were conventionally polite, but not over-formal. This politeness strategy was:

- shunned by the least educated speakers
- employed by middle class and educated speakers
- employed by lower middle class speakers who keep their distance

A striking feature of Rule 2 politeness is the fact that it is avoided by the least educated speakers in our corpus. The least educated speakers polarise into those who adopt either Rule 1 or Rule 3 modes of politeness. Such speakers avoid attenuating expressions and classify the interview situation set up with an Anglophone teacher of French, either as one which requires formality of expression or as one which requires the creation of camaraderie. Out of the ten subjects who use Rule 1 strategies, six are women, four are men. Out of the seven subjects who use Rule 3 strategies, five are men, two are women. It appears, then that Lakoff’s suggestion that men are more likely to opt for Rule 3 may, tentatively and up to a certain extent, be supported by our data for French. But let us look more closely for the moment at the individuals who adopt Rule 2 strategies, reserving comments on Rule 3 till further down.

Illustrations of Rule 2 usage: middle class and educated speakers

As utterance- or turn-length increases, so does the incidence of PPs. This was Vincent & Sankoff’s (1992: 213, Figure 3) finding for punctors in Canadian French. Rate of punctor-usage rose from 0.15 for 400 lines of transcription to 0.55 for 1,000 lines of transcription. More ‘loquacious’ interviewees in their corpus produced proportionately more punctors. In a statistical test conducted
on our own data to ascertain whether average particle-usage rose in relation to the length of the interview, this was found not to be the case, at least not to a statistically significant degree. Indeed, nine speakers in our corpus adopt a deferent mode of politeness in the short or non-discursive interviews. These middle-class, highly educated speakers appear to use Type 1 PPs to hedge speech but avoid *hein* and *quoi*. Interview 66 is principally non-discursive, to do with times and prices of canoeing on the Lot, but the 25 year-old attendant makes substantial use of PPs. This would seem to vitiate the arguments made previously to the effect that non-discursive conversations appear not to motivate the use of PPs. Where educated speakers enter into a rapport with the hearer they make liberal use of PPs. More educated young men, conscious of the slight formality of the interview, avoid the use of *quoi*.

Turning to more discursive interviews, relatively educated speakers are aware of the formality of the situation and thus avoid the colloquialisms inherent in Rule 3: Camaraderie. They indulge, however, in a large number of tentative or hedging expressions which demonstrate a sense of humility or deference towards their interlocutor (deriving from a view of politeness which involves recognising, really or conventionally, the superior status of the interlocutor) or a somewhat knowing or playful sophistication of expression (such as might be the preserve of academics). Four women and three men fall into this category. Of the four women, two are teachers of English, one is a nurse and one is a ballet-teacher (interviews 81, 82, 84 and 87). The speech of these women is similar in being highly hedged, rich in expressions of epistemic modality and relatively free of colloquialisms.

Interview 81 is a short conversation (5 minutes long) but is a discursive one in which the speaker answers sensitive questions about reconciling paid work and domestic duties involving children and whether the speaker is proud to be French. This educated speaker takes fairly long turns and her speech is typified by self-effacing hedges or asides such as the following: (81, 71–73):

…je ne suis pas particulièrement je me *enfin à moins que je ne m’en rende pas compte* mais je ne pense pas être très fière d’être française.

(…I’m not particularly I *well unless I don’t realise it* but I don’t think I am very proud of being French).

This speaker clearly feels (possibly as a teacher of English) that it is suspect to be proud of one’s nation but is sufficiently humble (polite?) to concede that she may have this unwelcome characteristic without realising it. Her hedge is a manner of avoiding a face-threatening act, a form of negative politeness. This
speaker also uses a large number of epistemic modal expressions, such as je crois, je ne pense pas, je trouve, on serait tenté de croire que (I believe, I don’t think, I find, one might be tempted to believe that), two of her adjectives are qualified by assez (quite, fairly): assez contradictoire, assez difficile (quite contradictory, quite difficult) and there are three occurrences of peut-être (perhaps), all of which indicate a speaker who is careful not to make statements which are over-assertive. It comes as little surprise that this 5 minute conversation should contain hedging particles — 6 occurrences of quand même, 7 of hein and 3 of quoi. The speaker thus attends linguistically in a number of ways to her own and her interlocutor’s face needs given the perceived sensitivity of the subject-matter under discussion. Such a speech-style contrasts with that of the jewellery-maker (interview 58) by being at once more tentative, more resigned and calm. The subjects are of a similar age and speak on similar topics — reconciling a job and family life — and both have a hedged manner of speaking. The jewellery-maker of interview 58, however, chooses different strategies for marking the tentativeness of her opinions. She uses many more particles and far fewer epistemic modals in the longer twelve-minute conversation. It seems that a diffident and unconfident personality may give rise to large quantities of hedging expressions and epistemic modals, with relatively fewer occurrences of explanatory expressions, using c’est-à-dire. A tentative speech style such as this is stereotypically female. In our corpus, however, this does not appear to be the main factor distinguishing male from female speech, as male speech may also display substantial quantities of hedged expressions.

Interviews 82 and 84, with a female teacher and a female nurse respectively, centre on sensitive issues, the teacher using few particles by comparison with the nurse, despite her heavy use of explicit epistemic modals. Language teachers in particular may use fewer PPs in a bid for clarity of expression and in order to avoid stigmatised forms such as hein, quoi and even enfin, which they might not wish learners to adopt. The Parisian ballet-teacher in her forties who features in interview 95 has a fairly formal and rather old-fashioned manner of speech which reflects her somewhat conservative views on life. She maintains a high level of politeness through the use of a particular set of particles, especially si vous voulez (if you like) of which there are forty-one occurrences in twenty-five minutes of speech. There are also three occurrences of c’est-à-dire, twenty-three of quand même, ten of bon, three of bon ben, four of ben, twelve of hein. Interestingly, too, there are eight occurrences of vous voyez (you see) which we have previously noted as being a characteristic of the speech of older people. In her interview, Mme. H. mentions that she spends Christmas with her parents
and makes a point of getting all her parents’ friends together. It seems that the usage of *vous voyez* in her speech may be linked to her philosophy of life; a rather traditional and caring outlook which respects the elderly. The PP *si vous voulez*, too, seems to mark the speech of conservative, elderly women. In an authoritative role, women are just as likely as men to indulge in explanatory and referential expositions, using PPs like *c’est-à-dire*. Whilst traditionalists may use *hein*, they are highly unlikely to use *quoi* which is a stigmatised form. When men adopt hedged speech styles, their delivery suggests greater assurance — take for example the performance of the two men in interview 94. The close friendship and very high level of education of the two Parisian male speakers who feature in interview 94 are reflected in the topics addressed, the confident and informed manner of their speech and particularly in the high level of, at times ironic, hedging. Whilst the interview differed from some in that one of the men acted as interviewer and whilst it might be argued that the men display qualities which Coates (1997) dubs ‘expertism’, the tenor of the conversation is not that such expertism is competitive or combative but rather a role which they readily assume, a duty to provide reasoned and clearly exposed information on a variety of topics and a role which, as teachers, they are experienced and unselfconscious about adopting. The role of explanatory or hedging riders as a means of playing with ideas is very apparent in this interview. In addition, it is interesting to observe the degree to which the men play to each other’s strengths in a way which resembles the interaction between the two boys in interview 1. Contrary to Coates’ (1997) findings that men avoid collaborative or facilitative talk, preferring to take the floor in one-at-a-time turns with little overlap, the men who feature in interview 94 seem, on a number of occasions, to create a collaborative floor, adding to the symphonic build-up of the topic in hand.

The initial role taken by the men might be said to be unequal, as A clearly takes the interviewer role, asking the questions, whilst B takes on the role of the “expert” with the job of answering the questions in as full and explicit a manner as possible for an outside audience. A recognises that B is a good speaker and is well-informed in a number of topic-areas, particularly politics and sport. A has a doctorate in English drama and contributes more to the discussions on culture, the cinema and theatre and on architecture, although even here, B retains his “expert” interviewee role. A speaks a great deal less than B and, when he does speak, his speech is marked by features of tentativeness, such as rising intonation, question forms and the use of *quand même*. Speaker B’s use of riders and paraphrases is diametrically opposed to that of A and
reflects his role as the interviewee and supposed expert and also his more outgoing and confident personality. Even the hedges here might be interpreted as being information-conveying tactics or explanatory asides rather than a hedge on the ongoing argument.

The paucity of particles in the two men’s speech would seem to indicate their command of the language and the way it is used to convey information rather than to create a relationship or sense of solidarity. Their sense of relationship appears to come, at least on this occasion, from the playful juxtaposition of their ideas or of the sense of replicating consensual opinions or jokes which are current in a particular context. Whilst the type of conversation analysed here is based on dyadic interviews and thus exclude polyphony, the men’s conversation in interview 94 and the boys’ conversation in interview 1 provide a number of examples of “bleshing” and playing to each others’ strengths. It is true that the topics of conversation are more to do with transfer of information on what might be considered to be classically “male” topics: politics (the forthcoming European elections), cinema and cultural events, Paris architecture, tennis. However, such examples as these not only provide counter-evidence to Sacks, Scheglo and Jefferson’s (1974, henceforth SSJ) one-at-a-time model of turn-taking but also suggest that, to adopt Edelsky’s (1981) terminology, men can develop a collaborative floor and not just a single one. Coates (1997) argues that men’s topics do not lend themselves to overlapping but to ‘expertism’ whereby one man holds forth on a subject and then the other does. The evidence from the French corpus seems to indicate a level of supportive comment and facilitation in male conversation even in the unlikely context of a relatively formal interview situation. Clearly, further research in this area with a larger group of French men would be of enormous interest.

Highly educated speakers hedge and add explanatory riders to their expositions. Men, in particular, seem to employ the pragmatic particle enfin to gloss or add correctives and repairs. When put in the role of experts, men tend to rise to the demand to provide referential detail and indeed spar with each other to provide the most telling remark. In this, contrary to the findings of other researchers, they may create a polyphonic floor.

Older speakers, both men and women, adopt sophisticated and hedged speech-styles, using a large number of PPs of both Type 1 and Type 2 in order to successfully create rapport with their interlocutor and to provide a nuanced argument. This is strategic — such speakers are in full command of the linguistic resources at their disposal to provide repairs and glosses on ongoing spontaneous speech. The subject of interview 23, M. D., an elderly life-long
inhabitant of St. Lunaire, talked for thirty minutes on the history of the town and how times have changed. In common with other speakers who use a number of glosses (the director of the youth hostel for example), M. D. presents as a fluent, nuanced, lively, well-informed speaker who is sensitive to the face needs of his interlocutor. Contrary to the assertions of Lakoff concerning features of tentativeness, M. D.’s speech forms reflect a powerful and non-tentative speaker in full command of the range of expression which the spoken language affords him.

4.3 Rule 2 and Rule 3 combined

Rule 2 and Rule 3 were deemed to have been combined where a certain degree of deference was retained but was allied to a friendliness or informality of manner suggestive of camaderie. These speakers indulged more heavily in Type 1 particles but did not exclude Type 2. Such speakers divide into those who:

– provide factual information but in a friendly/egalitarian manner
– downplay their expertise or express uncertainty

Factual but friendly/egalitarian

The speakers who combine Rule 2 and Rule 3 styles of politeness and who use PPs strategically to nuance their conversation appear, at first sight, to have few characteristics in common apart from their command of language. They include a youngish woman in charge of the youth hostel at St. Lunaire, a pasteur in charge of a colonie de vacances, a second-home owner in Port Navalo, a Parisienne who is setting up her own business as a jewellery-maker, a Quebecois who is in charge of the Arts centre in Rennes and a recently retired teacher of French. All are, however, highly educated, articulate professionals who have (had) to deal with people, either in a business context or in a managerial and/or caring one. Four of them fall into the “older” category. The speech of such individuals is marked by a high degree of hedging and downplaying of their authority.

The social role but also the personality or identification projected by the director of the youth hostel at St. Lunaire (interview 5), is evident in her interaction with the interviewer. She combines a factual and fluent approach in describing her duties with a manner which downtones or attentuates her role.
She uses language which downplays her expertise, showing humility and a sense of humour in the face of the task which managing groups of adolescents imposes upon her. This renders her more approachable as a person. Her first response sets the tone for the rest of the twenty-minute interview (5, 1–6):

B: Alors je suis gestionnaire d’un…de cet équipement qui est un centre international de séjour et en fait qui est un établissement qui propose l’hébergement et la restauration. L’animation également. [Breath] Donc euh je m’occupe si vous voulez de coordonner un petit peu tous les services pour que le travail se fasse euh [Pause] le plus enfin le le mieux possible, quoi [rire]. Voilà.

A speech style characterised by a high degree of nominalisation and abstraction in the first two sentences containing lexical items such as ‘gestionnaire, équipement, centre international, établissement, hébergement, restauration, animation’ (administrator, facility, internation centre, establishment, accommodation, catering, entertainment) (which we suspect may be phrases which she has used to describe her role officially on a number of occasions) gives way to a more self-effacing and hesitant style in the ensuing utterance marked by downtoners or mitigating expressions such as si vous voulez (if you like) and un petit peu (a little bit) and ending in the hesitant reprise euh [pause] enfin le le mieux possible, quoi [rire]’ (…er [Pause] the most I mean the as best as can be, so to speak [laughter]. There.) The director searches for the most apposite and diplomatic expression to use and downplays her managerial role by ending on quoi and laughing. She thus establishes an informal rapport with the interviewee, having demonstrated that she can ‘play the expert’ as required. The remarks made by the speaker in interview 5 are characterised by a large number of downtoning expressions such as quand même, bon (beh), bon ben, je dirais, disons, hein, quoi and à mon avis.

The speaker in interview 58, a Parisienne, is 32 years old, has two young children, one still a baby, is highly energetic and has an extremely upwardly-mobile attitude, commuting into central Paris to continue her job as a jeweller and expressing her desire to set up her own business closer to home. She speaks rapidly and in a highly hedged manner, using a number of particles such as c’est-à-dire (seven occurrences), quand même (four occurrences) bon (nine occurrences), bon ben (nine occurrences), ben (four occurrences), hein (ten
occurrences), *quoi* (four occurrences). There are no occurrences of *disons* or of *si vous voulez* or indeed of *vous voyez* in her speech. Could it be that a hedged or glossed manner of speaking including a number of particles is a style of speaking adopted in general by educated speakers (especially Parisians) speaking fast? Educated (urban?) women with a job outside the home (access to a multiplex network) use a full range of PPs to hedge and nuance their speech. Younger middle-class men and women use both *hein* and *quoi* to establish rapport with their interlocutor.

Interview 91 with Mme. R., an articulate teacher of French in her late 50s, provides another example of a speaker who uses particles strategically to nuance her speech. Her fluency and ability to talk both on intellectual factual matters and on matters which concern her personally in a dramatic and vivid manner perhaps reflect the fact that she has spent a large part of her working life teaching French. Such a combination of the authoritative with the relational roles is not restricted to women. In interview 15, M. K., adopts a similar role and displays similar speech patterns. M. K. describes himself as a “pastor” in charge of an activity centre for young people. Like the director of the youth hostel, he combines a factual and authoritative manner with a humility and a tentativeness in managing sensitive themes employing hedging devices such as *peut-être* (perhaps) and *un petit peu* (a little bit) with pragmatic particles such as *bon, puis bon, et puis, et puis bon ben, disons, bien sûr, bien entendu, quand même, quoi* (though not *hein*). Similarly, the 60 year-old businessman of interview 52 appears confident and competent and is evidently wealthy enough to own a second home. His hedged and somewhat apologetic manner of speaking, then, is far from being an indicator of powerlessness, rather the opposite: it demonstrates that here is someone in full command of his life and his language and able to gloss his statements as necessary. His speech is friendly, polite and evidently aimed at creating solidarity with the interviewer at the same time as providing interesting information about the region. Although the middle-aged male Quebecois working at the arts centre in Rennes (interview 83) also uses a large number of particles, he uses relatively few explicit epistemic modals or downtoning adverbials and it seems that he takes a different approach to hedging overall than some of the women. In his speech he maintains social contact with the interlocutor by using particles such as *hein* and *quoi* but his delivery is overall a great deal less hedged. The best educated and older speakers manifest highly hedged speech styles, employing PPs to flag the non-coincidence between things and words. They make substantial use of PPs of Type 1 and have some, but less, recourse to Type 2.
Downplaying expertise or expressing uncertainty

In the short or non-discursive interviews, six speakers adopt a combination of Rule 2 and Rule 3, combining a hedged and deferent mode of speech with colloquial expressions to create rapport (interviews 4, 13, 30, 38, 65 and 79). The hedged and particle-rich speech which is characteristic of such a mixed mode of politeness is typified by the middle-aged receptionist at St. Lunaire Tourist Office (interview 4). Like the moniteur in interview 3, she begins the answer to her interviewer’s question with Ben (Ben, nous proposons toutes les activités ayant trait à la mer…4, 7). In some cases, there is an accumulation of particles as in the following answer to the interviewer’s question about the falling numbers of tourists in the town (4, 59):

C’est très différent, c’est-à-dire que bon ben la ville s’est quand même agrandie.
(It’s very different, that is to say that, well, the town has after all got bigger).

and, about second-home ownership, she remarks (4, 67–68):

Euh je pense que bon ben les gens des villes aiment quand même avoir quelque chose qui leur appartienne.
(Er I think that well people in the town sort of like to have something that belongs to them).

The use of Type 2 particles, such as bon ben and quand même, coupled with fairly careful pronunciation, makes this speaker appear approachable and authoritative at the same time, someone who assumes we share some knowledge — that the town has grown, that people like to have something which belongs to them. PP usage appears to correlate both with a desire to impart information and with a desire to downplay expertise.

The subjects of interviews 13 and 30 appear to be a great less confident in their role than others. Their diffidence might be interpreted in two ways, either they are “fluffy”, unclear about the propositional meaning in itself, or avoiding expertism and averting a face-threatening act. In Prince, Bosk and Frader’s (1982) parlance, is the use of hedging in these cases an approximator or a shield? Or, indeed, is it simultaneously an approximator and a shield? One suspects that these women are new to the job or only in temporary employment. Their speech style indicates a lack of training in the job and a lack of confidence concerning the facts. Subjects who lack confidence and authority in a given social role illustrate precisely the points made by Lakoff (1975). Women in such a position use PPs to express their lack of certainty and the tentativeness of their points of view.
4.4 **Rule 3: Camaraderie**

Rule 3 users were defined as those whose rate of particle usage, particularly *enfin-* and *quoi-*usage, was very high. These divided into:

- young, rural and less educated speakers
- young(ish) speakers who know each other well
- working class men who affect “straight from the shoulder” camaraderie

**Young, rural and less educated speakers**

Interview 3, with a windsurf instructor, is at once referential/non-discursive and informal. The speaker replies to the interviewer’s questions about the sailing school but he uses a number of particles, such as *ben, beuh, enfin, quoi* (well, umm, I mean, as it were). The use of such particles in a young man demonstrate his diffidence, his uncertainty concerning the correctness of his replies and perhaps constitute an emblem of youth. By the use of *ben* (well) and *quoi* (as it were) for example, a young man can avoid ‘playing the expert’, as this would make him appear unpleasantly over-confident.

The speaker in interview 12, a receptionist at the Syndicat d’Initiative in Dinard, illustrates a similar manner of speech. Despite being only in her early twenties, she provides facts and figures fluently, confidently and smilingly in her role — for which she has had training (a BTS in Tourism). Her longest utterance is 34 lines long. Whilst her speech is fluent and factual, she ensures that she remains in touch with her interlocutor by using *quoi* (as it were) and *hein* (you know?). The speaker does not hesitate (with or without *euh* (er)) and rarely repeats. The persona projected by this young woman is one of straightforward, direct and friendly imparting of information — one is aware that she is behaving in a professional manner and imposing some distance between herself and the client. It is therefore suggested that the social role adopted by speakers is a powerful influence on their manner of speech particularly where hedges are concerned. PPs are used in fact-purveying situations to smooth interaction and create rapport with a listener, downplaying what might be considered to be expertise or a “lecturing” tone. It may be that women adopt such rapport-creating forms to a greater extent than men. *Quoi* is evidently not so stigmatised as to be entirely banished from the speech of young women in the slightly formal context of the Tourist Office.

Interview 44, a non-discursive interview with a helper at the sailing school,
though short, seems to indicate that a speech style might be adopted by a young person as a “marker” of youth. The two-minute interview notably contains 8 occurrences of *quoi* (see 44, 8–10; 15–16; 46–47, 51–53; 57–60; 66–68). This *quoi* appears to be used to create an easy relationship with the interviewer by downplaying the expertise of the speaker and indicating a humility or relaxed attitude as illustrated in the following example (in which occurrences of *quoi* are underlined) (44, 8–10):

Les planches on fait on fait des stages d’une semaine, on donne des cours dessus, *quoi*, avec un moniteur, les optimistes aussi, c’est une semaine et le locataire par contre loue qu’on ne donne pas de cours dessus à moins que [pause] il y a des gens qui demandent, *quoi*.

(Windsurfing, we do we do week-long courses, we give classes in it, *so to speak*, with an instructor, optimists, too, they’re week-long courses but the rental-firm rents — we don’t give lessons unless [pause] people sort of ask for them).

There is some evidence in the corpus that rural speakers adopt Rule 3 more readily than town-dwellers. Interviews 34, 36, 37, 61, 63 and 78 illustrate this. Despite the relative formality of the situation — in the town-hall in Siran (interview 36) — the deputy mayor employs Rule 3 politeness strategies. He uses particles from Group 1 albeit sparingly (one *c’est-à-dire*, one *quand même*) and a larger number from Group 2 (two *hein*, five *quoi*, twenty-one *vous voyez*). His speech is marked by the very large number of occurrences of *vous voyez*. This appears to be a form which is used by older or perhaps more old-fashioned or rural speakers. Erman (1992, 228) comments on the use of *you see* in English in the following manner:

> As *you see* frequently occurs in explanatory discourse (see Erman, 1987), it is tempting to explain the relatively high frequency of this PE² in men’s speech by their alleged tendency to offer explanations of various phenomena to their interlocutors, male as well as female, even in fields where they have no expertise.

However, *vous voyez* is used by both the older (rural) men and women in our corpus.

Rule 3: Young(ish) speakers who know each other well

The number of speakers and their relative status may alter the dynamic of the communicative situation and lead to the production of a different range of linguistic items. A telling example of the manner in which the nature and number of the participants may impact on the language employed is provided
in interview 1. This interview was conducted with two teenage boys. The relationship between the interviewer (speaker A — an adult authority figure perceived to resemble a teacher) and the two boys is different from interview situations with adults. The interviewer plays a more active role in eliciting information, the two boys are interviewed together and at times answer questions in tandem. They encourage one another by latching and overlapping in answer to questions they might find difficult, for example, in questions about politicians. The boys anticipate each other’s words and create the kind of collaborative discourse which Coates (e.g. 1998: 243) claims generally typifies women’s speech. The personalities of the two boys contribute, too, to the texture of the conversation, speaker C being more ready to talk and keep the conversation flowing whilst speaker B is more introverted. B appears to be a good deal more conscious of questions of face than C, using hesitation phenomena and attenuators to downtone possibly face-threatening remarks. B is in disagreement with C that it is necessary to go to Paris to follow a serious course of studies. He repeats enfin and je suis pas and uses the attenuator tout à fait to mitigate his criticism or correction of the younger boy’s assertions (1, 1153–1154):

B: Non, enfin enfin moi je suis pas je suis pas tout à fait d’accord avec ce qu’il vient de dire puisqu’il y a une enfin la plus grande école d’ingénieurs est à Lyon en France.

(B: No, I mean I mean I’m I don’t totally agree with what he’s just said since there’s a I mean the biggest engineering school is in Lyons in France.)

Interestingly, if speaker B inserts comment (examples 1 and 2 below) as a filler to manage his faltering articulacy, C uses a number of parenthetical correctives introduced by enfin (examples 3 and 4) to adjust his expression retroactively:

1 B: en France nous avons euh [pause] comment un marionnettiste qui euh tous les soirs critique euh les… (1, 376)

(B: in France we have er [pause] what a puppeteer who er every evening criticises er the…)

2 B: C’est une publicité pour comment les C: Boîtes de thon

(B: It’s an advert for what the C: Tins of tuna).

3 C: Il y a beaucoup enfin il y a beaucoup de familles il y a certaines familles françaises qui sont comme ça.(1, 517–519)

(C: There are lots well, there are lots there are some French families that are like that).
Whilst B cannot find the words in the first place, C is so hasty and so fluent that he frequently has recourse to a repair mechanism. The fabric of the conversation is woven in the interplay of the psychosocial roles adopted by the interlocutors and the respective ages and number of participants involved subtly alter the nature of conversation. The linguistic items selected by each speaker reflect this. Despite the brevity of the turns and the relative youth of the speakers, large numbers of PPs characterise the speech of the two young men, who play to each other’s strengths, displaying a joshing familiarity with one another. Young male speakers appear to have some problems with expression which involves them in using repair mechanisms, which flag diffidence about the adequacy of the expression used and protect the speaker’s face. With each other, the boys indulge in Rule 3 politeness. It is a regrettable limitation of the corpus that conversations between adolescent equals do not feature more prominently.

The corpus contains, however, a parallel conversation between four young female speakers. In interview 39, a thirty-minute recording of four girls interviewed on a number of subjects, most of the girls’ responses are relatively brief and one is aware that they have difficulty in deciding what to say. They are not so fluent as the mass of adult interviewees and yet their speed of delivery is 243 w.p.m. Speaker B is unusual in this age-group in producing a relatively large number of occurrences of vous voyez (4). The girls do not use hein but there are 15 occurrences of quoi. Bon ben is used twenty-two times and enfin thirty times. Our hypothesis that quoi is a marker of the young male is undermined by this interview, although we might still contend that it is mainly used by young people and possibly mainly by men.

Whilst the fact that interviews 1 and 39 are similar in including more than one interviewee, they are dissimilar, not only because there are four girls and only two boys but because the boys inter-relate and support each other in their conversation in a manner which the girls do not — perhaps because the latter are relative strangers or felt that more formality should be retained in such an interview situation. Certainly the degree of latching and overlapping noticeable in the interview with the boys is not apparent with the girls. This runs counter to the evidence put forward by Coates (1998) who argues that it is women, not men, who indulge in creating a collaborative floor, latching and
overlapping to create common ground. One might conclude that, in order for valid conclusions to be drawn concerning gender differences in single-sex conversation, the exact relationship between the interlocutors is a highly important factor, depending not just on how well they know each other but on their personalities and the way their personalities interact in a particular communication situation. We are reminded strongly of Goffman’s words concerning face (Goffman, 1967, reprinted in Jaworski and Coupland, eds. 1999: 307):

A person may be said to have or be in or maintain face when the line he effectively takes presents an image of him that is internally consistent, that is supported by judgements and evidence conveyed by other participants and that is confirmed by evidence conveyed by impersonal agencies in the situation. At such times, the person’s face clearly is something that is not lodged in or on his body, but rather something that is diffusely located in the flow of events in the encounter and becomes manifest only when these events are read and interpreted for the appraisals expressed in them.

Personality, fluency and articulacy play a major part in determining the incidence of PPs. The more fluent a speaker is, the greater likelihood there is that they will use PPs of both an explanatory and corrective sort. Quoi is not restricted to male speech, despite the stigma attached to it. It may be gaining acceptance amongst young people as a means of hedging expressions which are considered potentially inadequate.

Illustrations of Rule 3 usage: working class men/ “straight from the shoulder” camaraderie/rural speakers

In interview 16, M. L. explains that he spent many years in homes in his youth including Reform School. He is self-conscious about being recorded, asking the interviewer not to put the microphone too close and apologising for his colourful vocabulary. Interestingly, he apologises for using not only couillons (bloody idiots) and pisser (to piss) but also boulot (mild slang-word for work) and flic (cop), claiming that the interviewer would be taping a bad sort of French with these terms. M. L.’s views on the usefulness of capital punishment are outspoken but he creates a rapport with the interviewer through laughter, a provocative manner and plentiful use of particles and downtoners such as quoi, hein, un petit peu, si vous voulez, bon ben and enfin. In 50 minutes of lively talk, M. L. downtones his inflammatory or sensitive remarks, perhaps speciously, by using a number of devices including excusez-moi, je dirais (sorry, I would say) and correctives as in the following example (16, 1047–1052):
y a une saturation euh … d’étrangers en France en fin excu-sez-moi euh.. je parle des gens qui y vivent, hein! Euh des Arabes en fin moi je dirais faut pas dire qu’on est raciste parce que je connais des Arabes, des trucs comme ça qui sont très gentils, mais euh … quand vous, vous allez euh pour chercher un appartement des choses comme ça ils sont prioritaires sur les Français, hein.

(there are far too many euh… foreigners in France I mean sorry er.. I’m talking about people who live there, you see! Er Arabs I mean I would say you can’t say I’m racist because I’ve known Arabs, stuff like that, who are very nice but er… when you, you go er to look for a flat things like that they take precedence over French people, you know?)

M. L. is well aware that his remarks are provocative and, whilst evidently refusing to budge from his extreme right-wing position on such matters as capital punishment or immigration, he feels he must apologise and thus deflect the criticism which he is aware may be in the mind of the interviewer. He adopts a range of linguistic devices to gloss or hedge what might be considered a too outspoken or socially unacceptable position or to concede some points in order to come back more forcefully with his original pronouncement. Once again, the substance of the speaker’s utterances, the degree to which the topic is sensitive or perceived as sensitive by the speaker influence the linguistic forms adopted.

Where less educated speakers are fluent but lacking in articulacy, a large number of PPs are used to mediate repair or as hedging mechanisms (notably a very high incidence of *enfin*-usage). PPs are used in particular to hedge remarks on topics which are considered to be sensitive. Rates of *hein* and *quoi* usage may be extremely high in such speakers. Indeed, such is the case in interviews 46, 51 (though this speaker avoids *quoi*, creating rapport through a high usage of *hein*), 62 and 64. They serve to project a working class identity, carry covert prestige and mediate politeness by creating rapport.

Interview 47, a 30 minute recording with a ninety year-old Breton woman, illustrates the manner in which rural speakers (including elderly, female ones) adopt Rule 3: Camaraderie. Mme. le C. uses relational particles of a particular sort, in particular using *quoi* no less than 47 times. This elderly rural woman is perhaps unaware of the stigma attached to *quoi*. Certainly the overwhelmingly high usage of this particle in the speech of this very elderly woman undermines our hypothesized correlation between *quoi*-usage and men, whether they are young or old.
4.5 Conclusion

The richness of the topics, situations, personalities and inter-relationships encountered in this chapter make the drawing of conclusions particularly difficult. The over-riding advantage of the qualitative approach lies in its appreciation of the individual, its rejection of over-hasty categorisations and pigeon-holing of people and situations. Each individual in each situation takes a “line” which is, as Goffman (in Jaworski & Coupland, eds., 1999: 307) says, “diffusely located in the flow of events”. We firmly subscribe to an approach, whose fluidity allows for individuals to adapt and change, to react slightly differently to situations and thus continuously recreate their social and linguistic identity. We can, however, make some broad generalisations (without wishing to suggest the existence of rigid rules, or, indeed, to prescribe them) concerning the situations in which it appears that PPs are more likely to occur in such conversations on the basis of the sample analysed.

Firstly, in situations where speech is highly monitored, PPs are avoided. The extreme end of this continuum is the prepared speech which is read out over a public-address system. Closest to such unspontaneous forms of speech is the explanatory “spiel” which has been repeated so often, either by tourist guides or in other professional contexts, that speech is no longer fully spontaneous. Routine information transfer which raises few problems of expression and does not constitute a face-threatening act similarly will give rise to little use of repair or hedging expressions.

Secondly, the speaker’s perception of their social role and how it should be played out will create variation in the usage of PPs. Those who consider that they must project an authoritative or formal ‘face’ avoid PPs in non-discursive situations. Those who have had training in public relations such as receptionists in tourist information offices tend to take a more relaxed approach and indulge in a more particle-rich and rapport-creating form of speech. Particle-usage is motivated where speakers ‘do politeness’ by creating rapport. It reduces the distance between speakers. Young speakers and some male speakers seem to keep their distance from the interviewer using few particles (i.e. monitoring their speech) probably out of respect. Their manner of ‘doing politeness’ is a different one, corresponding more closely to Lakoff’s Rule 1. We have tentatively noted, too, a potential difference in PP usage in rural speech. Subjects from rural areas, regardless of their social standing, appear to indulge in particle-rich speech. This may derive from the fact that such features are below the level of consciousness for these speakers or from their greater desire
to create rapport and show a friendly and welcoming face to visitors. PPs, however, may be used to express referential uncertainty as well as in the creation of rapport.

Thirdly, utterance- or turn-length may be a crucial factor in PP usage. As a general rule, speakers must take the floor in a substantial turn before PPs are motivated. PP usage increases with fluency and articulacy. But PP usage is also increased in cases where loss of fluency causes a speaker to search for words or smooth repair.

Fourthly, there may be a class basis to PP usage. Working class speakers appear to use the particles hein and quoi as a badge of identity (perhaps, like the rural speakers, they create rapport with others more readily) and adopt a style of politeness close to Rule 3 (Camaraderie). More educated speakers seem to make greater use of bon and c’est-à-dire, along with a range of attenuating expressions. This could be seen as echoing their role as “leaders” in society, in the habit of controlling (with Bon) and explaining (with c’est-à-dire) coupled with a (possibly fictive) regard for the negative face of their interlocutor and, more importantly, for their own positive face. They appear to have a tendency to adopt a mode of politeness close to Lakoff’s Rule 2 (Deference).

Finally, personality traits and the relationship and degree to which one is familiar with one’s co-locutor(s) play a major role in shaping the fabric of an interaction and in motivating the usage of PPs.

The particular importance of PPs in the articulation of the spoken language, both as mechanisms for repair deriving from psycholinguistic (processing) needs and, on a sociolinguistic or pragmatic level, as a means to avert face-threatening acts and articulate politeness has been indicated in this chapter. A number of difficulties of interpretation have arisen, not least because particles have different functions in different contexts and may indeed be multi-functional, which renders the allocation of one pragmatic function per occurrence problematic. Careful analysis of the speech of the individuals in the corpus appears to indicate that, although there are no exclusive differences between the speech of individuals belonging to demographic sub-groups, male or female, young or old, uneducated or educated, the values and identifications and the social role of each may be reflected in the strategies of politeness adopted and in the distributional frequencies of certain expressions. The wealth of conflicting evidence concerning the use of pragmatic particles is consoling. There is no easy pigeon-holing or correlation between sex or social class, age or educational background and linguistic usage. Some trends are perceivable but they are tenuous. Politeness in the male speakers often appears to be articulated
in a desire to “give information” — hence the much greater use of PPs to introduce or terminate phrases with a referential function and relatively less recourse to PPs which might serve to hedge the baldness of their assertions. The female speakers, on the other hand, appear to conform to the model posited by Lakoff (1975) or Brown (1980), whereby women hedge their remarks, either by using particles and other expressions of epistemic modality or by using them more often to hedge what might be considered over-assertive or sensitive remarks than to indulge in the explanatory, referential asides more markedly favoured by male speakers. Hedging expressions seem to be used, not by the powerless but by the best educated, along with explanatory asides and riders, bon and c’est-à-dire. This seems to support Houdebine-Gravaud (1998)’s hypothesis, that individuals are drawn to identify with a particular mode of speech as belonging to a sub-group to which they wish to belong and that they approximate their speech to such a model. A speaker’s idiolect will display features which draw him or her closer to one grouping or another, in a shifting manner. In each of the interviews in the corpus, the speaker has that part of his or her persona on display which he or she considers suitable for a foreign teacher of French in a context in which we might expect maximal politeness.

PP counts which are undifferentiated as regards their function are demonstrably unworkable as the data pull in opposite directions. PPs are sometimes used for referential, repair purposes and sometimes for hedging purposes, mediating a form of politeness. Each occurrence of a PP must be analysed in context and its function as a repair or hedging mechanism accounted for. The qualitative analysis has suggested that a speaker’s social role and such factors as the degree of formality (or perceived formality) of the situation and the scripted or spontaneous nature of the speech act may be just as or more important than a speaker’s gender in predicting the usage of PPs. As Edwards (1989) points out, it is only through statistical analysis that such obfuscated and non-absolute trends may be charted. This is particularly the case with respect to our data as interviews were not all of the same length and thus it is difficult to perceive mean rates of usage for each speaker without the use of numerical calculation. The business of Chapters 5–8 will be to gauge the extent to which one might say that the asymmetrical use of particles (both numerically and in terms of the functions they serve) might be considered to be an “emblem” of femininity or masculinity (albeit often a subconscious one). Is there a difference between men’s and women’s speech with respect to PP-usage and, if so, is it a statistically significant one?
Notes

1. Such an approach argues strongly in favour of the researcher being present at the time of the recording such that participant observation may occur. This may undermine arguments for research conducted on large impersonal corpora for studies of this kind and this is particularly the case with regard to spoken corpora.

2. Pragmatic Expression.
Chapter 5

C’est-à-dire (que)

5.0 Introduction

Fernandez (1994: 176) distinguishes between two sorts of MRPs (“marqueurs de reformulation paraphrastique”), the first are described as complex expressions, most often containing verbs or nouns, which refer to the communicative process and which may be sub-divided into two main sub-groups: a) complete propositions (je le répète, je vais vous dire…) (I repeat, I’ll tell you…) b) stereotyped expressions (c’est que, c’est-à-dire (que), autrement dit, par exemple…) (it’s that, that is to say (that), in other words, for example). The second sort of MRP mentioned by Fernandez comprises morphemes and expressions which are traditionally considered as adverbs, conjunctions and interjections: a/ah, ah oui, ah ben, alors, bon, évidemment, enfin, hein… (ah, ah yes, oh well, so, right/well, obviously, I mean, you know?/you see?) These elements can be combined and form sequences of MRPs, such as b / alors déjà si vous voulez, eh ben alors voyez… (so already, if you like, right well you see…). This second category, according to Fernandez, “est tributaire d’équivalences sémantiques fortes, dépendantes du contexte” (“is reliant on strong semantic equivalences, depending on the context”). This places c’est-à-dire (que) in a different category from the other PPs which constitute the focus of our study. It might be suggested that, if we follow Erman’s (1992: 221) continuum from lexical to pragmatic, c’est-à-dire (que), though stereotyped, has a more transparent and constant meaning being very close to the lexical end of the textual pole and distant from the pragmatic end of the interactional pole. To the extent that it is less polysemous and its meaning less dependent on the context than other PPs, its role in male and female speech should be easier to define unambiguously.

5.1 C’est-à-dire (que)—pragmatic, semantic and syntactic characteristics

Hölker (1988: 108–113) charts the uses of c’est-à-dire (que) in his corpus of doctor-patient interviews, which he defines as being fundamentally of two
types, illustrated in Examples 1 and 2.

(1) L’eau ne coule plus, c’est-à-dire que nous allons mourir de soif.
(There is no more running water, that is to say that we are going to die of thirst).

(2) Un radjah, c’est-à-dire un prince de l’Inde.
(A rajah, that is to say an Indian prince).

In example (1), a cause-effect relationship is indicated and the context is called upon in order to explain the relationship between the terms on each side of c’est-à-dire que. C’est-à-dire que is interpreted metaphorically as “which means that”. In example (2), however, c’est-à-dire is not interpreted metaphorically but is to be interpreted as introducing an explanation, “an Indian prince” is an expression which explains the meaning of “rajah”. C’est-à-dire (que) introduces not only explanations but more precise detailing, reformulations and corrections. If c’est-à-dire (que) is to be defined, globally, as a Korrekturmarker, which links two expressions in the manner outlined above, Hölker (1988: 111) finds himself at a loss to explain a number of turn-initial occurrences of c’est-à-dire (que) in his corpus, where the expression is used at the beginning of an answer as in Example (3):

(3) P: Oh, c’est peut-être une [ménopause?]
   A: Ah euh, ça m’étonnerait quand même.
   P: Ça dure quatre ans?
   A: C’est-à-dire que la ménopause, ça touche essentiellement les femmes, hein. Ça touche pas les hommes.
   (P: Oh, perhaps it’s a [menopause?]
   A: Ah er, I’d be very surprised if it was.
   P: It lasts four years?
   A: That is to say/I mean the menopause essentially affects women, you know? It doesn’t affect men).
   (Hölker, 1988: 111, Example 231)

The Robert and Larousse dictionaries give partial explanations of such turn-initial usage with the commentary “Au début d’une réponse, l’énoncé d’une atténuation, d’une rectification” (“At the beginning of a response, the utterance of an attenuation, of a correction”). In Hölker’s examples, the explanations or corrections provided may be context-dependent, a correction of a misconception on the part of the patient by the doctor, as in example (4):
(4) P: C’est pour voir s’ils sont passés pour moi avec le résultat ou quelque chose.
A: C’est-à-dire que en fait, bon. Ils me feront savoir quand ils seront plus d’accord pour vous, pour pour vous, pour accepter vos arrêts de travail, hein. Mais enfin pour l’instant, ils m’ont pas écrit. Mais de toutes façons, ils vous le feront savoir à vous en premier, hein.
(Hölker, 1988: 111, Example 233)

(P: It’s to see if they have dropped by for me with the result or something.
A: That is to say/well in fact, what happens is this.¹ They’ll let me know when they no longer agree to accept your sick leave, you see. But for the moment, they haven’t written to me. But in any case, they’ll let you know first, OK?).

Hölker (1988: 112) explains that it is not so much the verbal content of the patient’s question which is being corrected by the doctor as this is answered in “ils m’ont pas écrit” (they haven’t written to me). What is being corrected is rather the patient’s implicit understanding that the Social Security office will contact the doctor when sickness benefit is due to end. The doctor contradicts this assumption when he says “ils vous le feront savoir à vous en premier” (“they’ll let you know first”).

In other examples given by Hölker, a hedging role is evident. Examples 5 and 6 illustrate this.

(5) P: Non au départ je pensais à un orgelet peut-être. Quelque fois.
Ä: Non euh, l’orgelet, c’est un petit bouton qui s’trouve là, voyez, en dedans des cils sur le bord de la paupière.
P: Ouais, d’accord… Apparemment mon médecin traitant a dû prendre ça un peu à la rigolade au départ.
Ä: Oh, c’est-à-dire qu’au départ c’était peut-être un orgelet, puis ça a évolué euh…mal. Oh, souvent, vous savez, ces petites histoires-là, ça se résoud tout seul, hein.
(P: No to begin with I thought it was perhaps a stye. Sometimes.
Ä: Oh er a stye is a little spot that you find there, you see, inside the eye-lash on the edge of the eye-lid.
P: Yeah, OK… Apparently my family doctor can’t have been taking this very seriously to begin with.
Ä: Oh, that is to say that/well at the beginning it was perhaps a stye and then it got er… worse. Oh often, you know, these little things clear up of their own accord, don’t they?
(Hölker, 1988: 111, Example 233)
There is an implied criticism of the general practitioner in the patient’s words “Apparemment mon médecin traitant a dû prendre ça un peu à la rigolade au départ”. The doctor could have given a direct contradiction of this in explaining that what began as a stye (which would have cleared up of its own accord) has turned into something more serious. Instead, she starts with *c’est-à-dire que* which softens the contradiction and saves the doctor’s face in defending her colleague’s apparently dismissive behaviour.

A similarly hedged denial is exemplified in (6).

(6) Viendrez-vous vous promener avec nous? *C’est-à-dire que* je ne suis pas libre.
(Will you come out for a walk with me? *That is to say that/well I’m not free*).


The speaker here hedges the implicit refusal to go for a walk by explaining that they are not free. This serves both speaker’s and interlocutor’s face — the force of the refusal is mitigated.

Hölker (1988: 113) does not invoke politeness theory as an explanation of such occurrences, adhering rather to a textual, discourse-marking interpretation of *c’est-à-dire (que)*, the general meaning of which he describes as follows:

Die allgemeine Bedeutung eines Ausdrucks der Form *c’est-à-dire (que)* — $X_1$ ist also offenbar, daß es ein $X_0$ gibt und $X_1$ eine Korrektur von $X_0$ ist.
(The general meaning of an expression with the form *c’est-à-dire (que)* — $X_1$ is thus plainly that there is an $X_0$ and $X_1$ is a correction of $X_0$).

Such a formulation does not fully reflect the primarily hedging role of *c’est-à-dire que* found in Examples (3)–(6). Whilst there is an implicit contradiction of the preceding text (or implicit assumption) in $X_1$, *c’est-à-dire (que)* appears in such examples to function both as a discourse-marker, flagging an upcoming explanation, and as a hedge, attenuating the force of a contradiction or refusal — both face-threatening acts. Like many PPs, *c’est-à-dire (que)* may take a textual, reformulating role and an interactional, face-saving role. In our assessment of the potentially gender-asymmetrical role of *c’est-à-dire (que)* in the speech of the men and women in our corpus, the extent to which speakers use *c’est-à-dire (que)* for referential reformulation or to ward off FTAs will be of particular interest.

160 occurrences of *c’est-à-dire (que)* were found in our corpus. Almost all took the form, described by Hölker (1988), of a term or proposition $X_0$ which is
elaborated upon, reformulated, corrected or adjusted in $X_1$, the two terms or propositions being linked by *c’est-à-dire (que)*. Both $X_0$ and $X_1$ take a number of very varied syntactic forms, ranging from one word to a number of phrases or linked propositions both in $X_0$ and in $X_1$. The simplest form is that of a term in $X_0$ which is defined in $X_1$, as we can see in Example (7), where *CCF* is reformulated as *un camion citerne forestier*:

(7) Nous sommes aujourd’hui en vacances et vous voyez nous réparons donc un CCF, *c’est-à-dire* un camion citerne forestier qui qui a une petite fuite alors nous travaillons dessus de façon euh à réparer cette fuite. (54, 4–6). (We’re on holiday today and so you see we’re repairing an FTL, that is to say a forest tanker-lorry which has a little leak so we’re working on it so as to repair this leak).

In example (8), a term in $X_0$ is glossed employing a synonymous term in $X_1$:

(8) Oui. Alors euh ce que tu donnes comme terme pour médecine traditionnelle, c’est en fait ce qu’on appelle, nous, la médecine allopathique, *c’est-à-dire* la médecine des médicaments classiques. (86, 74–76). (Yes. So er what you give as the term for traditional medicine, that is in fact what we call allopathic medicine that is to say the medicine of classic remedies).

Often (technical) terms in $X_0$ (typically noun phrases) are defined in $X_1$ (typically complex sentences), as we can see in Examples (9), and (10):

(9) Oui, beaucoup de de gens vont voir l’Aquarium. Et vous pouvez égale-ment voir l’usine marémotrice de la Rance, *c’est-à-dire* le barrage qu’il y a entre St. Malo et Dinard. (14, 21–24) (Yes, lots of of people go to see the Aquarium. And you can also see the tidal plant of the Rance, *that is to say* the dam there is between St. Malo and Dinard).

(10) On apprend à faire de la billetterie aérienne et maritime ts et aussi beaucoup de communication *c’est-à-dire* à apprendre à dominer sa peur ou à pouvoir avoir un entretien avec quelqu’un. (12, 103–105) (We learn to do ticketing for air-lines and sea-crossings ts and also lots of communication *that is to say* learning to get the better of one’s nerves and to be able to have a conversation with someone).

Full sentences in $X_0$ may be reformulated as full sentences in $X_1$ exhibiting a syntactic parallelism, as in Example (11) or not, as in Example (12):
on travaille plutôt bon beh [breath] dans le tourisme social, c’est-à-dire on essaie d’avoir des prix vraiment [pause] modiques quoi. (5, 54–55) (rather we work well er [breath] in social tourism, that is to say we try to keep our prices really [pause] reasonable so to speak.

Bon, c’est quand ça reste un travail saisonnier, c’est-à-dire que bon beh [pause] c’est en saison qu’on reçoit le plus de gens quoi hein (5, 192–192)

Yeah well, it’s when it’s just a seasonal job, that is to say that well [pause] it’s in season that we have most people as it were you know?

Both $X_0$ and $X_1$ can have lengthy and syntactically complex structures, as we can see in example (13):

Alors, ce que je fais comme métier [sourire] normalement on peut appeler ça en France on dit métier d’agent de comptoir, c’est-à-dire qu’on s’occupe de la vente euh de voyages en agence de voyage. (12,88–90)

(So, what I do for a living [smile] normally you can call it in France people call it a counter assistant, that is to say that one is responsible for sales er of organised trips in a travel agency).

$X_0$ could be described as métier d’agent de comptoir which is glossed in $X_1$ as on s’occupe de la vente euh de voyages en agence de voyage. The relationship between $X_0$ and $X_1$ is retrievable by reference to semantico-pragmatic features (not to syntactic ones) — $X_0$ is paraphrased in $X_1$. Indeed $X_1$ relates more readily to the chain of tentative references to the description or definition of the speaker’s profession than to the single noun phrase immediately preceding c’est-à-dire (que). In other words, ce que je fais comme métier [sourire] normalement on peut appeler ça en France on dit métier d’agent de comptoir. X$_1$ (on s’occupe de la vente euh de voyages en agence de voyage) relates equally to ce que je fais comme métier. Indeed c’est-à-dire que + $X_1$ appear to form the next link in the syntagmatic expression of the speaker’s emerging thoughts and her mediation of those to suit her audience. It is noticeable that the speaker remarks that it is en France that her job is given the title métier d’agent de comptoir and that she is mindful of the need to explain this term to her non-native interlocutor. She does so by explaining her role in this job. Both $X_0$ and $X_1$ are complex syntactically and include hesitation and repair phenomena. In $X_0$, the fronted relative clause ce que je fais comme métier is picked up in the main clause in ça which in a canonical SVO grammar might be said to lack the object of the verb. En France on dit is interpolated and the two phrases share the common object NP métier d’agent de comptoir. Fernandez (1994 : 178) de-
scribes this process as a “piétinement”:

Le locuteur “piétine” en quelque sorte sur une même place syntaxique, produisant par là même un inventaire paradigmatic, que l’on choisira de représenter sur un axe vertical, puisqu’il interrompt provisoirement le déroulement syntagmatique (horizontal), ex.:

Cela me semblait la première priorité pour essayer de …

de m’intégrer

Speakers “shuffle their feet around” in some way on the same syntactic position producing by this very action a list of paradigmatic structures, which we will choose to represent on the vertical axis, since it temporarily interrupts the syntagmatic (horizontal) development, e.g.:

That seemed to me the first

the first priority in attempting

to become part

Using the vertical and horizontal axes in a similar fashion the relevant section of Example (7) might be represented as follows:

normally you can call that

in France people say

counter assistant

If such a foot-shuffling procedure exists syntactically, whereby similar syntactic elements are “slotted in” paradigmatically into a syntagmatic syntactic frame, we might add that a similar strategy exists at a discourse level with sentences or propositions paraphrasing one another and meaning being similarly adjusted until the utterance or turn reaches a resolution. Such discoursal paraphrasings may be articulated through insertion of PPs, such as c’est-à-dire (que) or enfin. This is more difficult to demonstrate graphically on the horizontal axis on the page as discoursal paraphrases are longer than the syntactic “shufflings”. We may do so by referring to the propositions as $X_0$ and $X_1$. Thus, instead of:

$X_0$ c’est-à-dire (que) $X_1$ … $X_2$ … $X_3$

such phrases would be considered as:

$c’est-à-dire que$ 

$X_0$ 

$X_1$ 

$X_2$ … $X_3$ …

Such a hypothesis appears to be corroborated when we consider Example (14):
Le centre régional qui se trouve à Rennes est un centre tout informatisé, *c’est-à-dire que* moi quand j’ai une réservation pour un voyage, je fais ma demande par téléphone à Rennes qui enregistre ça sur ordinateur. Et donc tout se se trouve occupé sur Rennes. (12, 130–133)

(The regional centre which is to be found at Rennes is a fully computerised centre, *that is to say* that I, when I have a booking for a trip, I make my request by telephone to Rennes where it’s registered on computer. And so everything is taken care of by the people in Rennes).

\[X_0 \text{ is } \textit{un centre tout informatisé}. \]

The pragmatico-semantic “piétinement” \[X_1\] is flagged through *c’est-à-dire que* and constitutes in this case an exemplification of how such a computerised centre functions. \[X_1\] is syntactically complex, containing two subordinate clauses — *moi quand j’ai une réservation pour un voyage, je fais ma demande par téléphone à Rennes qui enregistre ça sur ordinateur*. In the discourse structure, however, though \[X_1\] constitutes a recursive “piétinement”, it could not be omitted, as \[X_2\] could not begin “Et donc”:

Le centre régional qui se trouve à Rennes est un centre tout informatisé. 
Et donc tout se se trouve occupé sur Rennes.

(The regional centre which is to be found in Rennes is a fully computerised centre. And so everything is taken care of by the people in Rennes).

It is the reason given in \[X_1\] which motivates the expression of consequence “Et donc”, *tous se trouve occupé sur Rennes* being synonymous with *Rennes est un centre tout informatisé*. If we wish to consider such structures as “piétinements”, we have to allow more than one sentence or utterance to be included in \[X_1\].

If we look at the larger context of this discourse extract in example 14a, we see that in fact “Et donc tout se se trouve occupé sur Rennes” forms part of \[X_1\] and that this is the end of that particular syntagmatic run, a fact which is signalled by *Voilà*.

\[14a\] A: Est-ce que vous utilisez l’informatique, le Minitel?
B: Ici dans l’agence, où je suis, nous l’utilisons pas, étant donné que c’est une agence saisonnière, j’ai juste le minimum pour la billetterie mais autrement le centre régional qui se trouve à Rennes est un centre tout informatisé, *c’est-à-dire que* moi quand j’ai une réservation pour un voyage, je fais ma demande par téléphone à Rennes qui enregistre ça sur ordinateur. Et donc tout se se trouve occupé sur Rennes.
A: Oui.
B: Voilà. (12, 127–137)
(A: Do you use IT, Minitel?  
B: Not here in the agency that I’m in, we don’t use it, given that it’s a seasonal agency, I just have the minimum required for ticketing but otherwise the regional centre which is to be found at Rennes is a fully computerised centre, *that is to say* that I, when I have a booking for a trip, I make my request by telephone to Rennes where it’s registered on computer. And so everything is taken care of by the people in Rennes.  
A: Yes.  
B: That’s how it is.)

The discourse structure might be represented syntagmatically as:

**Question > No, but yes at Rennes.**

Embedded paradigmatically within this fundamental structure are a number of both syntactic and semantico-pragmatic “piétinements”. Limits on the right hand edge of the page render notation of this problematic — we have employed … to abbreviate phrases and repeated the phrase on the left as we move to the next line of text.

Here in the agency where I am, we don’t use it, given… ticketing but otherwise the regional centre which is to be found in Rennes the regional centre is a fully computerised centre that is to say that….in Rennes. That’s how it is.

The relations between elements in $X_0$ and $X_1$ are retrieved semantico-pragmatically — the section to be related or reformulated is not restricted to a position directly before *c’est-à-dire que* as we can see from example (15):

> (15) Sans ça il y a les discothèques aussi [bip] sur Dinard. Il y en a plusieurs. Je pourrais vous les nommer entre autres vous avez le Pénélope, le [?Rusticlub], le Number One, le Black Jack et la Chaumière. Et la Chaumière je crois que ce sont quand même les seuls qu’il y a sur Dinard, *c’est-à-dire ça* fait donc cinq. (14, 52–55).  

(Apart from that there are also discotheques [bip] around Dinard. There are several. I could name them for you. Amongst others you have the Penelope, the [?Rusticlub], Number One, Black Jack and the Cottage. And the Cottage. I think all in all they’re the only ones around Dinard, *that is to say* that makes five then).
The speaker reformulates the list of discotheques, saying *ça fait donc cinq*, but which section do we define as \( X_0 \)? Is it just the section immediately preceding *c'est-à-dire*, in other words *ce sont quand même les seuls qu'il y a sur Dinard* or does \( X_0 \) run from *Il y en a plusieurs .... cinq*? If we decide on the latter, it seems that *c'est-à-dire* has, in this case, a summative role similar to that which König (1935) attributes to *quoi*. We could, however, argue that, in both of the examples given here which include *donc*, *c'est-à-dire* simply happens to find itself in a “concluding” utterance.

*C'est-à-dire (que)* in the corpus

Elements in \( X_0 \) and \( X_1 \) display a large degree of syntactic freedom and the relationship between them is derived semantico-pragmatically from the context. Each occurrence in the corpus was analysed in its context and six main functions of \( X_1 \) were discovered.

**Explanations or ramifications of \( X_0 \):**

(16) Deuxième chose, on élabore un produit, *c'est-à-dire* qu'on a du raisin et on en fait du vin, on fait aussi du jus de raisin, d'ailleurs. On fait du vin et du jus de raisin et troisième chose... (8, 124–126)

(Secondly, we make a product, *that is to say* that we have grapes and we make wine, we also make grape juice, besides. We make wine and grape-juice and thirdly...)

**Reformulations —** synonymous or near-synonymous expressions or paraphrastic versions of \( X_0 \).

(17) B: euh, il buvait, il, vraiment des problèmes avec les flics tout ça, vraiment enfin les gendarmes, et cet homme là, il s'est immolé. *C'est-à-dire* il s’est arrosé d’essence.

D: Il s’est brûlé.

B: Il s’est brûlé devant chez lui.

A: Oh là là ! (16,630–638)

(B: er, he drank, he, really problems with the cops all that, really I mean with the police and that man, he immolated himself. *That is to say* he poured petrol over himself.

D: He set fire to himself.

B: He set fire to himself in front of his own home.

A: Oh my goodness!)
C’est-à-dire (que) 117

Corrections—X₁ is a corrected version of X₀, often including enfin.

(18) Et puis à 18 ans, ce qui est bien, c’est qu’on peut faire partie d’un parti, enfin partie d’un parti, c’est-à-dire on peut être adhérent euhm du parti qu’on veut et euh on paye une cotisation chaque année. (39, 392–394)
(And then when you’re 18, what is good, is that you can become part of a party, well — part of a party — that is to say you can become a member of the party you want and er you pay a membership fee each year.)

(19) Et tu crois qui … il s’agit véritablement d’un en… enfin de ce qu’ils appellent un enjeu national, c’est-à-dire plus une sanction…(94, 11–12)
(And you think it.. it’s really a matter of a nat… well of what they call a national issue, that is to say more of a sanction…)

In example (18), the speaker corrects her expression because of the non-euphonious and awkward juxtaposition/repetition of partie/parti, whilst in example (19) the speaker hesitates over the selection of the lexical item enjeu, and corrects it to sanction.

Detailing — a reformulation, including detailing, with enumeration in X₁ of the contents or types of X₀.

(20) et pour la celle qui est à aux anchois, c’est tout simplement une pâte à pain de mie, de la sauce pizza, c’est-à-dire des oignons, des tomates enfin tout ça et dessus on met des anchois et des olives noires voilà. (37, 67–69)
(and for the anchovy one, it’s quite simply a bread dough, pizza sauce, that is to say onions, tomatoes, well all that, and on top you put anchovies and black olives and Bob’s your uncle²).

(21) les quatre opérations, c’est-à-dire addition, soustraction, multiplication et division. (29, 8)
(the four operations, that is to say addition, subtraction, multiplication and division).

Example (20) enumerates the contents of a pizza sauce, whilst Example (21) enumerates the four mathematical operations.

Specification — X₁ provides a restriction of the proposition enunciated in X₀.

(22) A cette époque-là il y avait donc des Romains qui s’occupaient de gérer l’administration de de d’où ils étaient à l’époque, c’est-à-dire en l’occurrence euh le sud du Pays de Galles était géré par des par des gouverneurs romains. (23, 68–70)
(So at that time there were the Romans who were in charging of running the administration of of where they were at the time that is to say as it happens, South Wales was run by by Roman governors).

**Exemplification** — the speaker exemplifies $X_0$ in $X_1$.

(23) c’est que toutes les corporations, ce n’est pas accepté partout, *c’est-à-dire* que moi, je vois, pour moi, j’ai demandé à mon patron parce que maintenant avec le deuxième, il est arrivé, il y a eu des problèmes… (58, 93–95)
(it’s that all corporations, it’s not accepted everywhere, *that is to say* that as far as I’m concerned, I asked my boss because now with the second one arriving, there were problems…)

(24) Mais le plus difficile je crois c’est de de commencer à essayer de vivre comme les Français, *c’est-à-dire* de de contacter euh des des maisons de la jeunesse pour faire des activités, pour faire des sports en commun avec des des Français et là vraiment c’est euh c’est ce qu’il y a de plus difficile à mon avis. (82, 15–18)
(But the most difficult thing I think is to to begin to try to live like French people, *that is to say* to to contact er youth clubs to take part in some activities, to do sport along with with French people and that really, it’s er it’s the most difficult thing in my opinion).

(25) Pour ce qui est d’autres médecines euh l’homéopathie par exemple soigne les terrains, *c’est-à-dire* l’asthme, *c’est-à-dire* l’eczéma, des choses comme ceci mais également des choses plus urgentes, une angine, une crise de, une bronchite, une trachéite, et puis diverses intoxications également. (86, 100–104)
(As far as other types of medicine go er homeopathy for example treats particular ailments, *that is to say* asthma, *that is to say* eczema, things like that but also more urgent things, angina, bronchitis, tracheitis, and also various types of poisoning).

(26) On ne traite pas un symptôme, on traite un individu. *C’est-à-dire* pour donner un exemple, euhm quelqu’un viendra vous voir parce qu’il a mal au ventre ou même plusieurs personnes parce qu’elles ont mal au ventre et même s’il s’agit d’une même maladie, elles auront tout un traitement différent car il s’agit de personnes différentes. (86, 124–127)
(One doesn’t treat a symptom, one treats an individual. *That is to say* to give an example, erm someone will come to see you because they’ve got a stomach ache, several people because they’ve got a stomach ache and even though it’s the same illness, they will all be treated differently because they are different people).
The manner in which a speaker exemplifies $X_0$ in $X_1$ may consist of giving an example from one’s experience, as in Example (23), or by enumerating some of the elements which might constitute $X_0$ as in Examples (24) and (25) (the distinction between exemplification and detailing is thus a fine one). Example (26) explicitly draws attention to the exemplificatory role of this type of *c’est-à-dire* through the inclusion of *pour donner un exemple* (to give an example).

A further “Miscellaneous” category grouped together very low-frequency sub-types. These include Contradiction, Hedge, Summary and Request for clarification.

**Miscellaneous**

a) Contradiction — with *c’est-à-dire (que)* in utterance initial position, a speaker responds to an interlocutor’s question and hedges or downtones a potential contradiction by employing *c’est-à-dire (que)*. This usage resembles Examples (3)–(6) discussed above.

(27) A: Parce que vous travaillez et et bon euh par exemple, qu’est-ce que vous pensez du du MLF, vous êtes d’accord avec les les principes?

B: Ben, *c’est-à-dire que* je suis d’accord dans un sens que je suis beaucoup pour la femme si vous voulez, que la femme avait … devait être l’égale de l’homme si vous voulez mais je ne comprends pas qu’on … il faut qu’on voie dans un juste milieu, *c’est-à-dire qu’on a … on ne doit pas si vous voulez euh devenir plus que l’homme*… (95, 206-212)

(A: Because you work and and well er for example, what do you think of the the Women’s Liberation Movement, do you agree with its principles?

B: Well, *that is to say that* I agree in the sense that I am entirely for women if you like, that women had… should be men’s equal if you like but I don’t understand that people… you have to see things in a happy mean, that is to say that we have… we mustn’t if you like become more than men…)

(28) A: Vous préféériez la vie euh à cette époque, Mlle. M., plutôt que maintenant?


(A: You preferred life er at that time, Mlle. M. rather than now?

B: *That is to say, I wasn’t thinking of that. But then, it was good. I stayed there eighteen years in that house).*
In example (27), the speaker does not wish to contradict the questioner (the implicature of whose question expects a positive reply) and has mixed feelings on the issue of the MLF which she expatiates upon, using modalised forms, both the polarised *mais* and also hedging expressions such as *dans un sens* and *si vous voulez*.

In example (28), the speaker denies the implicature which her interlocutor has derived from her previous statement (that she preferred life as it was in the old days). She does not contradict her interlocutor in a direct way but does so in a hedged manner, using *c’est-à-dire*. But she does concede that life was good then — *Mais là, c’était bien*.

Both examples (27) and (28) appear to have an ambiguous function. The usage might be interpreted as politeness (saving one’s own and one’s interlocutor’s face by avoiding a direct confrontation/contradiction) or as a means of hedging an overstrong assertion, of nuancing one’s reply on a referential level. Both speakers concede a degree of agreement with the implication inherent in the interlocutor’s question.

b) Hedge — a speaker hedges X₀ in X₁.

(29) A: Vous ne vous entendez pas?
    B: Ben *c’est-à-dire* y a eu
    C: C’est les belles-soeurs
    B: Vous savez y a eu des problèmes y a eu …(16, 595–601)
    (A: You don’t get on?
    B: Well *that is to say* there have been
    C: It’s the sister-in-laws
    B: You know there have been problems there have been…)

Whilst (29) might be considered to come into the category of “contradiction” in falling into turn-initial position, it is felt to be more clearly a hedge. The speaker does not contradict the interviewer’s suggestion that he did not get on with members of his family but clearly it is a sensitive issue which he glosses over by suggesting that, if they did not get on, it was because of particular problems, which he goes on to explain. He deflects therefore the implicature of the question and maintains face.

c) Summary — the speaker summarises X₀ in X₁.

(30) Ça, c’est pour faire les traitements, c’est les soufretages, les traitements contre euh les vers euh c’est un appareil à aérer puis c’est pneumatique ce qu’on appelle pneumatique, c’est plutôt les traitements ou les traitements
d’hiver, les désherbages, *c’est-à-dire* c’est une cuvée dont on se sert pour désherber à meilleur rapport que sur le tracteur. (34, 60–63) (That’s for the treatments, it’s the sulphur treatments, the treatments against er grubs er it’s an aerating machine and it’s pneumatic what is called pneumatic, it’s rather the treatments or winter treatments, weeding, *that is to say* it’s a vatful which we use to weed more effectively than on the tractor).

5.2 The sociolinguistic stratification of *c’est-à-dire (que)*

Gender-linked variation of *c’est-à-dire(que)* usage

Of the 160 occurrences of *c’est-à-dire (que)* in the corpus, 84 were uttered by men and 76 by women. Quantitatively, there appears to be little gender-asymmetry in its usage. Occurrences of sub-types of *c’est-à-dire (que)* usage are summarised in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 reveals that there is not only little quantitative difference in the usage of *c’est-à-dire (que)* by men and women but that qualitatively, there is

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little gender-asymmetry in their usage. The vast majority of occurrences, for both men and women, are to be found in the context of ramificatory explanation of a referential type. The numbers of occurrences of the remaining subtypes of *c’est-à-dire (que)* do not allow us to make meaningful comparisons, though it is perhaps of interest that women employ more in the miscellaneous category and these are largely of the request-for-information type, which might suggest that women are more sensitive to their interlocutor and to ascertaining exactly what it is that their interlocutor is asking. However, there are, in all only three occurrences of “Request for clarification”, two of which are posed by the same speaker, which suggests that they are idiolectal or subject-specific.

The raw numbers of occurrences were divided by the Word Count and multiplied by 10,000 and Figure 5.1 displays the mean usage for men and women. Women’s mean usage appears to be marginally greater than men’s. However, as we shall see, this result is not statistically significant.

![Figure 5.1](image)  
**Figure 5.1** Mean usage of *c’est-à-dire (que)* in men’s and women’s speech
Education and age as factors in the variation of c’est-à-dire (que) usage

Figure 5.2 Mean usage of c’est-à-dire (que) as a function of education

Figure 5.3 Mean usage of c’est-à-dire (que) as a function of age
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the average rate of usage as a function of education and age respectively. The sociolinguistic stratification of *c’est-à-dire (que)* appears to have a regular pattern, with increased usage according to education. However, the mean-usage is far higher in the youngest speakers than in the 21–40 or in the 41+ age-group. This is an apparently anomalous finding. All speakers repair or gloss their speech. Their strategies for doing so differ, however. It appears that younger speakers indulge to a greater extent in explanations introduced with *c’est-à-dire (que)*. An ANOVA conducted to test the effects of age, education and sex on *c’est-à-dire (que)* usage produced a significant result for education (F= 6.071, P.<.003). This demonstrates that it is education which is a prime mover in *c’est-à-dire (que)* usage: the more educated you are, the more likely you are to use *c’est-à-dire (que)*. This appears to contradict the finding displayed in Figure 5.3, as the youngest members of our corpus were also the least educated (having not had the opportunity yet to pass on to Higher Education). We might suggest that our sample of young people was composed of relatively educated people who would be going on to Higher Education in due course and that this is reflected in their *c’est-à-dire (que)* usage. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 tell another story, however.

Figure 5.4 indicates that both sexes adhere to the regular sociolinguistic patterning whereby *c’est-à-dire (que)* usage increases regularly with education level. Figure 5.5, on the contrary, reveals that, though the men follow the

**Figure 5.4** Mean usage of *c’est-à-dire (que)* as a function of sex and education
overall pattern for age, with a gradual downward trend, the women do not. Usage in the under 20s is very high, drops to half that usage in the 21–40 age-group and rises in the older women. It may be that idiolectal factors play a part in this: one of the girls in interview 39 is unusually articulate and there are 14 occurrences of *c’est-à-dire (que)* in this interview. This does not account for the relatively low usage amongst the middle-aged. We might look for a possible explanation for these data by referring to the demographic table in Chapter 3, Table 3.5. Here we observe that there are no Age 3/Education 3 male speakers in the corpus. This would account for men’s relatively low score at Age 3 as *c’est-à-dire (que)* usage is higher in the more educated. It does not explain, however, the relatively low score for women in the 21–40 age-group. In this age-group there are an almost equal number of male and female speakers in the most educated group (4 male and 5 female speakers) and a healthy, if unequal, representation in the mid-educated group (8 male and 15 female speakers). It would appear that female speakers in their middle years are atypical in avoiding *c’est-à-dire (que)* and it is difficult to arrive at an explanation for this either in terms of the demographic distribution of the data or in terms of the kind of hypercorrection which is a well-documented feature of middle-aged, aspirant women. As *c’est-à-dire (que)* is a form which is most prevalent in the most highly educated, one might expect it to be used preferentially in aspirant groups such as the middle-aged, mid-educated women. Such is not the case here. We can only put forward the tentative explanation, in line

**Figure 5.5** Mean usage of *c’est-à-dire (que)* as a function of sex and age
with Tannen’s (1990) assertions concerning men’s preference for a factual reporting style of speech versus women’s rapport-creating speech, that the middle-aged women tend to avoid referential reformulations, favouring instead PPs which create rapport, such as *hein*.

5.3 Summary and conclusions concerning *c’est-à-dire (que)*

Overall, the usage of *c’est-à-dire (que)* in the present corpus confirms the findings of lexicographers and previous researchers that *c’est-à-dire (que)* is used to introduce both (paraphrastic) reformulation and ramificatory explanations. We cannot agree with Hölker’s definition that it is a *Korrekturmarker* and, though it may be used turn-initially to hedge a response which might appear to contradict the interlocutor and to request clarification, such usages are extremely rare in our corpus.

The vast majority of occurrences of *c’est-à-dire (que)* serve to introduce referential updatings of the preceding text. As such, we might expect them to be used to a greater extent by the male speakers in our corpus. Such is not the case, however. Though there are a marginally larger number of instances in male speech, the mean usage is slightly greater for women. *C’est-à-dire (que)* displays a remarkably regular sociolinguistic stratification when correlated with education level — the more educated speakers are, the more likely it is that they will employ *c’est-à-dire (que)*. On the other hand, the older speakers are, the less likely it is that they will use *c’est-à-dire (que)*. Statistically, only findings with education were revealed as significant and it seems that, at least where *c’est-à-dire (que)* is concerned, sociolinguistic stratification in French is marked to a greater extent by membership of an educational group — and we might extrapolate from this to social class — than it is by gender.

Notes

1. A somewhat wordy translation equivalent of “*bon*” in this context. It attempts to capture, however, the signal inherent in “*bon*” here that the doctor is going to set the record straight in what ensues.
2. Again, a somewhat wordy translation equivalent of ‘*Voilà*’. It captures, however, the self-congratulatory finality of ‘*Voilà*’ used to terminate a piece of discourse.
Chapter 6

Enfin

6.0 Introduction

This chapter is in two parts — the first deals with the pragmatic, semantic and syntactic description of enfin, the second with its sociolinguistic stratification.

6.1 Enfin—pragmatic, semantic and syntactic characteristics

Oui enfin moi je suis, euh, enfin euh ... euh par principe moi je dis que euh ... tout ouvrier, enfin en France hein, tout ouvrier ... doit euh ... enfin, doit, on peut pas dire doit, enfin pour moi, doit être au moins socialiste ou communiste. Enfin, euh de milieu ouvrier, quoi. (16, 1003–1006)
(Yes, well, me, I’m er well er er as a general rule I would say that er workers, at least in France you know, workers... must er...well, must, you can’t say must, well for me, must be socialist or communist. I mean, people from a working class background, so to speak.)

In the 17½ hour corpus of spontaneous spoken French, enfin occurs no fewer than 432 times and, as is illustrated in the extract quoted above, it is most often used as a corrective, either to restrict the scope of the proposition (enfin moi, enfin pour moi, enfin en France hein, enfin euh de milieu ouvrier), to introduce a hedging expression (enfin euh...euh par principe) or to correct what is perceived to be an over-strong assertion of one’s views (enfin doit, on peut pas dire doit).

Dictionary definitions of enfin found either in traditional monolingual dictionaries such as le Grand Larousse de la langue française (1972, Vol.2: 1618–1619), or in more recent bilingual and corpus-based dictionaries such as Corréard and Grundy (eds.) Oxford Hachette (1994: 300) include the following main definitions of enfin:

1. lastly (in a development or after an enumeration): Je montrerai enfin que ces deux systèmes sont compatibles.(I will demonstrate finally that these two systems are incompatible).
2. indicating relief: *Enfin seuls!* (Alone at last!)

3. to sum up, in other words: *Il est intelligent, travailleur, enfin il a tout pour réussir.* (He is intelligent, hard-working, in short he has everything he needs to succeed).

4. indicating resignation: *C’est triste mais enfin on n’y peut rien.* (It’s sad but well you can’t do anything about it).

5. indicating an objection: *Enfin, vous pouvez essayez…* (Well, you can try…)

6. indicating impatience: *Vas-tu te taire, enfin!* (Are you going to shut up, or what!)

7. introducing a correction (a restriction of the original word(s)): *Il pleut tous les jours, enfin presque.* (It rains every day, well almost) (or a more precise version of the original word(s): *C’est une robe à peine évasée, enfin presque droite.* (It’s a slightly flared dress, well virtually straight).

8. when everything is taken into account, after all: *Cet élève qui, enfin, n’est pas sot, ne réussit pas dans son travail.* (This pupil who, after all, is no fool, is not doing well in his work).

9. indicating surprise: *Mais enfin, c’est incroyable, une aventure pareille.* (But well, it’s incredible, an adventure like that).

Cadiot et al. (1985) attempt to provide a unified description of *enfin* as a metalinguistic marker whose function is to indicate that a given discourse fragment (in *italics* in the examples below) is meant to preclude the utterance of a previously possible discourse. In this way they hope to account for the different contexts in which *enfin* is used.

*C’est désagréable, enfin ça va pas durer.* (It’s unpleasant, but well it won’t last).


*Il est bien ce film, enfin pas mal.* (It’s good that film, well not bad).

*Enfin, qu’est-ce que ça te fait?* (But well, what difference does it make to you?)


Barnes (1995) likens the use of *bon, ben* and *enfin* to the use of *well* in English. She categorises all three as ‘discourse particles’. In the two hours of interviews in Barnes’ corpus, there were 175 occurrences of *enfin*, 120 of *ben* and 100 of *bon*. Her initial findings confirm our own that these particles are of very frequent occurrence in the spoken language. In the present study, we shall not be considering Barnes’ analysis of *ben* and *bon* but shall investigate her suggestion, quoting Schiffrin (1985), that *well* is the closest equivalent to such expressions in English. Barnes argues that *enfin* marks a discontinuity in the discourse,
signalling that the discourse is not accomplishing its communicative purpose or ‘that it stakes a claim too strongly’ (Barnes, 1995: 821). It is this aspect of her study which is of interest to us, in that it hints at the pragmatic functioning of *enfin* as a hedging device. We prefer to name *enfin* a pragmatic particle, rather than a discourse marker, and, in this, we follow Fraser (1999) and Wouk (1999) in considering that Schiffrin’s (1987) criteria for what counts as a discourse marker are very broad. The debate concerning discourse markers and their definition is raised by Fraser (1999), who remarks that they have been studied ‘under various labels, including discourse markers, discourse connectives, discourse operators, pragmatic connectives, sentence connectives and cue phrases’ (Fraser, 1999: 931). As indicated in the traditional dictionary definitions above, *enfin* has a number of different senses, including its ‘core’ or structural (rhetorical, discourse-marking) sense of ‘finally/ at last/ to sum up’. In the spoken language, it appears to be used more frequently in an interactive or phatic manner than rhetorically.

The examples Barnes provides appear to support the case for reinterpreting *enfin* in many cases as a pragmatic particle serving to protect a speaker’s face and, as such, it may be analysed within Brown and Levinson’s (1987) theory of politeness. It is clearly only in its corrective sense that *enfin* might be translated as *well*. Barnes (1995) discovered, as we have done, that the corrective sense of *enfin* far outweighs the others in the spontaneous spoken language. It is worth noting that Schiffrin’s analysis of *well* differs from the present analysis of *enfin*, in that she investigates the uses of *well* in conversation, whilst the present corpus is of interviews. *Enfin* is thus used most often in the present corpus as a self-corrective, not as a corrective to the views of others. Schiffrin (1985: 641) describes *well* as a ‘marker of response’. Her analysis shows that ‘*well* anchors its user in a system of conversational exchange when the options offered by a referent for the coherence of a response are not precisely followed’ (Schiffrin, 1985: 641). The conversational use of *well* is very different from the corrective use of *enfin* in the context of the present corpus, though the suggestion that it marks a discontinuity appears to hold true. In Schiffrin’s corpus, it is implied that the ‘self-repair’ usage of *well* is a relatively rare occurrence though it functions in this context in exactly the same way as corrective *enfin*. The turn-initial usage of *well* which forms the focus of Schiffrin’s paper could not be rendered by *enfin* (though *bon, ben* or *c’est-à-dire (que)* might fit the bill here) as we can see from Schiffrin’s example 40:
(40) Zelda: D’y’ know where the cemetery is, where Smithville I: Inn is?
Debby: Yeh.
Zelda: Well, when y’get to the cemetery, y’ make a right.
Schi
V
rin, 1985: 657

There is no easy one-to-one mapping of *enfin* in French and *well* in English. Each has a range of meanings or uses. It appears to be only in self-repair that they coincide, as in Schiffrin’s example 42:

(42) Look at Bob’s par- eh father an’ mo- well I don’t think his father ac-
cepted it- his mother.
Schi
V

Within the framework of Brown and Levinson’s (1987) theories of positive and negative politeness, speakers employ politeness strategies in an attempt to avoid face-threatening acts (FTAs). It may be that corrective *enfin* is used by speakers both in attending to their positive face (their desire to be approved of) and to their negative face (their desire to be unimpeded in their actions) in different contexts, depending upon whether the ‘correction’ is designed to downplay an assertion which is too strong or to correct an item of factual accuracy. Neither of these functions appear to be text or discourse related, although the signal flagged up by *enfin* (here comes a correction) evidently is.

The overwhelming majority of examples of *enfin* (311 examples) in the present corpus introduce a corrective. There are about 50 examples of ‘To sum up, in short’, and under 20 examples each of ‘resignation’, ‘finally’ and ‘all in all’. There are no examples of ‘relief’, ‘adversativeness’ or ‘impatience’. This might be explained by the fact that the speakers were unknown to each other and the situation was an interview situation, not one in which such feelings might readily be expressed. A category which does not appear in dictionary definitions but which was fairly widespread, with 15 occurrences in the corpus, is one which I have named ‘hesitation’. This category distinguishes itself from others by providing a breathing space during which a speaker may find the term required by the context.

Correctives introduced by *enfin*

In the 311 occurrences of *enfin* in its corrective role, *enfin* typically follows a phrase, either a noun phrase or a verb phrase, and is followed by another ‘correcting’ or ‘adjusting’ phrase which may be in the same word class or a
parallel structure or may be a near synonymous paraphrase which is dissimilar in structure. Often *enfin* introduces an insertion into the syntactic structure which continues to left and right of the inserted ‘aside’, which may or may not be characterised by the ‘intonation d’incise’ mentioned by Delomier and Morel (1986). Example 1 is an illustration of this type, where the italicised section displayed classic characteristics of the *incise*.

(1) Beaucoup d’enfants viennent de parents divorcés, *enfin* beaucoup peut-être pas beaucoup mais quelques-uns quand même et souvent on a des problèmes. (15, 56–57) (Lots of children come from divorced parents, *well* lots perhaps not lots but some anyway and often we have problems).

The structure of utterances containing corrective clauses starting with *enfin* may be represented thus:

A1 + *enfin*+A2 (+A3)

A1 represents a piece of discourse which contains X, an item requiring correction. The upcoming correction is flagged by *enfin* and A2 contains the correction. *Enfin* + A2 may be a parenthetical remark inserted into an ongoing discourse (as indicated by the bracket around A3 — the ongoing discourse) or may end the utterance in question. A2 refers back anaphorically to A1 and the relations between A1 and A2 are of considerable linguistic interest, generally involving sense relations which may be reflected, too, in the syntax. Occasionally, the relationship is pragmatic, in other words the relationship between A1 and A2 can be retrieved only by reference to the extra-linguistic context. A1 contains a term — X — which is corrected or modified in A2 in a term which we shall call XM. We shall be returning to Example 1 below when discussing correctives of the echo/self-mimic type. Before we begin our finer investigation of the relationship between the uncorrected and the corrected term and to explore the psycholinguistic (process-driven) or sociolinguistic/pragmatic (politeness-driven) motivations which may lie behind the use of such correctives, it is of interest to point out that Schiffrin’s example of self-repair using *well* in English and quoted above (Schiffrin, 1985, 657) fits the paradigm outlined for correctives with *enfin* in French. A1 = Look at Bob’s parents eh father an’ mo; X = father an mo’; *enfin* +A2 = well I don’t think his father accepted it. XM = his mother.
Sense relations connecting the uncorrected with the corrected term

The large numbers of examples of correctives in the corpus reveal a remarkable homogeneity in terms of the relationship between \( X \) and \( XM \). They involve specifying (precision or restriction), generalising and providing a synonym or near-synonym. They fall into six main sub-groups as indicated below.

After *Oui*, *Non* or *Si*

The categorical *Oui*, *Non* and *Si* were often to be found before the corrective, as speakers wish to hedge their initially over-strong assertion. This is illustrated in examples 2–6:

(2) A: Vous êtes breton?
   B: Oui. [rires] Enfin, je suis né à Rennes, quoi. (3, 21–23)
   (A: Are you breton?
   B: Yes. (laughter) Well, I was born in Rennes anyway).

(3) A: Et si j’achète les cassettes par exemple des films en France est-ce que je peux l’utiliser normalement en Angleterre ?
   B: Ah oui, oui, pas de problème. Mm. Enfin, il faut un magnétoscope acheté en France. (11, 48–51)
   (A: And if I buy cassettes for example of films in France, can I use it in the normal way in England?
   B: Ah yes, yes, no problem. Mm. Well, you need a video recorder bought in France).

(4) A: Alors vous êtes c’est c’est un passetemps plutôt l’accordéon?
   B: Oui, c’est enfin bon l’accordéon disons que c’est modestement le principal mais bon je pratique aussi le piano et l’orgue. (25, 15–18)
   (A: So you’re it’s more of a hobby the accordion?
   B: Yes, it’s well it’s like this shall we say the accordion is a bit more of a main instrument but I also play the piano and the organ).

(5) A: Vous louez des combinaisons?
   B: Oui. Enfin, les combines sont fournies avec [pause] avec la planche dans le même prix pour le même prix. (44, 34–37)
   (A: Do you hire wet-suits?
   B: Yes. Well, the wet-suits are provided with [pause] with the wind-surfer in the same price for the same price).

(6) B: On s’en est rendu compte rapidement, on a arrêté tout de suite l’utilisation de cette centrale.
A: Oui, enfin, c’est ce qu’ils disent aux informations, n’empêche que je pense que le sodium a eu le temps aussi de euh de partir par par les eaux et puis de nous polluer un peu plus de nos rivières. (86, 23–27)

(B: They realised quickly, they immediately stopped using that power station.

A: Yes, well, that’s what they say on the news, but nonetheless I think the sodium had time too to er to escape through through the water and then to pollute our rivers a bit more).

In such cases, the ‘correction’ offered after Oui, Non or Si is a correction to a proposition rather than a single vocabulary item which is adjusted or modified. Generally, too, such corrections are not self-corrections, they are corrections of the proposition made by the interlocutor whose question is answered by Oui, Non or Si. As such, these corrective enfin phrases are atypical of the corpus as a whole. It is of interest that, in many cases it is an implicature in what H has said which is picked up and corrected by S. In example 2, the S questions what is meant by ‘being Breton’ (a concept taken for granted by H) by saying that he was ‘Breton in so far as he had been born in Rennes’ with accompanying laughter, which seems to underline the point that S was taking something for granted. In 3, the S picks up a possibly mistaken implicature in H’s question, that one can use a British VCR to play back French videos. In 5, H has assumed that wet-suits are rented separately, a misconception corrected by S. In 6, S corrects H’s misconception that the nuclear power station was shut down by suggesting that that is what we hear on the news (but it is not necessarily the whole truth). Whilst correction of misconceptions residing as implicatures in H’s speech does not account for all of the uses of enfin clauses in this subcategory, examples of it are sufficiently numerous to lead us to believe that it is a major motivation for correctives of this type. Enfin in such circumstances thus serves as a gentle introducer to an objection raised by H to S, indeed softens the blow, thus contributing to reducing what might be perceived as a FTA. In other cases, the corrective in more classic manner downtones an over-assertive remark by S in replying baldly ‘yes’ or ‘no’. In some cases, the Ss show a degree of embarrassment concerning their assertion and use the corrective to save face.

Precision

The vast majority of corrections move in the direction of greater precision or appropriacy and may be one word replacements (far the most common) as we
can see in examples 7–14 or a paraphrase version of the first term as we see in examples 15–17. The terms to be made more precise or stylistically appropriate which occur before \textit{enfin} and those which replace them which occur after \textit{enfin} are underlined.

(7) J’ai, j’ai refait une ét enfin une formation agricole [One assumes ét... to be truncated \textit{études}] (8, 109–110)
(I I retook \textit{a cour a cour} I mean an agricultural \textit{training} [One assumes the truncated form here to be ‘a course’])

(8) J’ai un patron qui m’enquiquine tout le temps enfin qui m’ennuie (16, 166–167)
(I have a boss who gets on my wick all the time I mean who gets on my nerves.)

(9) on leur dit pourquoi pas faire les cons enfin excusez-moi aller faire l’imbécile (16, 441)
(people say to them why not arse about I mean sorry go and play the fool)

(10) il buvait, il, vraiment des problèmes avec les flics tout ça, vraiment enfin les gendarmes, et cet homme-là, il s’est immolé (16, 631–632)
(he drank, he, really, problems with the cops all that, really I mean the police and that man, he set fire to himself).

(11) moi, j’ai vu mon gamin venir devant moi pisser, enfin uri..., enfin faire pipi devant moi (16, 869–870)
(me, I’ve seen my kid come and piss, I mean uri..., I mean do a wee in front of my face).

(12) son copain est venu ce midi enfin ce matin enfin en fin de matinée (16, 740–741)
(his mate came at mid-day I mean this morning I mean in the forenoon).

(13) des des infractions enfin des irrégularités considérables (94, 328–329)
(Offences I mean considerable irregularities).

(14) on commence par les les banques tout ça pour savoir si on peut avoir des des prix enfin des taux assez bas pour avoir des des charges moins grosses (37, 16–17)
(you start with the the banks and all that to find out if you can have prices I mean rates which are low enough to have lower lower costs).

(15) on donnait notre paiement enfin ils nous géraient notre salaire (16, 483)
(they gave us our payment I mean they managed our salary).
(16) J’ai été cinq ans et demi la jambe dans le plâtre enfin j’ai passé onze ans dans les hôpitaux. (16, 158–159)
(I had my leg in plaster for five and half years I mean I spent eleven years in hospitals).

(17) c’est pour, si vous voulez dans les quartiers, comme les quartiers surpeuplés comme Villejean enfin, où il y a vraiment des des, des des mutations de personnes très, très denses (16, 372–374)
(it’s to, if you like in the areas, like the overpopulated areas like Villejean I mean where there really are very very dense er er er movements of people).

The motivations for the replacements appear to differ. Some derive from a respect for the perceived respectability of H. The informal terms enquiriquer, cons, flics and pisser are replaced by the standard terms ennuyer, imbécile, gendarme and faire pipi (via uriner). This seems to be a fictive correction, in that the S could have used the more polite term at the outset and yet seems to prefer to use the informal, colloquial French he is accustomed to adopting and then correct it with a wink to H. The social distance between H and S is thus decreased as a secret understanding is created between H and S whereby S ‘lets H in’ on the secret of vulgar terminology but ‘nods’ towards respectability in this way. It is significant that all of these examples were spoken by one subject, a man who had had little education and had, indeed, spent many years in Reform School. Other replacements are linguistically or referentially motivated, the speaker uses enfin to introduce the correct term for the context (e.g. infractions > irrégularités considérables, des prix> des taux). Examples 15–17 illustrate a cline of exactness in paraphrase. The change from On donnait notre païement to ils nous géraient notre salaire (talking of the subject’s period in prison/on parole) represents a considerable shift in emphasis or may simply be a syntactic adjustment on the part of the S to express the situation better. It is a sensitive issue whichever interpretation we take and we might posit that the act of correcting or mitigating in itself may flag a speaker’s psychological difficulties in approaching an issue or expressing himself. On the other hand, examples 16 and 17 appear to be simply reformulations of the same or a similar concept/situation, a mechanism whereby ideas and themes are reworked, thus creating the redundancy which is often noted as being a characteristic component of the spoken language (where phrases are termed ‘redundant’ by virtue of the fact that a similar concept has already been expressed in (near-)synonymous terms or in a paraphrase).
Expressing uncertainty — in one’s personal experience at least

Correctives with *enfin* are often used with *moi, personnellement*, with *je pense (pas), je crois (pas), je trouve, je sais pas* as in examples 18–19. Ss mitigate the forcefulness or imposition which might be created by their assertion by stating that this is only their opinion (others might not agree):

(18) Ah oui, enfin c’est une famille quand même assez, enfin moi je trouve, hein! (16, 246)
(Ah yes, well it’s a family which is all the same quite, well I think so anyway!)

(19) Qui entre nous enfin personnellement est une horreur. (94, 500)
(Which between ourselves well from my personal point of view is a horror).

The particular to the general case

These examples could be classified as enumerative *enfin* (briefly, in short, to sum up) where a list of examples is being ‘summed up’ in a superordinate term on the right. In 20, however, there are only 2 items (Dinard and Rennes) and in 21, the intonation accompanying *sur l’Espagne, sur l’Italie, sur le Portugal* was not of the ‘listing’ variety, and S attempts to generalise his concept in the term to the right of *enfin* in the first instance but has to recorrect before he reaches the end of his definition to recategorise Spain! He is clearly on difficult and sensitive ground and this is reflected, too, in the numerous repetitions and hesitations which lead up to his final ‘les gens qui sont dans la purée quoi’. The use of the informal ‘purée’ and the terminal ‘quoi’ are an attempt on the part of S to downtone the seriousness of his (somewhat racist and outdated) remarks and to distance himself from them. He recognises that such outspoken views will be unacceptable to H and attempts to reduce the imposition his words will create.

(20) Vous allez sur les marchés, par exemple, peut-être pas à Dinard mais, vous allez à Rennes, enfin dans les grandes villes, vous avez que des étrangers qui font les marchés! (16, 1111–1113)
(You go around the markets, for example, perhaps not in Dinard but you go to Rennes, well in the big towns anyway, it’s only foreigners who are running the markets!)
Oui, mais on va se baser, on va, on va se baser sur euh, sur la monnaie, on va se baser sur l’Espagne, sur l’Italie, sur le Portugal, enfin sur des pays qui sont euh considérés comme des pays…, enfin, l’Espagne euh … c’est, c’est les deux extrêmes hein, y a la, y a y a les bourgeois et puis carrément les gens qui sont dans la purée quoi. (16, 1169–1172)
(Yes, but we are going to base it on, we’re going, we’re going to base it on er on the money, we’re going to be based on Spain, on Italy, on Portugal, I mean countries which are considered to be countries…, well, Spain er… it’s it’s the two extremes, isn’t it? there’s the there’s the there’s the bourgeoisie and then frankly the people who are in a right pickle, so to speak).

Restrictive

*Enfin* in these circumstances could have been replaced with ‘at least’. The Ss in all of these examples downsize their claims or show some embarrassment about making over-sweeping generalisations. Clearly, such correctives serve face needs.

(22) beaucoup d’enfants viennent de parents divorcés, enfin beaucoup peut-être pas beaucoup mais quelques-uns quand même et souvent on a des problèmes (15, 56–57)
(Lots of children come from divorced parents, *well* lots perhaps not lots but some anyway and often we have problems).

(23) L’avenir n’est pas tellement rose, je crois pas en enfin pour la région ici, hein. Ailleurs peut-être. Pas ici. (34, 125–126)
(The future’s not so rosy, I don’t think, at least not for this region here, anyway. Elsewhere perhaps. Not here).

(24) Bon, les Etats-Unis, les Anglais sont les amis de la France enfin reconnus comme tels [rire]. (85, 95–96)
(Well, the United States, the English are friends of France, well acknowledged as such anyway [laughter]).

Syntactic repair

Repair mechanisms in the spoken language very often serve to backtrack on a syntactic structure which has proved inappropriate for the context. Interestingly, given the usefulness of such a device, there are few examples of this in the corpus — only 2. Example 25 clearly shows the usefulness of *enfin* in changing
the tense of the verb, whilst 26 might be interpreted as a syntactic repair but also as a complete reformulation or paraphrase of the speaker’s communicative intent.

(25) Oui, oui. … Ah oui, parce que c’était un type euh, enfin c’est toujours un type sensationnel (16, 984–985) (Yes, yes … Ah yes because he was a fantastic er I mean he still is a fantastic bloke).

(26) s’ils échouent ce sera vraiment enfin ils auront largement contribué à faire de ces élections euh une sanction de leur politique, quoi. (94, 20–22) (if they lose it will really I mean they will have greatly contributed to turning these elections into a sanction of their policies, so to speak).

The ‘echo/self-mimic’ corrective

Example 22 (=Ex. 1) above illustrates a particular manifestation of the *enfin* corrective, which I shall dub the ‘echo/self-mimic’ type whereby speakers repeat their own words in fictive disbelief or surprise that they have employed a particular term. They then proceed to correct the inexact term which they have thus highlighted as being descriptively inaccurate or inadequate. There are nine further examples of ‘echo/self-mimic’ in the corpus, illustrated below, in examples 27–35. The echo/self-mimic phrase is accompanied by lowered intonation, with a perceptible pause at the end of the flagged inaccuracy followed by the correction.

In order to capture the rules whereby echo/self-mimic correctives operate, it is useful to develop a notation. The notation below, which is adapted from a method employed by computer programmers, may best be described at 4 levels. Level 1 makes the system of combining words, symbols and punctuation explicit. Level 2 provides the basic paradigm in symbols, words and punctuation. At Level 3, the symbols are displayed on the left with their meaning on the right. At Level 4, symbols introduced at Level 3 are displayed on the left with their definition on the right. In such a way, an elegant and terse manner of presenting the paradigm may be achieved.

Other researchers with spoken corpora may wish to test and refine the paradigm:

\[
A_1 + enfin + A_2 (+A_3)
\]

developed thus far to describe the echo/self-mimic sub-type of *enfin* clause, the notational specifications of which at this stage of our investigations stand as follows:
Level 1
The notation is written using (a) the words *enfin* and *mais* (b) symbols (c) punctuation. Nothing else.
Symbols are strings of upper case letters and numbers, e.g. A1, X, XM
The punctuation is:
+ followed by 
( ) contents of brackets are optional
/ include either of the terms to each side of the slash but not both, and not neither

Level 2
An utterance containing a corrective clause starting with *enfin* takes the general form:
A1+*enfin*A2(+A3)

Level 3
symbol meaning
A1 discourse + X (+E)/(+X)
A2 X + (ME+)(NX mais +)XM
A3 continuing discourse (+E)

Level 4
symbol meaning
X The word or expression which is to be corrected, or part of that expression
ME Modal expression such as ‘peut-être’
N Negating expression such as ‘pas’
XM Modified or toned-down form of X or commentary on X
E An ending to the discourse phrase in A1 (which may be repeated in A3)

In the following examples *enfin* + X (the element to be corrected) are italicised.
Example 27 illustrates the classic echo/self-mimic corrective:

(27) Puis alors après pour trouver du travail tous les étudiants vont à Paris après *enfin tous les étudiants* tous ceux qui peuvent. (1, 884–885)
(So then afterwards to find work all the students go to Paris afterwards *well all the students* all those who can).

A1 (Puis alors après pour trouver du travail tous les étudiants vont à Paris) contains a term X (tous les étudiants) which requires correction. This term is
picked up, ‘echoed’ after enfin in A2 which thus contains X + XM — the corrected phrase tous ceux qui peuvent. XM constitutes a restriction of X tous les étudiants to tous ceux qui peuvent, with the deictic ceux referring back to étudiants. The speaker once more downtones a potentially too-strong assertion and is protecting his face needs.

Example 22 (=ex.1) follows a slightly different pattern. A1 contains a word or expression X (beaucoup) which is repeated after enfin in an echo/self-mimic (enfin beaucoup). This is followed by a corrective expression A2. The corrective expression may optionally be a negation of X (pas beaucoup) which may be modalised (peut-être pas beaucoup). This in its turn may optionally be followed by mais with a toned-down or modified version of X termed here XM (quelques-uns). The relationship between X and XM is a semantic one, here it is numerical (beaucoup >quelques-uns). However, the judgement as to whether 25%, 50% or 75% constitutes a large number of divorced parents or not is subjective. In terms of the politeness principle, the speaker is reducing the forcefulness of his claim and is thus reducing the imposition on his hearers, thus not opening himself to attack/pre-empting potential criticism.

(28) A: C’est vrai? Ça coûte pas cher?
C: Si, ça coûte cher mais le son est beaucoup mieux enfin ça coûte cher, ça coûte plus cher que les cassettes mais le son est beaucoup mieux.
(1, 159-162)

(A: It’s true? It’s not expensive?
C: Yes, it’s expensive but the sound is much better well it’s expensive it’s more expensive than cassettes but the sound is much better).

Here X= ça coûte cher, XM = ça coûte plus cher, the negation of the original term is not made explicit but is implicit in enfin ça coûte cher. The modified first term (XM) is that CDs are not expensive per se but more expensive than cassettes. Once again, there is a semantic relationship between X and XM (cher > plus cher que les cassettes) (i.e. not so expensive as all that). The speaker thus downtones the forcefulness of his remarks but, given that he is only 14 years old, such a remark could be regarded as attempting to impose his own will. Speaker A suggests that CDs are expensive, speaker B agrees but then disagrees, but only marginally, having firstly gone along with ça coûte cher and then qualifying his remark to ça coûte plus cher que les cassettes. Another point of interest is that A3 is a repetition of the second half of A1 — mais le son est beaucoup mieux. It is thus possible to pick up one element from an utterance, correct that element but reproduce A1 with the corrected element XM inserted within it.
(29) Voilà. Il y a beaucoup enfin il y a beaucoup de familles il y a certaines familles françaises qui sont comme ça. (1, 517–519) (There. There are lots well there are lots of families there are certain French families that are like that).

The interest of example 29 lies in the omission of part of the repeated term X in A1. A1 contains beaucoup (no de familles) whilst A2 contains beaucoup de familles. The speaker’s mind has run on and corrected itself before it even finishes A1. The listener can reinterpret beaucoup in A1 as beaucoup de familles because this is what appears in A2. Once again the speaker uses the correction to tone down his assertion (beaucoup de familles > certaines familles) and could thus be said to be hedging and attending to face needs.

(30) S’il veut suivre des des grandes études ou s’il veut prendre des études plus enfin plus calmes plus moins moins grandes et ça dépend ça dépend de tout euh ça dépend beaucoup de (1, 1149–1151) (If he wants to pursue a challenging course of study or if he wants a course which is more well calmer less challenging and that depends, that depends on everything er that depends a lot on.. )

Once again there is an omitted term in A1, the adjective calmes which is modified in A2 to moins grandes. In this instance, études is omitted in X and the only common feature is plus. This is explicable because of the linear, one-bit-at-a-time nature of the spoken language (see Brazil, 1995) and because the adjective follows the noun in French. In example 29, X (beaucoup) has not been omitted in A1, not because X must be made explicit in order to be picked up in A2 and corrected as XM, but because it comes first in the linear progression of spoken French.

Once again, in example 30, there are lexical and semantic links between X (albeit truncated in A1) and XM (plus calmes/ moins grande) and, even more obviously, between terms in A1 and XM (grandes études/ moins grandes) involving antonymy, degrees of seriousness and comparatives. The speaker here is evidently struggling with how to refer in a euphemistic manner to academic courses which are less demanding. The corrective constitutes a series of edits aimed at finding an appropriate phrase. This is ultimately motivated by considerations of face.

(31) Puisque maintenant il faut avoir le bac avec mention puisque maintenant enfin presque tout le monde il y a beaucoup de gens qui ont le bac mais il y en a pas beaucoup avec mention et c’est les gens avec mention qui sont pris dans…(1, 1290–1294)
(Since nowadays you have to have the baccalauréat with distinction as now well almost everyone there are a lot of people who have the bac but not a lot with distinction and it is the people with distinction who are taken on in...)

In example 31, X, the phrase to be corrected is entirely absent from A1! but is recoverable from the start of A2–presque tout le monde. Our initial hypothesis that some vestigial part of X must remain in A1 in order for it to be picked up and corrected in A2 has been undermined. This would seem to further justify the notation (+X) in A1.

The correction is a hedged expression of the original, each having a clear semantic relation with the other (presque tout le monde > il y a beaucoup de gens) and once again the speaker tones down what might seem a too-strong assertion of his case in order to deflect criticism, and attend to face needs.

(32) On pratique enfin on pratique on peut pas pratiquer le sport avec enfin c’est-à-d par exemple le tennis je peux pas faire du spo je peux pas faire du tennis avec mon frère puisque on n’ar on n’est pas du même niveau donc euh peut pas peut pas jouer il faut être deux pour jouer au tennis. Alors, euh c’est dur. (1, 1522–1525)

(We play well we play you can’t play sport with I mean that is to s... for example tennis I can’t play spo I can’t play tennis with my brother as we are we aren’t at the same level so er you can’t you can’t play — it takes two to play tennis. So, it’s hard.)

In this example, the speaker makes a wry comment about playing tennis with his younger brother. The first enfin clause constitutes a classic example of the echo/self-mimic which contains a modalised negative of X (i.e. XM = a modalised negative of X, as in Example 25). A2 is, however, truncated in order to introduce a second corrective, this time, not one of the echo/self-mimic type but one which restricts the subject matter from le sport in general to a more specific example par exemple le tennis, thus downtoning to some extent the remark in that it is restricted to tennis and does not refer to all sport. The use of the corrective to introduce precision or a restriction in scope from X to XM (le sport > le tennis) has been considered in more detail above. The function of the first corrective here is to self-contradict in a somewhat humorous and wry manner.

(33) Euh, bébé d’un an, enfin, moi j’ai vu mon gamin venir devant moi pisser, enfin, uri, enfin, faire pipi devant moi et ben il recevait une fessée, il avait
un an euh, ça je vous dis franchement, il avait une fessée, euh je me faisais engueuler par ma femme après parce que j’avais donné, euh, enfin une fessée façon de parler parce que… (16, 869–872)
(er one year old baby, I mean, me, I’ve seen my kid come and piss, I mean uri… , I mean do a wee in front of my face and well he got a spank, he was one year old er I’m telling you this frankly, he got a spank, er I got told off by my wife afterwards because I had given him er well a spank manner of speaking because…)

In example 33, it is the fourth enfin which is of interest in the context of the echo/self-mimic corrective. Once again X (une fessée) is omitted in A1 but is recoverable from the previous line in the utterance and from the collocation j’avais donné. Here, XM does not constitute a correction but a comment on the appropriateness of the term employed, that it is a façon de parler. The sensitivity of the subject matter (smacking one-year-old babies) is clearly a prime motivator in the adoption of the corrective here, the speaker is deflecting criticism by downplaying the strength of the term ‘fessée’ to talk about the small slap he administered the baby! Once again, a corrective with enfin serves a speaker’s face needs.

(34) Ah ben je lis, tous les enfin tous les journaux, je lis Ouest France. (23, 669)
(Oh well, I read all the well all the newspapers I read Ouest France.

This speaker omits X in A1 and XM (Ouest France) is a hyponym of journaux. Once again, the speaker employs the echo/self-mimic corrective to downtone his too-strong initial assertion.

It is perhaps of interest that all of the examples of the echo/self-mimic type of enfin corrective were uttered by men — with 6 examples from one subject, a 14 year-old boy, who spoke for around 30 minutes on a number of different topics. The other four examples were drawn from interviews with 4 different men, all over 40. The preponderance of downtoners amongst these correctives is significant — it seems that one of the major functions of such correctives lies in attending to face needs, in other words oiling the wheels of social intercourse. It is natural that a 14 year-old boy should feel the need to take care in asserting his views too strongly, given the distance between himself and the interviewer in age and social standing. The prevalence of enfin in the spoken language might be said, thus, to derive both from the spontaneous, linear, rapid nature of the spoken language where repair mechanisms are at a premium but also because of the role of the spoken language in mediating social interaction.
Conclusions concerning the pragmatic functions of enfin

As Fraser (1999) indicates, discourse markers in general, whether used in spoken or in written discourse, have proved difficult to categorise. Indeed, such expressions have been variously referred to as discourse connectives, pragmatic markers and so on. *Enfin* might be classed as a discourse marker in its textual role in flagging an upcoming correction. In its corrective role (though not in its other senses), the corpus investigated indicates that *enfin* shares the syntactic and pragmatic characteristics of English *well* but only when the latter is used for self-repair. In French spoken discourse, *enfin* is functionally primarily a pragmatic particle, used to introduce a corrective or downplaying remark. Occurrences of *enfin* in the corpus have been categorised into five sub-types: those which down-play after *Oui, Non* or *Si*, those which substitute a term to the left of *enfin* with one which is more precise, those which, coupled with *moi, personnellement, je pense (pas), je crois (pas)* etc., hedge by suggesting that this is only the personal view of the speaker, those which go from the particular to the general case, those which provide a restriction on the term to the left of *enfin*, and those which provide syntactic repair. The perlocutionary force of the corrective or hedge is often opaque. Such a particle does double duty: the correction introduced may be triggered by psycholinguistic motivations (to do with speech processing or with identification), by referential or by relational motivations.

The attempt made in the chapter to reveal the structured nature of the echo/self-mimic corrective — a corrective which appears to be primarily a down-player and which is marked by particular syntactic and intonational features — appears to give further substance to Martinie’s (1999) thesis that repair mechanisms are rule-governed. If the written language has been codified and its rules enshrined in descriptive grammars, the spoken language, too, appears to follow particular conventions which are implicitly recognised and reproduced by Ss and Hs. This introduction has attempted to make explicit some of the rules concerning the syntactic and pragmatic properties of the use of *enfin* in spontaneous spoken French. A fruitful terrain for future investigations is the manner in which such particles co-occur, as in the example: *enfin dans la purée quoi* (well in a right pickle, as it were). But now we must turn to its sociolinguistic characteristics.
6.2 The sociolinguistic stratification of *enfin*

Lakoff (1975) claimed that women were disadvantaged by comparison with men because of their hedged and non-assertive manner of speech. Other researchers have suggested that women adopt more standard and correct, or even hypercorrect, forms (a view which has been substantiated in a large number of studies, notably Labov, 1966, for American English and Houdebine, 1983, for hexagonal French). Yet others (e.g. Holmes, 1995) have promoted the idea that, although women appear to adopt more polite and hedged manners of speech, this should be interpreted in a positive and not a negative light. When it is used in its corrective sense *enfin* might be said to contribute to the attenuating strategies available to French speakers, it might be used to repair, add referential detail or to downtone an over-strong assertion. Do women use *enfin* more than men in this way? And if so, could its user then be considered to be adopting speech practices which were more polite than those of their male counterparts? These are the questions which will be addressed in the following section.

The number of occurrences of *enfin* and the category of each were noted. An extra category was added to the nine described above — that of hesitation. This was defined on both a formal and a pragmatic basis. Where a speaker stumbled, repeated words and seemed to be searching for words and also where none of the other categories were appropriate, the usage was categorised as “hesitation”. The data were submitted to quantitative analysis. As the men and women produced a comparable number of words, the raw numbers were first compared. In order to establish a realistic tally of the rate of occurrence for the different education and age-groups in the population, as the interviews last between 2 and 50 minutes each, the figures were divided by the word count and multiplied by 10,000 in order to have manageable figures.

One subject was removed from the analysis. It was decided that M. L. (interview 16) might well unbalance our results as his speech manifests an extremely high rate of occurrence of *enfin*. M. L. is an excellent representative of the “one-of-the-lads” stereotype described by Labov and by Trudgill to explain the systematic phonological differences between Anglophone men and women. It seems that in order to integrate socially, men adopt language which is colourful or in an informal register. In 50 minutes of speech (8,912 words), the subject of interview 16 uses *enfin* 127 times and very often he uses it to correct expressions which he apparently adopts habitually in order to establish his identity but which he feels obliged to adjust out of respect for the interviewer. He uses *enfin* in corrective phrases to substitute the words *travail* for...
boulot, gendarme for flic, imbécile for con. Several times he draws attention to the fact that “people would learn bad French with him.” He is aware that the register of language is inappropriate but he does not succeed in eliminating it (as his language forms an integral part of the projection of his identity). As a consequence, he has recourse to a large number of corrective expressions. On the other hand, this subject employs a hedged fashion of presenting opinions which are likely to displease his interviewer, as we see in example (36):

(36) … il y a une saturation euh … d’étrangers en France, enfin excusez-moi euh .. je parle des gens qui y vivent, hein ! Euh, des Arabes, enfin, moi je dirais faut pas dire qu’on est raciste parce que je connais des Arabes, des trucs comme ça qui sont très gentils, mais euh … quand vous, vous allez euh pour chercher un appartement des choses comme ça ils sont prioritaires sur les Français, ils sont, enfin tous les étrangers, ils ont priorité sur les Français, hein. (16, 1027–1033)

(there are far too many euh… foreigners in France I mean sorry er.. I’m can’t say I’m racist because I’ve known Arabs, stuff like that, who are very nice but er… when you, you go er to look for a flat things like that they take precedence over French people, you know?)

The speaker finds himself on shaky ground. He claims that there are too many foreigners in France, realises that the person he is addressing is foreign and backtracks in order to specify that it is long-term resident foreigners to whom he is referring! His repair strategy, which unleashes a proliferation of hedging expressions, aims to make his opinions more acceptable.

The subject of interview 16 thus projects a working-class male identity through his use of colloquial and non-standard expressions which he corrects for the interviewer whom he thus explicitly recognises both as a woman and as being from a certain social class which would tend to use a more standard register and to have less provocative or right-wing views. This speaker pays attention to his own face needs and to those of his interlocutor — the threat to his face derives from the difference in social milieu as it is perceived by the interviewee. If this subject is excluded from the data, the distributional frequency of enfin is strikingly similar in men and women as we can see from Table 6.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.1 Raw number of instances of enfin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men: 141 (out of 69.343 words = 0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women: 164 (out of 81.090 words = 0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: 305</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.2 Raw number of instances of *enfin* in men and in women by category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>7a</th>
<th>7b</th>
<th>7c</th>
<th>7d</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we can see from Table 6.2., the instances of *enfin* employed in its canonical or primary sense (meaning ‘finally’ or ‘lastly’) are very few in the corpus. There are no instances of senses 2, 5, 6 and 9 (indicating relief, objection, impatience or perplexity). This is no doubt attributable to the fact that the corpus comprised interviews and not naturally-occurring spontaneous conversations between family members and friends. It would be of interest to investigate such uses in more intimate domestic contexts. The vast majority of instances of *enfin* were used to introduce correctives with attenuators coming top of the list — 38% of total usage. Correctives which introduce a more precise definition follow at 32%. Hesitations account for 6.7% of the usage and instances in the other categories are very few in number. These results indicate that, in the spoken language at least, *enfin* is used primarily to introduce correctives — 70% of the total are employed in this way and, interestingly, the majority of these correctives — 54% of the total — are employed as hedges, downplaying the force of an utterance, a percentage which may be compared with the lower percentage — 46% — used to clarify or make an expression more specific on a referential level. One might deduce that, in the spoken language, questions of face are of equal or of greater importance than referential precision in a speaker’s repair behaviour. The difficulties which speakers faced in finding appropriate words and expressions are reflected in the number of hesitations which are flagged by *enfin* (6.7%) but the rate is a great deal lower than that of the mitigating expressions.

Although, if we exclude M. L. from our data, the women use *enfin* to a similar extent numerically as the men, they employ them very differently from a pragmatic and semantic point of view. As we can see from Table 6.3, the distribution is very different from that of the men.

Table 6.3 Percentage usage of *enfin* by category of use

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>7a</th>
<th>7b</th>
<th>7c</th>
<th>7d</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.87</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41.13</td>
<td>38.29</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>11.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>34.75</td>
<td>25.61</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
25% of the women’s uses of *enfin* are aimed at rhetorical discourse development in their canonical sense of ‘finally’ or ‘to sum up’ (as opposed to 10% for the men). 5% of the occurrences for women are used in expressing resignation (0% for the men) and the percentages used for correction, either for hedging (34% for the women; 41% for the men) or for referential precision (26% for women; 38% for men) are higher for men than for women. The hypotheses often put forward concerning the hesitant nature of female speech do not seem to be borne out in the use of *enfin* as a correction-marker. If women adopted more hesitant modes of expression, we would expect them to produce an equal or larger number of corrective expressions as the men. It may be that women adopt other strategies of expressing hesitation: this point merits investigation.

The results appear to indicate that *enfin* usage is gender-asymmetrical. The men used *enfin* to repair a situation in which they have not succeeded in expressing themselves adequately in the first “draft” and are seeking to “edit” what they have said (as we can see from the large number of hesitations and corrections) whilst the women, who have perhaps a greater mastery of the language, have less need to use *enfin* to make up for difficulties of expression (the use of category 10 ‘hesitation’ is less, this also being true for correctives). They use *enfin* to a much greater extent than men in a discursive fashion in narration in its primary sense of ‘finally’ or ‘to sum up’. This could be explained by reference to women’s alleged ‘linguistic insecurity’ whereby they are said to employ fewer swear words and non-standard expressions. It may be that *enfin* is associated (as is *quoi*, and to a lesser extent, *hein*) with an uneducated and stigmatised (working class) form of speech which women would tend to avoid more than would a man. That women should be resigned to their fate is a highly traditional notion and it is interesting to see which women employ *enfin* in this way (subjects of interviews 30, 47, 49, 58, 91 and 92). Subject 30 comments on the fact that a storm was taking place as the interview proceeded but that the storm had arrived too late to counter the effects of long-term drought. She is resigned to the whims of the climate:

(37) *Ah oui en ce moment c’est vraiment la tempête là, c’est un orage quoi. Ça arrive de temps en temps. Depuis le temps qu’il y a pas d’eau mais enfin. C’était un peu tard pour certaines choses, hein?* (30, 159–161)

(Ah yes at the moment it’s a real tempest out there, it’s a storm, you know. That happens from time to time. Since there hasn’t been water but well. It was a bit late for certain things, wasn’t it?)
The subject of interview 47, an 88 year-old woman, is resigned to the fact that the good times are over, the subject of interview 49 resigns herself to summer holidays which she finds unattractive but that her husband enjoys, subject 58 to women’s dual role, whilst subject 91 is resigned to the rise in juvenile delinquency which she considers unavoidable due to the very high unemployment rate (example 38):

(38) Oui, ça, c’est horrible. Enfin. Que voulez-vous? Il y a maintenant telle-ment de chômeurs. Le chômage augmentant, il y a beaucoup plus de dé-linquance. (91, 306–307)
(Yes, that, that’s horrible. But well. What do you expect? There are so many unemployed people these days. With unemployment going up, there’s more delinquency).

This subject seems to project the responsibility for unemployment on to others — the (male) politicians whose opinions she does not share but over whom she has no control.

The subject of interview 92, another 88 year-old, also regrets the passing of the good old times and uses enfin twice to express her resignation. The small number of occurrences of enfin used to express resignation in the corpus does not allow us to arrive at any firm conclusions. It would however appear from the examples given that there are social and demographic factors which motivate a higher rate of expression of resignation amongst women. First of all, there are more elderly women than men in the population at large and our corpus reflects this tendency: in other words; it is probable that resignation is an attitude which is prevalent amongst elderly people. Judging from the examples from younger women, women have a tendency to give precedence to the needs of their husbands and children over their own, hence a resigned attitude to their lot. These two factors find their expression in the use of enfin (resignation) in the corpus. One might argue that the language, if studied with care, does indeed reflect the structures and norms of society by incorporating in its lexis, its structures and its particles, the reflexes and identifications of its uses. As they often lack power vis-à-vis their situation (biological, within the family or in politics), women express their resignation.

Tables 6.4–6.6 demonstrate that differences in rates of usage of enfin, whether their total usage or 7a and 7b (corrective) usage, are in general as marked by age and education level as by the sex of the interlocutor. The youngest speakers (up to 20 years old) use enfin a great deal less than the others — the older one is and the higher the level of education, the greater tendency
there is to use *enfin*. Table 6.5 indicates that for the sub-category 7a, the same tendencies prevail with a tendency to favour hedging usages amongst those with a high level of education. These tendencies are less marked for sub-category 7b (Table 6.6) where sex plays a more determinant role than level of education and in which the young have a very low level of usage.

**Table 6.4** Average number of occurrences of *enfin* broken down according to the variables sex, age and education level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex 1 (M)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex 2 (F)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ. 1</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ.2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ. 3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6.5** Average number of occurrences of *enfin 7a* (hedging) broken down according to the variables sex, age and education level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 3</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ. 1</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ.2</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6.6** Average number of occurrences of *enfin 7b* (referential correction) broken down according to the variables sex, age and education level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>45</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 2</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 3</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ. 1</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ.2</td>
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<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.3 Summary and conclusions concerning enfin

Whilst ANOVA tests do not provide statistically significant results overall for sex, education or age in relation to *enfin*, there are indications that there are gender-asymmetrical differences in usage, men employing *enfin* to a greater extent to introduce explanatory ramification, whilst women use *enfin* to a greater extent in its canonical sense of ‘Finally’. That *enfin* 7b (referential correction) should be more frequent in male speech will not surprise adherents of Tannen’s (e.g. 1990) theories. Tannen, following Maltz and Borker (1982), makes the distinction between Report and Rapport as defining characteristics of male and female approaches to the purpose of conversation. These researchers posit that there is a difference of culture, men’s aim in conversation being to exchange information whilst women consider it as a means of establishing solidarity or of creating rapport with their interlocutor. In addition, the gender-asymmetrical usage of *enfin* in its more canonical function as a discursive marker signalling the end of an enumeration or to flag “in short”, “to sum up” or “finally” appears to support the assertions of Chambers (1995). According to Chambers, because of biological differences in brain geography, women are “better” linguists than men. They are better able to structure their discourse in a coherent fashion and to pay attention to the hypotactic structure at a supra-sentential level as well as creating the paratactic or syntagmatic structuring which is characteristic of spontaneous spoken language (Gadet, 1989: 121–125; Brazil, 1995, passim). That women should be competent linguists is not surprising in itself but it might seem paradoxical that linguistic ability should place women in a subordinate role. As we have seen, Lakoff (1975) claimed that women are more hesitant in their speech than men and that they are thus subject to linguistic domination. This study seems to suggest that, far from dominating, the speech of male interlocutors is characterised by successive attempts to refine the expression of their ideas and to render them more precise.

This detailed investigation of the exploitation of *enfin* in a corpus of spoken French seems then to reveal that women are more capable from a linguistic point of view as they are less hesitant and demonstrate greater sophistication in discursive structuring than their male counterparts. In addition, the expressions which are often referred to as hesitant, non-assertive or hedging expressions are not only also used by the men but are those favoured by sectors of the population with a high level of education (and, in consequence, a higher status?). The men in our corpus (in the context, let us not forget, of interviews
with a non-native female interviewer) might thus be said to be just as polite as
the women. Even if the question of hedging and downplaying expressions has
not been finally resolved in the linguistic literature, a number of studies
(Preisler, 1986 for English; Wouk, 1999, for Indonesian) seem to suggest that
hedging strategies derive from a desire not to exaggerate or not to impose an
opinion too strongly, and that male speech cannot be distinguished from
female speech in this respect. The results of our study of the pragmatic func-
tion of the particle *enfin* in French support Preisler’s (1986) assertion that
linguistic asymmetry exists only in the roles adopted by interlocutors, Erman’s
(1992) findings concerning men’s greater recourse to particles in the media-
tion of repair and also the conclusions drawn by Wouk (1999) for whom
politeness (as expressed in hedging) is not restricted to women. In our next
chapter, we shall consider the role of *hein* in these respects.

Notes

1. Fuller versions of sections of this chapter have been published as “La fonction de la
particule pragmatique *enfin* dans le discours des hommes et des femmes.” and “Repair
strategies and social interaction in spontaneous spoken French : the pragmatic particle
*enfin*” in Beeching (2001a) and Beeching (2001b) respectively.

2. I should like to acknowledge my indebtedness to Mark Jarvis for his invaluable help in
the development of the Notation System for the echo/self-mimic corrective with *enfin*.

3. The categories are as follows: 1 finally; 2 relief; 3 to sum up; 4 resignation; 5 objection; 6
impatience; 7 corrections — 7a hedges; 7b precision/restriction; 7c paraphrase; 7d denying
the implicature of interlocutor’s utterance; 8 all things considered; 9 perplexity; 10 hesita-
tion.
Chapter 7

Hein

7.0 Introduction

One of the features of women’s language which has been the subject of much research since Robin Lakoff’s pronouncements upon it in 1975 is the tag question. It might be argued that the pragmatic particle hein in French fulfils functions similar to those of the tag question in English and, as such, may be used to test the universality of tendencies charted for English. Once again, this chapter will test the hypothesis that tentativeness or politeness is a feature of female speech and that this may be reflected in the distributional frequency of pragmatic particles, in this case the differential usage of hein. The research questions to be addressed are: Is hein usage gender-asymmetrical? And if so, do women use hein in a way which is more polite than men? This leads us to two problems, one is in interpreting the function of hein in each of its occurrences, the second is defining what we mean by “polite”. Traditionally hein has been considered to be a stigmatised form, used only in informal contexts. As Doppagne points out (1966):

Les dictionnaires sont unanimes: hein est une interjection à proscrire dès que l’on sort du domaine de la familiarité... hein n’est tolérable que dans le parler familier. (Dictionaries are unanimous: hein is an interjection to be proscribed as soon as one departs from the domain of familiarity... hein is only tolerable in colloquial speech).

Traditionally, hein was to be avoided when in polite company, a proscription enshrined in the parental stricture: “Don’t say hein, say pardon”. An avoidance of a stigmatised form in this way might be termed hypercorrect. However, the employment of hein might be considered polite in the sense that hein can hedge or make speech more tentative. Hein is thus an item which may be used to achieve sociability or politeness in its broader sense as described in Chapter 1. In 7.1 we shall consider the pragmatic, semantic and syntactic properties of hein as revealed in previous studies and as illustrated in our corpus. In 7.2, we shall consider the social stratification of hein. The analytical framework adopted is once again rooted in the ethnomethodological principles of Garfinkel and
Turner, with an eye to Brown and Levinson’s (1987) politeness theory. This is coupled with an approach similar to that of Holmes (1995) in combining a qualititative with a quantitative approach. With particular reference to *hein*, it is interesting to consider, too, any evidence which might support Labov’s two principles relating the intersection between sex and social class with linguistic change. Labov (1990) posits two principles as follows:

Principle 1: In stable sociolinguistic stratification, men use a higher frequency of nonstandard forms than women.
Principle 2: In the majority of linguistic changes, women use a higher frequency of incoming forms than men.

### 7.1 Hein—pragmatic, semantic and syntactic characteristics

In the introduction to this chapter, it was suggested that *hein* may be compared to tag questions. *Hein* differs from tag questions in being formally invariable. It thus does not change in polarisation in the way that tag questions may. It also differs from tag questions in that it is always pronounced with rising intonation. However, like tag questions, it is generally used in utterance-final position and appears to share the pragmatic functions of hedging and facilitating tags. We shall not pursue a detailed comparison of the differential usages of *hein* in French and tag questions in English. The similarities between the two are witnessed in bilingual dictionary definitions of *hein*, where tag questions are used to translate *hein* in the exemplification given.

Previous studies of *hein* have made differing pronouncements on the variation of *hein*. Delomier (1999) considers that *hein* is idiolectal, appearing more often in the speech of some speakers than in that of others. Vincent (1993) shows that social origins may enter into it. Güllich (1970) defines both *hein* and *quoi* as markers of closure, Maury (1973) considers the form and function of *hein* in Ontario, Luzzati (1985) calls them phatic, Andrews (1989) utterance terminators and Morel and Danon-Boileau (1998) rheme punctors.

Many previous studies tended to focus, thus, on the discourse-marking qualities of *hein*, pronouncing its function to be primarily that of “terminator”. Andrews (1989), Vincent (1993), Delomier (1999) and Léglise (1999) are the first studies to suggest an interaction marking function and it is this pragmatic aspect of *hein* which appears to be the most fruitful approach to the analysis of *hein* in the context of spontaneous spoken contemporary French.
Andrews (1989: 203) describes *hein* as “an interaction marker used by the speaker to signal to the listener that he is aware of his presence and that he seeks to provoke some reaction from him.” Such a desire to engage in a relationship with the interlocutor can manifest itself in different types of utterances; orders, questions and statements so that its function differs according to the type of utterance in which it occurs. Moreover, Andrews explains, the exact value expressed by *hein* will vary according to the context and the intention of the speaker. When added to orders, *hein* has a reinforcing effect so that the order is perceived as being more insistent. In questions *hein* indicates that the speaker is seeking the agreement or approval of the listener. *Hein* adds a slight note of hesitation which suggests that the speaker is perhaps not completely certain of the listener’s reaction. In other cases, Andrews goes on, *hein* serves to reinforce the affective content of a question or statement and (1989: 204) “introduces into the statement a provocative note because in a sense the speaker is challenging the listener to interrupt what he is saying by contradicting him or by reacting in some way.” Andrews highlights the implication intonation of emotive statement and that *hein* adds to the end of the utterance “a note of challenge which is lacking in the first part since the tone is rather hesitation. It is as if the speaker finally makes up his mind to say something provocative and is challenging the listener to accept his assertion.”

Other researchers refer to the use of *hein* as a “sorlicitation d’approbation” (a request for approval), (Vincent 1993) or a “deman de d’assentiment”, (a request for assent/consent — or approval) (Darot and Lèbre-Peytard). Such a request, though interrogative in intonation, does not require a response from the interlocutor. But such a request for approval or assent may be very different in kind, ranging from a covert or not-so-covert order:

\[
\text{on se réunira } hein
\]  
(we’ll meet up, shall we?)

to a hedge which diminishes the force of a potentially over-strong assertion:

\[
\text{et puis il est vachement sympa, ce mec-là, } hein \text{ tu verras heuh il est formidable.}
\]  
(and then he is really nice, that bloke, you know? you’ll see huh he’s fantastic).

Fernandez (1994), studying didactic discourse, proposes that *hein* functions as an end-marker of a section which has been emphasised:
Simulation réciproque ça veut dire/ simulation dynamique/ *hein*/ où/ les progrès intervenus *hein* intervenant/à l’un des deux pôles/mis en tension/ *hein*/sont immédiatement/ *hein*/ euh… récupérés/ *hein*/ simulés par l’autre pôle.

(Reciprocal simulation that means/ dynamic simulation/you see/where the advances made you see being made/at one of the two poles/placed under tension/yes? are immediately/OK? er… picked up/you see/simulated by the other pole).


Dans la partie technique du discours, le rythme souligne une démarche ouvertement didactique qui consiste à détacher ("mâcher") les mots pour rendre cognitivement accessibles les étapes successives de la procédure.

(In the technical part of the presentation, the rhythm accentuates an overtly didactic presentation which consists of highlighting ("chewing over") words to make the successive stages of the process accessible from a cognitive point of view).

Léglise (1999: 337) proposes, instead of such heterogeneous and incomplete categories, a finer description based on semantic values. This presupposes a rejection of the thesis that *hein* is desemanticised. In her study of the speech of the Patrouille Maritime, Léglise distinguishes 16 main uses of *hein*, based on its position in the utterance, its level of intonation and the co-text.

On its own, *hein* may constitute various requests: for repetition, to continue an intervention, for attention and for compliance. In initial position in the utterance, *hein* may constitute a way of repeating what the previous speaker has said, a request for support. In final position, it may constitute a request for authorisation, an injunction in the form of a verification, a reminder of something already said, a verification that an order has been heard or a request for confirmation. When *hein* is on its own but follows an utterance it constitutes an injunction to reply, a punctor — a consensual indicator. This might be interpreted as a request to take a new fact into account, an insistence on shared knowledge or a reminder of a contradictory piece of knowledge or an insistence on a fact which should have been known. Léglise attempts to find a unifying principle for all of these uses of *hein* whose function, she says, can only be interpreted in the context of their co-text. She arrives at the following definition:

Etant donné un dire P, *hein* fait accéder P au statut d’enjeu intersubjectif entre S₀ et S₀¹

(Given an utterance P, *hein* suggests that P may involve intersubjectivity between S₀ and S₀¹).

(S₀ = Speaker 1; S₀¹ = Speaker 2)
This appears to argue for the inclusion of *hein* in the ranks of the range of hedging devices which, according to Brown and Levinson’s (1987) politeness theory, enable speakers to protect their own or their interlocutor’s face needs. Léglise indeed goes so far as to suggest the hedging and face-saving force of *hein* when she says (1999: 395):

Le locuteur laisse à son interlocuteur le soin de décider, lui reconnaissant par là la possibilité de le faire et la possibilité que sa position soit remise en cause. Il se désengage par là même de son assertion.

(Speakers leave it up to their interlocutor to decide, recognising in doing this the possibility of doing it and the possibility that their position might be questioned. They distance themselves by this very act from their assertion).

This echoes Barnes’ (1995: 821) words concerning the use of *bon*, *ben* and *enfin*, which are used when the discourse “stakes a claim too strongly”.

Caffi (1999: 882) claims that mitigating expressions are used in a number of situations in “smoothing interactional management” and “reducing risks for participants at various levels. e.g. risks of self-contradiction, refusal, losing face, conflict and so forth”. Such an interpretation involving shielding oneself from possible criticism seems to me to be a satisfying unifying principle which builds on the definition proposed by Léglise and which englobes such concepts as requests for approval and as an accompaniment to acts which might be considered to threaten one’s interlocutor’s face, such as orders, or to constitute impositions, such as exaggerated claims, contradictions, expressions of self-pity, complaints or self-congratulatory remarks. Indeed, all of the latter types of potentially face-threatening acts were to be found in my corpus. We may thus refine Léglise’s definition so as to include a reference to the literature on politeness and hedging in the following way:

Given a proposition P, *hein* serves to hedge P in order to protect S0 or S0ʰ’s face.

This, then, is a far cry from a purely discourse-marking function. *Hein* serves as an utterance terminator but its primary function is pragmatic, interactional and politeness-oriented. For this reason, it will be interesting to investigate its role in the speech of men and women. If its role is primarily one of diminishing face-threatening acts, it may serve as a test-case of the relative politeness of men and women. It will be of interest, too, to sub-classify the acts it accompanies, as men may consider different acts to be threatening or an imposition to those selected by women as meriting such hedging or “smoothing”.
Léglise states (1999) that her corpus does not differ from a well-established type of discourse marked by its essentially interactive nature. She concedes that it over-represents a situationally-based discourse in the sense that certain of the frequencies are higher than average. Judging from the examples she gives, the Patmar corpus appears to be marked by a certain type of short instructional interchange which sets it at the opposite end of the spectrum from the narrative or analytical discourse which typifies the corpus used as the basis for this study in which in the longer interviews speakers take the floor for turns which may be over 50 lines long. Such a corpus permits us to investigate further the general applicability of Léglise’s categories and indeed those of previous researchers such as Orr (1965), Darot and Lèbre-Peytard (1983), Andrews (1989), Vincent and Sankoff (1992), Vincent (1993), Fernandez (1994), Morel & Danon-Boileau (1998) and Delomier (1999).

All instances of *hein* in the present corpus were cut and pasted into a file of examples with sufficient surrounding text to facilitate the analysis. Attributing functional labels to examples of *hein* was, as Léglise discovered, and for the reasons described above, no easy task. Whilst the vast majority of examples appeared to be of the “request for approval” type, it was difficult at first to discern why the subject considered the proposition to be requiring such a gloss. In so far as possible, attempts were made to find formal justification for the allocation of *hein* to particular sub-categories. However, slavish adherence to such procedures was eschewed in favour of an interpretation based on co-text and context in the ethnomethodological tradition. At times, various interpretations appeared to apply simultaneously. Consider the following example:

(1) C: Donc., mais sinon, c’est c’est très pollué et quand on arrive à la campagne on est quand même content.
B: C’est pas du tout agréable. Et on dit à la campagne pour aller à l’école il faut prendre le car mais euh moi il faut que je prenne un un bus il faut que je prenne le métro, j’ai une j’ai une demi-heure de trajet, *hein*?
A: Même en même habitant en plein centre de Paris. (1, 925–932)
(C: So… but otherwise, it’s very polluted and when you arrive in the country you’re really happy.
B: It’s not pleasant at all. And they say that in the country to go to school you have to get a bus but er me I have to take a a bus I have to take the underground, I have a I have a half-hour journey, you know?
A: Even though you live right in the centre of Paris.
In a discussion of the relative merits of the town and the countryside the two boys featured in interview 1 argue that living in the countryside is pleasanter and B contradicts one of the criticisms commonly put forward concerning living in the country, namely that you have to take a bus to go to school. He says that even in Paris, he has a half-hour journey to school and ends on hein. This might be glossed as:

a. Can you accept my counter-argument/contradiction (to what some people say)?

b. This may appear surprising but I am honestly not exaggerating — can you accept this?

c. I am feeling sorry for myself — I have a half-hour journey to get to school — (but I don’t want to impose on you by invoking your sympathy)

d. I am making a point emphatically and underlining my point with hein.

In all cases, the boy is making a plea for approval or assent on the part of his interlocutor and is protecting his face needs. The face-threatening act in each case is different. In a) he must cover the risk that the interlocutor may disagree with his analysis, he is contradicting accepted opinion. In b) he could be accused of exaggerating and for that reason must make a plea for agreement; in c), he could be accused of asking for his interlocutors’ sympathy, thus imposing upon them; in d) — using hein to underline an emphatic point, the speaker invokes the listener’s understanding in accepting such emphasis. Cameron et al, in Coates and Cameron (eds.) (1989: 77), suggest not only that forms must be studied in their linguistic and social context in order to devine their communicative function but also that multifunctionality is the unmarked case. How then can we attribute one function to each instance in order to arrive at a numerical or quantitative comparison of the uses made by men and women? Although most acts are multifunctional, a primary function may be discerned and, for the purposes of the present study, it was decided to attempt to isolate the primary function of each of the examples in its social and linguistic context. As a large number of examples of hein in final position mark an emphatic statement, this was felt not to distinguish sufficiently between its functions. This category was thus necessary but insufficient, along with the concept of demande d'assentiment. Almost all statements accompanied by hein in the corpus constituted demandes d'assentiment (in other words were a response to face needs). Within that broader category, a large number were also markers of an emphatic statement. Emphatic statements included what might be considered hyperbolic expressions, surprising facts, contradictions and complaints/
feeling sorry for oneself. Non-emphatic statements included discoursal usages, restrictions, hedges and expressions of epistemic modality and uncertainty, as well as a comment on the aptness of a term selected. We thus arrive at the following set of classifications and sub-classifications:

Table 7.1  *Hein: A taxonomy of communicative functions*

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Emphatic</th>
<th>Non-emphatic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>– hyperbolic expressions</td>
<td>– discoursal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– surprising facts</td>
<td>– restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– contradictions</td>
<td>– hedges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– complaints/play for sympathy</td>
<td>– epistemic modality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– uncertainty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Example (1) falls into the emphatic statement category but could be sub-classified as Surprising Fact, Contradiction or Complaint. Within the discourse argument which is being pursued, the main function may be construed as Surprising Fact or as a Contradiction. As a Contradiction is a sub-set of Surprising Facts, this leaves us with the final knotty problem of whether this is primarily a Contradiction or a Complaint. This is resolved by the interlocutor’s response, which is “even though you live right in the centre of Paris”. This response indicates that the (primary) force of the speaker’s words is the contradiction that what is usually claimed about schools in the countryside is also true of Paris. Had the speaker’s assertion been interpreted primarily as a complaint, the interlocutor might have replied sympathetically, with e.g. “Really? you have a half-hour journey to school?” or similar facilitative remark aimed at encouraging the speaker to relieve his feelings on this point. In this example, we have an explicit way of justifying the interpretation of the phrase preceding *hein* as a contradiction. We do not always have an overt manifestation of the primary force of the utterance. Indeed, the interlocutor could quite easily have returned to the topic at a later point in the conversation and taken up the secondary illocutionary force of the utterance as a “complaint”. This highlights the question of the possibility of the formal identification of the communicative function of an utterance. Many of the examples of “Complaints” in the corpus might be said to be marked through their use of verbs of obligation, such as “Il faut…” (“It is necessary…”/ “You have to…”). Yet we cannot blindly allocate all examples containing ‘Il faut’ to the Complaints category because, as we have
seen in the current example, the complaint forms part of a larger argument, that of Contradiction, the complaint being an illustration of the contradictory position taken by the speaker, that long-distance travel is far from being restricted to schools in the countryside. Whilst the formal characteristics of communicative acts can be illuminating and aid decisions regarding their categorisation, they are far from being fail-safe indicators.

By far the largest category of statements terminated by *hein* were of the discoursal variety. By this, we mean that they mediated an on-going discourse and might be glossed: “Do you follow what I am saying so far?” At first blush, they appear to bear similarities to Fernandez’ description of the didactic usage of *hein* and it is interesting that Fernandez refers to these as markers of the end-point of a section which has been emphasised. We can argue either for the inclusion of Fernandez’ examples within our framework as “non-emphatic” and discoursal or, in our own analysis, shift discoursal into the emphatic category. It seems that there are degrees of emphasis and it may be that didactic discourse is characterised by less emotion than the genre of conversational speech studied in the present corpus. Hence, these examples, marked by *hein*, fall into an emphatic mode of speech relative to the rest of the didactic discourse whereas similar examples in conversational speech are relatively non-emphatic. It seems, however, that the instances of *hein* in Fernandez’ example might be reinterpreted or interpreted additionally as discoursal in that each might be replaced by “Do you follow (what I am saying so far)?” with no loss of coherence, as we demonstrate below:

(Reciprocal simulation that means/ dynamic simulation/Do you follow?/ where the advances made Do you follow? being made/at one of the two poles/placed under tension/Do you follow? are immediately/Do you follow? er… picked up/Do you follow?/simulated by the other pole).

The last example might be interpreted in our schema as a “term”-based *hein*, *récupérés* being updated by the term *simulés par l’autre pôle*. We will return to a discussion of “term-based” *hein* further down.

Typical examples of Discoursal *hein* often include, to the right of *hein*, a further elaboration of the term on the left, as if speakers are ensuring that the interlocutor is following what they are saying by providing a (possibly) redundant paraphrase. Such a usage is illustrated in example 2, where the subject of discussion is the best age to start wind-surfing:
(2) Plus qu’on commence jeune, ça vaut pour eux, hein? S’ils en font un petit peu tous les ans à partir de dix ans, de neuf, dix ans, bon ben ils arrivent à quatorze, quinze ils se débrouillent aussi très bien, quoi. (44, 66–68)
(The younger they start the better it is for them, yeah? If they do a little bit every year from about the age of ten, nine, ten, but well if they start at fourteen or fifteen they kind of manage really well, too).

The speaker exemplifies what he means by “young” in the utterance following hein — they should start about nine or ten. However, he then goes on to nuance his remark, saying those who start at 14 or fifteen manage pretty well, too. Illustrations, paraphrasing and reformulation are a familiar feature of spontaneous spoken text. As such redundancy is a very common characteristic — one might even say distinguishing feature — of the spoken language, this cannot be taken as a criterion for the definition of Discoursal hein but it distinguishes it from Hyperbolic hein where hein is followed by a dramatic pause, a higher rise in intonation and there is rarely fuller elaboration in the following utterance.

In using Discoursal hein, a speaker will either provide an elaboration of utterance A in utterance B or there is exemplification of utterance A in utterance B, as in example 3:

(3) il y a trois ans de ça, j’avais essayé la médecine courante, hein, je suis resté au lit au bout de trois mois là, des anti-inflammatoires, des différentes sortes de médicaments que j’ai avalées par à peu près tous les orifices naturels. (57, 24–26)
(three years previously, I had tried ordinary medicine, yeah? I stayed in bed for three months, anti-inflammatories, different sorts of medicines which I swallowed through all the natural orifices).

The clause beginning je suis resté au lit constitutes an illustration or exemplification of what trying traditional medicine is all about.

Discoursal hein may also “connect” larger units of discourse, as in example 4:

(4) Maman a toujours, était toujours, elle était très contente parce que ça lui permettait aussi, on pensait aussi, ça va lui permettre aussi d’avoir un petit peu plus de un peu un peu de pour pouvoir lire un petit peu plus dans la journée, hein. Alors autrement Maman, elle préparait tous les repas et en plus on… nous avions des ouvriers à la maison parce que Papa avait deux ouvriers alors il fallait que maman prépare les en plus de
toute sa petite famille, on était neuf à table tous les jours, il fallait préparer pour deux autres personnes… (89, 60–65)
(Mum always, was always, she was very happy because it meant that she could, we thought too, that will allow her to have a little more a little a little to be able to read a bit more in the day, you see. But otherwise Mum, she prepared all the meals and in addition we… we had workers in the house because Dad had two workers so Mum had to prepare the as well as for all her little family, we were nine at table every day, she had to make meals for two other people).

There is no exemplification or elaboration of utterance A in utterance B but the subject remains the same and one might argue that hein serves as a connector in constructing the discourse and ensuring that the interlocutor’s attention is held. The term “discoursal” is thus selected for those situations where hein is inserted in sections of text which are larger than one utterance and which may be glossed “Do you follow me so far?” A formulation for such situations might be:

We may define hein as discoursal when it occurs in a communicative situation where the message takes the linguistic form A + hein + B, in which a proposition A is linked to a proposition B by sharing its topic-matter, or in which B elaborates, illustrates or exemplifies A.

Such a formulation, however, cannot pass muster because natural conversation may be considered to “cohere” by extra-linguistic or paralinguistic means if not linguistic ones without the necessity for the presence of hein (or any other connector or punctor). For this reason, it could be argued that many examples of hein which have been categorised as Hyperbolic or Surprise Facts may be followed by utterances which cohere with it and could equally well be classified as discoursal.

Let us take an example of Hyperbolic hein.

(5) Et moi j’étais handicapé enfin, même sur sur le plan psychique dans la mesure où je me disais: je peux pas me mettre en maillot de bain, je peux pas me mettre en short, parce que j’ai une jambe qui est plus petite que l’autre, qui est plus, enfin ça tient surtout moi c’est la hanche, quoi. Et euh, maintenant je me balade en short et puis je, je m’en fiche complètement ce que ces gens pensent, hein1. Je crois que là, je crois qu’il faut être comme ça, hein2, hein3 ? (16, 172–177)
(And me I was handicapped I mean, even from the from the on a psychic level in so far as I would say to myself: I can’t put on a swim-suit, I can’t wear shorts, because I’ve got one leg which is smaller than the other,
which is more, well it’s OK with me it’s more sort of the hip. And er now
I wander round in shorts and I I don’t give a damn about what people
think, you know. I think that in this, I think you have to be like that,
don’t you, you know?

In example (5), the first example of *hein* has been classified as hyperbolic
because of the extravagant nature of the expression *je m’en fiche complètement*. The speaker appears to be defying the listener to disagree with him and could
be accused of overstating his case. However, without such hyperbolic vocabu-
lary, *hein* could be classified, by our earlier definition, as discoursal since the là
in *Je crois que là* is an example of deictic cohesion, pointing back anaphorically
to the preceding text, not simply the preceding proposition but the whole of
the conceptual field presented up to that point. *Hein*, from a formal point of
view, could in that case be interpreted as discoursal and as being possible to be
glossed as “Do you follow me so far?” not as (approximately) “If you see what I
mean?/Do you take my point?/I challenge you to disagree”. Evidently, once
again, our interpretation is posited on an amalgam of pragmatic and semantic
considerations, not formal ones. A definition of discoursal must exclude ex-
amples such as *hein* in 5). As we have said, the “connective” definition does
not discriminate adequately between discourse and hyperbolic uses, as speech
normally has coherence and cohesion without requiring explicit linguistic
markers of such coherence and cohesion. It is only through our knowledge of
societal and linguistic norms that we perceive *je m’en fiche complètement* as
constituting a hyperbolic and potentially over-emphatic remark, requiring a
request for approval or assent (rather than being discoursal, a request for the
listener to continue listening). Our definition of discoursal must be adjusted to
include such a consideration. A working version might be formulated as
follows:

> We may define *hein* as discoursal when it occurs in a communicative
situation where the message is non-emphatic, factual and does not
constitute a face-threatening act. The message takes the linguistic form A
+ *hein* + B, in which a proposition A is linked to a proposition B by
sharing its subject-matter, or in which B elaborates, illustrates or exem-
plifies A.

Fernandez’ example of didactic text, as we have noted above, fits such a “non-
emphatic” description a great deal better than a face-threatening one, despite
the fact that Fernandez describes the statements accompanied by *hein* in such
circumstances as emphatic and the use of *hein* as a means of marking such
emphasis. It seems that all examples of *hein* are emphatic up to a point and some are relatively non-emphatic, (our “discoursal” and Fernandez’ didactic examples) whilst others are more emphatic, as in our hyperbolic, surprise facts and contradiction examples. Non-emphatic exponents are unmarked emotionally as they do not constitute face-threatening acts which require the speaker to hedge what might be considered a too-strong assertion. Emphatic exponents have a considerable emotional impact and hence require hedging or a request for assent or approval from the listener. There are generally lexical or syntactic indications of such emphasis, including the use of superlatives and superlative expressions such as large numbers, *n’importe qui, tout*; intensifying adverbs such as *très* or *très très, complètement, même* and *trop*; metaphorical or figurative expressions such as *catastrophe, sensationnel, terrible, passionner* and negative expressions which might appear to be too direct or forceful an assertion.

Let us return now to *hein*² and *hein*³ in example (5) in the utterance:

Je crois que là, je crois qu’il faut être comme ça, *hein*², *hein*³?

Here *hein* accompanies an expression of epistemic modality, reflecting the (stated) uncertainty of the speaker with respect to his assertion which is further hedged by the use of *hein*, requesting the interlocutor’s approval or assent. This appears to substantiate the interpretation of *hein* which terminates the previous very firm assertion as a strategy designed to preserve negative face. Speakers using Hyperbolic *hein* wish to assert their views and gain their interlocutor’s adherence to them (in other words remain unimpeded in their actions). Expressions similar to those used in example (5) with *hein*², *hein*³ in which speakers qualify their assertion with the overt use of expressions of personal opinion such as *je pense que, je crois que, à mon avis, mon avis personnel* have been defined as “my opinion” and may be classed as expressions of epistemic modality along with hedges under the general banner of uncertainty. Uncertainty may also be expressed using other elements drawn from the modality system, employing modal verbs or adverbials such as *peut-être*: there are a number of examples of such usages in the corpus in collocation with *hein*. It is perhaps telling that the most natural translation equivalent in English is a tag question followed by you know? or don’t you think? (though of course, as Holmes, 1995: 80–82, explains, tag questions themselves may have a challenging function as well as softening or facilitative ones).

In summary, the examples of *hein* in the corpus were divided into two main sub-categories, category A — those which functioned globally as a request for approval and category B — those which functioned as an insistence
marker, either reinforcing an order or a request. Examples of category B were rare in the present corpus and accompanied the instructional language which is atypical of the corpus as a whole. Category A — Requests for approval or assent — appeared to accompany assertions of five main types (including emphatic and non-emphatic statements). These were defined as Hyperbolic, Discoursal (backchannel requests), Contradictions, Complaints and Hedges. Examples of *hein* used with expressions of uncertainty, epistemic modals, personal opinion and restrictions were numerically small and were subsumed under hedges. Examples of the uses of *hein* are provided below.

Examples of uses of *hein* in the Corpus:

A Requests for approval/assent.

a. Hyperbolic/Emphatic use of *hein*

Gloss: Can you credit it?!

(i) C’était un port de pêche et c’était relativement assez connu parce que c’est à l’entrée du Golfe de Morbihan qui lui-même fait une surface de 12000 hectares, *hein*? (52, 10–12)

(It was a fishing port and it was relatively quite well-known because it’s at the entrance to the Gulf of Morbihan which itself extends over 12,000 hectares, *you know*?)

(ii) en France ici, il y a au moins je sais pas moi, cinq à six millions de tondeuses. Les gens sont c’est c’est effarant *hein* c’est effarant, oui, oui, oui. (52, 89–91)

(here in France, there are at least I don’t know, five or six million lawn-mowers. People are it’s frightening *you know*? it’s frightening, yes, yes, yes.)

b. Discoursal use of *hein*

Gloss: Do you follow me so far?

Plus qu’on commence jeune, ça vaut pour eux, *hein*? S’ils ont font un petit peu tous les ans à partir de dix ans, de neuf, dix ans, bon ben ils arrivent à quatorze, quinze ils se débrouillent aussi très bien, quoi. (44, 66–68)

(The younger they start the better it is for them, *yeah*? If they do a little bit every year from about the age of ten, nine, ten, but well if they start at fourteen or fifteen they kind of manage really well, too).

c. Contradiction

Gloss: Can you accept my counter-argument?

B: Bon, il y a des petits drôles qui s’amusent à mettre des virus dans les
ordinateurs…[…]
C: Enfin mais c’est pas toujours des petits drôles, hein, c’est les sociétés qui paient des informaticiens…. (1, 1395–1405)
(B: Well, there are little idiots who amuse themselves by putting viruses in computers…[…]
C: But well, it’s not always little idiots, is it, it’s companies who pay computer programmers…)

d. Complaint
Gloss: Can you accept my complaint/give me some sympathy?
Mais un pêcheur, c’est c’est dur hein vous savez . (51, 81–82)
(But a fisherman, it’s it’s tough, isn’t it, you know).

e. Hedge (uncertainty, epistemic modals, personal opinion, restrictions)
Gloss: Can you accept this despite my uncertainty/reservations?
i) Oui, peut-être mais ça dépend aussi, hein? (64, 100)
(Yes, maybe, but it depends too, doesn’t it?)
ii) C’est quand même je crois assez isolé, hein? (64, 200–201)
(But all the same I think it’s pretty isolated, isn’t it?)
iii) Ah oui, enfin c’est une famille quand même assez, enfin moi je trouve, hein! (16, 246)
(Ah yes, well it’s a family which is all the same quite, well I think it is, anyway!)
iv) L’avenir n’est pas tellement rose, je crois pas enfin pour la région ici, hein. (34, 125–126)
(The future’s not so very rosy, I don’t think, well not for the region around here, you know.)

B. Reinforcing orders and interrogatives.
a. Reinforced Order.
(You’re not going to stop like that. You have to stop. STOP! [?] The two at the back, you haven’t stopped. Stop! That’s it. Once you’ve stopped, should you let the hor the pony ern start walking again? Obviously not. So keep it stopped. **OK**?)
b. Reinforced interrogative

Alors, est-ce que tu as regardé ce qu’ils ont fait? Non, hein? Non mais toi, tu fais pas grand chose sur ton poney. (17, 48–49)
(So, did you watch what they did? No, you didn’t, did you? No, but you, you’re not doing much on your pony).

7.2 The sociolinguistic stratification of hein

Gender-linked variation of hein usage

As we can see from Table 7.2, of the 351 “mainstream” occurrences of hein\(^3\), 178 were produced by men and 173 by women. Quantitatively, men and women use hein to the same extent.

Table 7.2 Numbers of occurrences of hein in men’s and women’s speech

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of occurrences of hein in the corpus:</th>
<th>351</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men’s total:</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s total:</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, as Figure 7.1 shows, the mean usage for women exceeds the mean usage for men and when the occurrences of hein are categorised by function, a very different picture emerges.

![Figure 7.1 Mean scores of hein in men’s and women’s speech](image-url)
Hein usage, sub-divided by function

As we can see from Tables 7.3 and 7.4, there are 70 instances of Hyperbolic Hein in the corpus of men’s speech, that is 39% of their total usage and only 35 instances of Hyperbolic Hein in the corpus of women’s speech, that is only 20% of their total usage. Conversely, we find only 57 instances of Discoursal Hein in the corpus of men’s speech, that is 32% of their total usage by comparison with 102 instances in the corpus of women’s speech, that is 59% of their total usage.

Table 7.3 Number of occurrences of Hein according to sex and function

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hype</th>
<th>CD</th>
<th>CT</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>HE</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>U</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.4 Distribution of usage by function according to sex, expressed as a percentage of the total of each sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hype</th>
<th>CD</th>
<th>CT</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>HE</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>U</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.01%</td>
<td>.02%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.5 shows the distribution of usage, focusing on Hyperbolic and Discoursal and expressed as a percentage of the total usage for both sexes.

Table 7.5 Distribution of usage, expressed as a percentage of total usage by both sexes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hyper</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can perceive here an interesting cross-over pattern. The responsibility of the men for the large proportion of discoursal uses of Hein in the corpus is not very much lower than their hyperbolic usage. The women on the other hand show a much greater differential usage, with a far lower percentage of hyperbolic usage (half that of men) and a much higher rate of discoursal usage, almost three times that of their hyperbolic usage and twice that of men.

This empirical evidence of the men’s greater tendency towards emphatic or hyperbolic statements argues against Robin Lakoff’s (1975) delineation of women’s speech as one characterised by a greater range of boosters (intensifiers, intonational features) than men’s speech but appears to support Maltz and Borker’s (1982) and Tannen’s (1990) ‘different culture’ hypothesis which
underlines the adversarial quality of men’s speech by comparison with the inclusive, solidarity and rapport-creating elements more characteristic of women’s speech. Though such differences are far from sex-exclusive, the men in our corpus use *hein* to punctuate emphatic statements, aimed more often at impressing the listener and underlining the importance of what they are saying, whilst the women’s use of *hein* is aimed at engaging the listener in the unfurling of their tale. We have discussed the difficulties of allocating instances of *hein* to different categories and it may be that women adhere to a topic for longer turns than do men and hence instances of *hein* are more readily attributed a discoursal function than a hyperbolic one (according to the definition outlined above whereby an instance may only be defined as discoursal where utterance B following *hein* must share its subject matter). In this, we might compare the gender-asymmetrical use of *hein* with that of *enfin*, which we have described above. *Enfin* is often used to mark an upcoming corrective phrase. We found that, with the exception of the idiolectal usage of subject of interview 16, *enfin* is used in virtually equal numbers by men and women. However, we discovered that the functional purposes to which the correctives were pressed are very different. Men used *enfin* in substantially greater numbers to provide a factual addition whilst women used *enfin* in its canonical sense to mean “Lastly” or “Finally”.

The asymmetrical use of *hein* by men and women appears to provide support from French for Holmes’ (1998) assertion (in Coates (1998: 472) that

> Women tend to interact in ways which will maintain and increase solidarity, while (especially in formal contexts) men tend to interact in ways which will maintain and increase their power and status.

By trading in impressive facts and hyperbolic accounts, underscored by *hein*, the men in the corpus aimed to purvey facts and assert their status. The women’s preferential use of Discoursal *hein*, ensuring that listeners are following their account, engaged them in a different, less distant, relationship.

An interpretation which may be less apparently denigratory of the male of the species may be found in Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory. Men and women do politeness in slightly different ways, the men are more attentive to their own face, particularly their negative face, whilst women appear to be more attentive to their own positive face and to others’ face, employing strategies of both positive and negative politeness. But let us now turn to the ways in which Hyperbolic and Discoursal *hein* intersect with age and educational background.
Variation of hein as a function of age and education

A second value for each sub-function of *hein* was calculated, which expresses the proportion of *hein* usage in relation to the word count of each speaker. In each case, the value was divided by the word-count and multiplied by 10,000 to give manageable figures. Figure 7.2 shows the mean for Hyperbolic usage according to education and Figure 7.3 the Hyperbolic usage according to age.

**Figure 7.2** Mean usage of Hyperbolic *hein* according to education

**Figure 7.3** Mean usage of Hyperbolic *hein* according to age
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 indicate an interesting trend, with the least educated having a usage which is twice as high as the most educated and the 40+ age-group having a usage which is twice as high as the 20+ age-group. The under-20s appear to use *hein* very little. A number of explanations may be put forward for the latter phenomenon: members of the youngest age-group tended not to take the opportunity to “take the floor” in extended turns and this might militate against the use of *hein*. Also, out of respect for the interviewer, they kept some distance and either used very few emphatic remarks or did not punctuate them with *hein*. They adopted Lakoff’s (1975) Rule 1: Formal and avoided colloquial forms.

The fact that the most educated speakers make less use of *hein* does not come as a surprise as *hein* is generally regarded as being a colloquial form of speech. It is interesting that the older speakers are those who had the highest rate of usage. What sociological factors might promote the use of *hein* between a 40+ speaker to a younger speaker from another country? Judging from the conversations we have studied in the corpus, we may put forward the tentative hypothesis that such speakers wish to inform their interlocutor and to express their views on the topics raised in a dramatic way, entailing the use of a “softening” *hein* to hedge the force of their remarks. The more educated (older) speakers refrain from such usage. In Lakoff’s parlance, older speakers overall engage in a style of politeness which is based on the creation of camaraderie whilst most educated speakers engage in a style of politeness involving deference.

![Figure 7.4](image-url)  
*Figure 7.4* Discoursal usage of *hein* as a function of education
Figure 7.4 appears to indicate a similar trend for Discoursal *hein* as for Hyperbolic *hein*, with a gradual downward movement from the least to the most educated, the most educated using fewer instances of Discoursal *hein*. However, the trend is not so dramatic as for Hyperbolic *hein*, the most educated still retaining a mean of 10.5 overall. If educated speakers do not consider that it is “respectable” to use *hein* to punctuate hyperbolic or emphatic statements, they are less reserved about employing it to remain in contact with their interlocutor, checking their comprehension or requesting backchanneling. It might also be argued that Discoursal *hein* is used to mark speech which is not so overtly emotional as Hyperbolic *hein* and that it is not *hein* per se which is eschewed but the dramatic, almost melodramatic, mode of speech associated with Hyperbolic *hein* which is foregone by such speakers.

Figure 7.5 — Discoursal usage of *hein* as a function of age — demonstrates that Discoursal *hein* is not used at all by the youngest age-group. This seems to give some credence to the hypothesis that the dearth of *hein* usage in general is related to turn-length. Discoursal *hein* appears most commonly in linking several statements, the second of which is an elaboration of the first. As the youngest speakers restricted their remarks to very short interventions, Discoursal *hein* would appear very little in their speech. The 20+ age-group display a proportionately greater rate of Discoursal *hein* usage than the 40+ age-group. This contrasts with the findings for Hyperbolic *hein* where the usage doubled for the higher age-group. This may explained by the fact that many of the most
educated speakers find themselves in the 40+ age-group. But it does not entirely explain this finding. A large number of less educated speakers also fall into this age-group. Why might it be that the 40+ speakers used Hyperbolic *hein* proportionately more than the 20+ group and used Discoursal *hein* proportionately less?

If we turn to the way in which education and sex correlate with *hein* usage, an interesting sex-linked asymmetry is revealed. This is illustrated in Figures 7.6–7.9.

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**Figure 7.6** Hyperbolic *hein*, mean scores (sex and education)

**Figure 7.7** Discoursal *hein*, mean scores (sex and education)
The men’s usage of *hein* overall shows a very regular pattern. It goes down in distributional frequency with class and up with age. This appears to indicate that *hein* is a well-established feature of male speech — it is acceptable for older men to use this stigmatised form.

The women’s usage of *hein* presents an apparently more confused picture. Educational considerations do not appear to be so influential. It is acceptable for highly educated women to use *hein*. And when we look at age, we see that the pattern is an upward one, there are few examples of *hein* in the youngest age-group and the highest means are in the 21–40 year-olds particularly.
amongst the women. This may be explicable by positing that the older women refrain from using *hein* as, for their generation, it was considered to be impolite and was a stigmatised form. Why is it then that the 21–40 year old mid-educated women retain such high rates of *hein*-usage? Or, so as to avoid considering women as the marked case, why is that the more educated men use *hein* less than the women? The answer may be to look at the differential usage of *hein* by men and women.

In general, the mean Hyperbolic usage of *hein* is higher in the speech of less educated speakers whilst it is more present in older speakers. However, the mean for Discoursal *hein*, despite being lower for less educated speakers is also lower in the oldest speakers. Hyperbolic *hein* is used less by the most highly educated women. The mean for the most highly educated men remains the same. Not so Discoursal *hein* which is used substantially more both by women with the bac and with a degree than by the men whose rate of *hein* usage reduces in the more highly educated.

There appear to be competing forces at work here related to the differential uses of *hein*. Hyperbolic *hein* appears to be a stigmatised form which carries covert prestige. Discoursal *hein* functions as a politeness feature which is acceptable and possibly even prestigious and which is gaining ground amongst women. The Hyperbolic usage appears to be well-established and to follow set patterns of usage which are class and sex-differentiated. The discoursal usage appears to be more prominent in Age 2 than in Age 3 which would indicate a change in progress. And this seems to be a “change from above” promoted by educated women using *hein* in its discoursal form.

In terms of language change and Labov’s two principles we might say that Hyperbolic *hein* illustrates principle 1, that in a stable sociolinguistic stratification men use a higher frequency of nonstandard forms than women. Discoursal *hein*, on the other hand, illustrates principle 2 whereby, in the majority of linguistic changes, women use a higher frequency of incoming forms than men.4 We are thereby suggesting that Discoursal *hein* is an incoming usage which is currently favoured by the middle age-range, that is the 21–40 year old women and which is gradually gaining acceptance as a non-stigmatised form.

### 7.3 Summary and conclusions concerning *hein*

Let us return now to our original research question — is *hein* usage gender-asymmetrical? A comparison of mean ratings of the proportional usage of *hein*
in the full corpus of ninety-five subjects gave results which did not reach a level of statistical significance — a multivariate ANOVA test provided only a positive result for Age \( (F = 4.673; p < .012) \), not for Sex or, indeed, for Education. However, when a sub-set of the data was examined of an equal number of men and women in the mid-age range and with representation of each of the education levels, the results proved significant for *hein* overall. A one-way ANOVA test demonstrated that women use *hein* significantly more than men \( (F = 4.4373; P < .047) \). A simple factorial ANOVA including education also showed statistical significance for sex \( (F = 4.402; p < .05) \). Whilst in this sub-sample the differences in usage of Hyperbolic *hein* were not statistically significant, that for Discoursal *hein* was, as measured by a one-way ANOVA, \( (F = 4.4212; p < .047) \). It appears that men’s and women’s *hein* usage varies and, indeed, that women’s usage is more polite. More polite in shunning the emphatic or reinforcing usage favoured by men, which could be considered to be distancing or adversarial one-upmanship, and more polite, too, in adopting more often, and to a statistically significant extent, a discoursal usage which aims to promote solidarity and rapport with interlocutors.

Notes

1. *sic* — Fernandez presumably refers to the manner in which educators reformulate or “chew over” their words to help students follow and give students time to think or take notes.

2. Contradiction might be defined as a sub-category of “surprising fact” but as contradictions are more numerous than surprising facts in the corpus, we have preferred to retain them as a full, rather than a subordinate, category.

3. That is, excluding the occurrences of *hein*—very rare in this corpus — where it is used as a genuine interrogative (8 occurrences), to reinforce an order or injunctive (10 occurrences), to reinforce an interrogative (2 occurrences) or to apologise (1 occurrence).

4. It is the nature of stable sociolinguistic variables to become aligned with such class hierarchies in a monotonic fashion. For a prestige marker, the higher a speaker’s socio-economic status, the higher the frequency of use. For stigmatised markers, the reverse is true. (Labov, 1990, 220)
8.1 Syntactic, semantic and pragmatic characteristics of quoi

First, we must clarify that it is so-called “post-posed” or “terminating” quoi which forms the object of our study. Hölker (1984) demonstrates the discourse-structuring role played by quoi and gives rules of usage based on the study of a 10-hour corpus of doctor-patient interviews recorded in the south of France. Hölker draws a distinction between markers which have some semantic content such as or, donc and mais and those which appear to have no or very little conceptual meaning, such as hein, quoi, eh bien, dis-donc/dites donc, écoute/écoutez. He defines markers as having three possible functions, argumentative (contributing to the rhetorical structuring), topographical (linking sections of text together) and interactive (marking an utterance as being a reaction to a remark made by a previous speaker). Hölker aims to look at the topographical and interactive functions of quoi. Hölker begins (1984: 49) by quoting the following dictionary definitions of quoi:

Grand ROBERT -Fam. Quoi, accompagnant une explication (avec une nuance d’impatience). “Je sers au régiment étranger. — Au régiment?… A la Légion (cit.7), quoi!

(Fam. Quoi accompanying an explanation (with a shade of impatience). “I serve in the foreign regiment. -In the regiment? In the Legion (cit. 7), you know/what!)

- Fam. Quoi, accompagnant un mot qui résume une idée, une énumération (Cf. Indulgent, cit.9) “Un peuple de candidats à la bourgeoisie, un peuple d’aspirants à la bedaine. Les pantouflards (cit. 6), quoi!” (V. Larbaud).

(-Fam. Quoi, accompanying a word which sums up an idea, an enumeration (Cf. Indulgent, cit. 9) “A people of candidates for the bourgeoisie, a people who aspire to have a paunch. Stay-at-homes, in a word!” (V. Larbaud).

“… tout ce qu’ils possédaient, leur campagne, les charrettes, brancards en l’air, leurs champs, leurs enclos, la route, les arbres et même les vaches, un chien avec sa chaîne, tout, quoi.” Céline, Voyages au bout de la nuit, p.18. (“…everything they possessed, their countryside, their carts, shafts in the air, their fields, their enclosures, the road, the trees and even the cows, a dog with its chain, everything, in short.”)
We might add that the only usage of post-posed quoi in the corpus-based Oxford-Hachette (1994: 667) dictionary is categorised under “excl. what.” The example given is: “Il est prétentieux, stupide, agaçant, pas du tout intéressant, ~! he’s pretentious, stupid, irritating, in short he’s pretty uninteresting.” This picks up the notion that quoi is used after an enumeration in which the final term sums up all of the previous terms and is punctuated by quoi.

Hölker (1984: 50) gives the following example from his corpus:

-mais, j’ai bien perdu un demi-litre, un litre et demi de sang,…en tout,…eh, en deux jours, hein? Enfin, j’ai évalué ça, vous savez, à quelque chose près, quoi.

(-but I lost a good half-litre, a litre and a half of blood…in all,…er, in two days, you know? Well, I estimated it, you know, to be about that, as it were.)

Hölker suggests that it is difficult to see how this fits the Larousse definition of either explanation or enumeration and it is also difficult to discern exactly what is meant by the term “impatience” in the dictionary definitions. In his own corpus, Hölker found that quoi collocated with enfin, that all of his examples have the structure X₁ + X₂ + X₃ + “quoi” (where X₁ is a short answer) but the following are also possible:

\[
\{X₁ + (X₂)\} \\
\{X₁\} + X₃ + “quoi” \\
\{(X₁) + X₂\}
\]

Hölker argues that this demonstrates that quoi-usage is dependent, not on a sentence-structure, but on a particular discourse structure and this motivates a discourse-structuring interpretation of its usage. In all of his examples, Hölker discovered a common structure, that of repeated reference, a naming of an individual item or fact which is repeated at least once. In X₃, an object is referred to, which has already been referred to in X₁ or X₂. Such repetitions may take different forms. They may be:

1. repetitions of words;
2. a contextually synonymous expression;
3. explicit contextual inference
4. an expression, which has a contextual reference to something which the speaker has already mentioned in X₁ or X₂

The usage rule for quoi formulated by Hölker is thus that quoi can occur after a declarative sentence by which the speaker refers to an item which has been mentioned shortly before either by himself or by his interlocutor. It is for this
reason that Hölker feels that the term discourse-structuring is appropriate. As far as its pragmatic functions are concerned, Hölker perceives at least two:

1. self-correction
2. terminating function

The correcting function relates to the topographical element mentioned above and covers the “explanation” category mentioned in dictionaries, which Hölker feels is too broad a definition. The correcting function is particularly evident in conjunction with *enfin*.

Hölker further argues (1984: 57) that *quoi* acts a terminator. When *quoi* is absent, a speaker may continue adding further propositions and that this would be, to say the least, bizarre after an occurrence of *quoi*.


(1) Finally (after all)
   Eh bien, allez-y, parlez, ne craignez pas d’étaler vos petites histoires devant moi. Je suis de la famille, *quoi*!
   (Well then, go on, talk, don’t be frightened to tell all in front of me. I’m one of the family, *after all*!)

(2) In the last place, after all
   Dis-donc, fit le capitaine, te payes-tu ma tête après celle du gendarme?
   Tu l’as fait marcher, *quoi*!
   (Hey!, said the captain, are you taking the mickey out of me after doing the same to the gendarme? You had him fooled, *after all*!)

(3) For all that, at least
   Oh! pas des gants neufs, bien sûr, des gants trempés de boue, mais des gants, *quoi*!
   (Oh! not new gloves, of course, gloves covered in mud, but gloves *for all that*!)

(4) Of course
   Eh bien, qu’est-ce que tu me chantes alors? S’il se tue, on l’entererra, *quoi*!
   (Well then, what are you talking about? If he kills himself, we’ll bury him, *won’t we!*
So, therefore
Eh bien, j’ai été à Lens, il y a trois semaines. C’était le 11. Y a vingt jours, quoi!
(Well then, I was in Lens three weeks ago. It was the 11th. It was twenty days ago, then!)

Of course (giving reasons)
Seulement, les fantômes, on n’en a pas peur… On est brave, quoi!
(Only, ghosts, we’re not frightened of them… We’re brave, you know!)

Of course, after all (apologising)
On ne va se brouiller, que diable! Errare humanum est, quoi!
(We’re not going to fall out, damn it! Errare humanum est, after all!)

Of course (explaining, illustrating)
Il aime surtout ce qui est affreux, cet homme! C’est son goût, quoi!
(He particularly likes horrible things, that man! It’s his taste, you know!)

To highlight the polysemy of *quoi* in this way is extremely valuable and it is of particular interest that so many of the translation equivalents include the concept “Of course” — we shall be returning to this further down. We agree with Hölker, however, that there are limitations to an approach which attempts to find translation equivalents as a means of pinning down the usages of *quoi*. As Hölker puts it, the problem of the analysis of *quoi* is not solved, it is simply postponed. For one thing, a number of translation equivalents may fit the bill in each context, and the analysis of the usages of such particles in German or in English has been problematic. As we have seen with *enfin* there is not a one-to-one correspondence between particles in different languages (their usages may coincide in some contexts but not in others). König regards *quoi* in conclusion as a terminator which is equivalent to “briefly” or “in a word” (*kurzum* or *mit einem Wort*).

Whilst Gülich (1970) focuses mainly on the discourse-marking role played by *quoi* as a *Gliederungssignal* and highlights the paraphrastic nature of phrases terminated by *quoi*, Thielmann (1982: 26–48) puts forward the following proposal as a unifying principle for the analysis of *quoi* (Thielmann, 1982: 46):

Ausdruck der Annahme, der Hörer verstehe/akzeptiere das Gemeinte, habe das Gesagte erwartet/erwarten können.2

Though Hölker opines that such a definition is not all-inclusive, the formulation has great attractions as a unifying description of the uses of *quoi* in the context of the current study. The definition focuses on the relationship be-
tween the speaker and the hearer and derives thus from an interpersonal perspective. Interpreted in the framework of politeness theory, we might posit that the speaker’s request or supposition concerning the hearer constitutes an act of negative or positive politeness. When *quoi* is used to emphatically punctuate a proposition, a situation which might be glossed “I am stating the obvious here — with brio”, it could be termed as a means of protecting a speaker’s own negative face (speakers wish to be unimpeded in their actions). When *quoi* is used apologetically, a situation which might be glossed “I’m stating the obvious here, I apologise”, it could be termed an act of negative politeness or means of preserving positive face (speakers wish to avoid imposing on hearers). In the latter case, speakers protect both their own and their hearers’ face — speakers downplay their expertism and hearers do not feel talked down to or lectured.

Halliday’s three-way categorisation of the functions of language, ideational, interpersonal and textual may usefully be pressed into service. Language functions simultaneously on these three plains and we can include the usage of *quoi* in relation to its position in the utterance and the type of proposition which it accompanies in all of those terms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideational</th>
<th>Interpersonal</th>
<th>Textual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Referential additions</td>
<td>Negative face</td>
<td>Discourse-marking:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformulations</td>
<td>(emphasis, impatience)</td>
<td>utterance terminator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrections</td>
<td>Positive face</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanations</td>
<td>(apologies for stating the obvious, hedges)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraphrases</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Other markers serve the ideational need to add referential additions, reformulate, correct, explain and so on. We have seen that *c’est-à-dire*, and *enfin* may serve such a purpose. We have seen, too, that *enfin* may serve interpersonal needs by providing for mitigation of over-strong assertions. *Quoi* differs from these in being, like *hein*, utterance-terminal (as a general rule) and in having the particularity, in some cases, of punctuating a generalising term at the end of an enumeration in a manner similar to the canonical use of *enfin* but utterance-terminally. It is distinguished, too, in that one of its primary roles is to preempt a possible criticism on the part of the hearer that what the speaker is saying is obvious, unneeded, or to be expected. If what is said is obvious, this breaks one of Grice’s four Maxims about communication and a speaker will need to provide an apology or a “nod” to the hearer to this effect, in order to deflect the inevitable inquiry: “What is new in what you have just said?”
In order to test whether such a formulation can be usefully applied, let us return to König’s eight examples (we have already noted that a number of them have been paraphrased “Of course”):

(1) Finally (after all)
   Eh bien, allez-y, parlez, ne craignez pas d’étaler vos petites histoires
devant moi. Je suis de la famille, quoi!
(Well then, go on, talk, don’t be frightened to tell all in front of me. I’m
one of the family, after all!)

In this example, the phrase terminated by quoi — je suis de la famille, quoi! — provides referential information or an explanation as to why it would be acceptable for the hearer to self-disclose. The information is self-evident but the speaker decides to point it out and adds the emphatic quoi to add force to his/her argument. We might define this then as a means of protecting one’s negative face.

(2) In the last place, after all
   Dis-donc, fit le capitaine, te payes-tu ma tête après celle du gendarme Tu
l’as fait marcher, quoi!
(Hey!, said the captain, are you taking the mickey out of me after doing
the same to the gendarme? You had him fooled, after all!)

In the second example, faire marcher is a synonym of se payer la tête and, as such, is a repetition of the first expression, drawing out the action of the hearer vis-à-vis the gendarme and underlining this emphatically through the use of quoi. Once again, the speaker employs quoi to mediate negative politeness in making a self-evident or expected (not-new) remark.

(3) For all that, at least
   Oh! pas des gants neufs, bien sûr, des gants trempés de boue, mais des
gants, quoi!
(Oh! not new gloves, of course, gloves covered in mud, but gloves for all
that!)

Once again, the speaker makes the obvious remark that these are gloves, quoi is employed to punctuate the obviousness of the remark (despite the concession which has just been made that the gloves are not new and are in fact covered in mud). This may be classed as negative face protection as quoi is used emphatically to reinforce the speaker’s position (that these ARE gloves) which might have been undermined by his/her concession concerning their salubrity!
(4) Of course
Eh bien, qu’est-ce que tu me chantes alors? S’il se tue, on l’enterrera, 
quoi!
(Well then, what are you talking about? If he kills himself, we’ll bury him, 
won’t we!)

Here again, the speaker asserts the obvious, that if someone dies they have to be 
buried (somewhat speciously in all likelihood, in that, although we have no 
further context for this utterance, we imagine that the discussion revolves 
around preventing someone from committing suicide, not burying them, once 
they have succeeded in doing so). The obviousness of the remark (and its 
speciousness?) are underscored by quoi and this constitutes, once again, an act 
invoking the speaker’s negative face.

(5) So, therefore
Eh bien, j’ai été à Lens, il y a trois semaines. C’était le 11. Y a vingt jours, 
quoi!
(Well then, I was in Lens three weeks ago. It was the 11th. It was twenty 
days ago, then!)

The reformulation of the dates from three weeks, to from the 11th, to 20 days 
ago, once again is an emphatic statement of the obvious, punctuated by quoi.

(6) Of course (giving reasons)
Seulement, les fantômes, on n’en a pas peur…On est brave, quoi!
(Only, ghosts, we’re not frightened of them… We’re brave, you know!)

The synonymy of on n’en a pas peur and on est brave is punctuated by quoi, 
once again emphatically and once again to mediate the statement of the 
obvious.

(7) Of course (apologising)
On ne va pas se brouiller, que diable! Errare humanum est, quoi!
(We’re not going to fall out, damn it! Errare humanum est, after all!)

Despite König’s classification of this utterance as one of apologising, this 
example does not appear to illustrate the type of apologising we have defined as 
positively polite but to be a reinforcement of the appeal inherent in “Let’s not 
fall out!” Errare humanum est provides an emphatic vindication and dismissal 
of past behaviour, in the disculpatory way that que diable! does. The speaker 
provides further justification for his initial speech act, emphatically punctuated 
by quoi.
(8) Of course (explaining, illustrating)
Il aime surtout ce qui est affreux, cet homme! C’est son goût, quoi!
(He particularly likes horrible things, that man! It’s his taste, you know!)

The synonymy of goût and il aime surtout provides the clue to the “statement of the obvious” in this final example. The speaker provides again a reformulation of his/her original assertion and again punctuates the remark with an emphatic quoi.

All of these examples illustrate speakers’ attempts to protect their negative face in being, like Hyperbolic hein discussed in Chapter 4, emphatic underscorers of a point, in this case a reassertion in different terms, a statement of the obvious made to reinforce a speaker’s argument. Quoi constitutes an appeal to the interlocutor to accept the speaker’s argument.

Hölker provides examples from his corpus (1988: 51–52) in the context of doctor-patient interviews, which, we would like to argue, illustrate negative politeness or greater tentativeness on the part of the speaker. Such tentativeness is indicated by other terms and expressions, hesitation markers such as euh or enfin.

(9) [Hölker’s example (58)]
A: Est-ce que vous vous êtes blessé?
P: Non, pas du tout. J’suis tombé d’ailleurs. Je… je me tenais à cette barre, vraiment serré, j’ai pas tombé, j’ai penché la tête en arrière, j’ regardais en l’air, j’avais les yeux… euh… un peu en l’air, quoi […]
(A: Were you injured?
P: No, not at all. What is more, I fell. I… I was holding on to this bar, really tight, I didn’t fall, I leant my head back, I was looking into the air, I had my eyes… a bit up, like […]

In this example j’avais les yeux… euh… un peu en l’air constitutes a synonymous reformulation of j’ regardais en l’air but we might posit that the speaker is searching for words. Quoi here might be glossed ‘if you know what I mean’, ‘sort of’ or ‘like’. In other words, in some contexts, quoi may be added as a hedge or apology for a deficiency of expression. In this case, it might be interpreted as an act of negative politeness, tentatively expressing a difficult concept, searching for the correct words to use and allowing the interlocutor to decide on the degree to which the words are appropriate or true.

Another example of this type, with hesitatory repetitions of the indefinite article un, and the relational expression vous savez is as follows:
This could be interpreted as negative face protection strategy in the sense that the patient emphatically asserts — *mais carrément* — that he/she even went so far as to consult an optician. The assertion is punctuated by *quoi*. On the other hand, it could be interpreted as negative politeness in alerting the doctor in a number of ways that the patient feels some embarrassment concerning his/her actions in going so far as to consult an optician. Without intonation contours, it is difficult to tell how this utterance should be interpreted. The presence of hesitatory markers — the repetition of *un*, the existence of *vous savez* and the possibly apologetic *mais carrément* — might lead us to interpret the use of *quoi* here as an example of negative politeness. It is to be noted that, unlike all of the other examples we have studied so far, there is no reformulation here and no statement of the obvious.

Such examples — and we have yet to quantify the sub-types in our own corpus — appear to undermine the similarity which Hölker (1988) draws between *enfin* and *quoi*, particularly in Chapter 6 (1988: 95–107). *Quoi* may punctuate expressions which recap previous formulations, refining or reexpressing them in different terms referentially but it is often additionally used in contexts which do NOT contain a reformulation. In such cases, *quoi* may be more satisfactorily described as a mediator of politeness, a way of flagging non-coincidence, the non-coincidence between words and things, a speaker’s diffidence concerning their articulation of an idea or a hedging device, designed to downplay the force of a word or suggest its inadequacy.

Andrews (1989: 195–199) draws a parallel between *quoi* and *voilà* but distinguishes between them by saying that although *quoi* “may sometimes add a light categorical tone to an utterance, it is far from having the same challenging tone associated with *voilà*.” He demonstrates that *quoi* is accompanied by the flat (or slightly falling) intonation which Delattre (1966) calls ‘parenthèse basse’ or ‘echo’ and comments that the part that precedes *quoi* normally has the S-shaped intonation of ‘implication’. This combination of intonation tunes — ‘implication’ + *parenthèse basse*, he claims, is the most distinctive feature of affective language in spoken French. He goes on (1989: 196):
This intonational pattern is associated with a syntactic pattern frequently encountered in spoken French by which an utterance (or clause) consists of an affective comment followed by a repeated (and unstressed) topic.

He gives the example of:

Il est stupide, ton ami.

and interestingly suggests that a reason for the *parenthèse basse* intonation pattern may derive from the fact that, having used the emotive implication intonation, a speaker experiences the need to add on some sort of tag as a counterbalance, which acts as a type of ‘détente nerveuse’ (‘nervous relaxation’) and which at the same time indicates that the surge of emotion is over. *Quoi* according to such an analysis would occupy the place of the unstressed topic. Andrews (1989: 197) provides a number of examples which support his view of *quoi* as a ‘pure terminator’ which expresses a slackening off of the emotional tension. My own reading of the examples, however, leads to an interpersonal interpretation involving non-coincidence. Each of them could be read as a flagging of the speaker’s awareness of the inadequacy of his own words to express what he means and which could be glossed ‘sort of’ or ‘if you know what I mean’. Often, the subject-matter in such circumstances may be sensitive.

Examples 11 and 12, both drawn from Andrews (1989: 197) illustrate such a hypothesis:

(11) - (…) l’amour que vous avez découvert ne vous a pas délivré de cette haine?
   - Non non je la garderai toujours je crois parce que …c’était…ce qu’il a fait disons c’était pas …raisonnable *quoi*.
   (- (…) the love you found has not stopped you from feeling this hatred?
   - No no I will always feel that way I think because… it was… what he did, shall we say, it wasn’t… reasonable *so to speak.*

(12) - c’est très plat comment ils vivent *quoi*—c’est pas drôle c’est toujours la même chose c’est euh c’est pas bien *quoi*.
   (It’s very flat the way they live *as it were*—it’s no fun, it’s always the same thing, it’s it’s er it’s not good *you know.*

Whilst *quoi* clearly plays a terminating role and acts as a *détente nerveuse* following an emphatic expression, it equally manifestly flags the end-point of a search for adequate expression. In example 11, the search-path is marked by the repetition of *c’était*, the inclusion of *disons* and a number of hesitations,
marked …. In (12) the search-path is marked by a number of near-synonym-
ous expressions (c’est très plat, c’est pas drôle, c’est toujours la même chose,
c’est pas bien), the last of which is a larger category, constituting a judgmental
conclusion which falls into the “last term in an enumeration” which is one of
the dictionary definitions of the canonical use of quoi commented upon above.
However, it is also marked by repetitions and hesitations: c’est euh c’est.

We would like to argue that, whilst we are agreed that quoi is a terminator,
may serve to mark a release of tension or as an underscorer and is often used in
conjunction with corrections, a unifying principle behind all of its uses (in-
cluding those in which there are no visible reformulations or corrections) is to
flag non-coincidence between words and things, to signal a speaker’s diffidence
concerning the words selected. Thielmann (1982) suggested that quoi consti-
tuted the “expression of the supposition that the hearer understands/accepts
what has been uttered, expected/could expect what has been said.” Two very
important concepts are raised here. The first is that the hearer understands/
accepts what has been uttered. Such an appeal to the hearer can, I believe, be
related to politeness theory — the speaker in appealing to the hearer is deflect-
ing criticism for what he considers to be the inadequacy of their expression.
The second that the hearer expected/could expect what has been said does not
appear to be true in all cases. It is difficult to know whether Thielmann meant
the comma separating her two categories to place them in an either/or rela-
tionship. It is certainly true, as we have said above, that an over-obvious
expression would also require a hedge to pre-empt and deflect a hearer’s
criticism that this has been said before or is obvious. The question of the
relationship between enfin and quoi and that of corrections and reformulations
is subsumed in our unifying framework for quoi in that, in a search for
adequacy of expression, speakers may or may not introduce successive at-
ttempts at, or refinements of, an original attempt to evoke in the listener’s mind
the (as yet non-verbal) impressions emerging in the speaker’s mind.

Chanet (2001), drawing on the CORPAIX — the large spoken corpus
collected by researchers at the Université d’Aix en Provence — analyses 1728
occurrences of “quoi” functioning as a pragmatic or discourse particle (particule
énonciative). She usefully reviews the syntactic and lexical collocations of quoi
and comes to the conclusion (2001, 69) that “quoi n’a donc pas vraiment de
‘distribution’ spécifique” (‘quoi does not have a specific “distribution”). Chanet
concludes that “quoi” indicates an uncertainty in the speaker’s mind concerning
the adequacy of the information they are providing and signals a range of
possible meanings and expressions of that meaning (“un ensemble de possibles
énonciatifs et cognitifs”). This allows the interlocutor to co-construct the message, “quoi” thus being fundamentally attentive to the interlocutor and indicating “le désir de voir sa propre parole entrer en résonance avec une possible parole de l’autre” (‘indicate the desire to see one’s own words resonate against those of one’s interlocutor’). It is a short step from such an assertion to an interpretation which includes considerations derived from politeness theory — though Chanet herself does not consider “quoi” primarily from this perspective.

Quoi functions ideationally, interpersonally and textually. It is both a Korrekturmarker and a Schlußmarker. Its primary function, however, — that which drives the ideational and textual — is pragmatic and interpersonal. It is a hedge, mediating politeness, protecting a speaker’s negative and positive face. If we are to distinguish between the usage made of quoi by the men and women in our corpus, interpretations will have to be made of its use in context. These will distinguish between quoi used as a means of protecting negative face, where it punctuates an emphatic assertion and quoi used as a form of positive or negative politeness, where it is used either to enter into a relationship with the listener, engaging their adherence or as a hedging expression to apologise for what the speaker considers a “non-coincidence”. König’s examples — exhibiting as they do few of the characteristics of spontaneous speech — appear to fall mainly into the first category, whilst the examples drawn from Hölder and Andrews appear to fall to a greater extent into the second category. Chanet’s (more recent) examples resemble those found in our own corpus, and her conclusions concerning the semantico-pragmatic functions of quoi are similar to ours. However, the syntactic focus of her analysis occasionally leads her up a blind alley in our view — quoi appears to be motivated to a much greater extent by semantic and interpersonal considerations and these are more easily accounted for in terms of politeness theory than in terms of syntactic theory.

It may be helpful when attributing interpretations to make a comparison with you know whose functions have been dubbed ‘referential’ and ‘affective’ by Holmes (1995: 87–91). Holmes gives the following examples (1995: 89) (\ and / indicate falling and rising intonation respectively):

```
\ they obviously thought he was a bit stupid / you know

and it was quite// well it was it was all very embarrassing you know
```
In the first example *you know* expresses the speaker’s belief that the addressee knows or understands, on the basis of shared experience or attitudes, the kind of thing referred to in the proposition. In the second, the speaker appeals to the listener for an indication of understanding. *You know* is used as a positive politeness device — but as a speaker-orientated rather than an addressee-orientated device.

Given that the syntactic characteristics and core semantic meanings (or relative ‘meaning’) of *you know* and *quoi* seem very different, such a comparison may appear surprising. However, when we look at Östmann’s (1981) definition of the ‘prototypical’ meaning of *you know*, we are struck by the parallels between the issues raised above and the hypothesis which he makes concerning *you know*. Östmann (1981: 17) suggests that:

> The speaker strives towards getting the addressee to cooperate and/or accept the propositional content of his utterance as background knowledge.

The first part of such a definition echoes very strongly the first part of that of Thielmann concerning *quoi*. Holmes (1995: 87) glosses thus:

> The speaker’s appeal to the addressee constitutes the affective meaning of *you know*, while the referential meaning relates to the presupposed shared knowledge.

Whilst *quoi* does not call up the notion of ‘evoke shared background knowledge’ to the same extent as *you know*, there is a degree to which it plays such a role and this is highlighted in Thielmann’s suggestion that the proposition was ‘expected’ or ‘could be expected’.

Holmes (1995: 87) goes on to distinguish different functions of *you know*. Its primary function may be to signal that the speaker attributes understanding to the listener, it may appeal to the listener’s sympathy or function as a booster to emphasise the mutual knowledge of the participants. These, she claims, are affectively orientated functions with implications for an analysis of linguistic politeness. Alternatively *you know* may be more referentially orientated: it may function primarily as a lexical hedge to signal linguistic imprecision or mark a qualification, or it may express uncertainty about the propositional content of an utterance.

Holmes gives the following examples of referential usage:

```
\better/entertainment product or better/you know/music

the house/ up above the one I was telling you/you about you know the one your dad used to live in
```
In the first example, *you know* is a signal that the following word is causing problems for the speaker, and in the second it signals that there is a problem relating to referential precision.

When it is used with an emphasis on its affective meaning, *you know* refers to assumptions, values, attitudes and even earlier experiences shared by the speaker and addressee. It acts as a booster on the force of such utterances.

The following example illustrates this:

```
and that way we’d get rid of exploitation of man by man all that
\ stuff/you know/you’ve heard it all before.
```

It is clear from such examples that an interpretation of the function of such a pragmatic particle includes an analysis of the co-text and context of each occurrence to determine whether it is referential or affective. Holmes allocates reformulations to a referential category (negative politeness) and “boosters” as relating to affective meaning and positive politeness. As Brown points out, it depends what is being “boosted” — our interpretation of Hyperbolic *hein*, where *hein* is used as an emphatic punctuator of a referential point, was interpreted by us as a means of protecting negative face as it seems to indicate that the speaker wishes to be unimpeded in asserting his/her views. A similar point might be made here. *Quoi* may be used as an emphatic reinforcer at the end of an enumeration (conserving negative face) or it may be used as a questioning form, a request for the acceptance of the reformulation or term finally landed upon by a speaker in search of expression (negative politeness/conserving positive face). We are faced once more with the lack of one-to-one correspondence between linguistic form and function — a reformulation may be motivated referentially or affectively. Once again, we are faced with a dilemma similar to that outlined by Caffi (1999) in relation to doctor/patient interaction in Italian — does the doctor really know but does not want to say? In the successions of “amorces avortées, de ratages, de phrases en suspens” which characterise the spoken language (Culioli, 1983: 291), is the speaker searching for a term — referentially — or are the reformulations, mitigations and hedges motivated by politeness, a recognition of the sensitivity of the subject-matter and attention to the face needs of both speaker and listener? Does utterance-terminal *quoi* flag a textual reformulation of a referential type or a hedge/mitigator of an interpersonal type, or indeed both? Only by detailed reference to co-occurring lexis and semantic and pragmatic contextual effects
can such interpretations be made, though it is hoped that reliable formal indicators may be found to support such interpretations.

The uses of *quoi* in the present corpus

Although *quoi* appears at the end of a tone-group in the corpus, it could not be said to be utterance-terminal in every case. Indeed, the orthographic transcription and an automatic word-count indicates that, of the 240 occurrences of *quoi* used in a tone-group terminal fashion, there are 145 occurrences of “quoi.” whilst there are 81 occurrences of “quoi,” and 28 occurrences of “quoi (space)”. Although some leeway must be allowed for repetitions in the data file (254 occurrences in the automatic word-count versus 240 occurrences counted by hand), we may conclude that there are a substantial number of occurrences which do not occur utterance- or turn-terminally. This is explicable in terms of the “ratages” and “phrases en suspens” which characterise the spoken language, whereby reformulations are heaped up, one upon the other in a syntagmatic fashion. *Quoi* may be inserted in the midst of such a cluster of reformulations. An additional feature of the corpus is that, in a number of cases, a reformulation follows *quoi* rather than preceding it. Hölker (1984: 50) suggested the formula:

\[
\{X_1 + (X_2)\} \\
\{ \} + X_3 + "quoi" \\
\{ (X_1) + X_2 \}
\]

where \(X_1\) is a short answer and \(X_2\) and \(X_3\) are reformulations of an item already mentioned in the preceding text. In our corpus, we discover examples of a reformulation following *quoi*.

(1) beh, disons que bon pendant deux fois que j’ai cuit ce millat, *quoi*, cette recette, et je leur ai demandé la recette… (37, 49–50)  
(well, shall we say that, well, the two times I cooked this “millat”, you know, this recipe, and I asked them for the recipe…)

In Example (1), *millat* is a term which the speaker feels will be unfamiliar to the hearer as it is a term referring to a regional speciality. The *quoi* simultaneously establishes a relationship with the hearer and indicates anaphoric reference to the dish which had just been the topic of conversation, which, to ensure understanding, is reformulated immediately afterwards with the anaphoric deictic demonstrative “cette” and the superordinate term “recette”.

(2) au bout de deux trois années ça ça ça se tasse, quoi, l’investissement, c’est remboursé normalement si ça marche bien (44, 51–52)  
(after two or three years, it it it settles down, you know, the amount you have to invest, usually you get it back if it goes well).

In this example, the three occurrences of ça appear to indicate that the speaker is searching for the correct expression. He lands on se tasser but his diffidence concerning the adequacy of the term in the context is flagged by quoi. The speaker then reformulates or clarifies in the following phrase “l’investissement, c’est remboursé”.

(3) et puis alors les bonnes, quoi, les serveuses, dansaient (47, 401).  
(and then the maids, like so to speak, the waitresses, danced.)

In example (3), the speaker once again flags the inadequacy of the term she has first chosen — les bonnes — using quoi and substitutes the more accurate one, les serveuses.

(4) Et des moments où on ne fait rien, quoi, pas forcément des loisirs mais où je prends le temps de vivre (81, 55–56).  
(And moments when you do nothing, as it were, not necessarily leisure activities but when I take the time to live).

Once again, the speaker is concerned with the adequacy of her expression. Quoi flags the speaker’s uncertainty that her hearer will fully understand and appeals to her hearer’s background knowledge or shared understanding of what “doing nothing” might mean. She then goes on to reformulate or refine that your spare time is not necessarily about leisure activities but about just taking time to relax. In this case, quoi could be glossed ‘as it were’ or ‘if you know what I mean’, as it could also in example (2). In examples (1) and (3), the terms deemed to be inadequate and in need of correction are not vague terms but very precise ones and work in a diametrically opposed way, the relationship millat>recette being hyponym>superordinate, whilst bonnes>serveuses is superordinate>hyponym. Quoi thus serves, in similar ways to enfin, as a means of mediating ongoing corrections and reformulations in a text, reformulations which reflect the non-coincidence between words and things.

To return to Hölker’s (1984) formula, the position of quoi, though always tone-group terminal, is far from being exclusively utterance-terminal, though what follows is always a definition of a term immediately preceding quoi. We should like, therefore, to adjust Hölker’s formula to reflect this, in the following way. X₄ denotes the post-quoi reformulation of X₃.
Each occurrence of tone-group terminal *quoi* was analysed in its context in the corpus, the total number for each speaker was noted, along with the number which accompanied reformulations, contradictions, emphatic or emotional statements (where the role of *quoi* fulfils the function of the *détente nerveuse* noted by Andrews) and those which appeared to express a speaker’s tentativeness. Tentativeness might or might not be accompanied by a reformulation and was subdivided into two types, tentativeness relating to inadequacy of expression or tentativeness related to a potentially over-exaggerated claim. It was possible to define the latter semantico-syntactically through features such as the use of hyperbolic terms such as *superbe, très, très, très* + adjective, superlatives or superlative expressions. Interestingly, Chanet (2001, 74) also comments on the very large numbers of cases where *quoi* accompanies “une opération de quantification ou de graduation d’une échelle” (‘the handling of quantification or terms on a continuum’). She highlights terms on the extremity of the scale giving examples such as “il s’en foutra complètement quoi” (‘he won’t give a damn, if you know what I mean’) and *quoi* in collocation with *un peu* (a little bit) — “bon dans les journaux c’est important que + que tout le monde puisse *un peu* comprendre *quoi*” (‘well, in the newspapers, it’s important that + that everyone should be able to sort of understand a little bit’). Such examples may, in my view, be interpreted as hedges, within a theory of politeness, whereby speakers are constantly downplaying potentially over-assertive statements, to tend to their own and their interlocutor’s face. The “quoi” in “Il s’en foutra complètement quoi” serves as an appeal to the interlocutor to accept this possibly slightly over-exaggerated means of expression and as a means of flagging shared background or linguistic knowledge with the interlocutor, as demonstrated in the (somewhat lengthy) translation equivalent ‘if you know what I mean’. The collocation of ‘un peu’ and ‘quoi’ is unsurprising according to such an interpretation — both serve to flag the diffidence of the speaker regarding the view asserted and the means of its expression. This diffidence derives, in my view, from considerations of politeness and sociability. The speaker does not wish to be perceived as an over-bearing and bombastic pedant. Chanet (2001, 75) interprets such a stance as an appeal to shared knowledge, inviting the interlocutor to share the subjectiveness of the assertion. It seems to me that an interpretation which includes considerations of
politeness and face needs takes Chanet’s view to its logical conclusion and provides a more satisfactory theoretical framework in which such particles may be accounted for. By using “quoi”, speakers protect both their own and their interlocutor’s face.

A miscellaneous category included examples where quoi marks obviousness or an appeal to the background knowledge shared by the speaker and interlocutor.

Each of the categories of quoi-usage is illustrated below.

Reformulations (from one word to whole clauses)

Il y en a certaines mais en général les femmes sont habillées enfin modestement normalement quoi pas euh… (1, 588–189)
(There are some but in general the women are dressed well simply normally so to speak not euh…)

Et puis aussi apprendre aux gens tout ce que tout ce que nous, on découvre ici, permettre la transmission de du savoir populaire, quoi. (32, 69–70)
(And then also to teach people all that all that we, we find out here, to facilitate the transmission of popular culture, so to speak.)

Contradictions

Je suis de nationalité française mais je suis très contente d’être bretonne, je suis fière d’être bretonne quand même, quoi. (77, 211–12)
(I am French by nationality but I’m very happy to be Breton, I’m proud to be Breton all the same, you know).

Emphatic/emotional

et puis chaque région a son climat, chaque région a sa faune, chaque région a son a ses a ses désirs, quoi, …(46, 209–211)
(and then each region has its climate, each region has its fauna, each region has its has its has its aspirations, sort of)

Tentativeness

a) Inadequacy of expression

ménager des moments où on peut se se détendre un peu et faire autre chose, ne pas avoir que des contraintes dans dans sa vie, quoi, hein? (81, 46–47)
(arranging moments when one can re relax a little and do something else, not always just having constraints in in one’s life, as it were, you know?)

b) Over-exaggerated claim

ce sera regrettable parce que [pause] vraiment c’est quand on voit les car-ferries qui passent c’est c’est superbe quoi, on adore ça, nous. [rires] (5, 126–128)
(it will be a shame because [pause] really it’s when you see the ferries going past, it’s it’s fabulous kind of thing, we love it! [laughter])
**Obviousness**

Des hauts et des bas. Dès qu’il fait beau, on loue plus, _quoi_. (31, 24)
(Ups and downs. As soon as the sun shines, we rent more, _of course_.)

**Background Knowledge**

Si bien qu’on a fait un steak-frites _quoi_ pour faire voir à la gamine qu… (16, 746–747)
(To the point that we made steak and chips _you know_ to show the kid that…)

The difficulties in associating a pragmatic function to each occurrence of _quoi_ should not be under-estimated. In many cases, it could be argued that _quoi_ is multi-functional or that there is a global category which includes the sub-categories and which might be glossed ‘as it were’. The example given for contradiction is a case in point. The speaker sets up contradictory terms — French nationality/being Breton — but the function of _quoi_ may be to express tentativeness/inadequacy of expression. It just happens that, in this case, _quoi_ accompanies an already hedged or contradictory and nuanced assertion. The same could be argued for both obviousness and background knowledge (where the speaker is talking about making an effort to make “proper meals” when camping and appeals to the background knowledge or agreement of the interlocutor that _steak-frites_ constitutes such a meal). Similarly, the example given of an over-exaggerated claim, calling the passing of the car-ferry “superbe” might be categorised as a form of “inadequacy of expression” — the speaker is clearly laughing at herself for making such an emotional plea and enjoining her listener to indulge her in this. In all cases, _quoi_ constitutes a type of authorial voice, a mocking of self or self-expression, a distancing between oneself and one’s words, an apology or hedge.

The main findings of the analysis are recapitulated in Table 8.1 (male speakers) and 8.2 (female speakers).

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8.1 Rates of <em>quoi</em>-usage, male speakers</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>% of total M</td>
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<td>% of total M &amp; W</td>
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<th>Table 8.2 Rates of <em>quoi</em>-usage, female speakers</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>% of total W</td>
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<td>% of total M &amp; W</td>
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These tables indicate that male speakers use *quoi* proportionately more than female speakers, with 133 occurrences for the men, compared to 107 occurrences for the women. The ways in which *quoi* is used, however, differ very little. 30% of male usage involved reformulation, versus 35% for the women in the corpus. 92% of male usage of *quoi* involved tentativeness, with 81% mediating inadequacy of expression and 12% over-exaggerated claims. 90% of female usage was, similarly, devoted to tentativeness with 81% mediating inadequacy of expression and 7.5% over-exaggerated claims.

What hypotheses might we put forward to explain the higher rate of usage of *quoi* in male speech? Its function appears primarily to be to flag inadequacy of expression, reflecting a self-consciousness or distancing, a desire to include authorial voice. If we follow up Chambers’ (1995) suggestion that men have lesser powers of expression than women due to differences in brain geography, we could suggest that men require to flag inadequacy proportionately more than women for that reason. On the other hand, we have suggested that a hedged or tentative mode of speech is more polite. We could thus posit that men are more polite than women in down-toning or hedging their expression more frequently with *quoi*. It may be, however, that both men and women have difficulties in articulating their ideas when under the pressure of real-time expression, that both are polite and tentative in their expression but that they have different mechanisms or expressions which they adopt to mediate such exigencies. Older, female speakers use expressions such as *si vous voulez* and *vous voyez/voyez-vous* to a greater extent than younger or male ones. *Si vous voulez* and *vous voyez/voyez-vous* appear to share some of the pragmatic characteristics of *quoi*, in that they signal the speaker’s diffidence concerning the adequacy of the term they have selected and appeal to a listener’s understanding. Variations in particle usage may correlate with educational background and age as well as with sex and it is to this aspect that we now turn our attention.

8.2 The sociolinguistic stratification of *quoi*

The data for *quoi* were divided by the Word Count and multiplied by 10,000 in order to provide proportional rates of usage for sex, educational background and age. Figure 8.1 shows that the proportion of *quoi* usage is greater for men than women, Figure 8.2 that *quoi* usage is much greater for the least educated group, with equality between education groups 2 and 3, whilst Figure 8.3
reveals an interesting cross-patterning with the youngest speakers showing a surprisingly depressed rate of *quoi*-usage, with the middle-aged rate doubling their usage and the older age-group at a slightly lesser level of usage.

**Figure 8.1** Mean usage of *quoi* in men’s and women’s speech

**Figure 8.2** Mean usage of *quoi*, as a function of education
When we look at the rates of usage correlated with age and education with the sexes differentiated, however, a very interesting differential patterning emerges.

Figure 8.3 Mean usage of *quoi* as a function of age

Figure 8.4 Mean *quoi*-usage, as a function of sex and age
Figure 8.4 shows that, although female usage of quoi is at all ages lower than male usage, it follows precisely the same tendencies, with lower usage in Age-group 1, maximal usage in Age-group 2 and a dropping of from this, albeit not so low as Age-group 1, in Age-group 3. We can suggest a number of reasons for such age-stratification of quoi-usage, including the facts that:

a. the interviewer herself fell into Age-group 2 and speakers might thus feel more able to call on her understanding;
b. utterance-terminal quoi is a stigmatised form and, as such, might be avoided by older speakers (as it is, proportionately, by women in all age-groups, possibly for the same reason);
c. utterance-terminal quoi is rising in usage and its higher rate of usage in the middle-aged group is evidence of this;
d. the middle-aged group are less certain of the adequacy of their expression than the older age-group and flag this, using quoi and reformulations (but would we not also expect the youngest group to share such diffidence?).

The data appear to provide substantiation of the findings of researchers studying other languages and societies that women are more aware of the social implications of particular terms. Quoi is a socially stigmatised form and is thus avoided to a greater extent by women. It is avoided by the young in speaking to an older interviewer out of respect — they would tend to use “vous” to mark the difference in status (in other words they adopt Lakoff’s Rule 1 Strategy of Politeness: Formality). An additional factor, which we have noted before, is that utterance-length is greatly reduced in the younger speakers by comparison with the older ones and this might diminish the motivation for quoi-usage and reformulation. It may also be that quoi indicates a kind of articulacy, an ability to ramify one’s discourse, which the young have not yet developed. Kowal et al’s (1975) study indicated that whilst repetitions feature in the speech of young children, parenthetical remarks and subordinate clauses increase with age.

Figure 8.5 charts results which appear at first to be very difficult to interpret. As a stigmatised form, we would expect quoi to follow a similar trajectory to hein with graded usage down from high usage in the least educated group, mid-usage in the middle-educated group and least usage in the most educated. For hein we noted a highly interesting sex-differentiated and age-linked development whereby there appeared to be a rise in Discoursal hein-usage led by women. Not so for quoi. Quoi is used to a virtually equal extent by all groups, with the outstanding exception of the least educated men (there is a slightly higher rate for the least educated women and a slightly lower rate for most
Quoi is used three times as much by the least educated men as by the other groups. It would thus appear that quoi-usage, for those who are conscious of its social significance, has covert prestige, marking a rough-tough male identity. There appear to be competing forces at play in the motivation for the social variation of quoi. On the one hand, like other particles, it plays a role in mediating on-going expression of a spontaneous kind, allowing for reformulations and a flagging of inadequacy of expression or non-coincidence — the strategic usage of quoi. On the other hand, it is a stigmatised form and is thus shunned to a greater extent by women and by all but the least educated groups. These groups find alternative ways of reformulating which avoid quoi-usage. An ANOVA analysis investigating the interrelationship between quoi and sex, age and education, suggests that quoi-usage correlates at a statistically-significant level with education (F=4.122; p.=0.019). In the same ANOVA analysis, the p. values for sex and age are 0.094 and 0.075 respectively.

Women’s consciousness of the social stratification of quoi is further revealed in an investigation of a selected sub-set of 24 speakers, 12 male, 12 female, equally matched for educational background, in the middle-aged group.

Figure 8.6 reveals a similar pattern for quoi-usage as we have seen for the usage of Hyperbolic hein. Whilst the stratification for men in this group appears to follow a stable pattern of gradual reduction from the highest rate of usage amongst the least educated to the smallest rate of usage amongst the most educated, the stratification pattern for women reveals an avoidance of
quoi in the mid-educated women. The consciousness of the social stigma attached to quoi is particularly acute for these women. The least educated women have a rate of usage which is yet greater than that of the men, as do the most educated. Women in the mid-educated band avoid quoi and have the lowest rate of usage of all the groups in the mid-age range. We might, in this case, posit a form of hypercorrection amongst women in the mid-education 21–40 year-old group, a finding which appears to corroborate Labov’s and Trudgill’s findings for phonological features where the data for mid-educated, middle-aged women disrupt what is otherwise a regular social stratification. Labov (1990) suggests that the intersection between sex and social class may provide a motor for linguistic change. The linguistic insecurity of women in this social class grouping, their perception of stigmatised forms and their careful avoidance of them, might thus appear to be not restricted to phonological forms and not to English but to extend to French and to lexical forms.

8.3 Summary and conclusions concerning quoi

The study of tone-group terminal quoi-usage in the present corpus contributes to the body of knowledge on quoi in the following ways:

– it suggests that Hölker’s (1984) formula should be extended to allow for post-quoi reformulations in the following manner:

![Figure 8.6 Quoi-usage in a sub-set of 24 middle-aged speakers, by sex and education](image-url)
\[ \{X_1 + (X_2)\} \]
\[ \{\} + X_3 \text{ “quoi” } + (X_4) \]
\[ \{(X_1) + X_2\} \]

– it demonstrates that an overwhelming majority of occurrences of *quoi*, whether or not reformulations are included, do not, as suggested by previous researchers and current dictionary definitions, “sum up” previous formulations or accompany “statements of the obvious” but serve, rather, to flag a consciousness of inadequacy or vagueness of expression and, indeed, hedge such expressions. To this extent, *quoi* might be deemed to play a major role in mediating politeness, protecting a speaker’s face and deflecting criticism.

– it indicates that *quoi* is socially stratified and is used to the greatest extent by the least educated men and by the middle-aged. In addition, evidence is adduced to corroborate Labov (1990)’s claim that hypercorrection is prevalent in mid-educated women. Such women disrupt regular social stratification in language forms because of a heightened awareness of the class connotations attached to particular forms, not simply phonological variants but also lexico-pragmatico-semantic ones, such as *quoi* and not only for English but for hexagonal French as well.

There are two possible explanations for *quoi*-usage in the least educated men in our corpus of ninety-five speakers. One is their identification with a working-class mode of speech. The other is related to protection of face: if, as, for example, Maltz and Borker (1982) claim, men are required to compete and “cover their backs” in conversation to a greater extent than are women, this might explain a greater reliance on face-saving devices, such as *quoi*. Such a hypothesis would also go some way to explain higher rates of usage in the middle-aged group (notoriously “on the make”) than in the older age-group.

The role of tone-group terminal *quoi* is paradoxical. It is “polite” in hedging expressions and preserving face needs (but it is noticeable that it is frequently self-serving — it protects the speaker’s, not the listener’s face). It is “impolite” in being a socially stigmatised form, equivalent to mild swearing. Its appearance in the speech of the least educated men overall and in the speech of both the men and the women in our sub-sample of middle-aged subjects is doubly motivated: it provides a means of deflecting potentially face-threatening acts injurious to their self-image, and, in maintaining covert prestige, mediating politeness through camaraderie.
Notes

1. *quoi* might find a translation equivalent in an archaic or literary context in Advanced R. P. English terminating “what”, as in: “Jolly fine weather, what!”

2. Expression of the supposition that the hearer understands/accepts what has been uttered, expected/could expect what has been said.

3. This caveat is required, as one of the greatest users of *quoi*, with 47 occurrences, is the subject of Interview 47, an 88 year-old Breton woman. This example is at once a justification of our emerging hypothesis that *quoi*-usage is motivated as much socially as for discourse-shaping requirements and an instantiation of Labov’s and Trudgill’s theories concerning “change from above” and “change from below”. *Quoi* for this woman has not reached a level of consciousness as a stigmatised form, its suppression in other female speakers, and in more educated speakers, might be seen as a “change from above”.
Chapter 9

Conclusion

Our task has been daunting: although a number of recent French studies focus on the spoken language and, in particular, on the syntactic, discourse-marking or intonational characteristics of PPs (Gadet, 1992; Fernandez, 1994; Hansen, 1998; Morel & Danon-Boileau, 1998), none focus specifically on their potential in the creation of a hedged and polite mode of speech and none explore the relationship between their usage and the gender of the speaker. Indeed, sociolinguistic studies which investigate the correlation between sex, age, education and linguistic features in contemporary French are not numerous. Armstrong, Bauvois and Beeching (eds.) (2001) constitutes an exception to this rule, but, as Gadet remarks in the Preface to the work, “la sociolinguistique du français, pour l’essentiel, ce n’est pas de l’intérieur de l’hexagone qu’en vient l’initiative” (“as far as French sociolinguistics is concerned, on the whole, it’s not from inside mainland France that the initiative is being taken.”)

Previous studies have reported contradictory results with respect to the putative gender-asymmetrical usage of pragmatic particles. Brown’s (1976, 1979, 1993, 1998) seminal work on particle use in a Mayan community suggested that, though both men and women have access to the strategies whereby politeness may be operationalised linguistically, women employ particles to a quantitatively greater extent overall.

The present study aimed to investigate, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the functions and distributional frequencies of a selected range of PPs in a corpus of transcribed spontaneous French. While the corpus might be faulted in that it is composed of speech elicited by a non-native female interviewer, it has the advantage of including speakers from a wide range of educational backgrounds and age-groups. This has allowed us to investigate the social-structural features which were not available to, for example, Erman, whose corpus — 12 face-to-face conversations extracted from A Corpus of English (the London-Lund corpus) — features speakers from a relatively homogeneous group from the point of view of social status and education. The present study is, to my knowledge, unique in investigating gender-asymmetrical PP usage in French.
Chapters 1–3 provide an overview of theories of politeness, the (mainly Anglo-Saxon) literature concerning the inter-relationship between language and gender, along with a review of works which describe the formal characteristics of PPs and their functions. We air the problems we have experienced in accessing existing corpora of spoken French and address issues to do with data-collection and the so-called spontaneous interview (see Wolfson, 1997).

In Chapter 4, attention is turned to the detailed qualitative analysis of the ninety-five interviews in the corpus and to a consideration of the extra-linguistic factors which might promote the usage of PPs, either in mediating repair or as part of a strategy of politeness. Here, Lakoff’s (1975) three Rules of Politeness (Formality, Deference and Camaraderie) are pressed into service as a means of characterising a speaker’s assessment of the communication situation and the linguistic behaviour they adopted. The main findings which emerge from the qualitative analysis are as follows:

– situations involving information-transfer with little speaker involvement, speech acts involving instructions and scripted loudspeaker announcements tend not to motivate the use of PPs;
– monitored speech (used by language teachers or in situations perceived to be formal by the speaker) excludes PPs;
– the relationship between the speakers in terms of their social distance and relative power may affect the linguistic forms adopted;
– the number of participants in an exchange changes its dynamic as speakers interact: linguistic variation may arise from the degree to which a group of speakers are familiar with one other or are socially close or distant;
– speakers have in many cases developed an idiolect by which they project a persona or reveal underlying personality traits and this is incarnated in the use of a style of discourse involving the selection of a particular range of linguistic devices including the use of PPs;
– rural speakers, regardless of educational background, appear to adopt more colloquial forms;
– educational background may correlate with strategies of politeness: the least educated appear to avoid hedged or tentative speech styles but polarise into those who adopt a formal style (mainly women) to show respect and those who use colloquial forms (mainly men) to create camaraderie. Mid-educated speakers adopt deferent strategies and generally avoid the most colloquial forms. The most educated adopt a hedged style of speech and use certain (but not the most) colloquial forms and fillers to combine authority with approachability;
Conclusions

– age can create social distance between speakers: the youngest speakers adopt formal modes of politeness in the presence of older speakers whilst using colloquial forms with each other, the middle-aged adopt deferent modes, combined with authoritative information-purveyance, whilst the oldest speakers combine explanatory strategies with politeness, manifesting the highest rates of PP-usage.

– gender appears to be a secondary variable, dependent on educational background and on age. On the whole, however, men appear to err towards the more colloquial end of the spectrum (with the notable exception of those keeping social distance), whilst women err towards the more formal and deferent modes of politeness.

Chapters 5–8 are devoted to detailed studies of the syntactic and pragmatic characteristics and sociolinguistic stratification of *c’est-à-dire (que)*, *enfin*, *hein* and *quoi*, respectively. Whilst in some respects our study confirms the findings of researchers concerning the potential for referential reformulation afforded by PPs, it goes further than they do, both in suggesting that repair-mechanisms feature to a significantly greater extent in men’s speech, and in exploring the interactional qualities of PPs (as opposed to their textual ones — see Erman, 1992) and their importance in maintaining face and mediating politeness. In Chapter 5, it was demonstrated that the vast majority of occurrences of *c’est-à-dire (que)* introduce reformulation and ramification. The most educated speakers use *c’est-à-dire (que)* to a greater extent than the less educated speakers to a statistically significant degree but no gender-asymmetry could be detected in the usage of this particle.

Ten main functions of *enfin* were delineated in Chapter 10, with only six of these featuring in the corpus: *enfin* could be described as expressing ‘finally’, ‘to sum up’, ‘resignation’, (often in the expression “M’enfin”) ‘all things considered’ and ‘hesitation’ in the corpus, though its main use was in introducing a correction. *Enfin* was found to be used, in 70% of cases, to introduce a corrective, most of which (54% of the total) had a hedging quality. Though increased recourse to *enfin* does not correlate with sex, age or education to a statistically significant degree, there is some evidence to suggest that men use it to a greater extent than women to introduce corrections to the referential content of the preceding stretch of speech, whilst women use it to a greater extent than men in its canonical sense of ‘Finally’ to structure discourse. *Enfin*-usage appears thus to provide corroboration for French of Erman’s (1992) finding that women use particles to structure discourse while men use them to add referen-
tial detail or to signal repair work. It seems that, if there is gender-asymmetrical usage of particles in the speech of French men and women, it may be motivated less by considerations of politeness than by psycholinguistic considerations to do with text-processing and repair requirements.

The interpretation, in Chapters 7 and 8, of the uses of *hein* and *quoi* (often considered to be virtually desemanticised) proved one of the thorniest problems of the study. Whilst *hein* may be used as an insistence-marker on instructions or interrogatives, this was rare in our corpus (which distinguishes itself thus from the corpus studied by Léglise, 1999, containing extracts from the Patrouille Maritime, where instructional language was more prevalent). All occurrences of *hein* (apart from those, mentioned above, which serve as insistence markers) seem to function as a “demande d’assentiment” and *hein* could thus be classified as a hedging device. Two main categories emerged, a Hyperbolic and a Discoursal usage. The criteria which distinguish between these two usages are discussed at some length but, as multi-functionality is the unmarked case, allocations of *hein* to one or other sub-group were not without difficulty. Hyperbolic *hein* underscores an emphatic remark whilst the Discoursal usage links two pieces of discourse and serves as a means of gaining feedback from one’s interlocutor that they understand and are following what is being said. Mean usage of *hein* is slightly higher for women than for men and women favour a Discoursal usage, linking two consecutive arguments, whilst men favour a Hyperbolic usage of *hein* as a hedge on an attention-seeking device. This not only resembles the gender asymmetry which Erman (1992) describes for particle usage in British English but also the use of *hein*—accompanied by exaggerated and emphatic intonation patterns—bears similarities to the types of devices which Brown (1998) mentions as being conventionalised linguistic devices for positive politeness, indicating social networks involving multiplex relationships. In contrast to the emphatic (Hyperbolic) stigmatised use of *hein*, there appears to be a growing usage of a socially acceptable “polite” Discoursal *hein* which resembles the High-Rise Terminal spreading through English from New Zealand and Australia—women are in the vanguard of this change in *hein*-usage. As both Hyperbolic and Discoursal *hein* constitute a request for approval they could be said to be markers of negative politeness. *Hein*-usage thus appears to suggest that men simultaneously employ both negative and positive politeness and tend to their own negative face, whilst the women tend towards polite formulations, indicating greater deference, which neglect their own negative face. Such a hypothesis is supported by the fact that *hein* is most used by the least educated.
Quoi-usage, reported in Chapter 8, reveals similar trends. It is used in mediating on-going expression of a spontaneous kind, flagging inadequacy of expression or non-coincidence (see Authier, 1992, 1995) and thus distancing speakers from their linguistic expressions and reformulations. Quoi-usage could not be demonstrated to be gender-asymmetrical to a level of statistical significance though it is socially stratified: the least educated use quoi more than other groupings to a statistically significant degree. The least educated men also appear to use quoi to a far greater extent than the least educated women. Mid-educated women avoid quoi and appear to illustrate Labov’s assertions concerning hypercorrection in this social stratum.

In their referential uses of enfin and Hyperbolic hein, men outdo women in maintaining their negative face whilst, by using enfin in a more canonical manner and hein in a discoursal way to structure text, women outdo men in maintaining their positive face and being attentive to that of others. The stereotypical notions concerning men’s competitiveness (as reflected in the trading of facts, punctuated emphatically by hein) and women’s greater conservatism, connectedness, sensitivity to others and solidarity seem to some extent to find confirmation in the data presented. Tentativeness, however, appears to be a feature of the speech of both men and women, particularly in the middle classes. This finding appears to support those of Preisler (1986) for English.

Brown (1998: 97) remarks that:

sexism in language has been enthusiastically examined and well-documented. But the area that has been most disappointing has been the attempt to show how the ways in which women choose to express themselves reveal truths about their social relationships and their social status in society.

The analysis of the usage of a selected range of PPs in a corpus of spontaneous spoken French appears to indicate that French society is marked to a greater extent by classism than by sexism — statistically significant findings demonstrate that higher rates of usage of c’est-à-dire (que) are correlated with higher levels of education. Rates of usage of hein and quoi, particles which might be said to mediate negative politeness or a deferential attitude, or indeed to implement Lakoff’s Rule 3: Camaraderie, correlate with the least educated.

The analysis provides tentative backing for Brown’s (1998) suggestions concerning explorations of universals in gender-asymmetrical linguistic usage based on universals in the position of women cross-culturally. We have noted that certain deferential terms are used by the less educated and, if women form
part or the whole of such a class of society, such tendencies would be observable. Indeed, such were the findings of O’Barr and Atkins (1980), who suggested that women did not have a monopoly on the kinds of tentative or deferential terms proposed by Lakoff (1975). They renamed Women’s Language Powerless Language, observing that the so-called Women’s Language features were not employed in the courtroom by high-status women, nor by female expert witnesses, but were employed by low-status males. If women universally held low status in society, they might universally adopt Powerless Language forms. Happily, this does not appear to be the case in France if we are to judge from the corpus studied as part of this investigation. The women in our corpus do not appear to exhibit greater tentativeness or to employ more hedged forms of speech. On the other hand, men use more explanatory and referential reformulation than the women (enfin, quoi) and make more use of challenging and provocative (emphatic) remarks (accompanied by hein). Women make greater use of PPs both to enter into a relationship with their interlocutor and to connect consecutive arguments (enfin, hein). Middle-aged and mid-educated women avoid stigmatised forms, showing perhaps greater sensitivity to linguistic norms.

The pragmatic functions performed by PPs in men’s and women’s speech in contemporary France do not appear to contribute to or to reflect social disparity. It might be argued that the gender-asymmetrical usages which have been noted appear rather to reflect biological differences and aptitudes. Men’s greater attention to factual detailing and women’s to linguistic structuring might be explained by reference to the differing ways in which men’s and women’s brains are organised and to the “preferred cognitive strategies” proposed by Witelson (1985a). There may be some link with findings concerning aphasia and dyslexia where an overwhelming preponderance of cases are male (Garai & Scheinfeld, 1968; Miles et al, 1998). Verbal tests employed to test sex differences in the field of cognitive psychology have thus far demonstrated higher scores for girls and women than for boys and men in such areas as reading, articulation, verbosity, fluency, spelling, grammar, vocabulary and age of first speech and verbal memory (see Burstein, Bank & Jarvik, 1980: 290–291; Kimura, 1999: 91–101; 147). Such tests, however, as Kimura (1999, 92) points out, provide no evidence that women have greater ease in producing coherent sentences, nor that they structure speech more explicitly than men at a supra-sentential level. The types of tests employed by psychologists to measure fluency generally include tasks in which subjects have to produce words or sentences with particular constraints on them within a limited time period.
Conclusions

The present study provides some evidence that women are also more fluent at a supra-sentential level. A theory put forward by Kimura (1999: 100) to explain women’s consistently higher scores on verbal memory relating to evolutionary biology is that “activities like cooking, sewing, basket making, and so forth, may require more ordering of movements into a pre-set sequence than do activities like throwing or tracking of game. Being able to verbalise the order in which household tasks must be done might have been adaptive.” Despite the attractions of this theory as an explanation for women’s greater skill in structuring discourse, it remains highly speculative and it seems unlikely that natural selection would operate in such a way. Cosmides and Tooby (1992) suggest future avenues of research into the relationship between evolution and cognitive strategies but, at the present state of knowledge, it is not possible to relate gender-asymmetrical cognitive strategies to evolutionary factors. Fruitful research avenues, too, for (psycho)linguists working on language and gender, may well lie in the area highlighted by Erman (1992) for British English and demonstrated in this study for hexagonal French, namely that women appear to use pragmatic expressions to a greater extent to connect propositions whilst men use them as attention-seeking devices or to implement repair. The link between such linguistic strategies and cognitive variations between the sexes remains the preserve of the cognitive psychologist.

Five main views of politeness were reviewed in Chapter 1–the ‘social norm’ view, the ‘conversational-maxim’ view, the ‘face-saving’ view, the ‘conversational-contract’ view and Eelen’s ‘modus operandi’ view. The ‘conversational-maxim’ view includes Lakoff’s three Rules of Politeness: Rule 1–Formality; Rule 2–Deference; Rule 3–Camaraderie. All of these views have informed our study and it could be argued that they are mutually supportive, though not in any easily categorisable fashion. Speakers maintain face and act out a ‘line’ in different ways, some adhering more closely to the social norm (Rule 1), some apparently flouting the social norm in order to create camaraderie (Rule 3), by suggesting that both speakers form part of an ‘out-group’. Note here, the conflation of ‘social norms’ or everyday notions of politeness with mnore scientific descriptions. Eelen (2001: 50) talks of Lakoff’s ‘gigantic epistemological leap’ in assuming that the rules derived by a scientist as a means of understanding data are assumed to reside in the heads of speakers as prior rules in producing those data. Indeed Lakoff, 1990: 24 remarks that “the rules they [linguists] try to capture are […] those all fluent speakers of a language use without conscious reflection: rules that are ingrained in the mind, learned effortlessly in infancy.”
The deliberate flouting of the social norm is a consideration which is particularly relevant in the distributional frequency of pragmatic particles, such as the corrective (I mean) usage of enfin and the use of hein and quoi. Unlike c’est-à-dire, these are somewhat stigmatised or colloquial forms, which are avoided in formal contexts but which abound in everyday conversation. It may also be the case that the ‘social norm’ is changing and such forms are gaining wider acceptance. Politeness1 is eclipsed by the over-riding pressures to implement politeness2 in a society edging gradually from modes of politeness based on Distance and Deference to one based on Camaraderie.

The ‘face-saving’ view has formed the sub-stratum on which the analysis of the corpus has been built and has informed our interpretation of the politeness or impoliteness of particular speech acts in specific contexts. Paradoxically, this fundamentally anthropological approach is both universal and individual and yet does not provide a framework which is of practical use in charting linguistic manifestations at a societal level, such as to reflect social stratification. Indeed, for the detailed correlations between social actors and linguistic forms, recourse has been taken to both Lakoff’s Rules of Politeness and the classic variationist methods of Labov. With their tripartite divisions, these methods make it possible to make generalisations, albeit of a fairly gross sort, about conventionalised usages of PPs in French society. They create poles around which linguistic terms can cluster. Updating Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory with insights from Kerbrat-Orecchioni, we defined a non-hedged delivery of a declarative assertion as being a FEA with reference to a speaker’s negative face. When a speaker in a role of authority adopts such a strategy, however, we cannot say that it is an act of ‘positive impoliteness’: such a strategy responds to societal expectations. Lakoff’s Rules help us to systematise the contexts and conventions according to which it is polite or impolite to make bald statements or to hedge such statements, in a more satisfactorily transparent and socially relevant way than by reference to Brown and Levinson’s P, D, I and R categories. Brown and Levinson’s Imposition and Rating of an Imposition have particular salience in the analysis of speech acts such as requests which involve a FTA but are less visibly relevant to the hedges applied to speech acts, such as declarative statements or the expression of an opinion. Although there are degrees of riskiness in assertions and some are (perceived as) more contentious than others (see some of M. L.’s assertions about immigration and the benefits to be accrued from capital punishment), speakers who hedge do so apparently regardless of any external or objective measure of the contentiousness of their opinions, purely as a means of main-
taining politeness. The presence or absence of politeness markers seems thus to be less dependent on R than on the type of convention which Lakoff’s Rules attempt to capture. Social hierarchies are embedded in and reproduced through the playing out of such rules. Brown and Levinson’s categories of Power and Distance can be related to the classic variationist categories of educational level (social class) and age — and conceivably also to gender, though this is far from being demonstrated in our data. We have seen that speakers can project a particular persona when acting in a particular role or perceive themselves as doing so. We are reminded of Houdebine’s words (1983: 130) concerning a speaker’s “conscious or unconscious search for identity… a process of identification”. Finally, politeness in the context of hedging, may perhaps be more satisfactorily accounted for using Kerbrat-Orecchioni’s notion of a face-enhancing act. Hedges enhance the positive face of both the addressee and the addressee and seem to confirm Sell’s (1992) suggestion that there are limitations in a theory of politeness which restricts itself exclusively to the management of FTAs.

As *enfin* (=I mean), *hein* and *quoi* are almost exclusively ‘oral’ and considered negatively as ‘tics’ or ‘fillers’, they are stigmatised by ‘social norm (politeness1) standards, i.e. impolite in formal contexts. In informal contexts, however, they mediate politeness by oiling the wheels of social intercourse. Lakoff’s categories of Formality, Deference and Camaraderie thus embrace both social norms and theories of politeness to do with FEAs. The fact that Camaraderie is often associated with less educated modes of speech provides the link with Labov’s variationist paradigm and to social stratification. Social hierarchies are embedded and reproduced through the playing out of such rules, the social/cultural being the result of human interaction rather than vice versa.

Eelen’s (2001: 240) arguments for an approach to politeness in which the ‘social and the individual are more in balance’ are persuasive: the advantages of a theory which englobes both commonsense notions of politeness with scientific ones lie as he remarks (2001: 240):

in its larger explanatory scope, where politeness and impoliteness are captured by the same concepts; the empowerment of the hearer and of individuals in general; a full(er) coverage of empirical data, since statistically marginal and contradictory data are also covered; a more adequate account of social change and evolution, which become internal productive processes rather than external destructive factors; a richer psychological and social picture, in which the individual and the social are (re)united; and a richer view on politeness itself, as more of its social and argumentative functional potential is revealed.
The following might be cited as limitations of the study:

– the corpus is small — only seventeen hours — our conclusions could usefully be tested in the context of larger corpora of spoken hexagonal French as they are developed and made accessible;
– the corpus is composed of interviews, albeit of a “spontaneous” type — it would be of interest to compare our conclusions with those derived from a corpus of conversations between intimates;
– the interviewer was female and Anglophone — comparisons with speech elicited by male and native-speaking interviewers would eliminate these elements as factors in the variation of PP usage;
– our study focused only on a limited range of PPs and not on all the ways in which speakers might render their speech more tentative.

The study opens avenues of research in these areas:

– Our study suggests that PPs play a role in the mediation of politeness. Whilst the syntactic characteristics and textual functions of such items have been the focus of a number of research studies, ours is the first to investigate their interactional characteristics. A similar approach might be adopted in the study of the semantico-pragmatic properties of other PPs, such as bon, bon ben, ben, quand même, si vous voulez and vous voyez;
– It is suggested that, contrary to traditional notions derived from comparisons with the norms of the written language, spontaneous spoken French is structured along rule-governed lines. Repair-mechanisms and reformulations are an integral part of such a structure. A notation system, based on those adopted by computer programmers, may be helpful in attempting to capture the complexities of such rule-governed systems;
– The study suggests that men employ repair strategies to a greater extent than women — this was not the main focus of the study and it would be of interest to investigate this area by looking at the entire gamut of repair strategies available and not just those mediated through the use of the small range of PPs selected for study here;
– The male speakers in our corpus appear to “do politeness” above all by supplying factual material — there was a strong suggestion that men employed PPs referentially to a greater extent than women. It would be of interest to see whether such a tendency extends to other linguistic features as well;
– Some female speakers in our corpus — particularly those in the lower
middle classes — appeared to use expressions of epistemic modality to a
greater extent than the male speakers. A detailed study of expressions of
epistemic modality in spoken French might begin to test the universality of
the findings, for English, of Coates (1987, 1998).

– Our study of Discoursal *hein* provides some confirmation, for French, of
Labov’s suggestion that women are in the vanguard of linguistic change and
that there is over-indulgence in the incoming forms which come “from
above” amongst mid-educated women. It would be of interest to further test
Labov’s theory with other incoming forms in French (particularly as they
appear to be confirmed in the phonological studies of Armstrong and of
Pooley in Armstrong, Bauvois and Beeching, 2001).

In summary, if it is true, as Bourdieu (1977b: 33) claims, that “la politesse
enferme une politique, une reconnaissance pratique et immédiate des classe-
ments sociaux et des hiérarchies, entre les sexes, les générations, les classes”
(“politeness contains a politic, a practical and immediate recognition of social
classes and hierarchies, between sexes, generations, classes”), the relationship
between expressions of tentativeness and such hierarchies, as revealed in the
usage of PPs in our corpus, is a complex one. Although Lakoff’s (1975)
assertions concerning the non-tentative nature of men’s speech (by compari-
on with women’s) do not appear to be confirmed by our data, her classifica-
tion of modes of politeness according to three rules — Rule 1: Formality; Rule
2: Deference; Rule 3: Camaraderie — along with Labov’s variationist approach,
merit further investigation as a means of correlating politeness with social
hierarchies in French. In our study, such hierarchies have been shown to exist
both in the qualitative analysis and, in the quantitative analysis, to a statistically
significant extent, in relation to educational levels and age.
Appendix

List of French spoken corpora

   300 hours of speech were collected. According to Bergounioux (1996) these had not been systematically transcribed, though the recordings may be consulted on application to the CORAL (Centre Orléanais de Recherches en Acoustique et Linguistique) at the University of Orléans. They now make up part of the LANCOM corpus.

2. The ELICOP project. For more information on the projet ELICOP (Etude Linguistique de la Communication Parlée), based on the LANCOM and ELILAP corpora, contact Veerle.Brosens@arts.kuleuven.ac.be. or http://bach.arts.kuleuven.ac.be/lancom/
   The LANCOM and ELILAP corpora — the LANCOM corpus contains transcriptions of 500 hours of spoken French, comprising the Orléans corpus (1968–1971) (315 hours); the Livre parlé de Tours (1974) (120 hours); and Voix d’Auvergne (1976) (52 hours).
   The ELILAP corpus (from 1993) contains a total of 26 hours 26 mins with transcriptions of 8 hours of role-plays conducted with native speakers of French and Dutch learners of French.

3. The GARS (Groupe Aixois de Recherches en Syntaxe) Corpus 1975-
   The GARS enterprise is an on-going one, research students recording and transcribing passages of spontaneous spoken French according to GARS conventions and adding it to the growing stock of this “open” corpus. It contains spoken language of a variety of types, interviews, conversations, narratives about speaker’s lives or accidents, explanations about jobs, polemical pieces, public oration, relations between children and adults, technical explanations and political situations as well as radio and television broadcasts. The GARS distinguish between two sorts of corpora — short (10–15 minutes) and long (60–80 minutes, sometimes even 5 hours). All corpora are accompanied by sociolinguistic information, where this has been possible to obtain, dates and
places of birth, schooling and type of activity, as well as the circumstances surrounding the recording. Blanche-Benveniste (1996) does not provide a Web-site address where one might access the Corpus, though researchers have been permitted to consult it on-site at the Université de Provence.

4. VALIBEL (Variétés Linguistiques du français en Belgique) – 360 hours of transcribed spoken text, divided into 22 corpora, 8 300 pages of orthographically transcribed text (no phonological information but tapes available for consultation). This corpus is also an “open” corpus and is coupled with detailed information concerning the background of the speakers and the situation in which the recordings took place.

Contact: francard@frwa.ucl.ac.be

5. The Ottawa-Hull Corpus
270 hours of spontaneous French as spoken in Ottawa-Hull, 3.5 million words, transcribed and computerized, may be consulted at the Laboratoire de socio-linguistique de l’Université d’Ottawa on application to Shana Poplack, spoplack@aix1.uottawa.ca. (See also Poplack, 1989).

6. The Boudreau-Dubois Corpus and the Péronnet Corpus of Accadian French.
75 20-minute interviews with adolescents aged 17–18 years (1989–1994). 30 hours of recording in all, transcribed and may be consulted at the Centre de recherches en linguistique appliquée at the Université de Moncton.

The Péronnet corpus (1985–1989) combines three sub-corpora with 12, 8 and 6 hours of recordings, transcribed and available in Word perfect 5.1.

peronnl@rigel.ci.umoncton.ca

7. The Hansard Corpus contains six years of Canadian Parliamentary sessions, in English/French bilingual aligned format and is available from the ACL/DCI.

8. Corpus of spoken French, mainly Canadian but including some hexagonal French also: http://french.chass.utoronto.ca/fr-parle/

Black African French
1. The IFA (Inventaire des particularités lexicales du français en Afrique noire). This database of black African French was established on the basis of surveys of both written and spoken language in 12 countries of black Africa. Work started in 1983.
Contact: Suzanne Lafage, Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle-Paris III, Centre Censier, 13 rue de Seneuil, 75231 Paris Tel 33 01 45 87 41 37.

*Creole corpora*
Though often the property of a single researcher, a number of corpora have been established for creoles, both spoken and written, in Haiti, Antilles, Guadeloupe, Guyana, Reunion, Mauritius, Seychelles, Maritinique, the Indian Ocean and Louisiana.

*Corpora of learner language*
1. The European Science Foundation’s Second Language Database. Of particular interest for researchers of learners of English, the database has been converted to CHAT format and hence analyzable using the CHILDES program. There is data for L2 learners of French, German and Swedish. Contacts: starren@mpi.nl, Clive Perdue, Université Paris VIII.

2. InterFra
Interlanguage of Swedish learners of French — 320 000 words which have been grammatically coded. Contact: Inge.Bartning@rom.su.se
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